Contrary to the guesses and assumptions of the German High Command, the Russians struck their first blow on the Karelian Isthmus. Their next blow fell on Army Group Center. The first signs of the deployment of enemy forces in front of the army group front appeared as early as early June, but the Supreme High Command, firmly convinced that the Russians would deliver the decisive blow in the South, attached almost no importance to this. Therefore, very few forces were allocated to Army Group Center. Almost all tank formations were located on the southern sector of the front, which was considered the most threatened. On the front of Army Group Center, the divisions were not fully equipped and defended strips up to 30 km wide on average each. In addition, they often occupied positions that were very unfavorable for defense, since Hitler forbade even partially withdrawing troops back. He also imposed a ban on the use of "elastic defense", thanks to which the Germans could, at the beginning of the Russian offensive, withdraw their divisions from the blow and thereby reduce losses in people and in territory.

Simultaneously with the sharp intensification of the activities of the partisans, who disabled almost all rear communications of the army group, on June 21, the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts (on June 23 they were joined by the troops of the 1st Baltic Front) launched a general offensive in the directions to Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha and Vitebsk, that is, where strong defensive battles were fought before. The offensive was preceded by an extremely powerful artillery and aviation preparation. Large Russian tank formations stood ready to move forward immediately as soon as the infantry managed to break through the German defenses.

On the Bobruisk and Vitebsk directions, the Russians began to carry out a wide enveloping maneuver. The remaining blows they sent against Orsha and Mogilev. Already in the first days of the fighting, the advancing Russian troops broke through the German defenses in the Bobruisk and Vitebsk directions, deeply wedged into their location and created a threat of encirclement not only to the key strongholds, but also to all the forces of the army group located on the ledge of the front east of the Bobruisk-Vitebsk railway.

The main forces of the 9th Army were surrounded in the Bobruisk area; however, after heavy fighting that lasted several weeks, in early July, one German tank grouping, thrown to liberate the encircled troops, managed for a short time to break the encirclement, slowly moving to the west, and withdraw from it about 20 thousand people who had lost all their heavy weapons and equipment.

Large forces of the 3rd Panzer Army, on the orders of the Headquarters, remained in Bobruisk, which they were supposed to defend as a "fortress". When these troops were finally given permission to break through, their forces were no longer enough to break the encirclement. Almost the entire 53rd Corps, which included up to 4 divisions, was captured.

In the interval between Bobruisk and Vitebsk, the 4th Army fought fierce battles, defending Mogilev and Orsha. But she couldn't keep them. With heavy losses, the army was thrown back to Borisov.

At this time, a new danger arose at the junction of Army Groups Center and North. The Russians managed to penetrate deeply the German defenses in the area south of Polotsk, as a result of which a threat was created to the right wing of Army Group North.

Within a few days, the Russians, having created a huge superiority in manpower and equipment, defeated the Army Group Center. The remnants of the army group barely managed to somewhat slow down the advance of the enemy. Building on the success achieved, the Russians soon approached the capital of Belarus, Minsk, the largest junction of highways and railways in the area.

Hitler placed the blame for the defeat of Army Group Center on its commander, Field Marshal Bush, and appointed Field Marshal Model, who simultaneously remained commander of Army Group Northern Ukraine, in his place. This situation gave the Model the opportunity to take forces from the composition, however, of the very modest reserves of this army group.

Having surrounded almost all the remnants of the 4th Army in the area east of Minsk and forcing them to capitulate, the Russians captured Minsk on July 4. The command of the Army Group "Center" in a written report indicated that on the 350-kilometer front of the breakthrough it was opposed by 126 rifle divisions, 17 motorized brigades, 6 cavalry divisions and 45 tank brigades of the enemy, while the army group had in its forces, numbering about 8 divisions.

Defeat of Army Group Center

On July 9, the enemy approached Vilnius. After many days of resistance from the bravely fighting German troops, the Russians took the city by storm. During the fighting in the Vilnius region, Army Group North, whose right wing was increasingly stretched, and meanwhile the troops of the left wing of Army Group Center failed to connect with it, found itself in a very critical situation, which became especially aggravated after large forces Russians went on the offensive from the Polotsk region in the direction of Daugavpils.

However, Hitler, based on political and military-economic considerations, decisively rejected the proposal to withdraw Army Group North to the Western Dvina-Riga line, which was vigorously supported by Field Marshal Model and the implementation of which would give the command the only opportunity to free up significant reserves to strengthen the group armies "Center". Hitler's main motives for this were probably the desire to influence Finland and the desire to continue importing iron and nickel from Scandinavia. A few days later, there was a serious danger that Army Group North would be cut off from East Prussia and surrounded. Only the withdrawal of Army Group North to the border of East Prussia could bring really tangible relief to the entire front.

In mid-July, the enemy, now resisted only by a few tank divisions carrying out mobile defense, reached the line of Volkovysk, Grodno, Alytus, Ukmerge, Daugavpils. Here the Russian offensive was temporarily stopped by the reserves that had come up here. During the fighting, which lasted almost 4 weeks, the Russians captured such a huge territory, the area of ​​\u200b\u200bwhich is approximately equal to the area of ​​England. 38 German divisions were destroyed. The German Eastern Army, despite the stubborn resistance of its troops, suffered a major defeat, the culprit of which was entirely Hitler, who remained deaf to every reasonable and appropriate proposal. The defeat of Army Group Center put an end to the organized resistance of the Germans in the East.

The goals and objectives of the war against the USSR were formulated by Hitler on July 31, 1940 at a meeting in the Berghof: “We will not attack England, but we will break those illusions that give England the will to resist. Then we can hope for a change in her position. […] Submarine and air warfare may decide the outcome of the war, but it will last a year or two. England's hope is Russia and America. If hopes for Russia collapse, America will also fall away from England, since the defeat of Russia will result in an incredible strengthening of Japan in East Asia". Thus, the German leadership was looking for a way out of the strategic impasse in the crushing of the USSR. Germany did not have the opportunity to decide the fate of the war by invading the British Isles. Hitler saw an indirect effect in the destruction of England's hopes for victory over Germany, even in the long term. At the same time, the crushing of the last potential enemy on the continent allowed the Germans to redirect the military industry to the production of weapons for the navy and aviation.

The same words were repeated by the Fuhrer at a meeting at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht on January 9, 1941. He said the following: “The only support for the British is the possibility of a Russian entry into the war. If this hope were destroyed, they would stop the war. He [Hitler] does not believe that the British are "completely insane"; if they saw no other possibility of winning the war, they would stop it. After all, if they lose it, they will never again have the moral strength to keep their empire from falling apart. But if they hold out, if they manage to form 40 or 50 divisions, and if they are helped by the United States and Russia, a very difficult situation will arise for Germany. This shouldn't happen. Until now, he [the Fuhrer] has acted on the principle that in order to take a step further, you must first defeat the enemy positions. That is why it is necessary to smash Russia. Then the British would either surrender or Germany would continue the war against Great Britain under favorable conditions. The defeat of Russia would allow the Japanese to turn with all their forces on the United States, and this would keep the United States from entering the war. The defeat of the Soviet Union would mean a great relief for Germany [in the war against England]. Then only 40-50 divisions could be left in the East, the ground forces could be reduced, and the entire military industry could be used for the needs of the Luftwaffe and the Navy. Approximately in the same spirit, Hitler spoke in a conversation with the commander of Army Group Center von Bock on February 2, 1941. The latter wrote down the words of the Fuhrer in his diary in the following wording: “The gentlemen in power in England are far from stupid and cannot but understand that an attempt to prolong the war would lose all meaning for them as soon as Russia was defeated. That is, we have before us not a statement taken out of context, but a meaningful idea, constantly voiced at management meetings.

After the political leadership of the Third Reich made a political decision in the summer of 1940 to attack the USSR, the military leadership of the German armed forces began to develop military plans for the defeat of the Soviet Armed Forces.

After several preliminary developments in September 1940, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Franz Halder, entrusted the development of a plan for a war against the USSR to another prominent commander of the Third Reich, Major General Friedrich Paulus. The latter had just been appointed First Quartermaster of the General Staff. It was his developments that ultimately formed the basis of the Barbarossa plan. The first considerations were reported to Halder on September 17, then, under the leadership of F. Paulus, a series of card games were held to clarify the details. The plan was named "Otto". The main blow was supposed to be delivered north of the Pripyat marshes, due to favorable road conditions and the possibility of a direct attack on Moscow and the Baltic states. By the eighth day of the operation, it was supposed to reach the areas between the Dniester and the Bug, Mogilev-Podolsky, Lvov, Baranovichi and Kaunas. On the twentieth day of the war, “after heavy border battles in Western Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states, the German army will succeed in capturing territory and reaching the line: the Dnieper to the area south of Kiev, Mozyr, Rogachev, Orsha, Vitebsk, Velikiye Luki, south of Pskov, south of Pyarnu and thus reach the line, which can become the starting point for an offensive in the direction of Moscow. Not later than the 40th day of the war, it was planned to carry out an operation against Moscow, covering Soviet troops west of Bryansk and Vyazma (ibid.). The command of the ground forces believed that in the battle near Moscow the last reserves of the Red Army, which the Soviet command would put up for the defense of the capital, would be defeated, and the war would end before the onset of autumn.

Despite the fact that the development of F. Paulus was not completed (part of the headquarters games were planned to be held in mid-December 1940), the plan was reported on December 5, 1940 by Halder to Hitler. To solve the problem of crushing the Soviet Union, Halder appoints in his report 102 infantry, 32 tank and motorized divisions, of which large forces (two armies) will initially follow in the second echelon. A significant mistake of Halder was the assumption that most of the Soviet troops would be concentrated north of the Pripyat marshes. However, both the previous Greifenberg study and the Sonderstern study of December 7, 1941 quite rightly believed that the bulk of Soviet troops were stationed in Ukraine. Sonderstern wrote: "If at all one can speak of the concentration of the main forces of the Russians with their current grouping, then it is located in the Kiev Special Military District." But on the same evening, December 5, 1940, the chief of staff of the operational leadership, Jodl, invited Warlimont to his place and instructed him, on the basis of the considerations of the headquarters of the ground forces, to develop a draft directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on waging war against the USSR. The project was reported to Jodl on December 16, and on December 17 the folder with the plan of F. Paulus lay on the table of A. Hitler. They made the latest changes to the plan. Warlimont described them as follows: “If the OKH [High Command of the Ground Forces] considered the direction of the main attack on Moscow to be the criterion for the success of the entire campaign, since the main enemy forces deployed in this direction would be defeated here, then Hitler demanded that the central army group after the destruction of the Soviet troops in Belarus, it would first turn part of its strong mobile groupings to the north, meaning, in cooperation with the northern grouping, destroy the enemy troops fighting in the Baltic states, and then, after capturing Leningrad and Kronstadt, would advance on Moscow.

Finally, on December 21, the directive was approved. Hitler gave her the name "Barbarossa". The general plan of the operation was formulated as follows: “The main forces of the Russian ground forces located in Western Russia must be destroyed in bold operations by deep, rapid advancement of tank wedges. The retreat of combat-ready enemy troops to the wide expanses of Russian territory must be prevented. According to the tasks, the form of the operation was also built: both in the zone of Army Group South and in the zone of Army Group Center, it had the Cannes type, which was characteristic of German military planning, with deep coverage of the flanks.

The overall task was detailed for the German troops in the Moscow direction as follows:

“The theater of operations is divided by the Pripyat swamps into northern and southern parts. The direction of the main attack should be prepared north of the Pripyat swamps. Two groups of armies should be concentrated here. The southern of these groups, which is the center of the common front, has the task of advancing with especially strong tank and motorized formations from the Warsaw area and to the north of it and crushing the enemy forces in Belarus.

After the defeat of the Soviet troops in Belarus, it was supposed to strike in a northerly direction with the forces of the central group:

“Thus, prerequisites will be created for turning powerful units of mobile troops to the north, so that, in cooperation with the northern army group advancing from East Prussia in the general direction to Leningrad, destroy enemy forces operating in the Baltic. Only after completing this urgent task, which should be followed by the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, should the operation be started to take Moscow, an important center of communications and military industry.

The capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt meant both the safety of shipping across the Baltic and the release of forces to attack Moscow. Just in case, it should be noted that the turn to the south to the rear of the Soviet troops in Ukraine in Directive No. 21 was not even considered as one of the possible options.

Directive No. 21 ended with the words: “I expect oral reports from the gentlemen of the commanders-in-chief about their further intentions based on this directive. About the planned preparatory activities all branches of the armed forces and the progress of their implementation to report to me through the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW)”, that is, the commanders of the army groups formulated their tasks in a general way and invited them to develop their detailed proposals for conducting operations. During January 1941, a series of card games were held and ideas were formulated on which the actions of the German troops in each of the operational directions were to be based. The result of all this work was summed up at a meeting held in Berlin on January 31, 1941. At this meeting, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch informed the commanders of the army groups that the German plan was based on the assumption that the Red Army would fight west of the line of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper.

Regarding the latter remark, von Bock noted skeptically in his diary: "When I asked Halder if he had accurate information that the Russians would hold the territory in front of the mentioned rivers, he thought for a while and said:" This may well be. Thus, German planning from the very beginning proceeded from a certain assumption based on general reasoning. The actions of the enemy, i.e., the Red Army, could differ from those assumed by the German high command. Moreover, this could be due to both objective reasons and subjective ones.

As a result of the meeting, a document appeared entitled “Directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops (Operation Barbarossa)”, dated January 31, 1941. In it, the general task of Army Group Center was formulated as follows:

“North of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group Center is advancing under the command of Field Marshal von Bock. Having introduced powerful tank formations into battle, she makes a breakthrough from the Warsaw and Suwalki area in the direction of Smolensk; then turns the tank troops to the north and destroys, together with the Army Group North, advancing from East Prussia in the general direction to Leningrad, the Soviet troops stationed in the Baltic.

Also, the upcoming operation acquired clearer contours with the distribution of tasks between the formations allocated to each of the army groups. The task of the army group in the central sector was as follows:

"b) Army Group "Center", concentrating its main forces on the flanks, splits the enemy forces in Belarus. Mobile formations advancing south and north of Minsk are connected in a timely manner in the Smolensk region and thus create the prerequisites for the interaction of large forces of mobile troops with the troops of Army Group North in order to destroy enemy forces located in the Baltic states and in the Leningrad region.

As part of this task, on the instructions of the command of Army Group Center, tank groups and armies perform the following tasks.

The 2nd Panzer Group, interacting with the 4th Army, breaks through the enemy border fortifications in the area of ​​Kobrin and to the north and, quickly advancing to Slutsk and Minsk, in cooperation with the 3rd Panzer Group, advancing in the area north of Minsk, creates the prerequisites for the destruction enemy troops located between Bialystok and Minsk. Its further task: in close cooperation with the 3rd Panzer Group, as soon as possible, capture the area in the Smolensk region and to the south of it, prevent the concentration of enemy forces in the upper reaches of the Dnieper, thereby maintaining the Center Army Group freedom of action to perform subsequent tasks.

The 3rd Panzer Group, in cooperation with the 9th Army, breaks through enemy border fortifications north of Grodno, rapidly advances to the area north of Minsk, and, in cooperation with the 2nd Panzer Group, advancing from the southwest on Minsk, creates the prerequisites for the destruction of enemy forces located between Bialystok and Minsk. The subsequent task of the 3rd Panzer Group: in close cooperation with the 2nd Panzer Group, to reach the Vitebsk region and to the north at an accelerated pace, to prevent the concentration of enemy forces in the area of ​​​​the upper reaches of the Dvina, thereby ensuring the army group freedom of action in carrying out subsequent tasks.

4th Army, inflicting main blow on both sides of Brest-Litovsk, crosses the river. Bug and thus opens the way to Minsk for the 2nd Panzer Group. The main forces are developing an offensive through the river. Shchara at Slonim and to the south, using the success of the tank groups, in cooperation with the 9th Army, destroys the enemy troops located between Bialystok and Minsk. In the future, this army follows the 2nd Panzer Group, covering its left flank from the Pripyat swamps, seizing the crossing across the river. Berezina between Bobruisk and Borisov and crosses the river. Dnieper at Mogilev and to the north.

