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The main efforts of Russian diplomacy were aimed at finding allies in Europe, getting out of isolation and the collapse of the anti-Russian bloc, which included France, England and Austria. The situation then prevailing in Europe played into the hands of Russia. Former allies in the anti-Russian coalition were torn apart by sharp disagreements, sometimes reaching wars.

The main efforts of Russia were aimed at rapprochement with France. In September 1857, Alexander II met with the French Emperor Napoleon III, and in February 1859 an agreement on Franco-Russian cooperation was signed. However, this union did not become long and lasting. And when the war broke out between France and Austria in April 1859, Russia evaded French help, thereby seriously undermining Franco-Russian relations. On the other hand, relations between Russia and Austria have improved significantly. By these actions, Gorchakov actually destroyed the anti-Russian alliance and brought Russia out of international isolation.

Polish uprising 1863-1864 and the attempts of England and France to intervene under the pretext of this uprising in the internal affairs of Russia caused an acute crisis, which ended in the rapprochement of Russia and Prussia, which allowed the persecution of Polish rebels on its territory. Subsequently, Russia took a position of benevolent neutrality towards Prussia during her wars against Austria (1866) and France (1870-1871).

Having enlisted the support of Prussia, Gorchakov launched an attack on the articles of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 that were unfavorable for Russia. In October 1870, in the midst of the Franco-Prussian War, he declared that Russia no longer considers itself bound by the obligations of the Paris Treaty in terms of "neutralization" Black Sea, which have been repeatedly violated by other powers. Despite the protests of England, Austria and Turkey, Russia set about creating a navy on the Black Sea, restoring the destroyed ones and building new military fortifications. Thus, this foreign policy task was also solved peacefully.

The defeat of France in the war with Prussia and the subsequent unification of Germany changed the balance of power in Europe. A powerful militant power appeared on the western borders of Russia. A particular threat was the alliance of Germany with Austria (since 1867 - Austria-Hungary). In order to prevent this alliance and at the same time neutralize England, irritated by Russia's successes in Central Asia, Gorchakov organized in 1873 a meeting of the emperors of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary. Under an agreement signed by the three monarchs, they pledged to provide each other with assistance, including military assistance. But when, 2 years after the signing of the agreement, Germany again set out to attack France, Russia, alarmed by the excessive strengthening of the Germans, opposed a new war. The Union of Three Emperors finally collapsed in 1878.

Thus, Alexander II managed to fulfill the main foreign policy task in the main European direction. Russia achieved the abolition of the most humiliating articles of the Paris Treaty and peacefully restored its former influence. This favorably affected the implementation of reforms and the end of wars in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Eastern crisis of the 70s. 19th century

Since 1864, the Port began to settle in Bulgaria here the Circassians, who were evicted from the Caucasus in order to avoid Russian domination. Accustomed to living in their homeland by robbery and robbery, called bashi-bazouks, they began to oppress the Bulgarian peasants, forcing them to work for themselves, like serfs. The ancient hatred between Christians and Muslims flared up with renewed vigor. The peasants took up arms. And so, in order to avenge this uprising, Turkey sent thousands of Circassians and other regular troops against Bulgaria. In Batak alone, out of 7,000 inhabitants, 5,000 people were beaten. An investigation undertaken by the French envoy showed that 20,000 Christians perished within three months. All Europe was indignant. But this feeling was most pronounced in Russia and in all the Slavic lands. Russian volunteers from all classes of society flocked to the aid of the rebels; The sympathy of society was expressed by all sorts of voluntary donations. Serbia was not successful due to the numerical superiority of the Turks.

Russian public attention loudly demanded war. Emperor Alexander II, in his characteristic peacefulness, wanted to avoid it and reach an agreement through diplomatic negotiations. But neither the Constantinople Conference (November 11, 1876) nor the London Protocol led to any results. Turkey refused to fulfill even the mildest demands, counting on the support of England. War became inevitable. On April 12, 1877, the Russian troops stationed near Chisinau were ordered to enter Turkey. On the same day, the Caucasian troops, whose commander-in-chief was appointed Prince Mikhail Nikolayevich, entered the borders of Asiatic Turkey. The Eastern War of 1877-1878 began, covering such a loud, unfading glory of the valor of the Russian soldier.

On April 12 (24), 1877, Russia declared war on Turkey: after the parade of troops in Chisinau, at a solemn prayer service, Bishop Pavel (Lebedev) of Chisinau and Khotinsky read the Manifesto of Alexander II declaring war on Turkey.

Only a one-campaign war enabled Russia to avoid European intervention. According to the reports of a military agent in England, it took London 13-14 weeks to prepare an expeditionary army of 50-60 thousand people, and another 8-10 weeks to prepare the Constantinople position. In addition, the army had to be transferred by sea, skirting Europe. In none of the Russian-Turkish wars did the time factor play such a significant role. Turkey pinned its hopes on a successful defense.

The plan for the war against Turkey was drawn up as early as October 1876 by General N. N. Obruchev. By March 1877, the project was corrected by the emperor himself, the Minister of War, Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich the Elder, his assistant of headquarters, General A. A. Nepokoichitsky, assistant chief of staff, Major General K. V. Levitsky. In May 1877, Russian troops entered the territory of Romania.

The troops of Romania, speaking on the side of Russia, began to act actively only in August.

In the course of the ensuing hostilities, the Russian army managed, using the passivity of the Turks, to successfully cross the Danube, capture the Shipka Pass and, after a five-month siege, force Osman Pasha's best Turkish army to surrender at Plevna. The subsequent raid through the Balkans, during which the Russian army defeated the last Turkish units blocking the road to Constantinople, led to the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the war. At the Berlin Congress held in the summer of 1878, the Berlin Treaty was signed, which fixed the return of the southern part of Bessarabia to Russia and the annexation of Kars, Ardagan and Batum. The statehood of Bulgaria was restored (it was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1396) as a vassal Principality of Bulgaria; the territories of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania increased, and the Turkish Bosnia and Herzegovina was occupied by Austria-Hungary.

The Treaty of San Stefano on February 19, 1878, in addition to its direct goal - the liberation of the Balkan Slavs, brought brilliant results to Russia. The intervention of Europe, which jealously followed the successes of Russia, with the Treaty of Berlin significantly narrowed the size of the occupied territory, but nevertheless they remain very significant. Russia acquired the Danubian part of Bessarabia and the Turkish regions bordering on Transcaucasia with the fortresses of Kars, Agdagan and Batum, turned into a free port.

Expansion of the geopolitical space of Russia and the annexation of Central Asia

In the early 60s. the voluntary acceptance of Russian citizenship by the Kazakhs ended. But their lands were still subject to raids from neighboring states: the Emirate of Bukhara, the Khiva and Kokand khanates. Kazakhs were captured and then sold into slavery. To prevent such actions along the Russian border, fortification systems began to be created. However, the raids continued, and the governor-generals of the border regions, on their own initiative, made retaliatory campaigns.

These campaigns, or, as they were called, expeditions, caused discontent in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It did not want to aggravate relations with England, which considered Central Asia to be its area of ​​influence. But the Ministry of War, seeking to restore the authority of the Russian army, shaken after the Crimean War, tacitly supported the actions of its military leaders. Yes, and Alexander II himself was not averse to expanding his possessions in the east. Central Asia was not only of military but also economic interest for Russia, both as a source of cotton for the textile industry and as a marketplace for Russian goods. Therefore, actions to annex Central Asia also found wide support in industrial and merchant circles.

In June 1865, Russian troops under the command of General M. G. Chernyaev, taking advantage of the war between Bukhara and Kokand, captured the largest city of Central Asia, Tashkent, and a number of other cities almost without loss. This provoked a protest from England, and Alexander II was forced to dismiss Chernyaev for "arbitrariness". But all the conquered lands were annexed to Russia. Here the Turkestan Governor-General (Turkestan Territory) was formed, the head of which the tsar appointed General K.P. Kaufman.

The haughty behavior of the Emir of Bukhara, who demanded the cleansing of the conquered Kokand territory by Russia and confiscated the property of Russian merchants living in Bukhara, as well as insulting the Russian mission sent to negotiate in Bukhara, led to a final break. On May 20, 1866, General Romanovsky with a 2,000-strong detachment inflicted the first crushing defeat on the Bukharians. However, small Bukhara detachments continued constant raids and attacks on Russian troops. In 1868, the famous city of Central Asia, Samarkand, was taken by General Kaufman. According to the peace treaty of June 23, 1868, the Bukhara Khanate was to cede border territories to Russia and become a vassal of the Russian government, which, in turn, supported it during times of unrest and unrest.