The 9th Army, in cooperation with the 3rd Panzer Group, inflicts the main blow with the northern wing on the enemy grouping located west and north of Grodno, using the success of the tank groups, it is rapidly advancing in the direction of Lida, Vilnius and, together with the 4th Army, destroys enemy forces, located between Bialystok and Minsk. In the future, following the 3rd Panzer Group, it goes to the river. Western Dvina near Polotsk and southeast of it.

As we can see, the refrain in the list of tasks of Army Group Center is the words “destroy enemy troops”, “destroy enemy forces”. The object of the actions of the German troops was to be the Red Army. It was the destruction of it in a series of successive operations, as the German command believed, that would ensure the subsequent solution of political and economic problems.

The main instrument designed to achieve the goals set by the Barbarossa plan was to be tank groups. At that time, they, of course, were the pinnacle of the development of the organization of tank troops. Tanks became one of the main characters on the battlefield of World War II. However, the nature of their use in comparison with 1916-1918. has changed significantly. Tank attacks, typical for that period, together with infantry, remained, but they were only one of the ways in which armored vehicles were used. A big step forward was the creation of independent mechanized formations - tank and motorized divisions. The Germans for a long time were ahead of their opponents in the creation and use of this means of struggle. According to the "Directives for driving a tank division" in 1940, it was stated: "An armored division operates, as a rule, as part of an armored corps." The German tank, or rather motorized, corps of the June 1941 model consisted of one or two tank and two or one motorized divisions. Sometimes infantry divisions were attached to it. Tank groups in the form in which they existed at the beginning of the war with the USSR were an intermediate instance between the motorized corps and the army. The tank group included two or three motorized corps, sometimes infantry army corps were attached to it. The intermediate position between the corps and the army made it possible to subordinate tank groups to field armies, although tank commanders treated it without enthusiasm. Often the army groups took control of the tank group. The next step was the tank armies in the fall of 1941, but that's a completely different story.

With the strength of the tank group from 130 to 200 thousand people and the complete mechanization and motorization of its main formations, it could be used for breakthroughs to great depths. Such a mass of people and equipment had sufficient independence to operate in isolation from the main forces of the army group. The command even had to pull the commanders of tank groups. Thus, even at the planning stage of the campaign, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, Hermann Goth, caused von Bock's displeasure. On March 18, 1941, von Bock writes in his diary:

“Connecting to the first phase of the offensive of the 3rd Panzer Group presents certain difficulties. Goth gets ahead of himself, initially fixing his eyes on the positions of the Russians beyond the Dvina and the Dnieper, and pays little attention to the battles that can unfold on the outskirts of these water lines. The army command, however, believes that the first task of the armored groups is to assist the field troops in defeating the Russian armies stationed on the border. And although I agree with Goth in many respects, I will have to slow down his agility. But he won't give up his position without a fight. For this reason, I sent Treskov to Berlin so that he could find out there how firm the army command was in their intentions.

Indeed, von Bock was very skeptical about the assumption of the Wehrmacht High Command about the readiness of the Red Army to fight west of the Dnieper and the Western Dvina. At the same time, he was aware that the reduction of large mechanized formations into a tank group did not mean its separation from the tasks of field armies. The German military leadership preferred to keep tanks mainly in independent formations. But it was only a tool for solving problems by field armies. Therefore, quite often tank groups were subordinate to one or another army command, and only sometimes - directly to the army group.

But the very presence of such a powerful formation in the hands of the commander of a tank group awakened ambitions and forced him to look far ahead. Goth was no exception. The former commander of the 1st Panzer Group, Ewald von Kleist, already in Soviet captivity, described the properties of this association with a curious and even poetic comparison: “A tank group, as a means of operational control of an army group, can be compared with a hunting falcon that soars over everything operational area of ​​an army group, observes the battlefield of all armies and swiftly rushes to where his mere appearance decides the outcome of the battle.

Possessing such a powerful instrument of warfare, even at the stage of planning the operation, the German staff officers did not hesitate to name cities and rivers quite far from the border in orders. In addition, unlike Army Groups North and South, the Army Group in the central sector of the Soviet-German front received not one, but two tank groups. These were the 2nd Panzer Group of Heinz Guderian and the 3rd Panzer Group of Hermann Goth. The tasks of the 2nd Panzer Group were formulated as follows:

“... break through the border fortifications on both sides of Brest and advance along highways 1 and 2 to Slutsk and Minsk, then to the Smolensk region in order to prevent the concentration of enemy troops, destroy enemy forces on this side of the Dnieper and open the way to the enemy’s capital - Moscow ...

The first task of the group is to destroy the enemy forces located in the area of ​​Bialystok and Volkovysk with a quick strike on Minsk in cooperation with the 3rd tank group advancing through Olita and Vilna to the area north of Minsk, in order to then capture the Smolensk area without stopping.

The tasks of the Hoth tank group were symmetrical to those set by his colleague Guderian. They sounded like this:

“The 3rd tank group, first subordinate to the command of the 9th Army, then marching in front of the left wing of the army group, advances west of the Neman on Merkin, Olita and Prien and captures the crossings there. Without waiting for the approach of the divisions following it, the tank group attacks the enemy forces supposed in the Vilna region and cuts them off from Minsk. With the goal of bypassing the enemy grouping in the Minsk region from the north, the tank group is advancing to the Molodechno-Naroch-lake line, ready to turn east towards Borisov, in order to destroy the enemy in the Minsk region together with the 2nd tank group advancing on Minsk from the south-west or continue advancing pursuit in the direction of the upper Dune to Vitebsk and north of this city ... "

The role and place of mechanized formations in breaking through the enemy's defenses were the subject of fierce disputes between military theorists and practitioners on both sides of the front. The Soviet military school considered it expedient to bring tank divisions (corps) into the gap, which the infantry breaks through in the formation of the enemy. The main argument in favor of such use of mechanical units was the preservation of their strike force for further actions in the depths of the enemy's defenses. However, among the Soviet military leaders there were many who considered it expedient to bring tanks into battle for the second line of defense. These included, for example, I.S. Konev. He often led the tank armies entrusted to him not into a clean breakthrough, but into battle. Konev believed that, firstly, this way the enemy’s defense would be broken through faster, and secondly, it would be easier for the attacker to repel tank counterattacks. The topic was discussed at the December 1940 meeting of the command staff of the Red Army, but no consensus was reached. During the war, both options for the use of tank armies and tank (mechanized) corps took place.

The German tank school professed the principle of bringing tanks into battle already behind the first line of defense. It was this strategy that the commanders of Army Group Center professed. The tank divisions of the 2nd and 3rd tank groups on the morning of June 22 had their own offensive zone, they stood in the first echelon shoulder to shoulder with infantry formations. At the same time, there were precedents when the initial breakthrough was carried out by the infantry. This took place on 22 June in the nearby 1st Panzer Group of E. von Kleist. The crossing of the Bug and the capture of the bridgehead in the zones of the III and XXXXVIII motorized corps were carried out by infantry divisions, and only in the middle of the day did tank divisions enter the battle.

Guderian explained his commitment to entering battle, and not into a breakthrough, as follows: “Generals who had nothing to do with tank troops were of the opinion that the first blow should be delivered by infantry divisions, having previously carried out strong artillery preparation, and tanks should only be brought into battle after the wedging reaches a known depth and there is a possibility of a breakthrough. On the contrary, tank generals gave great importance the use of tanks from the very beginning in the first echelon, because it was in this type of troops that they saw the striking force of the offensive. They believed that tanks could quickly penetrate deep and then immediately build on the initial success using their speed. The generals themselves saw the results of the use of tanks in the second echelon in France. At the moment of success, the roads were blocked by endless, slowly moving horse-drawn columns of infantry divisions, which impeded the movement of tanks.

Goth supported Guderian in this. In his book Panzer Operations, he later put forward exactly the same arguments, based on the same experience of the campaign in France: “In spite of the ban, the horse carts of the infantry divisions drove onto the roads reserved for the movement of mechanized troops. As a result, suitable tank divisions, precisely at the moment of the planned success, turned out to be closed on “their own” roads by convoys of infantry formations.

I must say that in the words of Guderian and Hoth, of course, there was a rational grain. From the command of the 1st Panzer Group E. von Kleist, it took some effort to push the tank divisions through the infantry ram breaking the defenses on the border on June 22, 1941. Exactly what the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups predicted happened - road clogging infantry. At the same time, only two tank divisions were introduced at Kleist on the first day of the offensive, while at Guderian and Goth, a much larger number of divisions were to be launched simultaneously.

Goth, in addition, put forward another argument against bringing his group into a breakthrough. He wrote: “The conditions of the offensive for the 3rd Panzer Group were such that under no circumstances would the infantry divisions be able to overcome the distance to the crossings in one day, and this would give the enemy time to prepare defenses behind the Neman.” Simply put, he believed that tanks from the first echelon would quickly reach the Neman, if not before the explosion of bridges, then before organizing defense along the line of this river.

So, shoulder to shoulder with Hoth, the "fast Heinz" energetically repulsed all attempts by the higher command to persuade him to use tank divisions as an echelon for developing success after an infantry breakthrough. After that, Guderian attended to the problem of the assault Brest Fortress. He recalled: “Tanks could take it [Brest Fortress] only with a sudden blow, which we tried to do in 1939. But in 1941 there were no conditions for this. Therefore, I decided to force the Zap with tank divisions. Bug on both sides of Brest-Litovsk, and to attack the fortress, he asked me to subordinate the infantry corps to me. The reference to the experience of 1939 is not accidental. Ironically, the troops subordinate to Guderian had to storm the Brest Fortress for the second time, the first time was during the Polish campaign.

Also, the commander of the 2nd tank group, even at the planning stage of the operation, paid Special attention defending his left flank. In his memoirs, he explained it this way: “The greatest danger threatened the left flank, since, according to the information received, there was a strong group of Russians in the Bialystok region; it should have been assumed that this grouping, having learned about the danger that would be created by our tanks reaching its rear, would try to avoid encirclement by moving along the Volkovysk-Slonim highway.

The problem of covering the flank was supposed to be solved by deep echeloning of the group's troops. The third motorized corps, which was subordinate to the 2nd Panzer Group, XXXXVI Corps of the General of the Panzer Forces, Baron von Vietinghoff, was allocated to the second echelon. As the offensive developed, he was to take place behind the left-flank XXXXVII motorized corps of Lemelsen. In general, one cannot fail to note the rather well-thought-out construction of Guderian's tank group. It is all the more surprising that with the outbreak of hostilities, he began to shake up this harmonious system with his own hands, changing his original plan beyond recognition.

Nevertheless, the tactics and strategy for the use of tank forces were actually worked out by trial and error. The German military school in 1941 was of the opinion that tanks could and should be used to fight enemy tanks. The “Directives for driving a tank division” approved by the OKH in 1940 stated: “If a tank division stumbled upon enemy tanks during an offensive, then the fight against tanks becomes the main task compared to the rest,” i.e., German tankers were tuned in from the very beginning for tank battles. A collision with new Soviet tanks will soon cool their ardor.

In addition to tank groups, aviation was to become the most important tool for solving the tasks set in Barbarossa. According to the aforementioned "Directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops" dated January 31, 1941, the tasks of the Luftwaffe, the German air force, were formulated as follows: ground forces".

Aviation was one of the main tools of the German blitzkrieg. Although the Air Force of the Third Reich did not initially aim for close cooperation with the ground forces, by 1941 this was precisely the Luftwaffe's strong point. The experience of the war in Spain showed the effectiveness of air support for attacks on the ground. To effectively implement this strategy, it was necessary to clear the sky in the directions of the main attacks.

One of the methods of combating enemy aircraft was its destruction at airfields. Spain in this regard gave the Germans invaluable experience and became a kind of training ground for practicing tactics and strategies for such a struggle. On the night of October 2, 1936, 2 Yu-52 bombers belonging to the Francoists bombed the Getafe republican airfield. 9 planes lined up on it, which formed the basis of the Republican aviation in the Madrid direction. They were destroyed in one blow. In the future, the Germans continuously honed the tactics of attacking airfields in Spain. So, on the Northern Front in 1936-1937, where the Condor Legion was actively operating, of the 62 I-15 and I-16 lost by the Republicans, about a third (18 vehicles) were destroyed at the airfield by enemy bombardment.

The solution of such an ambitious task as the destruction of aircraft at airfields required careful preparation. The most important role in the success achieved in June 1941 was played by German aerial reconnaissance, carried out even before the start of the war. These flights were carried out by the so-called "Rovel team" (Kommando Rowehl), named after its commander, Colonel Theo Rowehl. Officially, it was called the Luftwaffe High Command Intelligence Group (Aufkl ungsgruppe des Oberbefehlshabers der Luftwaffe, abbreviated as Aufkl. St. (F) / Ob. d. L). The Rovel team was created back in 1933-1934, when the Luftwaffe did not yet officially exist in nature. Initially, she used civilian airliners for reconnaissance. I must say that Rovel's wards were not newcomers to the skies of the USSR. The group was already conducting reconnaissance in the skies of the Soviet Union in the mid-1930s. Since 1934, the Germans have been flying over Kronstadt and photographing ships of the Baltic Fleet. Moreover, one of the planes of the Rovel team was lost due to an accident during a flight over the Crimea. The Soviet leadership then got off with sluggish protests through diplomatic channels. It can even be said that Rovel's reconnaissance activity did not stop, except for the period from September to December 1940, when Hitler banned all reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory. The Fuhrer believed that a premature intensification of reconnaissance could frighten off the enemy. Therefore, one should not think that in 1941 the Soviet leadership suddenly fell into idiocy. The activities of German reconnaissance aircraft have simply become familiar.

The Rovel team resumed work on the territory of the USSR in the first months of 1941. By that time, it had four squadrons. The first flew from the Krakow airfield in Poland, the second - from the Bucharest region in Romania and the third - from the Hamina airfield in Finland. Contrary to popular belief, Rovel's group was not completely armed with high-altitude Yu-86Rs. The first three squadrons were armed mainly with Dornier-215s, as well as with some Yu-88s, Xe-111s and even Me-110s. The high-altitude Yu-86Rs came into the possession of the Rovel team in 1940 and by 1941 were assembled in the 4th squadron of the group (five Yu-86Rs in April 1941), also known as the "high-altitude flight test center." They flew from airfields in Bucharest and Krakow. In total, Rovel's team performed over 500 flights over the territory of the USSR. Fighter pilot Klimenko V.I. recalls: “Nearby, 100-125 km from Siauliai, there was a border with Germany. We felt her closeness in our own skin. Firstly, military exercises of the Baltic Military District were going on continuously, and secondly, an air squadron or, in extreme cases, a fighter unit was on duty at the airfield in full combat readiness. We also met with German intelligence officers, but we had no order to shoot them down, and we only escorted them to the border. It’s not clear why then they lifted us into the air to say hello, or what ?!

A characteristic flight profile of German reconnaissance aircraft is given by one of the first flights of the Rovel group on January 6, 1941. The reconnaissance aircraft crossed the border, deepened 24 km and then flew 161 km over Soviet territory and returned back. Of course, only high-altitude aircraft flew deep into the territory of the Soviet Union. In the absence of the USSR in 1941, a continuous field of view of the airspace by radar, flights at altitudes above 10 thousand meters were relatively safe. But not all reconnaissance flights went smoothly. On April 15, the Yu-86R, which took off from Krakow to take photographs in the Zhytomyr region, was forced to descend due to an engine malfunction. In the Rovno area, the plane was shot down by a Soviet fighter. However, in the general case, shooting down a Yu-86R flying at high altitude was not an easy task. At least other cases of interception of high-altitude reconnaissance known at the moment were unsuccessful.

From mid-April to mid-June 1941, the flights of the Rovel team were carried out with an enviable regularity - three sorties a day. Their main task was to update the information collected in similar flights in the spring of 1940. On June 21, 1941, the 4th squadron of the Rovel team returned to its permanent base, to the Berlin-Rangsdorf airfield, to continue reconnaissance in the West. The remaining three squadrons continued their activities after the start of the war. The results of the painstaking work of the “Rovel team” allowed the German command to plan a gigantic operation to defeat the air forces of the border districts at airfields.

To interact with Army Group Center, the 2nd Air Fleet of Field Marshal A. Kesselring was allocated. Its main formations were II and VIII Air Corps. The right-flank 4th Army and the 2nd Panzer Group were to be supported by the II Air Corps, while the VIII Air Corps was aimed at supporting the 9th Army and the 3rd Panzer Group. The air corps were commanded by Generals B. Lörzer and W. von Richthofen, respectively. The priority task of the air corps was to support the advance of tank groups. In total, the two air corps included 8 groups of bombers (299 aircraft), 8 groups of dive bombers (293 Ju87B / R aircraft), 9 groups of fighters (363 fighters), 2 groups of twin-engine fighters (60 Bf110C / D / E), two groups of attack aircraft (38 Bf109E and 22 Hs123) and three squadrons of long-range reconnaissance aircraft (30 aircraft). Also, the 2nd Air Fleet was given two groups of transport aviation (60 aircraft) and 3 communications squadrons (30 aircraft). Army aviation was represented by 4 long-range reconnaissance squadrons (40 aircraft), 11 short-range reconnaissance squadrons (110 aircraft) and 3 communications squadrons (30 aircraft). In total, the 2nd Air Fleet, including reconnaissance aircraft, transport aircraft and aircraft designed to interact with ground forces, had about 1,600 vehicles. Detailed data on the composition and basing of the air formations of the 2nd Air Fleet, see the Appendix.

According to the data on the average monthly strength, the formations subordinate to the Army Group Center in June 1941 consisted of:

3rd tank group - 130,657 people;

9th Army - 382,273 people;

4th Army - 490,989 people;

2nd Panzer Group - 181,752 men.

Thus, the size of Army Group Center before the attack on the USSR was approaching the figure of 1.2 million people. It was a powerful association capable of solving the most complex problems. The size of Gunther von Kluge's 4th Army is generally a kind of record for the Soviet-German front. Few armies on the Eastern Front subsequently had at least comparable numbers. She was a real monster. As, however, and the entire group of armies "Center". Both literally and figuratively.

Notes:

TsAMO RF, f. 208, op. 2511, d. 83, l. 71

History of the Civil War in the USSR. T. I. - M.: OGIZ, 1936

Revelations and confessions. The Nazi elite about the war of the Third Reich against the USSR. - Smolensk: Rusich, 2000. P.125.

Projector D.M. Aggression and disaster. Senior military leadership Nazi Germany in World War II 1939–1945. M.: Nauka, 1972. S. 249 with reference to W. Gorlits. Paulus: "Ich stehe hier auf Befehl!", Frankfurt a/M., 1960. S.122.

Major General Hans von Greifenberg - future Chief of Staff of Army Group Center.

Infantry General Georg von Sonderstern - future chief of staff of Army Group South.

Dashichev V.I. Bankruptcy strategy of German fascism. M.; The science. T.2. S. 84.

Projector D.M. Aggression and disaster. Top Military Leadership of Nazi Germany in World War II 1939–1945. - M.: Nauka, 1972. S. 252 with reference to W. Warlimont Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht 1939–1945. Frankfurt a/M., 1962. S.152.

I was Hitler's adjutant Belov Nikolaus von

Defeat of Army Group Center

Defeat of Army Group Center

The situation in the East developed differently at that time. On June 22, the very day the march on Russia began three years ago, the Red Army launched a major offensive against Army Group Center, undertaking its largest and most successful operation of the war (276). At first it seemed that the Russians wanted to take the offensive on a smaller scale. But when the first breakthroughs of the German defense line were made and significant gaps formed in it, a large tank offensive began in the area between Gomel and Vitebsk, and further followed. The Russians prepared each of their attacks with air raids and heavy artillery fire, massively throwing tanks into battle. The commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Bush, tried to encourage Hitler to move away from this, in the words of the Fuhrer, "a solid place." But he ordered to hold each position.

Now Hitler was forced to repulse three offensive wedges of the enemy at once: in France, Italy and Russia. He gave a categorical order: to defend every square meter of land to the end. But everywhere it became obvious: the enemy forces were superior to ours, and in some areas - and much more. But the Fuhrer still did not want to reckon with these facts and perceived the reports sent to him by the troops as greatly exaggerated. In Army Group Center, he replaced Busch with Model, and a few days later, the commander of Army Group North, Colonel General Lindem, with Colonel General Frissner. But this change of faces had no effect on the course of events. Army Group Center has already lost 25 divisions, approximately 350,000 men. A gap of about 300 km appeared in the front line, through which the Russians advanced towards the German border.

On July 9, Hitler flew to his Headquarters in East Prussia. He was accompanied by Heitel, Doenitz, Himmler, Jodl and Korten. Model, Frissner, and Colonel-General Cavalier von Greim, Air Commander of Army Group Center, arrived from the Eastern Front. Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Zeitzler was absent. From the beginning of the Russian offensive, he had various, sometimes sharp, disagreements with Hitler, since he could not follow the views of the Fuhrer on matters of command of the ground forces and, moreover, was at the limit of his strength. Since then, Hitler has never seen him again.

The conversation in East Prussia was primarily about the rapid transfer of new formations to the Eastern Front. Model and Friessner looked at the further course of events with some optimism. Their proposals and demands could be met within the next few weeks, however, on the condition that the Russians did not decide to quickly break through further. Grand Admiral Doenitz demanded that important ports for new submarines be kept on the Baltic Sea. In the afternoon, Hitler flew to Salzburg. I got the impression that he still assesses the course of events on the Eastern Front positively.

During these last weeks on the Obersalzberg I had a very touching experience. During one of the usual discussions of the situation, for some reason I had to leave the hall to a small room located nearby. There I suddenly heard Hitler say about me that I am the only one who openly and without fear expresses his opinion to him. The words of the Fuhrer that I accidentally overheard, which sounded right now, when the enemy is making his way to the Reich in three places, strengthened my intention to continue to behave in the same way. I did not return to the meeting because I was annoyed that others were not doing the same.

Chapter 4 “Biography of the group, sent by mail, with the age, spelling of the names and places of birth of the members of the group, released in the hope of improving the meager prospect of success; the complete lack of friendships in the music business; and with group members

1988. Defeat of the Gdlyan / Ivanov group A party conference is coming. Unexpectedly, it turns out that delegates can be chosen. This is the first election so far within the party. At the conference itself, Academician Abalkin, the future chief of the State Reform Commission, is subjected to harsh criticism.

Chapter 27. THE DESTRUCTION OF DENIKIN'S ARMIES However, already on July 9, Stalin was sent to the Western Front, where a dangerous situation also developed. Back in April 1919, Polish troops began to seize lands inhabited by Ukrainians and Belarusians. In the course of its offensive, Poland captured

Vinzer Bruno Soldier of the Three Armies

A. Operations of Army Group South (later Army Groups A and B) before entering the Volga Each battle has its own background, and it is often more interesting and instructive than the battle itself. Until now, it is considered to be the beginning of the "Battle of Stalingrad" on November 19, 1942. Neither the name nor the date

I. The situation on the front of Army Group "South" at the beginning of the summer campaign of 1942 (end of June) On the front 800 km occupied by Army Group "South" were: Taganrog17th Army East of StalinoItalian

III. The situation at the front of Army Group "B" In mid-September 1942, it turned out that the two armies participating in the operation had failed to capture Stalingrad in flares. The 4th Panzer Army did not capture the Volga heights in the Krasnoarmeysk region, its front was bent

IV. The situation on the front of Army Group A By mid-September, when the 4th Panzer Army and the 6th Army captured the central part of Stalingrad, it became clear that none of the far-reaching goals of Army Group A had been achieved and could no longer be achieved. be reached. Of all

VIII. The grouping of forces on the front of Army Group "B" before the Russian counteroffensive Apparently mainly for political reasons, the German and allied armies located on both sides of Stalingrad and on the middle reaches of the Don were originally supposed to be

II. The tasks and plans of the Don Army Group and the Gotha Army Group Don to the north, break through to the 6th Army. The command of the Don Army Group ordered the 6th Army:

The position of army group "G" When Balck took command on September 21, the troops of army group "G" were located as follows: 1st army of General von Knobelsdorff - in the Metz, Château-Salen area; 5th tank army of General Hasso von Manteuffel covered the Northern Vosges

Soldier of three armies Who did not rule over the territory of modern Croatia! In the 1st century BC, it fell under the rule of Rome and a little later became part of the Roman provinces of Pannonia and Dalmatia. In the III-V centuries, the Visigoths, Huns and Ostrogoths constantly invaded here, in the VI

The position of Army Group G When Balck took command on September 21, the troops of Army Group G were located as follows: - 1st Army of General von Knobelsdorf - in the Metz-Chateau-Salen area; - 5th Panzer Army of General Hasso von Manteuffel covered the Northern

Army Group Don Sends a Major On the morning of December 18, the commandant of the airfield in Pitomnik contacted us. - The officer of the intelligence department of Army Group Don, Major of the General Staff Eisman, has just arrived. He asks to send a car for him. One was immediately sent

The Center and the Right Center Created primarily by Yuri Luzhkov and his political allies, the Fatherland party initially declared itself a party of the social democratic type, that is, a party of the left center. In 1999, in opposition to it, the Unity party was created,

During the titanic struggle between Hitler and Stalin, the Soviet side had one predominant task - the destruction of Army Group Center, a powerful group equipped with the best forces and means, which, like a dagger, was aimed at the very heart of the Soviet Union.

In December 1941, Army Group Center approached Moscow and was ready to capture the capital of the Soviet state. Not a single year passed before the Red Army won a final victory. But then she herself was close to destruction.

Scorched Earth
Army Group Center

Scorched earth. Army Group Center

As the name suggests, Army Group Center operated in the central sector of the front formed by the three powerful army groups that Hitler brought down on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

Army Group North advanced on Leningrad, Group Center marched on Moscow through Minsk and Smolensk, and Army Group South attacked Odessa and invaded the Crimea.

For the offensive on June 22, Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal von Bock consisted of four powerful formations: the 4th Army under the command of von Kluge; 9th under the command of General Strauss; 2nd Panzer Group under the command of General Guderian; and 3rd under the command of General Hoth. Air support was provided by the 2nd Air Fleet under the command of Field Marshal Kesselring.

John Erickson, Professor of Defense Studies, University of Edinburgh: "Army Group Center was the most powerful unit in the Soviet-German war. It was commanded by Field Marshal von Bock, who, before the war with the Soviet Union, expressed doubts about the Barbarossa plan. He was a realist and had great intuition "As a commander at the strategic level, he was of great value."

Stephen Walsh, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst: "Field Marshal Fedor von Bock commanded Army Group B during the successful offensive in France in the summer of 1942. Now he has received leading role in the implementation of the plan Barbarossa - command of Army Group Center. He was a capable military leader, brought up in the traditions of the German military school. He was distinguished by caution and thoughtful command. Able to unite subordinates. As part of his armies, the tank group of General Guderian, who became one of the most famous military leaders of the Second World War, operated.

Army Group Center outnumbered the other two groups. It included 50 divisions. In the South group - 39, and in the North group only 29. She could put up 910 aircraft, the South group - 684, and 434 Army Group North. The two tank groups in von Bock's formation comprised the lion's share of the tanks prepared for the invasion. Von Bock had 1700 cars. 1000 with von Runstedt in the south and 650 with Rieter von Leeb in the north. Army Group Center was supported by 3,000 artillery pieces.

John Erickson: "Well, Army Group Center was served at the highest level. No wonder - it was considered a key player. And it played a key role until 1944."

In 1941, the success of Army Groups Center was decisive for the success of the campaign as a whole. If she had achieved her goal, and the goal was almost achieved, then back in 1941 the war in the east could have been won by Hitler. Army Group Center was aimed at the very heart of the Soviet state. The Red Army had to put up incredibly stubborn resistance in order not to receive a mortal wound.

John Erickson: "The Russians tried to divert this aimed strike. And it was impossible to avoid the confrontation. Army Group Center always found itself in front of the Soviet troops. It should be said that the basis of the Soviet-German war is the constant attempts to destroy Army Group Center. The Soviet units tried to act through the flanks on north and south, but their target remained Army Group Centre.

Stephen Walsh: "For the High Command, represented by General Halder, Army Group Center was of the utmost strategic importance. It was supposed to deliver a decisive blow to the Soviet Union and ensure victory as a whole. Thus, Army Group Center became a priority in all respects. She had to ensure the implementation strategic goal- inflict a decisive blow on Moscow. Assessing the transport system, the railway network, the importance of Moscow as a whole, political, economic, Halder believed that the Red Army would be forced to defend Moscow, responding to the strategic initiatives of Army Group Center. There she will lose the battle, the Center group will occupy Moscow and will not allow the Russians to organize full-fledged actions of the remaining forces. They will no longer have a chance to defeat the Germans."

At the beginning of the campaign, it seemed that Army Group Center would fulfill its strategic task. The Barbarossa plan fell on the Soviet army, which was not expecting an attack, on Sunday, June 22, 1941. In the first days of the campaign, the tank groups of Hoth and Guderian completed a large-scale encirclement of the Soviet units that had lost their leadership near Bialystok. They rushed further to Minsk.

The Soviet command was paralyzed. Chaos reigned in most sectors of the front. During the front-line battles, only in one place was there serious resistance. The garrison of the Brest Fortress fought for another 8 days after the front moved further to the East to the next goal. Only after the use of the forces of an entire division and "pieces" with bombs weighing 1800 kg, the citadel was captured by the Germans. 7 thousand defenders of the fortress were taken prisoner, the cruel conditions of which few survived.

The German chronicle demonstrates the surrender of the garrison of the Brest Fortress to Army Group Center.

John Erickson: "The Soviet leadership and command were confident that there would be a period of time between the declaration of war and the start of hostilities. That stubborn battles would be fought on the border, and that after the first blow the Red Army would go on the offensive and be able to defeat the enemy. No declaration of war and There was no ultimatum. The attack turned out to be tactically sudden. It's true."

Stephen Walsh: Discussing fighting in June 1941 and the state of the Red Army opposing the German troops, Army Group Center in particular, we must not forget about the purges arranged by Stalin in the army from 1936 to 1938. Stalin beheaded the officer corps of the Red Army. Two-thirds of the officers were killed or sent to camps. The same third that remained, as a whole, was no longer capable of taking the initiative, even if this initiative was encouraged. The Red Army was not weak, but due to many, many circumstances, it could not respond equally.

The Red Army was numerous, but the weapons were usually outdated. First of all, this applies to tanks and aircraft. As for the means of communication, the situation was simply depressing. The equipment necessary for combat operations simply did not exist. And it was difficult to fight the German troops otherwise. This immediately affected the course of operations. So, leadership, positions taken, equipment, tanks, aircraft and communications. In all these parameters, the Soviet troops opposing the Army Group Center could not be compared with the enemy.

After the success near Minsk, parts of the Center group rushed to Smolensk, where a huge batch of prisoners of war was captured on the approaches to the city. Despite all the losses suffered by the enemy, the Germans were forced to state that the resistance had intensified.

The Germans had to face another unpleasant surprise. In the battles near Vyazma, the first soviet tanks T-34. They ironed the positions of the 7th Infantry Division, went to the artillery battery and simply passed the guns. The morale of the German infantry suffered badly.

Thus began the tank terror.

In 1941, not a single anti-tank gun could cope with the T-34. Then the German infantry was armed with 37-mm and 50-mm anti-tank guns. They couldn't do anything with the T-34. A minimum 75 mm gun was required. But it still needed to be designed and built.

Meanwhile, only the 88-mm anti-aircraft gun could penetrate the armor of the T-34, and it immediately fell into completely different conditions.

By the end of July, the total losses of Army Group Center totaled 74,000 troops. Reinforcements numbered only 23,000. For a one month campaign that will last 4 years, these are huge numbers.

The rapid advance of June and July slowed down in August and September. There were no signs of weakening Russian resistance.

John Erickson: "In early July 1941, it already became clear that the Barbarossa plan in its original form had failed. The Soviet armies could not be destroyed. Yes, they were defeated, suffered heavy losses, but they could not be completely destroyed."

Despite the obvious successes, Army Group Center was unable to immediately capture Moscow. And Hitler also decided to make changes to the overall strategic plan - he transferred Guderian's tank group to the south to help the German troops fighting there, instead of concentrating forces for a decisive blow to Moscow. The consequences of this decision were very severe. But then Hitler did not think about it.

In the German chronicle, Guderian's tanks rush deep into Soviet territory. They would contribute to impressive victories when, united with Panzergruppe von Kleist in the south, they carried out a large-scale encirclement of the Soviet troops, capturing a huge number of enemy soldiers. You see a meeting of Guderian's group, whose cars are marked with the letter G, and Kleist with the letter K.