Since 1855, the Kirghiz and Kazakh tribes, subordinate to the khanate, began to pass into Russian citizenship, unable to endure the arbitrariness and lawlessness of the Kokand governors. This led to armed conflicts between the khanate and the Russian troops, for example, in 1850 an expedition was undertaken across the Ili River in order to destroy the Touchubek fortification, which served as a stronghold for K. gangs, but it was possible to capture it only in 1851, and in 1854 Vernoye fortification was built on the Almaty River (see) and the entire Trans-Ili Territory became part of Russia. In order to protect the Kazakhs, Russian subjects, the Orenburg military governor Obruchev built in 1847 the fortification of Raim (later Aral), near the mouth of the Syr Darya, and proposed to occupy the Ak-Mechet. In 1852, on the initiative of the new Orenburg governor Perovsky, Colonel Blaramberg, with a detachment of 500 people, destroyed two fortresses, Kumysh-Kurgan and Chim-Kurgan, and stormed the Ak-Mechet, but was repulsed. In 1853, Perovsky personally with a detachment of 2767 people, with 12 guns, moved to the Ak-Mechet, where there were 300 Kokandians with 3 guns, and on July 27 took it by storm; Ak-Mosque was soon renamed Fort-Perovsky. In the same 1853, the Kokand people tried to recapture the Ak-Mechet twice, but on August 24, the military foreman Borodin, with 275 people with 3 guns, scattered 7,000 Kokand people at Kum-suat, and on December 14, Major Shkup, with 550 people with 4 guns, defeated on the left bank of the Syr there were 13,000 Kokandans, who had 17 copper guns. After that, a number of fortifications were erected along the lower Syr (Kazalinsk, Karamakchi, since 1861 Dzhulek). In 1860, the West Siberian authorities equipped, under the command of Colonel Zimmerman, a small detachment that destroyed the Pishpek and Tokmak fortifications in K.. The Kokandians declared a holy war (ghazavat) and in October 1860 concentrated, among 20,000 people, at the Uzun-Agach fortification (56 miles from Verny), where they were defeated by Colonel Kolpakovsky (3 companies, 4 hundreds and 4 guns), who then took and Pishpek, restored by the Kokandians, where this time the Russian garrison was left; at the same time, the small fortresses of Tokmak and Kostek were also occupied by the Russians. By arranging a chain of fortifications from the side of Orenburg along the lower reaches of the Syr Darya, and from the side of western Siberia along the Alatau, the Russian border was gradually closed, but at that time a huge space of about 650 miles remained unoccupied and served as a gate for the Kokand invasion of the Kazakh steppes. In 1864, it was decided that two detachments, one from Orenburg, the other from western Siberia, would go towards each other, the Orenburg one up the Syr Darya to the city of Turkestan, and the West Siberian one along the Kirghiz Range. The West Siberian detachment, 2500 people, under the command of Colonel Chernyaev, left Verny, on June 5, 1864, took the Aulie-ata fortress by storm, and the Orenburg detachment, 1200 people, under the command of Colonel Verevkin, moved from Fort-Perovsky to the city of Turkestan, which was taken by trenching on 12 June. Leaving a garrison in Aulie-ata, Chernyaev, at the head of 1298 people, moved to Chimkent and, having attracted the Orenburg detachment, took it by storm on July 20. Then an assault was made on Tashkent (114 versts from Chimkent), but it was repulsed. In 1865, from the newly occupied region, with the annexation of the territory of the former Syrdarya line, the Turkestan region was formed, of which Chernyaev was appointed military governor. Rumors that the Emir of Bukhara was going to capture Tashkent prompted Chernyaev to occupy on April 29 the small K. Niaz-bek fortification, which dominated the waters of Tashkent, and then he, with a detachment of 1951 people, with 12 guns, encamped 8 versts from Tashkent, where, under the command of Alim-kul, up to 30,000 Kokand were concentrated, with 50 guns. On May 9, Alim-Kul made a sortie, during which he was mortally wounded. His death gave the defense of Tashkent an unfavorable turn: the struggle of the parties in the city intensified, and the energy in defending the fortress walls weakened. Chernyaev decided to take advantage of this and after a three-day assault (May 15-17) took Tashkent, losing 25 people killed and 117 wounded; the losses of the Kokandans were very significant. In 1866 Khujand was also occupied. At the same time, Yakub Beg, former ruler Tashkent, fled to Kashgar, which became temporarily independent from China.

Cut off from Bukhara, Khudoyar Khan accepted (1868) a trade agreement proposed to him by adjutant general von Kaufman, by virtue of which the Russians in the K. khanate and the Kokand people in Russian possessions acquired the right to free stay and travel, arrange caravanserais, and maintain trade agencies (caravan-bashi), duties could be levied in the amount of no more than 2?% of the value of the goods. The commercial agreement with Russia in 1868 actually made Kokand a state dependent on it.

The dissatisfaction of the population with the domestic policy of Khudayar led to an uprising (1873-1876). In 1875, the Kipchak Abdurakhman-Avtobachi (the son of the Muslim-kul executed by Khudoyar) became the head of those dissatisfied with Khudoyar, and all the opponents of the Russians and the clergy joined him. Khudoyar fled and his eldest son Nasr-Eddin was proclaimed khan. At the same time, a holy war was declared, and numerous bands of Kipchaks invaded the Russian borders and occupied the upper reaches of the Zeravshan and the environs of Khujand. Abdurakhman-Avtobachi, having gathered up to 10 thousand people, made the Mahram fortification on the left bank of the Syr Darya (44 versts from Khujand) the center of his operations, but on August 22, 1875, General Kaufman (with a detachment of 16 companies, 8 hundreds and 20 guns ) took this fortress and completely defeated the Kokandians, who lost more than 2 thousand killed; damage from the Russian side was limited to 5 killed and 8 wounded. On August 29, he occupied Kokand without a shot, on September 8, Margelan, on September 22, an agreement was concluded with Nasr-Eddin, by virtue of which he recognized himself as a servant of the Russian Tsar, and was obliged to pay an annual tribute of 500 thousand rubles. and ceded all the lands north of Naryn; the Namangan department was formed from the latter.

But as soon as the Russians withdrew, an uprising broke out in the khanate. Abdurakhman-Avtobachi, who fled to Uzgent, deposed Nasr-Eddin, who had fled to Khujand, and proclaimed the impostor Pulat-bek Khan. Troubles were also reflected in the Namangan department. His chief, later famous Skobelev, suppressed the uprising raised in Tyurya-Kurgan by Batyr-Tyurey, but the inhabitants of Namangan, taking advantage of his absence, attacked the Russian garrison, for which the returning Skobelev subjected the city to a brutal bombardment.

Then Skobelev, with a detachment of 2,800 people, moved to Andijan, which he stormed on January 8, and on January 10, the Andijans expressed their obedience. On January 28, 1876, Abdurakhman surrendered to prisoners of war and was exiled to Yekaterinoslavl, and the captured Pulat-bek was hanged in Margelan. Nasr Eddin returned to his capital, but in view of the difficulty of his position, he decided to win over the party hostile to Russia and the fanatical clergy. As a result, Skobelev hurried to occupy Kokand, where he captured 62 guns and huge stocks of live ammunition (February 8), and on February 19, the Highest Command took place to annex the entire territory of the khanate and form the Fergana region from it.

In the summer of 1876, Skobelev undertook an expedition to Alay and forced the leader of the Kirghiz, Abdul-bek, to flee to the Kashgar possessions, after which the Kirghiz were finally brought to obedience.

The lands of the Kokand Khanate entered the Fergana region of Russian Turkestan.

By the 70s. 19th century The Russian Empire conquered the two largest states in Central Asia - the Bukhara and Kokand khanates. Significant territories of these states were annexed. The Khiva Khanate remained the last independent state in Central Asia. From all sides it was surrounded by Russian territories and the territories of the vassal Russia of the Bukhara Khanate.

The conquest of the Khiva Khanate was carried out by the forces of four detachments, which came out in late February and early March 1873 from Tashkent (General Kaufman), Orenburg (General Veryovkin), Mangyshlak (Colonel Lomakin) and Krasnovodsk (Colonel Markozov) (2-5 thousand people each) with a total numbering 12-13 thousand people and 56 guns, 4600 horses and 20 thousand camels. The command of all the detachments was entrusted to the Turkestan Governor-General, General Kaufman K.P.

Speaking on February 26 from the Emba post, the Orenburg detachment of General Verevkin, through the steppes covered with deep snows, headed for Khiva. The campaign was extremely difficult: begun in a harsh winter, it ended in a scorching heat in the sands. During the journey, skirmishes with the enemy took place almost daily, and the Khiva cities of Khodjeyli, Mangit and others were taken. On May 14, the vanguard of the Orenburg detachment joined with the Mangyshlak detachment of Colonel Lomakin. On May 26, the united Orenburg and Mangyshlak detachments approached Khiva from the north, and on May 28 both detachments settled in positions opposite the Shah-abad gates of Khiva; On May 28, the united detachments stormed the gates, General Verevkin was wounded in the head during the assault, and command passed to Colonel Saranchov. On May 29, the Turkestan detachment of Adjutant General Kaufman approached Khiva from the southeast and entered Khiva from the south side, a truce was declared and the Khiva capitulated. However, due to the anarchy prevailing in the city, the northern part of the city did not know about the surrender and did not open the gate, which caused an assault on the northern part of the wall. Mikhail Skobelev with two companies stormed the Shakhabat gates, was the first to get inside the fortress and although he was attacked by the enemy, he kept the gate and the rampart behind him. The assault was stopped by order of General K. P. Kaufman, who at that time peacefully entered the city from the opposite side.

The Krasnovodsk detachment of Colonel Markozov, due to lack of water, was forced to return to Krasnovodsk and did not take part in the capture of Khiva.

To protect these lands from the east, in 1867, the Semirechensk Cossack army was formed along the border with China. In response to the “holy war” declared by the Bukhara emir, Russian troops captured Samarkand in May 1868 and forced the emir in 1873 to recognize dependence on Russia. In the same year, the Khiva Khan also became dependent. The religious circles of the Kokand Khanate called for a "holy war" against the Russians. In 1875, Russian detachments under the command of General M. D. Skobelev defeated the Khan's troops in the course of swift actions. In February 1876, the Kokand Khanate was abolished, and its territory was included in the Fergana region of the Turkestan Governor-General.