Stephen Walsh: "Guderian was the most capable German theorist tank war in the 30s. In 1939 he acted in Poland. In 1940 he established himself as one of the best German combat commanders. He commanded the 19th Panzer Corps. In May 1940, the corps crossed the Meuse River near Sedan. However, at the same time, he had an extremely hot-tempered and difficult character, which made his relations with other commanders rather difficult.

Guderian was one of the creators of the blitzkrieg strategy, so he was not deceived by the huge number of prisoners captured near Kiev. He knew that the essence of blitzkrieg is a concentrated strike on one target. This goal could only be Moscow. He was not afraid to convey his views to the Fuhrer. And an angry response followed. Thus the first seeds of hostility were sown, which led to the removal of Guderian in December 1941.

John Erickson: "There was a problem - the target was not defined. For example, there was the question of Leningrad. In addition, Hitler still could not decide which target would be the most impressive. The answer was of course the south, Ukraine and maybe even further. I think what happened some controversy over the change in purpose of the Barbarossa plan."

Stephen Walsh: "There were disagreements about the strategic goal of the Barbarossa plan. First of all, between Adolf Hitler and the Chief of the General Staff, General Franz Halder. Hitler, Halder and the High Command in general believed that this war for living space, a war of annihilation, which was supposed to be won as soon as possible. But they could not agree on the main objective of the offensive. Halder believed that this should have been Moscow. Hitler was now interested in the agricultural and industrial resources of the south. At the same time, he constantly thought about Leningrad. Halder and the High Command insisted on the fact that it should be Moscow".

John Erickson: "In many ways, judging by the directives of Barbarossa, the commanders of the tank groups, the same Guderian, did not improvise, but they interpreted the plans in a certain direction. Later, the new commander of the Army Group Center felt that they should be removed for this."

Despite the growing losses in manpower and equipment, the fierce resistance of the Red Army, Army Group Center advanced deep into Soviet territory. But the target still eluded them.

As a result, in October everything was ready for a decisive attack on Moscow - Operation Typhoon.

In November, the chief of the General Staff convened a meeting with the participation of the chiefs of staff of all three groups, as well as all the armies fighting on the Eastern Front. She was in Orsha. The commanders had to decide whether to take the German troops on the defensive along the entire front and go on a large-scale offensive in the spring, or whether all three army groups should continue the offensive in the winter.

As for Army Group Center, the prospects were as follows: on the one hand, the ability to capture the Kremlin, on the other, how much the troops were capable of delivering the final blow, given their weakened state.

After the meeting, a detailed discussion of the issue began with the field commanders. Field Marshal von Kluge regularly went to the front line to his soldiers. He could get a real idea of ​​their capabilities and mood. Opinions were generally divided. But the decision was made to make one last attempt, to deliver the last decisive blow to Moscow.

There were many large-scale battles that can claim to be considered the turning points of the Second World War. Operation Typhoon is one of the first on the list. Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group returned from the south. Now Army Group Center has gathered maximum strength for the last assault on Moscow. And this attempt almost succeeded, despite all the opposing factors.

The offensive began in the terrible mud of a rainy autumn. Mudslide, which was replaced by the coldest winter in the last 100 years. Despite all the obstacles and stubborn resistance of the Red Army, the Army Group Center continued to crawl towards the Stalinist capital.

By early December German troops went to the outskirts of Moscow. They were only 25 kilometers from the Kremlin. Through binoculars they saw the stars on its towers. 25 km or 2,500 - it doesn't matter. The Wehrmacht reached the farthest point of its offensive. Soldiers and equipment were on the verge. Huge losses in battles broke the morale of the troops. Unprecedented frosts also caused the death of thousands of soldiers along the entire front. Everything was finished. The defensive ring around Moscow was too tough for the weakened units of Army Group Center. Operation Typhoon failed.

John Erickson: "The significance of Operation Typhoon cannot be overestimated. It became the pinnacle of the Barbarossa plan. The decision was made to advance on Moscow. It became a turning point in operations on the Eastern Front. The problem was that the assault on Moscow began too late. The weather conditions were extremely difficult. The supply was clearly insufficient. Operation Typhoon is indicative in terms of the strategic circumstances of the Soviet-German war in the first stage. But I do not think that it is the turning point of the entire war, nevertheless."

Stephen Walsh: "The failure of the Typhoon operation must be correctly assessed. Simply put, it turned out to be a strategic failure for Nazi Germany. It affected the undermining of the Barbarossa plan as a whole. The destruction of the Red Army did not take place. In many ways, the failure of the Typhoon operation affected the strategic position of Great Britain. It The Soviet Union was on the verge of defeat in October 1941. Britain could have found itself in the same situation as in June 1940 after the fall of France. The Battle of Britain delayed defeat, but there was also no prospect of victory. near Moscow, the situation completely changed. Also, in December 1941, just a few days after the failure of the Typhoon, the United States entered the war on the side of the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Now the war will become completely different."

December 5, 1941 a powerful counterattack Soviet armies under the command of General Zhukov broke through the German defenses. A long retreat began. Hitler reacted as follows - he fell into a rage and personally led Army Group Center on December 19th. And then he issued an order - not to retreat. Everyone must fight to the last.

Surprisingly, Army Group Center found the strength to hold back the Soviet offensive practically at the positions that the Germans occupied in October. Some believe that Hitler saved Army Group Center by his order not to surrender. The debate continues to this day.

John Erickson: "Had the order Not to retreat been given, it is quite possible that Army Group Center would have been fragmented. For the first time, the Wehrmacht was defeated. In addition, the situation in which the Soviet offensive took place, it cut the defense to pieces. Without an order to stand to the death, many parts of Army Group Center would be cut off and destroyed."

Stephen Walsh: "Hitler's order to the German troops 'Don't retreat and put up stubborn resistance' alone could not save the Army Group Center. What he really did was to support the faith of the ordinary German soldier in the ability of Adolf Hitler. While the faith of the soldiers in its commanders gradually disappeared. The real reason for the preservation of the Army Group Center, and other formations, mainly lie in the mistakes of the Soviet command, above all, Stalin's ambitions. "

Now it was Stalin's turn to make a fundamental mistake. Stalin ordered the offensive to begin, which on January 7 crashed against the German defenses. This time there was no repetition of the December successes.

Stephen Walsh: "Contrary to the recommendations of the Soviet commander, General Zhukov, on December 20, 1941, Stalin expanded the goals of the offensive - the encirclement and destruction of Army Group Center. Zhukov and his colleagues believed that the goal of the offensive could only be the withdrawal of Army Group Center. They understood that the troops still there is not enough equipment, mobility and experience to carry out larger tasks."

As a result, Army Group Center retreated to its original positions. Her position has become more advantageous. The Red Army failed to capture a single strategically important object.

Such was his point of view in the winter of 1939/40. Hitler is by no means a far-sighted statesman. For him, politics was never a means to an end, but first and foremost a dream, and he, the dreamer, ignored time, space, and the limitations of German power. He forgot that Germany itself was just a tiny patch on a huge globe. Probably, soon after the campaign in Poland, his dreams were completely swallowed up by the East. Perhaps he even mentally saw a new "Germanization" of the vast eastern territories, as it was in past centuries. But the boundless steppes, bad roads or almost complete lack of roads, huge swamps and forests, and with all this a staunch, brave Russian soldier - he did not imagine this. During the First World War, he served as a private only in the West and was not familiar with the conditions of the East.

After lightning victories in Poland, Norway, France and the Balkans, Hitler was convinced that he could defeat the Red Army as easily as his former opponents. He remained deaf to numerous warnings. In the spring of 1941, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who had spent most of World War I on the Eastern Front, asked Hitler if he knew what it meant to invade Russia. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, commander-in-chief of the German ground forces, and his chief of staff, General Halder, tried to dissuade Hitler from going to war with Russia. General Kestring, who had lived in Russia for many years and knew the country and Stalin himself, addressed him with the same warnings. But all this did not bring any results. Hitler insisted.

It seems to me that Hitler seriously conceived an attack on Russia in the summer of 1940. He wanted, firstly, to strike at the Russians before they could attack Germany, and, secondly, to win living space for the growing population of Germany. At that time, only top political and other leaders knew about the intention. In some respects, Hitler's plan depended on making peace with England, which he still dreamed of. He knew that the successful execution of his intentions would depend on the security of the Western Front. A war on two fronts meant the defeat of Germany. But when all hopes for the realization of an important condition failed, when it became absolutely clear that England would never make peace with Nazi Germany, the Fuhrer still did not refuse to go to the East. With a firm hand, he took the helm and led Germany to the rocks of complete defeat.

Despite the conclusion of the German-Soviet treaty, a chill of distrust remained between the countries. However, relations between Russia and the West, especially between Russia and England, were even worse. During the Russian-Finnish campaign, England almost declared war on the Soviets, and now Hitler decided to do something that England had refrained from. By making this fateful decision, Germany lost the war.

Preparations for the war in 1940-1941

In 1940, shortly after the end of the campaign in the West, the headquarters of Army Group B under the command of Field Marshal von Bock was transferred to Poznań. Some time later, the headquarters of the 4th Army of Field Marshal von Kluge was transferred to Warsaw. Prior to this, there were only a few divisions along our eastern border, including one cavalry division. They were stationed in major cities as in peacetime, and the usual security measures were taken along the border. The Red Army, located on the other side of the demarcation line that divided Poland, behaved as quietly as our army. It was clear that neither side was thinking about war. But as soon as all operations in France ceased, German divisions began to gradually but steadily be transferred to the East.

Until January 1941, neither Field Marshal von Kluge nor his staff received any instructions to prepare for war with Russia. general provisions.

With the plan of operation "Barbarossa" ( symbol invasion of Russia), the top commanders met later. In the spring of 1941 more and more divisions were transferred to the East. To hide this from the Russians, they deployed far from the border. Headquarters of new large formations in the East were created, staff exercises and tactical games were held. There was no longer any doubt about Hitler's decision to attack Russia, and the headquarters of all units and formations intensified their preparations for war.

A very strange atmosphere has been created during these months. First of all, we had a clear idea of ​​what would entail new war. During the First World War, many of us fought in Russia as junior officers, and therefore we knew what awaited us. There was some unease and uncertainty among the officers. But the duty of service required careful, painstaking work. All maps and books relating to Russia soon disappeared from bookstores. I remember that on the desk of Field Marshal Kluge in Warsaw there was always a pile of such books. The Napoleonic campaign of 1812 became the subject of special study. With great attention, Kluge read the reports of General de Caulaincourt on this campaign. They revealed the difficulties of waging war and even life in Russia. The battlefields of Napoleon's Great Army were marked on our maps. We knew that we would soon follow in the footsteps of Napoleon.

We also studied the Russo-Polish war of 1920. As chief of staff of the 4th Army, I gave a number of lectures on this topic to the officers of our headquarters, illustrating the course of events with detailed diagrams and maps. The Pripyat marshes played an important role in this war. A huge region of swamps and forests, stretching from Brest to the Dnieper and almost equal in area to the whole of Bavaria. was not completely impassable, as before. During the First World War, we made our way through this territory and soon were going to go through it again.

Our preparations for Operation Barbarossa were partially interrupted in the spring in connection with the so-called Balkan Incident. Remembering Gallipoli, Hitler was afraid that the British would try again to commit sabotage in this corner of Europe. He took into account the possibility of an enemy landing in Greece, which could enable the British to advance through Bulgaria to the north and strike at the rear of Field Marshal von Rundstedt's Army Group South advancing to the East. To avoid this and ensure the security of Romanian oil, he sought to strengthen the political and military ties that bound the Balkan states to Germany.

As for Romania, General Antonescu fully approved of Hitler's plans. A German military mission was sent to Bucharest to reorganize the Romanian army. Antonescu was anxious to take back Bessarabia, which had been occupied by the Russians in 1940. He hoped to annex part of Ukraine to Romania as well. With all this in mind, Antonescu signed an alliance pact with Germany.

The attitude of the Bulgarians was more restrained, as they did not want to provoke the wrath of either England or Germany. As bait, Hitler offered Bulgaria Thessaloniki and its lost territories in Thrace. After long negotiations, the Bulgarians finally agreed to allow German troops to pass through their country's territory in order to strike at the British troops in Greece. In Albania, the Greco-Italian war reached a stalemate with an advantage, perhaps, for the Greek side. Yugoslavia caused Hitler a lot of unpleasant troubles. As early as 1939, the regent of Yugoslavia, Prince Paul, was received in Berlin with great honors. Hitler counted on Prince Paul to maintain neutrality. But unexpectedly, probably not without the intervention of London or Moscow, a revolutionary situation arose in Yugoslavia. The government of Prince Paul was overthrown, and the country ceased to be our potential ally. This situation immediately threatened the communications of the German armies in Romania and Bulgaria. Hitler acted without delay. German troops invaded Yugoslavia, and her brave army was soon defeated. This was largely facilitated by the national enmity between Serbs and Croats.

It is not my task to deal in detail with the brief Balkan campaign. Its significance is that it delayed our invasion of Russia to some extent. Since this campaign did not last very long and ended successfully, the divisions used in the Balkans again returned to their original areas. As for several armored divisions that made a long march through the mountains of Greece, their tank fleet needed a long repair and replenishment.

The start of Operation Barbarossa was tentatively scheduled for May 15. This was the earliest date, as we had to wait for the roads to dry after the spring thaw. Mechanized units would get stuck in April, when rivers and streams swell and the vast expanses of western Russia are covered with spring waters. The Balkan campaign delayed the start of the war with Russia by five to five and a half weeks.

But even if there had been no Balkan campaign, the start of the war with Russia would obviously have had to be postponed, since in 1941 the thaw came late and the Bug River in the sector of the 4th Army entered its banks only at the beginning of June. D-Day was finally set for June 22, which almost coincided with the start of Napoleon's campaign in 1812. .

In connection with the Balkan campaign and late spring, we lost many priceless weeks. Only a few months remained for the effective use of our motorized troops. From June to the end of September, conditions in Russia are exceptionally favorable for waging a moderate war. Thus, we had four months. In October, the autumn thaw begins and traffic is extremely difficult, as whole cars get stuck in the mud. The period of frost - from November to February - favors military operations, but only if the equipment, weapons and vehicles are adapted for warfare in cold weather, and the troops are dressed and prepared for combat operations like the Russian army. Despite careful study of Russian conditions, we were struck by the severity of two periods of mudslides in spring and autumn. In this case, the experience gained in the First World War not only did not benefit us, but even led us astray. Then we fought with the tsarist army mainly on the territory of Poland, and not in the depths of Russia, where the climate is much more severe.

Finally, about the morale of our troops. There is no doubt that our commanders and troops were worried about the prospect of a new campaign. Everyone had the impression that we were going to a mysteriously creepy country, a country without end and edge. However, this did not prevent us from preparing for war in the most thorough manner. Everything that could be done before the start of the campaign was done.

Russia and Russians

Evaluation of enemy forces should be approached very carefully. Better to overestimate them than underestimate them. We must assume that in fact the enemy may be much stronger than we imagined. Failure to correctly assess the enemy can lead to unpleasant surprises. The inhabitant of the East differs in many ways from the inhabitant of the West. He endures hardships better, and this humility gives an equally imperturbable attitude to both life and death.

His way of life is very simple, even primitive compared to our standards. Orientals attach little importance to what they eat and what they wear. It is simply amazing how long they can exist on what would mean starvation to a European. Russian is close to nature. Heat and cold have almost no effect on him. In winter, he protects himself from severe cold with everything that comes to hand. He is a master of imagination. To warm up, it does not need complex structures and equipment. Strong and healthy Russian women work just like men.

Close contact with nature allows Russians to move freely at night in the fog, through forests and swamps. They are not afraid of the dark, endless forests and cold. They are not unusual in winter, when the temperature drops to minus 45 o FROM.

The Siberian, who can be considered partly or even completely Asian, is even more enduring, even stronger and has a much greater resistance than his European compatriot. We already experienced this during the First World War, when we had to face the Siberian army corps. To a European from the West, accustomed to small territories, the distances in the East seem endless. A US citizen is used to thinking in terms of vast steppes and prairies, and therefore he will not share this feeling, close to horror. The horror is further enhanced by the melancholic, monotonous nature of the Russian landscape, which acts depressingly, especially in the gloomy autumn and languidly long winter.

The psychological influence of this country on the average German soldier was very strong. He felt insignificant, lost in these vast expanses. The natives of East Germany acclimatized much more easily to this strange new world, since East Germany is geographically the link between Russia and the West. Soldiers from other parts of Germany, like their fathers in the First World War, also learned to adapt to local conditions. Russia was a true test for our troops. It was a tough school. The person who survived after meeting the Russian soldier and the Russian climate knows what war is. After that, he has no need to learn to fight.

All the wars that Russia waged were cruel and bloody. During the Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great learned to respect the fighting qualities of the Russian soldier. Napoleon considered the battle of Borodino the bloodiest of all his battles. Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 was as brutal as the Russo-Japanese War at the beginning of the 20th century. In these two wars, the losses were enormous. During the First World War, we became intimately acquainted with the Russian tsarist army. I will cite a little-known but significant fact: our losses on the Eastern Front were much greater than the losses we suffered on Western front from 1914 to 1918, the Russian generals were then qualitatively inferior to the German ones, and the tactics of huge armies in the offensive were inflexible. But in defense, the Russian army was remarkable for its remarkable stamina. The Russians skillfully and very quickly built fortifications and equipped defensive positions. Their soldiers showed great skill in fighting at night and in the forest. The Russian soldier prefers hand-to-hand combat. His physical needs are not great, but his ability to endure hardship without flinching is truly amazing.

Such is the Russian soldier whom we recognized and respected a quarter of a century ago. Since then, the Bolsheviks have been systematically re-educating the youth of their country, and it would be logical to assume that the Red Army has become a tougher nut to crack than the tsarist army.

The Russians had carefully studied past campaigns, and we expected their top commanders to learn from past experience. But the middle and junior command staff, according to our observers, were poorly trained and had no combat experience.

It was very difficult for us to get a clear picture of the equipment of the Red Army. The Russians took careful and effective security measures. Hitler refused to believe that Soviet industrial production could be equal to German. We had little information about Russian tanks. We had no idea how many tanks a month the Russian industry was capable of producing.

It was difficult to even get the maps, as the Russians kept them under great secrecy. The maps we had were often wrong and misled us.

We also did not have accurate data on the combat power of the Russian army. Those of us who fought in Russia during the First World War thought she was great, and those who did not know the new enemy tended to underestimate her.

How will they treat us civilian population Russia, we did not know. In 1914-1918. The Russian population treated us gently and loyally. However, no one could say how much it had changed over the years.

strategic intent

In 1941, the German army still consisted mainly of purely infantry divisions, which moved on foot, and horses were used in the wagon train. Only a small part of the army consisted of armored and motorized divisions. Therefore, we faced the problem: how to cover huge distances in the short time that remained at our disposal? The length of the front was also enormous - from the Carpathians to the Baltic coast near Memel. The configuration of the border completely ruled out the possibility of immediate envelopment or encirclement of the enemy. I had to deal only frontal strikes.

In June 1941, according to our data, the Russians had 160 rifle and 30 cavalry divisions and 35 motorized and tank brigades. Some of these forces were deployed along the Far Eastern border. The total number of human resources to be mobilized was 12 million. We assumed that the Russians had more tanks than we did, but that their tanks were qualitatively inferior to ours, although other types of equipment for the Russian troops were considered good. Neither the air force nor the Russian navy posed a great threat to us. We also knew little about the organization of the Red Army.

Our main strategic problem, as I said, was to crush the enemy in a huge theater of operations within the limited time available to us. We had only a few months to crush the huge Russian armies west of the Dnieper and Western Dvina. If they can escape untouched behind these water barriers, we will face the same problem that confronted Napoleon in 1812. In this case, it will be difficult to say when the war in the East will end.

Hitler approached the war from purely economic positions. He wanted to seize grain-rich Ukraine, the industrial Donetsk basin, and then Caucasian oil.

Brauchitsch and Halder looked at the war from a completely different point of view. They wanted to destroy the Red Army first, and then fight to achieve economic goals. However, both Hitler's plan and the plan of his closest military advisers required the concentration of the main forces of German troops north of the Pripyat marshes. It was planned to deploy two army groups there, and the army group operating on the right flank was supposed to be stronger. Their task was to strike the enemy on both flanks with tank formations, surround him to the west of the upper reaches of the Dnieper and Zapadnaya Dvina and prevent his retreat to the east. At the same time, other formations of Army Group North were to capture Leningrad and link up with the Finns, destroying all Russian troops in the Baltic Sea area. Only after this was the German offensive planned for Moscow from the west and north.

South of the Pripyat Marshes, Army Group South was to launch a frontal attack and advance eastward.

Further planning was useless, since the course of the campaign depends on the successes achieved at the beginning of hostilities. So, the differences between Hitler and the High Command regarding the plans for the war remained unresolved even after our troops crossed the Russian border.

Later, in the summer, these disagreements caused great friction and led to the most unfortunate consequences.

Before proceeding to a detailed consideration of the troop grouping plan and our operational plans, it seems to be interesting to quote here the opinions of some of our senior officers expressed at that time.

Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who commanded Army Group South and, after Field Marshal von Manstein, our most talented commander during the Second World War, said in May 1941 the following about the approaching war:

“The war with Russia is a senseless undertaking, which, in my opinion, cannot have a happy ending. But if, for political reasons, war is inevitable, we must agree that it cannot be won in a single summer campaign. Just look at these huge spaces. We cannot defeat the enemy and occupy the entire western part of Russia from the Baltic to the Black Sea in just a few months. We must prepare for a long war and gradually achieve our goals. First of all, a strong Army Group North must capture Leningrad. This will give us the opportunity to connect with the Finns, destroy the red Baltic fleet and increase our influence in the Scandinavian countries. Army Groups "South" and "Center" should advance so far only to the line Odessa - Kiev - Orsha - Lake Ilmen. If it then turns out that we still have time this year, we will advance on Moscow: from the northwest - by Army Group North and from the east - by Army Group Center. All further operations can be postponed until 1942, when we can develop new plans based on the real situation.

My immediate superior in the 4th Army was Field Marshal von Kluge, who later commanded the 4th Panzer Army during its offensive against Moscow. He expressed his opinion in the following terms:

“Moscow is the head and heart of the Soviet system. It is not only the capital, but also an important center for the production of various types of weapons. In addition, Moscow is the most important junction of railways, which diverge in all directions, including to Siberia. The Russians will be forced to send large forces to defend the capital. Therefore, I believe that we should throw all our forces against Moscow, advancing through Minsk, Orsha and Smolensk. If we capture Moscow before the onset of cold weather, it will be possible to consider that we have achieved a lot in one year. Then it will be necessary to think about plans for 1942.”

Critical remarks made after 1945 by military leaders in other countries are also of some interest. One theory is that we should have focused on capturing the Black Sea and Baltic Sea basins with air and naval forces. Here the ground forces were to play a secondary role. Such actions would lead to the isolation of Russia. However, this plan was not feasible, since our Air Force and Navy were too weak. Further, it was considered necessary to quickly defeat Russia. Considering the features geographical location Germany, then a long war was to be fatal for her. Only the great maritime powers can afford to wage a protracted war, since they are impregnable and cannot be subjected to economic strangulation.

My personal point of view on this issue was as follows.

In 1941, we had to capture the areas of Moscow and Leningrad and hold the enemy's capital, its largest railway junction and two most important cities. This could be achieved by deploying the bulk of our forces in the areas of operations of Army Groups North and Center. The main task of Army Group South during the 1941 campaign would have been only to advance eastward south of the Pripyat marshes and to cover the right flank of Army Group Center. Therefore, there could be no question of trying to capture the southern part of Russia this year.

Each of these plans had its own advantages and disadvantages. Planning military operations was difficult, even in better times and, of course, it is by no means any easier now that political and economic factors influence military decisions.

The leadership of the Army Group "Center"

My subject is the Battle of Moscow, and therefore I will confine myself to sketching portraits of the people who were given responsibility for the capture of the Russian capital. Although the fighting of Army Group Center was closely connected with the actions of Army Groups North and South, here we will only touch on Army Group Center, commanded by Field Marshal von Bock.

Bock is one of the most outstanding military talents. Like Rundstedt and Manstein, he brilliantly directed operations on a large scale. During the First World War, for some time he was on the Western Front the chief of the operational department of the army headquarters, commanded by the German Crown Prince. Bock is a tall, slender man, a typical Prussian of the old school. Mobile and caustic, he expressed his thoughts clearly and clearly. Bock looked younger than his years - he could have been given no more than forty. However, his health was not in order (he suffered from a stomach ailment).

Field Marshal von Kluge is an energetic traditional stock officer. He was more of a talented tactician than an outstanding strategist. The field marshal did not smoke and hardly touched alcohol. No matter how disturbing the situation, he always went to bed early and got up early. Like Rommel, von Kluge felt happy being among the troops, on the front lines. Sometimes he personally took over the leadership of the combat operations of individual units and formations, which made the work of his headquarters difficult. True, he always made sure that his chief of staff knew the orders that he gave on the spot. The field marshal had a passion for aviation and was proud of his wing patch, which he earned during the First World War. Jokingly, he often compared himself to the Napoleonic Marshal Ney. Like Ney, he was unaware of the feeling of fear. Without a shadow of hesitation, he flew and rode under enemy fire. When visiting his troops, he always took with him a tent, a stove, food and water, as well as an armored car, a car with a radio station, and one or two messengers - motorcyclists. Thus, he did not depend on his headquarters and spent the night where the night caught him. Von Kluge was wounded several times, repeatedly got into car and aviation accidents. He was a tireless and determined man.

Colonel General Guderian commanded the 2nd Panzer Group, which operated in close cooperation with von Kluge's 4th Army. Even before the war, he became one of the creators of the German armored forces and was considered a born tank commander. On all the tanks and vehicles of his group was the letter "G" - the first letter of his last name. As one of the commanders of the German armored forces in the Polish campaign and in France, he gained a flattering reputation. He was not easy to deal with, as at times the general was incredibly stubborn - apparently, this trait is not uncommon in prominent personalities. A brilliant commander, the general was very popular among the personnel of the armored forces.

Colonel General Strauss commanded the 9th Army, which operated north of von Kluge's 4th Army. He was a calm, cautious and experienced commander. The 3rd Panzer Group of Colonel General Hoth interacted with his army. Goth was also an outstanding tanker and a level-headed, pedantic person.

About the commander of the 4th Panzer Group, Colonel-General Gepner, we will speak ahead. His troops managed to come closest to Moscow. He, too, was considered an energetic military leader.

There is no need to say that in the course of the war various disagreements arose between individual generals. This, however, did not interfere with the coordinated work of their headquarters. To the extent of our strengths and abilities, we always helped each other without fail.

Grouping of German troops in June 1941

Army Group South. Under the command of Field Marshal von Rundstedt were four field armies and one tank group of General von Kleist. The German-Romanian 11th Army was located in the Jassy region, the Hungarian army was in the Carpathian mountains, the 17th army of General von Stulpnagel was north of the Carpathian mountains and the 6th army of General von Reichenau was between the 17th army and Lublin. Panzer Group Kleist was stationed in Galicia west of Tomaszow.

The task of the Army Group "South": to advance in an easterly direction south of the Pripyat marshes, concentrating its main efforts on the left flank and aiming to capture Kiev.

Army Group Center. The composition and deployment of Field Marshal von Bock's Army Group will be discussed in detail below. It was located north of the Pripyat swamps and was supposed to advance on Moscow.

Army Group North. Field Marshal Ritter von Leeb had General Bush's 16th Army and General Küchler's 18th Army under his command, as well as General Hoepner's 4th Panzer Group. This army group was located between Suwalki and Memel. She was supposed to advance on Leningrad, and then turn south.

Air Force. Each army group was supported by one air fleet. The 4th Air Fleet, under the command of Colonel-General Lehr, supported Army Group South; Field Marshal Kesselring's 2nd Air Fleet, the strongest of the three air fleets, supported Army Group Center, and the 1st Air Fleet, under the command of Colonel General Koller, supported Army Group North.

Numerical composition. On June 21, 1941, the German high command had about 135 divisions at its disposal. Most of them, namely: 80 infantry, 15 motorized, 17 tank divisions and one cavalry division - were on the Eastern Front or on their way there. In addition to these troops, there were several more security divisions intended to carry out garrison service in the territory that we were supposed to occupy.

Army Group "South" consisted of 25 infantry, 4 motorized, 5 tank and 4 mountain rifle divisions. All these divisions were German. Army Group South also included a Hungarian corps, a Slovak division, and later an Italian corps. The Romanian army of Marshal Antonescu was operationally subordinate to Field Marshal Rundstedt. In front of the front of the Army Group "South" were superior Russian forces under the command of Marshal Budyonny.

Army Group Centre, the strongest of the three army groups, had 30 infantry, 15 panzer or motorized divisions, and one cavalry division. In front of the front of this army group were the Russian troops of Marshal Timoshchenko, who in their numbers had only a slight superiority over the Germans.

Army Group North consisted of 21 infantry and 6 tank or motorized divisions. In terms of the number of personnel, it was significantly inferior to the Russian troops commanded by Marshal Voroshilov.

Our three air fleets numbered about 1200 aircraft.

Grouping of troops of Army Group "Center"

A few days before June 21, the commanders of the armies and the commanders of the formations took their places at the command posts. Army Group Center, which consisted of the 4th and 9th field armies, the 2nd and 3rd tank groups (a group - a unit larger than a corps, but smaller than an army), was to advance east with the task of capturing the Soviet capital. In the future, we will consider the actions of this group of the army, especially the 4th Army and two tank groups.

Hour "H" was scheduled for 3 hours 30 minutes on June 22. By this time, the commander of Army Group Center had moved with his headquarters to Warsaw. Kluge's headquarters left the former Polish capital and settled down to the west of Brest. The headquarters of Guderian and Hoth were near the demarcation line.

Assessing the deployment of our troops, Kluge remarked: “Our battle formations are not deep. We do not have such powerful reserves as during the war in the West. The farther we advance to the east, the wider will be our front and the thinner the line of our advancing troops. Therefore, it is very important that our troops act compactly and not disperse, even if gaps arise between us and neighboring armies.

It was an accurate assessment of the situation. Territory European Russia had such a shape that we had to advance along a corridor, first squeezed on both sides by the Black and Baltic Seas, and then expanding all the time as we moved east. Our operational plan was as follows. Two tank groups were located on the flanks of the two field armies: Guderian's group on the right flank of the 4th Army, in the Brest area, Gotha's group on the left flank of the 9th Army, west of Suwalki. These tank groups were supposed to break through the enemy defenses and move at maximum speed to Minsk, where these giant pincers were supposed to close in, thus surrounding as many Russian troops as possible. The infantry corps of the 4th and 9th armies were to carry out more or less limited detour movements in order to destroy individual units and formations of the Red Army directly on the border or near it. The right flank, which was already reliably covered by the Pripyat swamps, was supposed to be covered by small forces. This was our basic plan of action.

The tension in the German troops was constantly growing. As we assumed, by the evening of June 21, the Russians should have understood what was happening, but on the other side of the Bug in front of the front of the 4th Army and the 2nd Panzer Group, that is, between Brest and Lomza, everything was quiet. The Russian border guard behaved as usual. Shortly after midnight, when all the artillery of the infantry divisions of the first and second echelons was ready to open fire, the international Moscow-Berlin train passed through Brest without hindrance. It was a fatal moment.

Three hours later the German combat aircraft took to the air, and soon only their sidelights could be seen far to the east. Field Marshal von Kluge and his headquarters were located at the location of the 31st Infantry Division north of Brest. By 3 o'clock 30 minutes - it was the hour "H" - it began to get light, the sky became somehow surprisingly yellow. And the surroundings were still quiet. At 0330 hours all our artillery opened fire. And then what seemed like a miracle happened: the Russian artillery did not respond. Only occasionally did some coastal gun open fire. A few hours later, the divisions of the first echelon were on the other side. Tanks were crossed, pontoon bridges were built, and all this with almost no resistance from the enemy. There was no doubt that the 4th Army and the 2nd Panzer Group had taken the Russians by surprise.

The breakthrough was successful. Our tanks almost immediately broke through the line of Russian border fortifications and rushed to the east on level ground. Only in the Brest Fortress, where the GPU school was located, did the Russians put up fanatical resistance for several days.

In order to quickly move on to the description of the Moscow battle, I will dwell on the hostilities of the next month very briefly.

Bialystok-Slonim cauldron

As I said, on the front of Army Group Center, the Russians were taken by surprise. When the hostilities began, our radio operators overheard the following conversation of the Russians on the radio: “They are shooting at us! What to do?" The senior boss to whom this question was addressed replied: “Yes, you are crazy! Also, why aren't you coding the conversation?"