The conquest of Central Asia also took place from the side of the Caspian Sea. In 1869, Russian troops under the command of General N. G. Stoletov landed on its eastern shore and founded the city of Krasnovodsk. Further advance to the east, towards Bukhara, met the stubborn resistance of the Turkmen tribes. The oasis of Geok-Tepe became a stronghold of resistance of the large tribe of Tekins. Repeated attempts by the Russian troops to seize it failed.

Later, M. D. Skobelev was appointed commander of the Russian troops in the west of Turkmenistan. For the uninterrupted supply of Russian troops, a railway line was laid from Krasnovodsk towards Geok-Tepe. On January 12, 1881, after a fierce battle, Russian troops captured Geok-Tepe, and a week later - Ashgabat.

The conquest of Central Asia by Russia deprived the peoples inhabiting it of statehood. But at the same time, internecine wars ceased, slavery and the slave trade were eliminated, part of the land seized from the feudal lords who fought against the Russian troops was transferred to the peasants. Cotton growing and sericulture began to develop rapidly, railway construction began, and the extraction of oil, coal, and non-ferrous metals began.

On the annexed lands, the Russian government pursued a flexible policy, avoiding disruption of the usual way of life, without interfering in national culture and religious relations.

Far East policy

Until the middle of the XIX century. Russia did not have officially recognized borders with its neighbors on Far East. Russian pioneers continued to settle in these lands, as well as in Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. The expeditions of Admiral G. I. Nevelsky on the coast of the Tatar Strait and Sakhalin (1850-1855) and the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia N. N. Muravyov, who explored the banks of the Amur (1854-1855), were of great not only scientific, but also political importance. . To consolidate, develop and protect the lands along the Amur in 1851, the Trans-Baikal Cossack Army was created, and in 1858 - the Amur Cossack Host.

Unleashed in the late 50s. Britain and France did not support the "opium war" against China, which caused a favorable response in Beijing. N. N. Muravyov took advantage of this. He invited the Chinese government to sign an agreement on the establishment of the border between the countries. The presence of settlements of Russian pioneers in the Amur region served as a weighty argument to justify Russia's rights to these lands. In May 1858, N. N. Muravyov signed the Aigun Treaty with representatives of the Chinese government, according to which the border with China was established along the Amur River until the Ussuri River flows into it. The Ussuri region between this river and the Pacific Ocean was declared a joint Russian-Chinese possession. In 1860, a new Beijing Treaty was signed, according to which the Ussuri Territory was declared a possession of Russia. On June 20, 1860, Russian sailors entered the Golden Horn Bay and founded the port of Vladivostok.

It was difficult to negotiate the border between Russia and Japan. According to an agreement concluded in the Japanese city of Shimoda in 1855, at the height of the Crimean War, the Kuril Islands were recognized as the territory of Russia, and Sakhalin Island was recognized as joint possession of the two countries. After the signing of the treaty, a significant number of Japanese settlers rushed to Sakhalin. In 1875, to avoid complications with Japan, Russia agreed to sign a new treaty. Sakhalin completely retreated to Russia, and the islands of the Kuril ridge - to Japan.

On April 25 (May 7), 1875, in St. Petersburg, Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov on the part of Russia and Enomoto Takeaki on the part of Japan signed an agreement on the exchange of territories (St. Petersburg Treaty).

According to this treatise, the property of the Russian Empire in exchange for 18 Kuril Islands (Shumshu, Alaid, Paramushir, Makanrushi, Onekotan, Kharimkotan, Ekarma, Shiashkotan, Mussir, Raikoke, Matua, Rastua, the islets of Sredneva and Ushisir, Ketoi, Simusir, Broughton, islands Cherpoy and Brat Cherpoev, Urup) was completely transferred to the island of Sakhalin.

On August 10 (22), 1875, an additional article to the treaty was adopted in Tokyo, regulating the rights of residents remaining in the ceded territories.

The Russo-Japanese treaty of 1875 caused mixed responses in both countries. Many in Japan condemned him, believing that the Japanese government had exchanged Sakhalin, which was of great political and economic importance, for the "small ridge of pebbles" that they imagined the Kuriles to be. Others simply stated that Japan had exchanged "one part of its territory for another." Similar assessments were heard from the Russian side: many believed that both territories belonged to Russia by the right of the discoverer. The Treaty of 1875 did not become the final act of territorial delimitation between Russia and Japan and could not prevent further conflicts between the two countries.

By the middle of the XIX century. American entrepreneurs, merchants, and poachers began to penetrate into Russian America - into Alaska. Protecting and maintaining this remote territory became increasingly difficult, the costs far exceeded the income brought by Alaska. American possessions have become a burden for the state.

At the same time, the government of Alexander II sought to eliminate possible contradictions and strengthen the friendly relations that had developed between the United States and Russia. The emperor decided to sell Alaska to the American government for an insignificant sum of $7.2 million for a deal of this magnitude.

The sale of Alaska in 1867 showed that the Russian government underestimated the economic and military importance of its possessions in the Pacific. It is impossible not to take into account the fact that Russia's main opponents in Europe - Britain and France - were at that time within a hair's breadth of a war with the United States. The sale of Alaska was a demonstration of US support from Russia.

Compiled by Venyamin Tolstonog

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Treaty on the Constitution of the European Union

1. The domestic policy of the European Union in the field of:

economic and monetary policy,

EU finances and its budget,

Integration, social security and health,

education and science, technology and energy, transport

and tourism, environmental protection and disaster protection,

Justice and law enforcement, anti-discrimination,

1. The foreign policy of the European Union in the field of:

Cooperation with other countries and humanitarian assistance,

security policies,

Defense Policies

3. The procedure for amending the EU Constitution

4. Decision-making system by qualified majority

1. The principle of subsidiarity and the role of national parliaments

Areas of internal policy of the European Union

Economic and monetary policy of the EU

The EU Constitution, in comparison with the previously concluded agreements between its countries within the framework of the economic and monetary union, introduces certain changes in the field of economic and monetary policy of the Union, primarily in terms of:

Strengthening its capacity and the member countries whose currency is the euro;

Strengthening the European Central Bank as an EU body;

Significant simplification of the content of the transitional provisions of the agreements on common economic and monetary policy concerning countries that introduce the euro as their national currency.

Economic and monetary policy was the subject of a long discussion during the work of the Convention and the conference of the governments of the EU member states. The consensus found enabled the Union to strengthen the coordination of its economic policy. Those of its countries whose currency is the euro will receive more autonomy in deciding issues that concern them without the participation of other countries in the vote, as evidenced by the relevant section of the EU Constitution and its protocol for the eurozone countries. The EU Constitution also extends qualified majority voting to almost all provisions of the economic and monetary policy of the Union.

The European Central Bank (ECB) becomes an EU body that has specific goals and objectives and a charter for its work in the system of central banks of the EU member states and which is independent of its other bodies and public services of the EU member states. At the same time, the ECB Council does not include the chairmen of the central banks of those EU member states that have not yet switched to the euro.

Economic policy. According to Articles III-177 and 178, the economic policy of the EU is aimed at its close coordination in the member countries of the Union, their internal market and the establishment of common goals. In turn, the EU member states, in the implementation of their economic policies, must contribute to the achievement of the common goals of the Union. It is a matter of harmonizing their economic policy with the principle of an open market economy with free competition. Article III-179 discusses innovations in the implementation of the common economic policy of the EU:

The European Commission may communicate its opinion directly to that EU member state whose economic policy does not correspond to the main features of the common EU policy or endangers the proper functioning of the economic and monetary union (and not to the Council of Europe, which makes the decision);

When the European Council expresses its opinion on a certain issue to any EU member state, this country does not take part in voting on it.

In the event of an excessive national budget deficit, the EU Constitution provides for the following changes (Article III-184):

If the Commission has an opinion that an EU Member State has an excessive budget deficit or could develop one, then this opinion is communicated directly to that country (and not through the European Council);

The role of the European Commission is also strengthened when dealing with excessive deficits, namely, the European Council, having received a proposal from the European Commission to overcome this deficit, can reject it only by unanimous decision. Those. the recommendations of the European Council in this matter should be based primarily on the opinion of the European Commission;

The country itself, whose excessive budget deficit is decided by the council, does not participate in voting on it (with the exception of the issue of measures to establish the size of the deficit);

The applicable provisions for this supermajority require no more than 2/3 of the votes of EU member states, and not a simple majority, as well as 55% of the votes of eurozone member states if they represent at least 65% of the population of these states.

Currency policy. The EU Constitution introduces several changes to the monetary policy of the Union. First of all, it officially defines the euro as the currency of the European Union and names it as one of its symbols (Article I-8). The EU Constitution also provides for a very clear distribution of the powers of the Union in the field of monetary policy. According to it, the Union has exclusive competence in this policy of the Member States whose currency is the euro (Article I-13). Those of his countries that have not yet introduced the euro retain their competence in currency matters. The institutional provisions on the tasks and objectives of the European system of central banks as a whole remain unchanged (Articles III-185 and 191). Article I-30 formally characterizes the concept of "Eurosystem": it is formed by the European Central Bank and the central banks of EU member states, whose currency is the euro, to conduct monetary policy. The EU Constitution creates a new legal provision for taking both the measures that are necessary for the introduction of the euro and, above all, the measures for its current use. This provision replaces the current transitional provision of Article 123 of the Treaty on the European Community.