On the other hand, Army Group South immediately ran into stubborn resistance, and heavy battles unfolded there.

And everything went according to plan. The two panzer groups advanced far to the east in a swift rush, and then turned towards each other. At the same time, part of the forces of Guderian's tank group continued to move forward, although a fierce battle was going on in the rear with the encircled Russian troops. Guderian sought to reach Minsk as soon as possible, since it was important to prevent the enemy from retreating to the east, beyond the Berezina, the Dnieper and the Western Dvina.

The infantry had to withstand the fast pace of the offensive. Crossing 40 kilometers a day was no exception, and on the most terrible roads. Before my eyes, I still have a vivid picture of the first weeks of the war: unbearable heat, huge clouds of yellow dust raised by columns of retreating Russian troops and trying to catch up with them by German infantry. Sometimes it rained unexpectedly, turning the dust on the roads into liquid mud. But as soon as the sun came out, the dirt turned to dust again.

By July 2, the first battle was won, 150 thousand prisoners were taken, about 1200 tanks and 600 guns were captured and destroyed. From our first impression, the Russian soldier was a tough fighter. However, Russian tanks were not perfect, and as for aviation, we almost did not see it at that time.

The behavior of the Russian troops, even in the first battles, was in striking contrast with the behavior of the Poles and Western allies in defeat. Even when surrounded, the Russians continued stubborn battles. The huge territory of the country with forests and swamps helped them. There were not enough German troops to create the same dense ring around the Russian troops everywhere as in the Bialystok-Slonim region. Our motorized troops fought along the roads or close to them. And where there were no roads, the Russians in most cases remained out of reach. That is why the Russians often got out of the encirclement. In whole columns, their troops moved through the forests to the east at night. They always tried to break through to the east, so the most combat-ready troops, usually tank ones, were usually sent to the eastern part of the encirclement. And yet, our circle of Russians has rarely been successful.

The high pace of our offensive can be judged at least by the fact that the headquarters of the 4th Army had to change its place of residence twice within four days in order to be close to the combat area. On June 24, our headquarters moved to Kamenetz-Podolsky, and on June 26 - to Pruzhany.

The battle for Minsk and the breakthrough of the "Stalin Line"

Before the battle of Minsk and the breakthrough of the Stalin Line, Army Group Center underwent a thorough reorganization.

As in the old days, when large masses of cavalry, building on their successes, moved far ahead, it was now decided to combine the panzer groups of Hoth and Guderian and send them as far as possible to the east. To manage this tank association, a headquarters was created, which received the name "4th Tank Army". Field Marshal von Kluge was appointed commander. He took with him the entire staff of the headquarters of the 4th field army, which from June 2 became known as the 2nd army. Colonel General Weikhs, whose headquarters was in Pruzhany, became the commander of the 2nd Army. We went to Minsk and, having arrived there on July 3, we began to perform new functions.

The fierce Minsk battle was in full swing. The liquidation of the encircled large enemy grouping was entrusted to the infantry, and we rushed to the Dnieper and the Western Dvina. It was during this advance between 2 and 11 July that the terrain first gave our tanks serious trouble. It was not easy to cross the Berezina with its swampy banks, since almost all the bridges were blown up. In this swampy area, the Russians offered stubborn resistance, and here we first began to stumble upon numerous mines. All this delayed the advance of the tanks and allowed the infantry to again catch up with the tank formations after the Battle of Minsk.

Goth and Guderian did not stay long in one place. Despite the difficulties listed above, Guderian quickly reached the Dnieper at Mogilev and Orsha. A little further north, Goth just as quickly reached the Western Dvina near Vitebsk and Polotsk. And now the tanks approached the so-called "Stalin Line" - the main defensive line of the Russians.

However, this line was not equally fortified along its entire length. In addition, the Russians did not have enough troops to defend it, despite reinforcements sent from the east. Guderian and Goth soon crossed the Dnieper and the Western Dvina. The way into the depths of Russia was open.

On July 8, the headquarters of the 4th Panzer Army moved to Borisov (on the Berezina). Here we found traces of Napoleon's army. A few kilometers north of Borisov, Napoleon's Grand Army was forced in the winter of 1812 to force a frozen river and suffered terrible losses. When there is little water in the river, the supports of bridges once built by French sappers are still visible.

Smolensk battle

After the 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper, and the 3rd - the Western Dvina, Russian resistance increased. The Soviet command transferred strong reinforcements from the east and tried to recapture the "Stalin Line". I won't go into details of these battles here. Suffice it to say that Russian tactics now consisted, as a rule, of striking at the flanks of our tank columns. This fighting lasted from 12 to 30 July, and even in August there were sporadic fights here.

The most significant of these was the battle in the Smolensk region, where a large grouping of Russian troops was surrounded. While the main body of the two panzer groups, repulsing the Russian attacks on the flanks, continued to move east, a small force was allocated to reinforce the eastern side of the Smolensk pocket. Two field armies, after an exhausting march, finally again caught up with the tank formations. They held three sides of the pocket, while our tanks blocked the exit from it near Yartsevo. Again, this operation was unsuccessful. At night, Russian troops broke out of the encirclement and went to the east. Tank troops were not suitable for such an operation, especially in the swampy area adjacent to the Dnieper.

On July 13, the headquarters of Field Marshal Kluge moved from Borisov to Tolochin. There we were visited by the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, General Oshima. We were ordered to take every precaution to keep him out of trouble. However, he insisted that he be shown the Dnieper near Orsha, where the ambassador came under heavy enemy artillery fire. But Oshima survived, and proud as Petrushka, returning to our headquarters, he showed Field Marshal von Kluge his samurai saber.

On July 10, the 29th Motorized Division captured Smolensk, the most important of the Russian cities so far in our hands. On July 24 we moved forward. Our headquarters were now camped in tents in the woods southwest of Smolensk, just a few kilometers from the front line. Not far from us was the old road along which Napoleon went to Moscow.

We lost precious weeks in late July and early August as our high command contemplated the best strategy for us. I have already said above that Hitler sought to achieve economic goals: he wanted to seize the Ukraine, the Donets Basin and, finally, the Caucasus. These areas were in the offensive zone of Army Group South. Hitler's secondary goal was to capture Leningrad, which at that phase of the campaign seemed about to fall and which in all likelihood would have fallen if Hitler had not repeated the mistake of Dunkirk. He ordered Field Marshal von Leeb to stop the German tanks in front of Leningrad

Hitler was least interested in Moscow. According to his original plan, Army Group Center was to stop on the line of the river. Desna and to the north, to transfer most of their forces to Army Group South and this year to stop any offensive actions in the direction of Moscow. Therefore, the 4th Panzer Army was disbanded, and the headquarters of Field Marshal von Kluge was transferred to the reserve. The two tank groups now reported directly to the commander of Army Group Center. It was proposed that Guderian's tank group and the new field army be subordinated to Kluge. It was assumed that this formation would advance in a southeasterly direction in the offensive zone of Army Group South in order to defeat the large enemy forces concentrated there.

The commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Field Marshal Brauchitsch and his chief of staff, General Halder, did not approve of this plan. Brauchitsch insisted that Army Group Center move directly to Moscow, the capture of which he saw as the main goal of the entire campaign. Field Marshal von Bock and the headquarters of Army Group Center shared this view. Field Marshal von Kluge preferred to act in accordance with Hitler's strategic plan. These disagreements led to sharp clashes. That is why the final decision was delayed for several weeks.

Meanwhile, heavy fighting broke out between the Dnieper and the Desna, between the Western Dvina and the upper reaches of the Dnieper. Gradually, our troops entrenched themselves on a fairly solid defense line along the river. Desna east of Roslavl and Yelnya and west of Dorogobuzh. This line, which was a continuation of the line defended by the 9th Army located somewhat to the north, was held by the troops of the old 4th Army. The 4th Army was restored, and Field Marshal von Kluge again became its commander. Now we were responsible for holding the defense along the Desna.

During the second half of August and throughout September, the 4th Army fought on the line of the Desna, and the 9th Army defended itself on the right bank of the Dnieper north of Dorogobuzh. To the south of us, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group fought with the 2nd Army, while Gotha's 3rd Panzer Group acted in cooperation with the 9th Army. Lacking sufficient tank support, we were forced to switch to positional defense along the Desna, which required a large number troops. The Russians launched furious counterattacks and increasingly broke through our thin line of defense. In a critical situation, only tank units saved us. During these battles, we made sure that in modern war the support of tanks is necessary for the infantry not only in the offensive, but also in defense.

When I say that our line of defense was thin, I am by no means exaggerating. The divisions defended the strip along the front for about 30 kilometers. In addition, in the course of hostilities, especially in the Yelnya region, most of the divisions suffered heavy losses and were now incomplete. As for tactical reserves, they simply did not exist.

The disagreements between Hitler and his top military advisers were not only about strategy, but also about tactics. In combat operations designed to encircle large enemy forces, we captured many prisoners and large trophies. Still, the results were not as significant as it might seem at first glance. Firstly, to encircle large enemy formations, large tank forces were required; secondly, such an encirclement of the enemy rarely ended successfully, since large groups of Russians often slipped out of the boilers and went east. Therefore, Hitler insisted on encircling small groups of the enemy, believing that this tactic would be more successful.

In September, the question of a future strategy was finally decided. The option proposed by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch was adopted. So, we are going to Moscow. The question now was whether we could, with our weak forces, capture the still distant capital before the harsh Russian winter set in. We had to pay dearly for the fruitless arguments that occupied several weeks of August and all of September.

Finally, the order was received. Army Group Center was to advance on Moscow. The start of the operation was scheduled for October 2. So the die is cast great battle it's about to start. The overture to it was to be the battle for Vyazma.

Battle for Vyazma

While the German high command was arguing about what to do, the Russians built a new defensive line along the upper reaches of the Dnieper and Desna, that is, just in front of the front of Army Group Center. This line was the outer ring of the defensive system that covered Moscow.

Our task is to break through this line of defense, carry out a double encirclement of the enemy, and enter Moscow before the onset of winter.

Our troops were deployed as follows. The 2nd Army, located in the Bryansk region and south of it, together with the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian attached to it, was supposed to strike in the direction of Orel and, having captured it, move north. On the left was Kluge's 4th Army with the Hoepner Panzer Group attached to it. The left flank of the 4th Army ran along the upper reaches of the Dnieper east of Smolensk. This army, reinforced with tanks, was supposed to deliver the main blow to Moscow. To the north of the upper reaches of the Dnieper was the 9th army of Strauss with the tank group Gotha attached to it. As in previous battles east of the Bug, the tank groups of Hoepner and Hoth were concentrated on the outer flanks of the field armies. These tank formations were to move first to the east, and then turn towards each other in order to encircle Vyazma. The field armies had to repeat their old tactics, which had always proved successful before. This tactic, as mentioned above, consisted of encircling small enemy groupings inside a huge encirclement ring created by tank formations. As soon as the flares close, the tank groups, ignoring the battle with the surrounded enemy, which will certainly flare up in the cauldron in the Vyazma region, will have to continue to move towards Moscow at maximum speed.

The offensive began in the early morning of October 2. The armies of Kluge and Strauss, reinforced by panzer groups, attacked the enemy with truly remarkable accuracy. The troops acted exactly according to the plans developed by the General Staff. In this battle, conducted as an exercise and taking place between 2 and 13 October, Army Group Center captured 650,000 prisoners, 5,000 guns and 1,200 tanks. Truly astronomical figures!

The same losses were suffered by the Russians in the sectors of Army Groups North and South. It is not surprising that Hitler, the high command and the troops believed that the material and human resources of the Red Army were coming to an end. As the prisoners informed us, this offensive, undertaken at such a late time of the year, was a complete surprise for the Russians. It seemed that Moscow was about to fall. Everyone in Army Group Center became big optimists. From Field Marshal von Bock to the soldier, everyone hoped that soon we would be marching through the streets of the Russian capital. Hitler even created a special sapper team that was supposed to destroy the Kremlin. And yet, one can only regret that the Minister of Propaganda found it appropriate to make a pompous statement that the war in the East, they say, was won, and the Red Army was actually destroyed.

In order to clearly imagine the dimensions of the impending catastrophe, it is necessary to outline what the mental state of our commanders and troops was at that moment. Starting from June 22, the German army went forward from victory to victory and, despite bad roads and bad weather, covered a huge distance from the Bug to the outskirts of Moscow. Since most of the army moved on foot with a horse-drawn convoy, one march of our troops can be considered a feat. And all this was done within a mere three and a half months, of which we sat idle for several weeks while the high command discussed questions of higher strategy. On October 12, when the battle for Vyazma was basically over (only scattered pockets of Russian resistance remained), we could look with pride at our past and with confidence - into the future.

In mid-October, all German armies launched an offensive against Moscow. Our headquarters, which was in Roslavl when the battle for Vyazma began, on October 6 was redeployed to Spas-Demensk, and on October 10 to Yukhnov. A few days later, the entire Army Group Center began to move east. Between us and the Russian capital was the so-called "Moscow defensive position." We had no reason to believe that this nut would be difficult to crack. If we manage to take these positions, the way to Moscow, as we believed, will be open.

Mood change

When we came close to Moscow, the mood of our commanders and troops suddenly changed dramatically. It was with surprise and disappointment that we discovered in October and early November that the defeated Russians had by no means ceased to exist as a military force. In recent weeks, enemy resistance has intensified, and the tension of the fighting has increased every day. Command of the Russian troops covering Moscow was now taken over by Marshal Zhukov. In a few weeks, his troops created a defense in depth, which passed through the forest adjacent to the river. Nara, from Serpukhov in the south to Naro-Fominsk and further north. Carefully camouflaged strongholds, barbed wire and large minefields now filled the huge forest that covered the western approaches to the capital.

From the remnants of armies battered in heavy battles, as well as fresh units and formations Russian command formed new strong armies. Moscow workers were drafted into the army. New army corps arrived from Siberia. Most of the foreign embassies and missions, as well as part of the Russian government, were evacuated from Moscow to the east. But Stalin, with his small headquarters, remained in the capital, which he firmly decided not to surrender. All this was a complete surprise to us. We did not believe that the situation could have changed so much after our decisive victories, when the capital seemed to be almost in our hands. The troops now recalled with indignation the pompous statements of our Propaganda Ministry in October.

Sarcastic remarks began to be heard at the military leaders sitting in Berlin. The troops believed that it was time for political leaders to visit the front and see with their own eyes what was happening there. The soldiers were overworked, and the units, especially the infantry, were not fully manned. In most infantry companies, the number of personnel reached only 60-70 people. The troops suffered heavy losses in the horse composition, and now it became difficult to transfer guns. In tank divisions, the number of combat-ready tanks was much less than the regular strength. Considering that the war with Russia was essentially over, Hitler ordered a reduction in the production of military materials by industry. At the front, in combat units, scanty replenishment now arrived. Winter was supposed to start soon, but we didn’t hear about winter uniforms.

Too stretched communication lines barely ensured the delivery of the necessary supplies to our troops. It was necessary to remake the gauges of the Russian railways, which were wider than the gauges of the railways in Western Europe. Deep in our rear, in vast forested and swampy areas, the first partisan detachments. We did not have sufficient forces and means to fight them. They attacked convoys and trains with supplies, forcing our troops at the front to endure great hardships.

The memory of Napoleon's Grand Army haunted us like a ghost. The book of memoirs of Napoleonic General Caulaincourt, which always lay on Field Marshal von Kluge's desk, became his bible. There were more and more coincidences with the events of 1812. But these elusive omens paled in comparison with the period of mud, or, as it is called in Russia, mudslides, which now followed us like a plague.

Of course, we knew that we were in for a thaw - we had to read about it in books. But the reality has surpassed the saddest fears. The mudslide began in mid-October, during the fighting in the Vyazma region, and continuously intensified until mid-November. What is the Russian thaw, it is impossible to tell a person who himself has never encountered it. There are only a few highways in this corner of the world. The entire territory of the country is covered with impassable sticky mud. An infantryman slips on roads soaked with water. Many horses must be harnessed to haul guns. All wheeled vehicles are deeply immersed in viscous mud. Even tractors move with great difficulty. Many heavy guns got stuck on the roads and therefore were not used in the Moscow battle. Tanks and other tracked vehicles were often sucked in with mud. Now it is not difficult to imagine what strain our already exhausted, exhausted troops were subjected to.

And suddenly a new, no less unpleasant surprise fell upon us. During the battle for Vyazma, the first Russian T-34 tanks appeared. In 1941, these tanks were the most powerful tanks in existence at that time. Only tanks and artillery could fight them. The 37 mm and 50 mm anti-tank guns, which were then in service with our infantry, were helpless against the T-34 tanks. These guns could only hit old Russian tanks. Thus, the infantry divisions were faced with a serious problem, . As a result of the appearance of this new tank in the Russians, the infantrymen were completely defenseless. At least a 75 mm gun was required, but it had yet to be created. In the Vereya area, T-34 tanks passed through the battle formations of the 7th Infantry Division as if nothing had happened, reached the artillery positions and literally crushed the guns located there. It is clear what effect this fact had on the morale of the foot soldiers. The so-called "tank fear" began.

We already knew about the order of Marshal Timoshenko, given to encourage his troops after many defeats. This order listed the weaknesses of the German troops. Timoshenko explained that the main strength of the Germans was in their technical skills and weapons. One by one, the German soldier is weaker than the Russian, the marshal wrote, he gets nervous and becomes timid when he has to fight at night, in the forest or on swampy terrain. In these types of combat, the Russian soldier is much stronger than the German. All this, of course, is not entirely accurate. If it were so, we would not be standing at the gates of Moscow. Yet Tymoshenko's order contained a grain of truth. The civilized European is inferior in many respects to the stronger man of the East, tempered by close communion with nature.

Our aircraft performed excellently. However, now the number of combat-ready aircraft has decreased, and there were not enough landing sites near the front line, especially during the thaw. The number of accidents during landing and takeoff of aircraft has increased dramatically. And Russian aviation has so far almost never appeared in the air.

On October 26, Field Marshal von Kluge moved his headquarters from Yukhnov to the Maloyaroslavets area, closer to his troops. Later, during the great Russian counter-offensive, his staff was nearly taken prisoner. By the way, in 1812 Napoleon passed through Maloyaroslavets.

By the end of October, the weakened sector of our front ran along the Oka from Aleksin and to the north, then along the river. Nara to Naro-Fominsk, then turned to the north-west and crossed the highway leading to Moscow through Ruza and Volokolamsk. This front line, at least temporarily, represented the frontier of the greatest advance of the German troops, as our offensive capacity was exhausted. Our troops were weakened and tired. Russian armies occupied a defense in depth in the forests surrounding Moscow. Part of our artillery got stuck in the mud somewhere between Vyazma and p. Hapa. But Moscow was not far away. At night it was visible how the shells of Russian anti-aircraft artillery were exploding over the capital. What should have happened?

Meeting in Orsha

In November, the chief of the general staff convened for a meeting in Orsha the chiefs of staff of the three army groups, as well as all the armies that participated in the battles on the Eastern Front. The fateful question on the agenda was whether the German armies should dig in along the then-existing front line and wait until favorable weather arrived in the spring, or continue the offensive in the winter.

The representative of Army Group South (its commander was Field Marshal Rundstedt) opposed further offensive operations and insisted on going on the defensive. Army Group North was so weakened that there was nothing to think about carrying out offensive operations in its area. Representatives of Army Group Center spoke out in favor of making a last attempt to capture Moscow. As soon as the Russian capital was in our hands, they said, individual tank divisions should be sent east of the city in order to cut off the main railways connecting Moscow with Siberia.

Opinions were divided. Of course, the prospect of entering the Kremlin could not fail to attract us, but many doubted the ability of our weakened troops to carry out a decisive blow.

last try

After this meeting, the issue of an attack on Moscow was discussed in detail with the commanders of units and formations. Field Marshal von Kluge repeatedly visited his units at the forefront and was interested in the opinion of non-commissioned officers.

As for our manpower and military equipment, we continued to receive minor additions to personnel and weapons. But since October, the divisions have had a little rest in their positions, held in the vicinity of Moscow. Only the right flank of the army was subjected to continuous enemy attacks in the Serpukhov area and along the Podolsk-Maloyaroslavets road. There were few of our troops on this flank, and they hardly repelled enemy attacks. The army commanders discussed the situation for hours on end. And so the final decision was made - to make the last attempt to deliver a decisive blow to Moscow. The High Command considered it possible to start the operation only after it freezes.

Troop disposition

The attack on Moscow was planned to be carried out by the troops of the 4th Army of von Kluge, which was strengthened in connection with this.

Our right flank, from the Oka to the Nara, was covered by weak forces. South of the Oka, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, attached to the 2nd Army, was to advance to Tula and further northeast. The main forces of the 4th Army were concentrated along the river. Nara, between the road Podolsk - Maloyaroslavets and the highway Moscow-Smolensk North of this highway and the river. Moscow, more precisely, between Ruza and Volokolamsk, concentrated the 4th Panzer Group of General Gepner attached to Kluge's 4th Army.

The experience of past combat operations showed that close interaction between tank and infantry formations gives a good result, and therefore several infantry corps were subordinated to the Gepner tank group.

The plan of the operation was as follows: the reinforced 4th Panzer Group was to strike in a northerly direction, to the left of the Moscow-Smolensk highway, then turn east and attack Moscow from the west and northwest. At this time, the 4th Army, having crossed the river. Nara, with its offensive actions, was supposed to tie down significant enemy forces on this sector of the front.

Last offensive

By mid-November, the period of mud was over, and the first frosts heralded the onset of winter. Now combat vehicles and vehicles of all kinds could move along roads and flat terrain. Far away in our rear, tractors pulled heavy guns out of the frozen mud, which were thrown one by one to the front line. However, it often happened that, pulling out tools from hardened mud, they were literally torn to pieces.

In the first days, the offensive of the 4th Panzer Group developed successfully. With heavy fighting, the enemy slowly retreated to the east. To the north, the 3rd Panzer Group of Colonel General Reinhardt was advancing. Both of these tank groups were subordinate to the commander of the 4th Army, Field Marshal von Kluge. Thus, under his command were 11 army corps, or 35 divisions, of which nine were armored. True, these were incomplete formations: there were not enough people and weapons.

Around November 20, the weather suddenly turned bad, and already through the night we experienced all the horrors of the Russian winter. The thermometer suddenly dropped to -30 o C. A sharp cold snap was accompanied by heavy snowfall. A few days later we were bitterly convinced that the Russian winter had begun. With increasing difficulties, the pace of advance of both tank groups slowed down, but still they continued to make their way to Moscow. Throwing their last reserves into battle, they captured Klin and went to the Moscow-Volga canal. In this area, their northern flank was suddenly attacked by fresh Russian units.

IN last days November, our advanced units advancing on Moscow reached Ozeretskoye, and reconnaissance units of tank units penetrated even into the western outskirts of Moscow. This exhausted the offensive power of both our tank groups.

Such was the situation on the evening of November 28, when Colonel General Gepner asked Field Marshal von Kluge to order the advance of the troops of the 4th Army located along the river. Nara. This offensive, Hoepner believed, would ease the pressure exerted by the enemy on both tank groups and force the Russian command to transfer part of its forces from their sector to the area of ​​​​operations of the 4th Army. After discussing this request in detail with me as with his chief of staff, on November 29, the field marshal gave the order to go on the offensive. The attack began the next morning. The main blow was inflicted on Naro-Fominsk. The tank corps supported the southern wing of the advancing army. A few days after the start of the offensive, the infantry in several places broke through the enemy's defense in depth in the forest along the river. Nara. However, by December 2 it became clear that the troops at our disposal were clearly not enough to fulfill the task assigned to them. Only the reconnaissance battalion of the 258th Infantry Division managed to find a gap in the Russian defenses. He moved forward throughout the night and almost reached the southwestern outskirts of Moscow. However, early in the morning of December 3, it was attacked by Russian tanks and detachments of Moscow workers.

The field marshal decided to suspend the offensive, the prospects of which, in the current situation, became hopeless and which could only lead to unnecessary losses. The troops of the 4th Army, located south of the highway, were ordered to retreat to their previous positions located beyond the river. Nara. The withdrawal was successful. The enemy pursued our troops with great caution.

In that situation, the decision of Field Marshal von Kluge must be considered correct. A few days later, Marshal Zhukov threw the Russian troops into a powerful counteroffensive. Launched on December 6, it was directed against two tank groups located northeast of Moscow. This was the turning point of our Eastern campaign - hopes to get Russia out of the war in 1941 failed at the very last minute.

Now it was important for the political leaders of Germany to understand that the days of the blitzkrieg had sunk into the past. We were confronted by an army far superior in fighting qualities to any other armies we had ever encountered on the battlefield. But it should be said that the German army also demonstrated high moral stamina in overcoming all the disasters and dangers that befell it.

It was clear to every soldier of the German army that our life or death depended on the outcome of the battle for Moscow. If the Russians defeat us here, we will have no more hope. In 1812, Napoleon nevertheless managed to return to France with the miserable remnants of his defeated Grand Army. In 1941, the Germans had to either survive or be destroyed. At that time, Russian propaganda was reduced to dropping leaflets from airplanes with a boring, crudely executed image of the snow-covered Russian steppes littered with the corpses of German soldiers. This propaganda did not make the proper impression on our troops. The four battalions of French volunteers operating as part of the 4th Army proved to be less resilient. At Borodin, Field Marshal von Kluge addressed them with a speech, recalling how, in the time of Napoleon, the French and Germans fought here side by side against a common enemy. The next day, the French boldly went into battle, but, unfortunately, they could not withstand either the powerful attack of the enemy, or the severe frost and snowstorm. They had never had to endure such trials before. The French legion was defeated, having suffered heavy losses from enemy fire and frost. A few days later he was taken to the rear and sent to the West.

Position of the armies

Before proceeding to consider further hostilities, it is necessary to talk about the German and Russian troops that participated in the battle near Moscow in 1941, as well as about the conditions in which the Moscow battle took place.

On our front, limited visibility was set for only a few hours a day. Until 9 o'clock in the morning, the surroundings were usually shrouded in thick fog. The sun gradually broke through, and only by 11 o'clock in the afternoon could something be seen. At 15 o'clock dusk set in, and an hour later it became dark again. In the Maloyaroslavets area, we had an airfield, where transport planes from Smolensk, Orsha and Warsaw occasionally arrived. They brought in reinforcements, but not enough to compensate for the daily losses. The soldiers arriving by plane were dressed in long trousers and lace-up boots. Often they did not have overcoats and blankets. Transport divisions were waiting for replenishment at the airfields and immediately transferred them to the front, where they were felt the most urgent need. Often they were at the front on the same night. Thus, people who only two days ago lived in the cozy barracks of Warsaw, after 48 hours, ended up on the Moscow front, which had already begun to disintegrate.

Even at the end of the summer, when Field Marshal von Brauchitsch realized that the war in the East would continue into the winter, he urged Hitler to prepare the necessary winter equipment for our troops in time. Hitler refused to take sound advice, as he was firmly convinced that the Russians could be defeated before the onset of cold weather. Now, even at Hitler's headquarters, they suddenly realized that the war in Russia, in fact, was just beginning and that, no matter how terrible it was, they would have to fight almost without winter clothes. Hitler began to give categorical orders for the urgent dispatch of warm clothing to the Eastern Front. In Germany, the collection of fur and other warm clothes was carried out everywhere. But it's too late! To deliver the collected clothes to the troops, it took not days or even weeks, but whole months. Thus, the soldiers were destined to spend their first winter in Russia in heavy fighting, having only summer uniforms, overcoats and blankets. Everything that was available in the occupied regions of Russia - felt boots, fur hats and woolen uniforms - was requisitioned, but turned out to be a drop in the ocean and almost did not alleviate the situation of the huge mass of our soldiers.

With the supply of troops, things were not very good. Only a few railways approached our area of ​​operations, and they were often cut by partisans. In the steam boilers of steam locomotives, not adapted to the conditions of the Russian climate, water froze. Each locomotive could only pull half the usual number of wagons. Many of them, covered with snow and ice, stood idle for days at dead ends of railway stations. Our huge need for artillery shells was met with difficulty. At the same time, to cheer up the soldiers, whole trains with red wine were delivered from France and Germany to the Eastern Front. Of course, you can imagine what a disgusting feeling arose among the soldiers and officers when, instead of shells, without which the troops literally suffocated, they were brought wine. However, wine often ended up at the front in an unusable form: during transportation it froze, the bottles burst, and only pieces of red ice remained from it.

Our defensive positions were almost devoid of cover. This affected the tactics of both sides, who fought stubborn battles for the capture of settlements, where one could find at least some shelter from the terrible cold. However, in the end, such tactics led to the fact that both sides subjected these villages to artillery fire and set fire to wooden houses and houses with thatched roofs, depriving the enemy of basic amenities. There was no point in digging into the ground and trying - the ground hardened like iron.

The harsh climate also had an effect on weapons. The lubricant on the weapon thickened so that it was often impossible to open the bolt, and we did not have glycerin or special oils that could be used in low temperatures. We had to maintain low fire under the tanks at night so that the engines would not freeze and fail. Often the tanks slid over the frozen ground and rolled downhill.

Probably this short description helped the reader to get an idea of ​​the conditions in which the German army had to fight in the winter of 1941/42.

The Russians were in better conditions. Most importantly, the intense cold was not new to them - they were used to it. In addition, Moscow was immediately behind them. Consequently, supply lines were short. The personnel of most Russian units were provided with fur coats, padded jackets, felt boots and fur hats with earflaps. The Russians had gloves, mittens and warm underwear. On the railways, the Russians ran steam locomotives designed to operate them in Siberia, at low temperatures. Russian trucks and tanks, like ours, were uncomfortable, but not to such an extent, they were better adapted to Russian conditions than ours. Until now, we have not yet seen much Russian aircraft, although at that time the front line passed only a few minutes of flight from Moscow airfields. Such were the conditions when, on December 6, Marshal Zhukov launched a powerful counteroffensive on the Moscow front, fatal to us.

Russian counteroffensive

Fierce fighting on the outskirts of Moscow, which almost led to the collapse of most of the German front, chronologically, in order to better understand the events that took place, can be combined into separate series of battles. To disassemble them in detail, it would be necessary to write a whole book. But in order to understand the battle for Moscow as a whole, they should be considered in general terms. Strictly speaking, the Moscow battle continued until mid-April 1942.

The Russian counter-offensive began with the fact that the superior forces of the Russians struck north of Moscow. They crossed the Moscow-Volga Canal from the east towards Klin and attacked the left flank of General Reinhardt's tank group in the area south of the Volga lakes. At the same time, they also attacked the 4th Panzer Group, located to the south. A particularly strong blow was delivered from the Moscow area in a western direction along the Moscow-Smolensk highway at the junction of the 4th Panzer Group and the 4th Army. In those bad conditions, the German armored forces could not withstand the overwhelming pressure of the Russians and were forced to slowly retreat, continuing to fight hard in deep snow and hoping to restore a united front further to the west. During the retreat, we left a lot of heavy weapons. Roads rare in these places, covered with a thick layer of snow, often turned out to be impassable for our guns and tanks. In battles with the enemy, we suffered heavy losses, but even more were the losses from the frost. Especially often, the soldiers frostbitten their feet, as uncomfortable, tight-fitting shoes made it impossible to wear more than one pair of socks. In the end, even Hitler was forced to agree to the withdrawal of two tank groups. In mid-December, the Russian offensive expanded to the south. New attacks were made against the 4th Army between Serpukhov and Tuchkovo. Here the enemy has so far managed to achieve only local successes, and the 4th Army has managed to hold the general front line.

A great threat loomed over the southern sector of the front of the 4th Army. Here, the 2nd Panzer Army of Guderian (the former 2nd Panzer Group), battered in previous battles, was attacked by superior enemy forces. The Russians launched a strong offensive in the Tula region, which the 2nd Panzer Army was unable to delay. One group of Russian troops continued to advance to the west, while the other turned to the northwest in the direction of Kaluga. Russian troops stationed in the Tarusa-Aleksin region also went on the offensive. Here again one of their groups rushed to the west, while the other turned to the north-west in the direction of Maloyaroslavets and Medyn.