The convention proposed to grant more autonomy to the EU member states whose currency is the euro, both in terms of being able to resolve issues related to it in the European Council, and, above all, with the fact that they share a common currency. According to Articles III-194-196, euro area EU member states can take measures to strengthen coordination and control of budgetary discipline, provide specific guidance for their economic policies, defend a common financial position in the relevant international institutions and ensure unified representation in them, as well as at conferences. According to these articles, only those EU member states that are part of the eurozone have the right to vote on these issues in the European Council.

The fact that the member states of the EU, whose currency is the euro, is given a say in the relevant issues of common economic policy is a big step forward. The fact is that with the entry of ten new countries into the European Union, twelve of its eurozone countries are, in fact, in the minority until the rest of the countries fulfill the criteria necessary for the introduction of a European currency into them. The provisions of the EU Constitution make it possible during the transitional period to make certain decisions only with the help of the countries concerned.

The subsection on transitional provisions further mentions other cases in which the right of non-Eurozone Member States in matters of financial policy (Article III-197) is annulled, namely, with regard to recommendations on multilateral control and measures to overcome excessive budget deficits. Finally, through the EU Constitution, the role of its member states in the eurozone is strengthened when other countries are admitted to it. Before the European Council decides on this, it must take into account the opinion of the eurozone countries, which, for their part, develop it by a qualified majority. Articles III-197-202 on transitional provisions also establish:

• determination of EU member states for which an exclusive rule applies on the applicability of the provisions of the EU Constitution that do not apply to these countries, as well as on their voting rights (Article III-197);
• the procedure for the introduction of the euro in an EU Member State, after the convergence criteria have been met (Article III-198);
• special provisions for EU member states, for which a special rule applies (Article III-202).

Without introducing fundamental changes, the EU Constitution also provides a significant simplification of these provisions, which improves their understanding and subsequent application for the citizens of the Union.

The EU constitution expands the scope of voting by qualified majority. Only certain provisions should continue to be adopted unanimously in the European Council, namely:

• adoption of measures to replace the protocol on the procedure for dealing with excessive budget deficits, which defines the criteria for convergence (convergence) for the introduction of the euro (Article III-184);
• specific tasks of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the field of credit institutions(Article III-185);
• fixing the exchange rate when replacing the national currency of the respective Member State with the euro (Article III-198).

The EU Constitution also defines the important role of the European Parliament in extending the scope of due process to:

• conditions and method of control of economic policy (Article III-179);
• amendment of certain provisions in the statutes of the Eurosystem of central banks and the ECB (Article III-187);
• measures required when using the euro (Article III-191).

The financial policy of the EU and the procedure for adopting its budget

The EU constitution simplifies the procedure for adopting its budget, which is a notable progress. This procedure refers to the method of joint decision-making during a single reading and mediated by the European Council and the European Parliament. In addition, the distinction between mandatory and non-mandatory expenses, as well as the establishment of an annual growth rate limit for non-mandatory expenses, is abolished. The EU Constitution adopts multi-annual financial limits, while the prescriptions for own funds remain essentially unchanged. According to the EU Constitution, the procedure for adopting its budget is described in two sections:

• Section 1, Subsection 7: Finances of the Union (Articles I-53-57). This section contains essential provisions on the principles of EU finance and its budget, the Union's own funds and their long-term financial limits;
• Section 2, Subsection 6, Chapter 2: Financial Regulations (Articles III-402-415). This chapter contains precise data for multi-annual financial limits, the plan for the annual EU budget, its implementation and lending, as well as general provisions on the fight against fraud.

In addition to the relevant provisions, the EU Constitution contains three other legal acts that are relevant to the EU's finances and the procedure for adopting its budget, namely the budget regulation of 2002, the inter-institutional agreement on budgetary discipline and the improvement of the procedure for adopting the budget of 1999, as well as 2002 decision on own funds system.

EU Budget and Finance Principles. These principles ensure the establishment and execution of the budget plan. According to them, all income and expenses of the EU must be the subject of preliminary calculations for each budget year and have an appropriate coverage (source). Execution of the budget presupposes the adoption of a relevant legal act. In order to maintain budgetary discipline, the financing of expenditures must be covered by own funds and, in doing so, take into account multi-year financial limits. In addition, the efficiency of budget execution and the need to combat fraud in this area of ​​finance must be ensured.

EU own funds. The EU Constitution recalls that its budget, among other expenses, is entirely financed from its own resources (Article I-54). This system of own funds is the subject of discussion in the European Council, which, after hearing this issue in the European Parliament, must unanimously decide on it in the form of an all-Union law, after which, as before, all EU member states must ratify this law. For the adoption of laws that establish provisions for the implementation of the system of own funds, only a qualified majority is required. This is what distinguishes the requirements of the EU Constitution from the current provisions on own funds of the Treaty on the European Community (Article 269).

The system of own funds (in excess of 100 billion euros per year) includes, firstly, traditional financial receipts from customs duties and fees (imports of manufactured goods, agricultural products and, especially, sugar from third countries to the EU), which amount to approximately 11.7% of all funds, and secondly, the value added tax, which is obtained from the application of uniform rates on the basis for calculating this tax of each EU member state agreed upon by the general provisions (i.e., on their mutual trade turnover) - approximately 14.1 % of all funds, and thirdly, a certain share of own funds from the budget of each EU member state, which is approximately 73.4% of all own funds in the EU budget (the remaining 0.8% of own funds in the EU budget comes from other sources ). At the same time, the total amount of own funds should not exceed 1.24% of the gross national product (GNP) of all EU member states. The amount of value added tax in different years ranged from 1.4% to 1.0%.

All main types of expenses (over 100 billion euros per year) related to the functioning of the Commonwealth of European countries are covered at their own expense, i.e. their Union, namely:

• expenses for the maintenance of all EU bodies (staff, buildings and structures, energy of all kinds, publication of reports, reports and other data, maintenance of delegations, etc.), approximately 6% of the total expenses;
• expenses for the implementation of all areas of the internal and external policy of the EU (i.e. for the implementation of activities in the field of education and science, health and culture, energy and transport, etc. within the EU and the provision of financial assistance to third countries), approximately 12% of general expenses;
• expenses for the implementation of measures to improve the structure of the economy in the EU member states, approximately 34% of the total expenses;
• expenses for maintaining the agricultural sector of the economy in the EU member states, approximately 43% of total expenses;
• the cost of providing financial assistance to economically weak EU Member States, approximately 3% of total costs;
• spending on compensating the budget deficit in terms of social spending in individual EU Member States, approximately 1.5% of total spending;
• for the formation of a financial reserve, approximately 0.5% of total expenses.

Procedure for drawing up and approving the EU budget. The fiscal year in the Union begins on January 1st and ends on December 31st. The Treaty on the EU Constitution simplifies the former situation, since From now on, the European Commission must propose to the European Parliament only the final draft budget, and not its preliminary version. The procedure for drawing up and approving the EU budget plan is as follows:

• before July 1 - each EU body submits an estimate of its costs for the planned year. The European Commission combines all private cost estimates into a general estimate in the draft budget expenditures;
• before September 1 - the European Commission submits to the European Parliament and the European Council a draft budget for the planned year;
• until October 1 - the European Council determines its point of view on the part of the draft budget and reports it to the European Parliament;
• within 42 days after the transfer of the opinion of the European Council on the draft budget to the European Parliament - three scenarios of action are possible here. The European Parliament agrees with the opinion of the European Council, and then the all-Union law on establishing a budget plan for the next year is recognized as adopted. The European Parliament does not take any decision, and then the all-Union law on establishing a budget plan for the next year is also recognized as adopted. The European Parliament, by a majority of its members, adopts changes to the draft budget and sends its amended version to the European Council and the European Commission, then the procedure for adopting the budget plan is repeated, which requires the immediate convening of a conciliation commission of the European Parliament and the European Council.
• after the receipt of the amended version of the draft budget by the European Council, two deadlines are possible: a) within 10 days and b) within 21 days - i.e. there are two possible scenarios of action after the conciliation commission of the European Parliament and the European Council is convened. Within 10 days, the European Council informs the European Parliament that it agrees with all changes in the draft budget, and therefore the conciliation commission does not meet, and the all-Union law establishing the budget plan (as amended) for the next year is recognized as adopted. Or, within 21 days, the conciliation commission should come to a consensus on the proposed changes in the draft budget. This requires a qualified majority, both from the representatives of the European Parliament and from the European Council. If the conciliation commission fails to reach consensus in this way, the European Commission must submit a new draft budget for consideration.
• Within 14 days after reaching a consensus in the conciliation commission - several scenarios of actions are possible here. The European Parliament and the European Council approve the common draft budget, or only one of these EU bodies will approve it, and the other body will not take any decision, or both of these EU bodies will not take any decision, anyway, in these cases, an all-Union law establishing a budget plan for the next year is recognized as accepted. If the common budget proposal is rejected by these two EU bodies, the Commission proposes a new budget proposal. Or if one of these EU bodies rejects the budget proposal, and the other EU body approves it or does not take any decision, then the European Commission also proposes a new budget proposal.
• Within 14 days after the approval of the draft budget by the European Parliament and its rejection by the European Council - in this case, the European Parliament can decide within 14 days whether to confirm all of its changes in the draft budget or only some of them. If at least one change in it is not confirmed, the point of view agreed upon in the conciliation commission regarding the position of the draft budget, which is the subject of the change, is adopted, and then the all-Union law establishing the budget plan for the next year is recognized as adopted on this basis.
• The final moment of the procedure for adopting the budget for the next year - the President of the European Parliament confirms that the all-Union law on the EU budget has been finally adopted.

Execution of the budget plan. The latest innovation regarding the procedure related to the budget plan is the annual compilation by the European Commission of a report on its implementation (Article 3-408) and its submission to the European Council and the European Parliament. The report should make it possible to assess the implementation of the budget plan in connection with the procedure for reducing the financial burden and, on this basis, begin to develop a draft budget for the next year. To this end, the European Commission, together with the European Court of Auditors and under the control of the European Parliament, oversees the implementation of the budget plan so that budget funds are directed to activities and needs in strict accordance with the positions of this plan and in accordance with the accepted procedure for their use.

Other areas of EU domestic policy

In the field of integration. At the beginning of the third section of the EU Constitution, there are generally applicable provisions on the integration and close interconnection of EU member states. Article III-115 explicitly states that the European Union is built on the basis of recognizing the close connection of its member countries in the implementation of activities in various areas of domestic policy, and its most important goals in the implementation of this policy are:

• combating discrimination of any kind based on gender, race or ethnic origin, religion or worldview, disability, age or sexual orientation;
• animal protection (according to the relevant protocol to the former European Community Treaty);
• promoting higher levels of employment, providing commensurate social protection, combating social division, achieving a higher level of general and vocational education and protecting people's health.

The EU Constitution also creates the legal basis for the adoption of laws to establish principles and conditions, incl. economic and financial type, which can serve as a basis for the implementation of services of general economic interest.

Domestic market. The chapter of the EU Constitution, which is devoted to this area of ​​domestic policy, consists of 7 sub-chapters (implementation of the internal market, free access to it and free circulation of services, free circulation of goods, capital and payments, competition rules, tax regulations and general provisions). Although all these provisions are already fully contained in the European Community Treaty, they are nevertheless included in the text of the Constitution.

The legal grounds for facilitating free access to the internal market for all EU Member States have been extended to the area of ​​social benefits for both employees and self-employed persons (Article III-136). However, it should be noted that here they deviated from the principle of unanimity in decision-making and in the future decisions will be made by a qualified majority. At the same time, it is emphasized that these legal grounds should not apply to other categories of EU citizens, for example, to students, pensioners. In addition, it is permitted for an EU member state that believes that if a draft legal act adopted (by a qualified majority) regarding social guarantees significantly violates its social security system or is likely to harm the financial condition of the country, it can apply to the Council of Europe with a proposal for a delay for her legislative procedure within at least 4 months.

With regard to the free circulation of capital, a new paragraph appeared in Article III-158 regarding limited national tax measures in relation to third countries, which are taken by any EU member state with the approval of the European Commission or the European Council. Article III-160 provides a new legal framework for the adoption of laws on the application of the necessary administrative measures to restrict the free circulation of capital and freeze the deposits of their owners or owners (individuals and legal entities, groups or non-governmental organizations) as preventive measures in the fight against terrorism and related activity with him.

Articles III-165 and 168 categorically provide that only the European Commission, within its powers, can develop and recommend for implementation regulations on competition rules for enterprises and the provision of state aid to them. When providing it, it is indicated that the European Council, within 5 years after the entry into force of the EU Constitution, may, by its decision, cancel the provision on the compatibility of assistance for the economy of any EU member state with its financial contribution to the budget of the Union, and also supplement this provision with a categorical indication of specific areas of directing this assistance, for example, to structural changes in the economy, improving the financial or social situation in the country. Article III-191 refers to additional measures to avoid distortions in economic competition, while Article III-173 deals with national measures that affect the EU internal market and may interfere with its normal functioning. Therefore, this article of the EU Constitution gives the Council of Ministers of Economics of the EU member states the right to regulate the application of these national measures through a model Union law and requires a unanimous decision if any exceptions are allowed.

Article III-176 provides for a new legal principle for the enactment of Union-wide laws or general laws on measures to create a European legal basis and its protection in connection with the right to intellectual property, as well as to put into effect central provisions for the admission, coordination and control of this right. These provisions should also regulate the use of languages ​​in all areas of the functioning of the EU.

Employment and access to the labor market. The provisions in this area of ​​EU domestic policy (Articles III-203-209) have not been fundamentally changed in the Constitution of the Union in comparison with the European Community Treaty. It should, of course, be noted that ensuring the coordination of political and economic measures carried out by the EU member states in the field of employment is recognized only as a special authority of the Union. At present, as is known, the issues of free access of citizens of EU member states as employees to the labor market of any of its countries are regulated by national or bilateral labor law. The agreement on the accession of new European countries to the EU provides for transitional periods from one to 7 years for free access of its citizens as employees to the common labor market. At the same time, for the Central and Eastern European countries, the so-called. model "2 + 3 + 2", i.e. three phases of transition. During the first two years of this period, free access to the common labor market of these countries is not possible. During this period, national or bilateral labor market access regulations continue to apply to them. In this way, the remaining (i.e. old) EU member states can decide when they will open their labor market to citizens of the new countries based on their national measures. After the expiration of the first phase, the old EU member states are obliged to inform the Commission by appropriate notification whether they wish to continue to maintain the transitional provisions agreed in the accession treaty for the new countries to the EU on national measures to restrict free access to their labor market for the next three years or grant them the right to free access to the labor market. The old EU Member States, which after 5 years want to maintain further (i.e. for another two years) national provisions on access to their labor market (due to difficulties in it), must once again inform the Commission. But the transitional period of 7 years remains the deadline, after which the old EU member states can no longer restrict free access to their labor market for citizens of newly admitted EU countries.

The Treaty on the Accession of the New European Countries to the European Union with regard to access to the labor market of the old EU Member States applies to employees and members of their families who are citizens of the new EU Member States. These employees are regarded as "migratory" in the sense of EU common law, who in principle only have a legal claim to enter into an employment relationship in establishments located in the territory of the old EU member states. In contrast, employees are citizens of new EU Member States who are posted for a limited period of time by their employer (i.e. not on their own initiative) from one establishment located in their home country to another establishment located in another but old Member State. EU, are entitled within this limited period to work in it. There is no restrictive rule for operating as a self-employed person (i.e. setting up one's own business), it is only necessary to observe, in addition to the professional and commercial legal provisions of the Member State concerned, also the legal provisions regarding residence in it .

It should also be noted that from the first day of the accession of a new European country to the EU, the access of its citizens to the labor market of the old EU member states as employees has been improving. This lies in the fact that they receive the so-called. preferences (benefits) of the European Community in terms of employment in relation to citizens from third countries. These benefits provide for the possibility of accepting citizens of European countries that have joined the EU to work in vacancies in the old EU member states, the existence of which is confirmed by the European Employment Service (EURES system - European Employment Services) or, respectively, by the state employment agency of the given country. In addition, the EU accession treaty provides that legal employment in the old EU member states, under certain conditions, leads to unrestricted access to its labor market. To do this, you must work in it continuously for at least 12 months from the date of entry of a new country into the EU.

Cooperation in the economic, social and territorial area of ​​domestic policy. Article III-213 of the EU Constitution provides for the cooperation of its countries in the field of social security with the help of the European Commission, which is granted the right to initiate initiatives in this area of ​​domestic policy within the framework of the concept of open coordination (setting directions for social development, development of social indicators, regular monitoring and evaluation of the state and etc.) and informing the European Parliament about it. Article III-223 states that by the time of the signing of the Treaty on the EU Constitution, the members of the European Council had established the first provisions for the EU Structural Fund (financial means for the implementation of structural transformations in the economies of the EU member states) and the fund for helping its lagging countries in the general EU budget. Funds from these funds are allocated on the basis of unanimous decisions of the European Parliament (subsequently - on the basis of decisions taken by a qualified majority in it).

Article III-231 deals with the general organization of EU agricultural markets, which should be regulated by European law or a series of model laws, and also specifies the objectives of the implementation of the common agricultural and fisheries policy, measures to establish agreed prices for products, the withdrawal of additional profits, financial assistance and quantitative restrictions. These measures, at the proposal of the European Commission, are taken by the European Council without hearing them by the European Parliament. The necessary financial resources for the implementation of these measures and the provision of financial assistance are provided from the agricultural fund of the general budget of the EU.

Similar to the cooperation of EU member states in the social field, through the European Commission, cooperation between countries in the field of science, space exploration and technological research is carried out (Articles III-248-255). According to them, the European Commission is granted the right to initiate initiatives in this area of ​​domestic policy within the framework of the concept of open coordination (setting directions for scientific progress, developing technological indicators, sharing experiences, regular monitoring and assessment of the state, etc.) and informing the European Parliament about this. Financial resources to promote the implementation of joint research programs and specific programs of individual EU member states are allocated by the European Council on the proposal of the European Commission and in agreement with the European Parliament from the corresponding item of expenditure of the general budget of the EU.

Article III-256 deals with the legal basis for the development of common measures to secure the energy supply of the EU Member States (use of various energy sources, establishment of a common energy supply structure, taxation issues), which should be summarized by the relevant European law (or a set of model laws).

Cooperation between EU Member States in the field of vocational education, youth and sports, health care, protection against natural disasters, environmental protection, tourism and other areas of domestic policy (Article III-278-284) is aimed at coordinating relevant national activities, developing common goals and relevant standards and the provision of organizational and financial assistance in carrying out certain activities from the funds of the general budget of the EU.