The intentions of the Russians were clear. They planned a wide double encirclement of the 4th Army by striking in the north and south. Their ultimate goal was to encircle and destroy this army in its positions west of Moscow. The German command almost did not hope to avoid the encirclement and defeat of the huge southern group. The Russians slowly widened the gap between the 2nd Panzer and 4th Field Armies. Field Marshal von Kluge had no reserves to deal with the danger looming over his southern flank. Moreover, only one road connected the 4th Army with the rear. It passed through Yukhnov, Medyn, Maloyaroslavets and Podolsk. All other roads in the army area disappeared under a thick snow cover. If the Russians, advancing from the south, managed to capture our only vital artery, the 4th Army would be finished.

"4th Army will fight!"

The situation was such that the command of Army Group Center had to think about organizing a systematic withdrawal of the entire reinforced 4th Army in a westerly direction. The need for this logically followed from the fact that the 2nd Panzer Army, located to the south, was forced to retreat behind the Oka in the Belev area. A line was drawn on the map, passing roughly from Belev through Yukhnov on the river. Ugra, to Gzhatsk and further north. The troops of the 4th Army were to withdraw to this line. An order was given to conduct a reconnaissance of the front line of defense. One motorized division has already set out for the Yukhnov area. Field Marshal von Kluge with his headquarters deliberately remained in Maloyaroslavets, although now the city was in serious danger. In mid-December, he summoned his corps commanders and their chiefs of staff to a meeting to discuss in detail the plan for the withdrawal of the 4th Army formations, which occupied the defense south of the Moscow-Smolensk highway. Everything seemed perfectly clear.

Suddenly, the Chief of Staff of Army Group Center, General von Greifenberg, my close friend, called. He wished to speak with the Chief of Staff of the 4th Army. I went to the phone. Greifenberg said: “Better stay where you are now. A new order from Hitler has just been received. The 4th Army must not retreat a single step."

The reader will understand what impression this order made on us. According to all calculations, it could only mean the defeat of the 4th Army. And yet he had to obey. Units and formations that had already withdrawn to the west were returned back. The 4th Army was preparing for its last battles. Now only a miracle could save her.

However, that was not all. At the most critical moment there was a cardinal replacement of some commanders by others.

Change of command

The commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock, had long suffered from a stomach ailment. Von Bock's physical condition had deteriorated sharply in connection with the defeat of his army group near Moscow, and now he had to at least temporarily transfer command of the army group to another person. Field Marshal von Kluge, a man of iron will, was appointed in his place. Leaving the 4th Army on December 18, he took command of the Army Group Center, whose headquarters was located in the forest west of Smolensk.

Thus, at the time of severe trials, the 4th Army was left without a commander. Kluge believed he could direct his old army by telephone and radio from Smolensk. Therefore, he sent me, as his former chief of staff, orders and instructions, for the implementation of which I was personally responsible. This situation continued until December 26, when the new commander, General of the Mountain Rifle Troops, Kübler, arrived at the headquarters of the 4th Army. For some time the commander of the army was General of the Panzer Troops Stumme.

It is not difficult to imagine how this change of commanders had a detrimental effect on the military operations of the army.

Even more significant changes took place in Berlin. The commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, had long been out of favor with Hitler. For several years he suffered from heart disease and could not stand the defeat of our troops near Moscow. Brauchitsch resigned, and Hitler became the absolute commander in chief of the ground forces. His only adviser, although without any rights, was the chief of the general staff, General Halder, who remained in his post after this purge.

Hitler believed that he alone could save his army from the catastrophe that was inevitably approaching near Moscow. And frankly speaking, he really achieved it.

His fanatical order, obliging the troops to hold fast in every position and in the most unfavorable conditions, was, of course, correct. Hitler instinctively realized that any retreat across the snow and ice in a few days would lead to the collapse of the entire front, and then German army would have suffered the same fate as Napoleon's Grand Army. The division was not allowed to retreat more than 5-10 kilometers in one night. More could not be demanded from the troops and horse-drawn transport in those incredibly difficult conditions. Since all the roads were covered with snow, they had to retreat through open areas. After several nights of such a retreat, the soldiers were so exhausted that, stopping, they simply lay down on the snow and froze. In the rear there were no pre-prepared positions where the troops could withdraw, and there were no defensive lines to be held.

Thus, over the course of many weeks, the battlefield slowly moved westward. Stubbornly defending, our armies gradually retreated. The Russians broke through our defenses several times, but we always found the strength to restore the front line again. The number of company personnel in most cases was reduced to 40 people. We have suffered heavy losses in military equipment. Until the end of December, the threat looming over the left flank of the army was seen as the main danger.

But luck smiled at Hitler. Although the enemy was much stronger than us, the pace of his offensive began to slow down. Undoubtedly, the Russians were disappointed that they had not yet achieved the collapse of the German front west of Moscow. They were surprised by the resilience of the badly battered German divisions fighting in a harsh climate.

The Russian command ruthlessly sent its troops forward. In Maloyaroslavets, a few days before Christmas, we intercepted reports transmitted by radio, which it is not without interest to reproduce here. The Russian commander of the regiment reported on the radio: “Now it is impossible to continue the offensive. It is necessary to stay at the reached milestone for twelve hours. The response of the senior commander was: “Attack the enemy immediately. If you don't, blame yourself."

Something like a miracle happened on the southern flank of the 4th Army. It was not clear to us why the Russians, despite their advantage in this sector of the front, did not cut the Yukhyov-Maloyaroslavets road and did not deprive the 4th Army of its only supply route. At night, Belov's cavalry corps, which caused us so much trouble in the second half of December, advanced in our rear towards Yukhnov. This corps reached our vital communications, but fortunately did not cut it. He continued to move in a westerly direction and disappeared somewhere in the huge Bogoroditsky swamps.

At the end of December 1941, the headquarters of the 4th Army was still in Maloyaroslavets. On Christmas Eve, fighting went on all night near our headquarters. Between us and the Russians was only the 19th Panzer Division, called up from the front, in which there were only 50 tanks.

During these weeks, the air force could not provide us with such effective support as before. Back in November, the most combat-ready units of Kesselring's 2nd Air Fleet were transferred to North Africa, where Field Marshal Rommel's troops were defeated.

On December 25, the headquarters of the 4th Army moved to Yukhnov at the very last moment. By December 22, the 4th and 3rd Panzer Groups were withdrawn from the 4th Army. Now the 4th Army could only rely on its own forces.

Comparative data on the forces and means of the German and Russian troops as of the end of December are very instructive. The 4th Army, which occupied the defense between Kaluga and Tuchkovo, consisted of 13 infantry and one tank division. However, these formations were so understaffed that many divisions were, in fact, battle groups consisting of units various genera troops. The following Russian formations were concentrated in front of the front of the 4th Army: 24 rifle divisions, three tank and two airborne brigades. The bulk of these forces operated on the southern flank of the 4th Army. South of Kaluga, six more rifle divisions, one tank brigade, and four cavalry divisions advanced westward. Three rifle, one motorized, two tank divisions and two tank brigades were concentrated in the Tula area.

These numbers speak for themselves. True, not all Russian divisions were staffed according to the states of wartime. Some of them were certainly very weak. They differed greatly both in organization and combat capability. The Russians were inexhaustible in various inventions. For example, cavalry divisions were often accompanied by infantry on sledges. Sledges were tied with ropes to the saddles of cavalrymen. It was strange to see how on a clear moonlit night long columns of horsemen moved across the snow, each of which was followed by an infantryman on a sledge.

Our losses in weapons and military equipment were as great as the losses in people, and perhaps even exceeded them. An example of this is the condition of the artillery of the 4th Army in early January 1942. In this case, we mean the artillery of army subordination. Before our retreat, it included: 48 heavy howitzers, 36 mortars, 48 ​​100-mm and nine 150-mm guns, 84 assault guns and 252 heavy and light tractors. Now we have five heavy howitzers, eight mortars, 17 l00-mm and two 150-mm guns, 12 assault guns and 22 tractors.

Fighting in early 1942

Despite the huge superiority in forces, the Russians were unable to achieve the collapse of the German front west of Moscow by the end of 1941. But this in no way meant that the acute crisis had passed. During the first three months In 1942, a serious danger repeatedly loomed over the 4th Army.

In January, the thermometer dropped to minus 42 Celsius. This only lasted a few days, then the temperature rose. Here I cannot describe in detail the battles that took place then, although in the aggregate they are part of the huge battle of Moscow. Those were terrible months. Later, Hitler ordered the casting of the "Eastern Medal", which was issued to everyone who took part in heavy fighting on the Eastern Front in the winter of 1941/42. This medal was then considered and is now considered as a sign of high distinction.

On December 26, a staunch soldier, General of the Mountain Rifle Troops Kübler, became commander of the 4th Army. After a few weeks, he came to the conclusion that he was incapable of commanding an army in such a difficult environment. In the second half of January he was replaced by General Heinrici, who had been in command of the 4th Army for a long time.

Conclusion

The campaign in Russia, and especially its turning point - the Battle of Moscow, dealt the first strong blow to Germany both politically and militarily. In the West, that is, in our rear, there could no longer be any talk of the much-needed peace with England. As for North Africa, we have failed here. A tense situation has developed in the Mediterranean region. German troops were in Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, Greece and the Balkans.

Even a glance at the map of the world, it was not difficult to understand that the small area in Central Europe, occupied by Germany, clearly could not put up forces capable of capturing and holding the entire European continent. Because of Hitler's policies, the German people and their armed forces were step by step getting further and further into a dead end.

It is appropriate to recall the last years of the reign of Alexander the Great, when his small army advanced into the depths of Asia until the situation forced the king to abandon his intentions. Or the Swedish king Charles XII, who in 1709 reached Poltava, where his small army was defeated by the Russians. Incidentally, Army Group South passed through Poltava in the summer of 1941.

But the closest parallel can be drawn with Emperor Napoleon. A child of the French Revolution, he believed he could conquer all of Europe. And here, in Russia, in the fire of burning Moscow, Nemesis overtook him. We will return to this parallel a bit later. It is often asked: could the Germans have won this war if they had succeeded in capturing Moscow? This is a purely academic question, and no one can answer it with complete certainty. I personally believe that even if we captured Moscow, the war would still be far from a successful conclusion. Russia is so vast, and the Russian government was so determined, that the war, taking on new forms, would continue in the vast expanses of the country. The least evil we could expect is guerrilla war widely deployed throughout European Russia. We should not forget about the vast expanses in Asia, which are also Russian territory.

One thing is absolutely indisputable: German military leaders and German troops have achieved almost the seemingly impossible. The war in the East was the last test of our soldiers. In two world wars, they demonstrated their iron will, steadfastly enduring the harsh Russian conditions.

1812 and 1941

Before closing, I would like to draw a parallel between Napoleon's campaign in 1812 and the campaign of 1941, although from a historical point of view this is difficult to do, since the causes and circumstances of these wars are completely different. And yet, in my opinion, it would be interesting to compare them.

Napoleon was not a Frenchman, but an Italian from Corsica, which became part of France. Hitler was not a pure German, but an Austrian. Napoleon used the striking force created by the French Revolution and relied on the might of France. Hitler used the power of Germany. Napoleon, a child of the revolution, fought many wars and conquered all the countries of Europe one by one. Hitler followed in his footsteps. England was Napoleon's main target, and he was ready to launch an invasion from Boulogne. Operation Sea Lion in 1940 was little more than a political threat. The French fleet was defeated by the English, and Napoleon's dream of conquering England became unrealistic, so the emperor decided to harm the island kingdom by creating a system of continental blockade. Most of the countries of Europe were compelled to carry out this measure of Napoleon, and only Russia hesitated. This was one of the main reasons that forced Napoleon to declare war on Russia. Hitler started a war with Russia, intending to win a living space for Germany, destroy Bolshevism and become the master of Europe.

Both Napoleon and Hitler believed that their wars in Russia would end as quickly and successfully as many others they had fought before. Both of them misunderstood the internal forces and dimensions of Russia. Both of them were insufficiently prepared for war and did not take into account the difficulties of supplying their armies in this vast country. Many of Napoleon's marshals and generals disapproved of his war plan in 1812. The same was true of Hitler's war plan in 1941.

In 1812, Napoleon invaded Russia with an army of over 600,000 men (among them over 200,000 Germans, Flemings, Poles, Swiss, Spaniards, and Portuguese), 1,400 cannons, and 180,000 horses. Napoleon led an army of all Europe against Russia. Hitler tried to do the same. Although he did not succeed in doing this to the fullest, nevertheless, among his soldiers were Romanians, Hungarians, Italians, Slovaks, Finns, a Spanish division and a legion of French volunteers. On June 21, 1812, Napoleon addressed his troops with a pompous order. Before the start of the 1941 campaign, Hitler also gave a similar order. On the evening of June 22, 1812, the emperor watched the crossing of his soldiers across the river. Neman at Kovno. Hitler's armies crossed the Bug on the same day, exactly 129 years later. Napoleon began hostilities on 24 June. In both cases, the war in the East began too late.

As in 1812, so in 1941 the war was delayed by an unforeseen pause. The French emperor lost several precious weeks due to negotiations with the Russian tsar. Napoleon resumed his attack on Moscow at a relatively late time of the year, as did Hitler, on October 2, 1941. In 1812, the Russians retreated with stubborn, bloody battles, luring Napoleon into the depths of Russia and dragging out the war until winter. In 1812, the French emperor captured Moscow, but the war did not end there. On the contrary, from the Russian point of view, the war was just beginning. Hitler was unable to take Moscow, and only after that the enemy began to wage war for real. When Napoleon was forced to leave burning Moscow, he suffered his first major defeat. A similar situation developed in 1941. In both cases, at this stage, the Russians launched a powerful counteroffensive, and in both wars big role partisans played.

In 1812, Napoleon believed that by retreating through the snow and ice, he could save his army. However, it turned out the other way around - the retreat led to the defeat of his Great Army. In December 1941, Hitler ordered not to retreat under any circumstances. With gigantic efforts, the front was held, and the crisis was eventually overcome. Other historical parallels can be found, but, as we noted above, they should be treated with great caution.

1812 and 1941 proved that using such an old-fashioned vehicle like a horse, it is impossible to conquer the vast expanses of Russia in a short time. Neither Napoleon's fairly strong cavalry nor Hitler's motorized formations were large enough to seize and control vast Russian territory.

Before starting the war, Napoleon made one last attempt to convince the king to accept his demands. Count Narbonne was sent to Vilna to Tsar Alexander I. The king told the ambassador the following: “I am not blinded by dreams; I know to what extent Emperor Napoleon great commander, but on my side, as you can see, space and time. In all this land hostile to you there is not such a remote corner, wherever I retreat, there is not such a point that I would not defend before agreeing to make a shameful peace. I will not start a war, but I will not lay down arms as long as at least one enemy soldier remains in Russia.

Stalin's determination in 1941 was not inferior to that of the Tsar in 1812. The big difference between the two wars is that the emperor personally led his army to Moscow and back, which Hitler did not.

At the military council of the Russians in 1812, the question of whether to leave or not leave Moscow was discussed. Prince Kutuzov then said: “With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not lost. My first duty is to preserve the army and get closer to those troops that are coming to us for reinforcements. By the very concession of Moscow, we will prepare the death of the enemy. As long as the army exists and is able to resist the enemy, until then there will be hope of a happy end to the war, but after the destruction of the army, both Moscow and Russia are lost. I order you to retreat."

One can definitely assume that if the Germans had taken Moscow, the Soviets would have acted in exactly the same way.

It is interesting to recall that on October 21, 1812, Marshal Mortier received an order from Napoleon to blow up the Kremlin before the French retreated from Moscow. Hitler intended to do the same if he succeeded in capturing Moscow.

The great difficulties in supplying the troops in 1812 and 1941 have already been pointed out above. In 1941, the main problem was to supply the troops with ammunition and fuel. In 1812, it was very difficult to provide horses with fodder. Napoleon's 180 thousand horses could not exist on the meager feed that the Cossack horses were accustomed to. The cavalry of the French emperor suffered heavy losses in battles, and the death rate of horses continuously increased on large crossings.

After the battle at Borodino, the famous cavalryman Murat said, reproaching his generals, that the cavalry attacks were not energetic enough. To this, the cavalry general Nansouty replied: “The horses are to blame for everything - they are not patriotic enough.

Our soldiers fight brilliantly if they don’t even have bread, but horses don’t move without hay.”

There is a famous painting that depicts a thoughtful Napoleon on horseback. On the sandy Russian road, he rides east ahead of the columns of his guard. Below the painting are the words: "They grumbled - and yet they followed him!" This is the best description not only of 1812 but also of 1941, for there is no doubt that the German troops also did their best.