PoliticsEUin the field of justice and internal affairs

Article I-42 of the EU Constitution contains general definitions of its space of freedom, security and law: "The Union offers its citizens a space of freedom, security and law without internal restrictions." At the same time, this article distinguishes between the scope of the Union as a whole, namely its legislative scope, and the operational cooperation of the EU Member States (taking into account the specifics of the field of national justice and the conduct of internal affairs). Article III-257 contains the following principles for the implementation of this cooperation:

• subsidiarity (i.e. complementarity, in which the European Union as a whole assumes the implementation of only those tasks that are beyond the power of its individual countries) and respect for the legal traditions and regulations of the EU member states;
• solidarity in the implementation of a common policy in the field of political asylum, immigration and external borders;
• mutual recognition of judicial and extrajudicial decisions in the field of civil and criminal law.

The role of national parliaments is established in Articles I-42 and III-259. In this system, national parliaments participate in the adoption of regulations through the ratification of an agreement. But since Since this legal instrument is no longer in force in the EU Constitution, in the future it provides for three measures that will continue to ensure the important role of the parliaments of the EU member states in the control and implementation of justice and home affairs policy:

• reliance on an early warning system in the field of subsidiarity, under which measures can be taken at the request of the parliaments of a quarter of the EU member states;
• participation in the political control of Europol (pan-European police service) and evaluation of the activities of Eurojust (pan-European service for the management of justice);
• information on the content of the results of the peer review system in cooperation with the European Commission.

The last measure (Article III-260) provides for the application of a system that has already been practiced in recent years. This system permits the concrete implementation of EU justice and home affairs policy through pan-European police and judiciary authorities (justice authorities), which at the same time requires mutual recognition by all EU member states. In addition, in the future, national parliaments will keep abreast of current affairs in this area of ​​domestic policy through mutual consultations of their internal security committees (successors of the former "36 coordinating committees", named after the article number in the Commonwealth Treaty). Article III-261 of the EU Constitution provides "de facto" to redefine the tasks of these committees, namely, to prepare the work of the Council of Europe in the field of police and judicial cooperation and to promote and strengthen operational cooperation between the relevant services of the EU Member States in the field of their internal security. This concept of internal security is part of the space of freedom, security and law throughout the EU. Article III-263 deals with other, non-operational types of cooperation between these services of the Member States. At the same time, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in the field of justice and home affairs includes the adoption of decisions on violations that EU member states may commit in this area. Article III-377 contains specific provisions to control the validity or proportionality of police or other criminal prosecution measures to maintain public order and protect internal security.

General Policy on Asylum, Immigration and External Borders. According to the Treaty on the EU Constitution, in this area of ​​its internal policy, the principle of solidarity and a fair division of responsibility between all EU member states (Article III-268) is enshrined, as well as in the issue of financial relations in this regard, since the Treaty on the European Community provides for this principle only to share responsibility for the reception of refugees and the protection of expelled persons in the event of their massive flows. At the same time, the European Commission is granted a monopoly on the development of legal provisions in this area of ​​internal EU policy, as well as control of relevant applications from EU member states. All measures in this area of ​​domestic policy are adopted in accordance with European laws and the relevant legislative procedures of the European Parliament by a qualified majority, in addition to urgent measures in the event of massive refugee flows, on which the European Parliament must, of course, consult with the European Commission.

Article III-265 contains important changes regarding the protection of the external borders of the EU in comparison with the provisions of Article 62 of the Treaty on the European Community, namely:

• application of the concept of "integrated external border guard system", through which cooperation in this area of ​​domestic policy should be strengthened in the future, both at the legislative level and in practice, with the prospect of the possible formation of common border guard units, which should be supported in their activities on national level;
• facilitating the granting of visas and other short-term residence permits;
• respect for the jurisdiction of each individual EU Member State in terms of geographical location its borders in full compliance with international law.

Article III-266 contains the notion of a “common European regulation on political asylum seekers”, which provides for the following for third-country nationals:

• the general procedure for granting and withdrawing the uniform status of an asylum seeker;
• a general procedure for granting and withdrawing a single subsidiary status of protection against political persecution.

To protect refugees in the event of a massive flow, the European Union does not create a special rule, its Constitution provides only the possibility of adopting an interim general rule, subject to the provisions of the Geneva Convention, as well as taking measures through partnership and cooperation with third countries in terms of managing immigration flows of persons and political seekers refuge and temporary protection for them.

The Common Immigration Policy (Article III-267) covers the effective management of immigration flows and introduces a provision that gives the Union the exclusive right to make agreements for the expulsion and repatriation of persons who are illegally in any of its countries. At the same time, the most important innovation concerns persons who are legally located in one of the EU countries, namely, from now on, the Union can establish measures by which assistance and support is provided to the efforts of an EU member state in terms of integrating immigrants into it. In addition, Article III-267 provides a unified legal basis for determining the rights of third-country nationals. Member States, however, retain their jurisdiction over the number of third-country nationals it hosts who seek employment there. This provision is especially important, because. it establishes an essential condition in favor of national jurisdiction in the general characterization of the concept of immigration policy, although it does not concern either access to the labor market for third-country nationals already residing in an EU Member State, or the fulfillment by an immigrant of other purposes therein (including family reunification and study ). There are no changes in this article of the EU Constitution compared to Article 63 of the Treaty on the European Community regarding the fight against illegal immigration and the introduction of criminal measures for this, with the exception of measures to combat human trafficking.

Legal cooperation in the field of civil cases. As in Article 65 of the Treaty on the European Community, this legal cooperation is limited to duties for crossing the borders of states, but only if they are required for the smooth functioning of the internal market of the EU member states. The principle of mutual recognition of judicial and non-judicial decisions is adopted by the EU Constitutional Treaty as the cornerstone on which this cooperation is based. Of course, indications of measures of similarity are very important, since the list of areas in which the EU can take such measures is extended to include types of measures that guarantee a higher level of access to the law, remove obstacles to the proper course of civil procedure, develop alternative measures for the resolution of disputes and support the professional development of justice officials. At the same time, all legislative measures taken in this area of ​​cooperation of EU member states require a qualified majority in voting and a joint decision, with the exception of the aspect of family law with the payment of a fee for crossing the borders of states, where full unanimity is required. But article III-269 of the EU Constitution contains a provision according to which the council of ministers of justice of the EU member states, by unanimous decision, can develop this aspect of the law in accordance with due legislative procedure.

Legal cooperation in the field of criminal cases. According to the EU Constitution, this area of ​​legal cooperation provides for the adoption of an all-Union Law or a number of general laws through the usual legislative procedure (i.e. through the European Parliament with the development of a draft by their Council of Ministers of Justice of the EU member states and with control over their implementation by the European Court of Justice). However, the condition should be provided that if a Member State considers that a Union Law or a common law concerns a fundamental aspect of its criminal law system, it can apply to the Council of Europe with a request to interrupt the regular legislative process. After discussing this request, the European Council must, within 4 months, withdraw the draft of the relevant law from the European Parliament and submit it to the European Commission for consideration of the justifications for the inconsistency of the draft law with the criminal law system of the country that requested such a request and, if necessary, propose a new draft law. If the European Council does not do this within 4 months, or after 12 months of discussion of other options for the draft law, does not take any decision, then a third of the EU member states may initiate a process of enhanced cooperation to develop a draft law acceptable to all EU member states.

Legal cooperation covers the harmonization of legal provisions through the adoption of relevant decisions in such areas of criminal law as criminal justice, substantive criminal law, criminal prevention, pan-European justice and the prosecutor's office. In terms of criminal proceedings, the EU Constitution in Article III-270 provides for three areas of cooperation:

• the admissibility of the means of evidence on a mutual basis between the EU member states (however, without bringing them to their common characteristics and their common assessment);
• the rights of an individual in the conduct of criminal proceedings;
• rights of the victim of a criminal offence.

In doing so, in each case it is necessary to ensure as close as possible to the provisions of the criminal law of the Member State concerned and, at the same time, to take into account the differences between their traditions and legal systems.

In terms of substantive criminal law, Article III-271 empowers the Union to establish crimes and penalties in the field of especially serious criminal offenses, such as: terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, human trafficking, sexual harassment of women and children, arms trafficking , money laundering, corruption, forgery of means of payment, computer crime. Of course, this list is not exhaustive, so the Council of Ministers of Justice of the EU member states, on a unanimous basis and with the consent of the European Parliament, can expand it. In addition, the Council may adopt (of course only unanimously) regulations for the establishment of crimes and criminal penalties for them in the relevant area of ​​criminal law (in particular substantive law), if the applicability of these rules is shown as necessary for the effective implementation of Union policy in that area of ​​law, where measures have already successfully achieved mutual conformity. This criterion concerns, first of all, the fight against racism and hostility towards foreigners, fraud and deceit in relation to the financial interests of the Union, tax evasion, environmental crime, currency counterfeiting.

Article III-273 of the EU Constitution provides the legal basis for the adoption of measures to prevent criminal offenses, and also provides for the possibility of promoting and supporting these measures. It is not necessary, however, to ensure that these measures are in full compliance with the legal and administrative regulations of the Member States.

Article III-273 also expands and clarifies the operational jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (i.e. the European Judicial Institutions), which, in accordance with Article 31 of the Treaty on the European Community, may require Member States to initiate criminal investigations (of course, with due regard to national provisions). and tradition), propose and coordinate prosecution measures to their public authorities. In doing so, the Charter of Fundamental Rights must be respected and supervised by the European Court of Justice.

According to Article III-274 of the EU Constitution, the European Council, by its unanimous decision and with the consent of the European Parliament, may, and, based on the powers of the European Justice, use the European Prosecutor's Office, but only to combat criminal offenses that damage the financial interests of the Union. The main tasks of the European Prosecutor's Office are to investigate, prosecute and initiate legal action against the perpetrators and participants in these criminal offences. The EU Constitution also provides the European Council with the opportunity to expand the tasks of the European Prosecutor's Office in the fight against serious crimes related to crossing the borders of states. But this requires the unanimous consent of the European Parliament and the hearing of reports on the work of the European Prosecutor's Office by the European Commission.

Police cooperation. The areas of this cooperation are dealt with in Article III-275 of the EU Constitution. It refers to the harmonization of operational measures by the relevant state authorities, since non-operational measures require prior discussion and decision on them by a qualified majority in the Council of Europe (Article III-276). The provisions of Article III-276 regarding Europol (European Police Service) are in line with Article 30 of the Treaty on the European Community. These provisions strengthen the administrative power in cases where criminal offenses concern two or more EU Member States and enable Europol to organize, coordinate and carry out investigations together with the authorized public authorities of the EU Member States. However, on the condition that Europol takes only operational measures with the consent of and in cooperation with these services. The application of coercive measures remains the exclusive prerogative of the national police authorities. The activities of Europol are controlled by the European Parliament together with the national parliaments of the EU member states. A prerequisite for the work of Europol is strict adherence to the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and control by the European Court of Justice.

protocols. This section of the EU Constitution contains protocols that define the scope of certain of its provisions, for example, in terms of border control, asylum seekers and immigration, for some EU member states (UK, Ireland, Denmark), as well as in connection with legal cooperation EU member states in the field of civil affairs and with police cooperation in the EU in terms of collecting, storing, processing, evaluating and exchanging information between the relevant public services of the EU member states.

Areas of European Union foreign policy

Goals and methods of implementation. Article I-12 of the EU Constitution specifies the powers to develop and implement a common foreign and security policy of the member states of the Union, including the gradual establishment of a common defense policy. The foreign policy of the EU is aimed at achieving mutual political solidarity between its countries, studying issues of common importance and implementing enhanced cooperation in all its fields in order to ensure the strategic interests and goals of the Union (Article I-40). Compared to the Treaty on European Union, its Constitution contains two important changes, namely the introduction of the office of the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs and the organization of the European External Service (Foreign Affairs). The main task of this minister is to participate in determining the main directions of the EU foreign policy and putting them into practice. He acts as the plenipotentiary representative of the EU in its external relations with third countries and international organizations, which are currently entrusted to the President of the European Council. The EU Minister for Foreign Affairs should coordinate the activities of the EU member states in various international organizations. The European Foreign Service supports the minister's efforts in his work, for which it includes a general secretariat and a commission of authorized persons from the national diplomatic services of the EU member states.

According to the EU Constitution, this commission no longer has the right to make proposals in the field of EU foreign policy. It should only support the initiatives of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. Decision-making in the field of foreign policy takes place, as before, with the help of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the EU member states, in which everyone has the right to veto. However, in strictly defined cases, a decision is provided for by a qualified majority, for example, when considering a proposal by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union, who makes it at the special request of the Council of Europe (Article III-300). At the same time, each member of this council who does not agree with the relevant decision may express his opinion on this matter, in which he must give significant reasons due to national policy the state he represents. The EU Foreign Minister then acts as an intermediary through which a solution acceptable to all is reached. Then this decision is already submitted to the European Council, which must unanimously approve it. The Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States may take common decisions on matters such as:

• actions carried out by the Union in the field of its foreign and security policy;
• provisions substantiating the common point of view of the Union;
• methods of action that allow these actions to be carried out and the provisions regarding the common point of view to be put into practice.

All expenses for the implementation of this policy are financed within the framework of the general budget of the EU, with the exception of expenses for military and defense-political measures. But the EU Constitution provides for the possibility of adopting a pan-European decision that will allow the allocation of budgetary funds for the implementation of initiatives within the framework of the common policy in the field of security and defense, including actions to prepare humanitarian actions, maintain peace, use special units to save people, overcome a crisis situation, etc. .d. In addition, for the preparation and holding of such actions, financial resources are used from a special fund formed from contributions from EU member states (Article III-313).

Although the European Court of Justice does not have special powers in the field of foreign policy, it can consider claims that come to it from individuals and legal entities challenging the legality of applying restrictive measures against them proposed by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU member states. This chamber is also authorized to check the compliance of international treaties, incl. and in terms of foreign policy, the provisions of the EU Constitution.

EU defense policy. An integral part of the common foreign and security policy of the EU member states is their joint defense policy. As you know, the military power of the EU member states and their ideas about internal and external security and necessary defense differ significantly from each other. This necessitates the introduction of provisions in the EU Constitution to ensure that arrangements are flexible and acceptable to all EU member states, while at the same time respecting their political commitments. And, of course, lay down the principle of unconditional unanimity in decision-making in this area of ​​policy.

In addition to the tasks specified in Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the EU Constitution provides for other tasks, such as armament measures, in terms of military advice and support, for the prevention of conflicts and the implementation of measures to stabilize the situation in the event of a conflict. And most importantly, the EU Constitution specifies the tasks for the joint fight against terrorism (Article III-309). Article I-43 of the EU Constitution contains a condition of solidarity, according to which a member state of the Union, subjected to a terrorist act or a natural or man-made disaster, can count on the help of all its other countries. In this case, the Union shall mobilize all means at its disposal, including the military, in order to support its respective country (Article III-284).

Article I-41 of the EU Constitution contains a mutual defense clause. It refers to the respective obligations of all its countries in terms of mutual defense, i.e. if any EU member state has been subjected to an armed attack by third countries, then all other EU countries are obliged to provide it with the necessary assistance and support with all means at their disposal, including military ones. If this obligation violates the neutrality of any EU member state, then this assistance is provided in close cooperation with NATO.

According to Article III-310 of the EU Constitution, the European Council may entrust a military mission to a group of EU member states that are ready for it and have the necessary capabilities for such a mission. These countries must coordinate their actions for the implementation of the military mission with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union. In addition, in order to strengthen the military capabilities of EU member states and rationalize their actions, the EU Constitution provides for the establishment of a European Agency for the development of their defense capabilities, military research, acquisition and equipping with weapons (European Defense Agency). This agency acts on the instructions of the Council of Ministers of Defense of the EU Member States, and all countries of the Union can take part in its work as they wish (Article III-311). Decisions in this agency are taken by a qualified majority, and its location and mode of operation is determined by itself.

Opportunities for ever-increasing cooperation in the field of security and defense policy not provided for by the European Union treaty are dealt with in Article III-312 of the EU Constitution. The fact is that this article provides for the possibility of organizing close cooperation between EU member states, in which each of them develops its military capabilities in accordance with modern criteria and assumes the responsibilities contained in the relevant protocol of the EU Constitution. Member States wishing to take part in such cooperation must inform the Council of Europe and the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs. Within three months, an all-Union decision on such cooperation and a list of countries participating in it are adopted by a qualified majority. Article III-312 retains the possibility of later joining this cooperation and, conversely, withdrawing from it. In addition, the participation of any state in this cooperation is excluded if the European Council decides that this state does not meet the criteria for military cooperation.

The EU constitution upholds the ban on spending on defense policy activities at the expense of the all-Union budget. These costs are covered, as before, from the corresponding article of the gross national product of each EU member state. Of course, the EU Constitution provides for the possibility of an all-Union decision by the European Council, which should ensure the allocation of funds from the all-Union budget in case of urgent need to finance the Union's initiatives in the field of its security and defense policy. However, a special fund formed at the expense of contributions from EU member states is being established to finance preparations for military actions and to carry out other tasks in the field of joint defense. All issues related to the creation of this fund are decided by the council of defense ministers of the EU member states by a qualified majority.

The procedure for amending the EU Constitution

Normal change process. Article IV-443 of the EU Constitution contains provisions on the general (usual) procedure for amending it. This article provides for various innovations against the former rule established by Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union. The first innovation provides the opportunity for the European Parliament to propose changes to the EU Constitution. Thus, the European Parliament is equalized in this respect with the European Commission and EU member states, which already have this right. The second innovation concerns the convening of a European convention (meeting), which should consist of representatives of national parliaments, leaders of EU member states and representatives of their governments, the European Parliament and the European Commission. The purpose of this convention is to test proposals for amending the EU Constitution and, through a conciliation procedure, adopt recommendations for a conference of governments of EU member states, which is convened by the President of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe may, however, by a simple majority and with the consent of the European Parliament, decide not to convene the Convention for minor changes. In this case, the European Council receives a mandate to hold only a conference of representatives of the governments of the EU member states, who must work out the necessary changes. Regardless of the procedure used, changes only come into effect when all EU member states have ratified them in accordance with the provisions of their national constitutions.

Simplified order of changes. This procedure is dealt with in Article IV-444 of the EU Constitution. According to it, the European Council is provided with two so-called. general transitional conditions: to use a qualified majority in a decision or the ordinary legislative procedure in an area for which the EU Constitution provides for unanimity or a special legislative procedure. According to the EU Constitution, national parliaments have the right to express their own opinion: for each application of one of the transitional conditions proposed by the European Council, representatives of national parliaments must be heard. If at least one of the national parliaments rejects the application of the transitional condition (within 6 months), the corresponding decision is not taken. At the same time, the transitional conditions apply only to the third section of the EU Constitution on the areas of its domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, these conditions are not involved in decisions on issues of military or defense policy. The European Council takes decisions only unanimously after consultation with the European Parliament, which, in turn, decides this by a simple majority.

The EU Constitution contains still other specific transitional conditions for certain areas of Union policy. The Council of Europe, after hearing in the European Parliament, may unanimously decide that the special legislative procedure, through the ordinary procedure (equivalent to the transition to qualified majority voting), is applicable in such areas of domestic policy as social (Article III-210), environmental protection (Article III- 234) and family law (III-289). The European Council may also, by unanimous decision, extend qualified majority voting to the area of ​​common foreign and security policy (Articles I-40 and III-300). In both these cases, the EU Constitution does not provide for the involvement of national parliaments. Finally, the EU Constitution provides for the possibility of changing the content of certain protocols through the adoption of an all-Union law by the European Parliament or a law by the European Council. This applies to regulations. European system central banks, the European Investment Bank, the EU Court of Justice, to the excessive budget deficit procedure, to the transitional provisions of both protocols through accession agreements.

Simplified procedure for changes relating to the internal policy provisions of the Union. Article IV-445 of the EU Constitution provides for a simplified procedure for amending the provisions of its corresponding subsection on the internal policy of the Union. In this context, you need to know that the Convention, when drafting the EU Constitution, did not propose any substantive changes in the field of the internal policy of the Union, but only limited them to adapting them to other areas of its policy within the framework of the changes proposed in them. Therefore, the Convention considered it expedient to adopt a simplified procedure for amending this subsection of the EU Constitution, so that it would be easier to do this later. However, this procedure can in no case be extended to the powers vested in the Union under the EU Constitution.

As in the normal procedure, the government of each EU member state, the European Parliament and the European Commission propose to the European Council draft amendments to the relevant provisions of the subsection of the EU Constitution on its domestic policy. The European Council may adopt an appropriate all-Union decision in which it will approve all or only part of the proposed changes. Thus, the European Council takes unanimous decisions only after hearing proposals in the European Parliament and the European Commission, and on issues such as institutional changes in the field of monetary policy, and after hearing them in the European Central Bank. It does not require the convening of a Convention or a conference of governments of EU member states to amend the relevant part of the EU Constitution. All that is required is a unanimous decision of the European Council, which then must be ratified by all EU member states.

Qualified Majority Decision System

The supermajority system is described in Article I-25 of the EU Constitution. The former system, in which each Member State of the Union had a certain number of votes, has been replaced in the EU Constitution by a double majority system. A qualified majority is valid in the future as sufficient when the decision is supported by 55% and at least 15% of the EU Member States and this majority simultaneously represents at least 65% of the population of the Union. But this position needs clarification. With 25 EU member states, 15 of them account for 60% of their total. If new countries enter the EU, then this provision loses its meaning, because. already with 26 countries, 55% of the total corresponds to the number 15 (rounded to the nearest whole number). Thus, this provision is, as it were, a transitional condition.

According to Article I-25, there is also a provision under which the Council of Europe takes decisions, basically, by a qualified majority. At the same time, its chairman and the chairman of the European Commission do not participate in the voting. The EU Constitution stipulates that the qualified majority system will come into force on November 1, 2009, when a new European Commission will be formed after the 2009 European Parliament elections. From 2004 to 2009, the current system, which was established by the Treaty of Nice, is in force. The EU Constitution adopts the provisions of the Protocol on Transitional Provisions for the Organs and Institutions of the Union, which is annexed to it.

The general double majority rule is supplemented by several special conditions for exceptional cases, namely:

• cases in which the European Council decides not on the proposals of the European Commission or the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs;
• rule for the so-called. "blocking minority";
• a special transitional condition for a small majority.

If the European Council or the functional Council of Ministers take a decision not on the proposal of the European Commission or the Minister for Foreign Affairs, then the majority of at least 72% of the EU Member States shall act as a qualified majority if they represent at least 65% of the population of the Union. The number of required EU member states is also higher here than in other cases. This provision is already contained in existing treaties: if the European Council does not act at the request of the European Commission (primarily in the field of common foreign and security policy, as well as police and judicial cooperation in criminal cases), then a qualified majority is carried out by at least 2/3 EU member states (Article 205 of the Treaty on the European Community and Articles 23 and 34 of the Treaty on the European Union). In the EU Constitution, the provision underlying this thought is taken into account, and therefore the majority assessment is increased from 2/3 to 72% of the EU member states.

According to the EU Constitution, a blocking (decision-making) minority requires at least four members of the European Council. This condition should be understood in the sense that in this way it is possible to take into account the demographic weight of the various EU member states. Without this condition, three of the four densely populated EU member states (Germany, France, Italy and the UK) would always form a blocking minority, since their demographic weight is more than 35% of the population of the Union. This condition works in favor of finding a solution in the European Council, since the formation of a blocking minority is difficult. This condition can also be understood as a guarantee against the possible diktat of the large EU member states. In the practical work of the EU institutions, this condition is probably not of great importance, since this kind of clear distinction between large and small EU member states is never made in practice.

A special condition also applies in the case when the qualified majority turns out to be insignificant (i.e., almost the limit), which makes the decision taken far from being indisputable. The EU constitution here resorts to a compromise, i.e. to the formula adopted back in 1994, which is valid until the entry into force new order taking into account the weight of votes. This formula provides that the European Council will continue to take decisions on the basis of the adoption of a legal act in the event that an EU member state so requests. The condition for such an application is that the Member State concerned submits:

• a quarter of the number of EU member states required to form a blocking minority, or
• three-quarters of the population of the Union, which are required to form a blocking minority.

This provision also applies, of course, when the qualified majority achieved is negligible.

The Council of Europe will always do its best to find, within a reasonable period of time, at the request of the members represented in it, a solution acceptable to all. To this end, the President of the European Council, with the support of the European Commission and other members of the Council, must take all necessary steps to find such a solution. However, it should be pointed out that by means of an application (request) a forced (prescribed by the EU Constitution, Union law or its regulations) period cannot be assigned if this may adversely affect the search for an appropriate solution. The decision also does not grant the right of veto to any EU member state in the European Council. After all, in practice, such a decision may be of little importance, because. The European Council in its daily work tries to find, if possible on the basis of comprehensive agreement and most often without a formal vote, a consensus. This order comes into force on November 1, 2009, when the transition to the new double majority rule takes place, and will be valid until 2014. After that, the European Council can take an all-union decision, i.e. decision by qualified majority, on the abolition of this order.

The principle of subsidiarity and the role of national parliaments

Subsidiarity(i.e., an addition, when the whole, for example, a federal state or an association of states, undertakes the implementation of only those tasks that cannot be performed by its parts, i.e., individual regions of the state or individual countries of their union) is a basic principle in the exercise of the powers of the European Union. It serves as the basis for deciding whether the Union can intervene or whether it should be left to its member countries. According to this principle, the Union can act in areas of policy that do not fall exclusively under its jurisdiction only when the objectives of the measures taken by the Member States cannot be fully achieved, or when, because of the scope of these measures or because of the impact of these measures throughout the territory of the Union, it is better for him to carry them out himself. The second decisive element for the exercise of powers is the principle proportionality. Following this principle, the Union shall only implement such measures which, both in content and in form, serve to achieve the objectives established by the EU Constitution.

At present, all bodies and institutions of the Union function in accordance with the existing treaties on the basis of these two principles. The same principle is laid down in the EU Constitution, but with significant innovations: national parliaments should be directly involved in monitoring the proper application of the principle of subsidiarity. Thus, the EU Constitution restores the active role of national parliaments, primarily in terms of transferring information to them and taking into account their opinions when making decisions by any bodies of the Union. Thus, these bodies, up to the European Parliament, cannot cause any damage to any of the EU member states with their initiatives, and national parliaments always have the opportunity to intervene in the legislative process and, if necessary, slow it down. The Annex to the Treaty on the Constitution of the EU contains the relevant protocols, which deal with the role of national parliaments in the European Union and the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the exercise of EU bodies of their powers.

According to these protocols, national parliaments have the opportunity, through their governments, to bring claims to the European Court of Justice in case of violation of these principles during the adoption of legislative acts. Each national parliament can check the proposals of the European Commission and convey to it its opinion on their content. Moreover, if a third of the European Parliament shares this opinion of the national parliament, then the European Commission or the relevant EU body must re-examine its proposal and, if necessary, make clarifications to it. The European Commission should send directly to all national parliaments not only all documents of a consultative nature, but also the drafting program of legal acts or the political strategy that it will propose to the European Parliament and the functional EU ministerial councils, not to mention the legislative proposals themselves. Similarly, these Councils of Ministers of the EU must communicate to the national parliaments and governments the agenda of their meetings and their results. The European Court of Auditors must also submit its annual reports to the national parliaments, and in urgent cases, for example, if an EU member state has an excessive budget deficit, send it (as well as all other EU member states) proposals to overcome it .

Foreign policy trends were dictated by the Crimean War, which introduced huge contradictions into the international relations of the Russian Empire. The military confrontation, which lasted virtually a century, brought not only a military defeat to Russia, but also a loss of positions in the international political arena.

During the reign of Alexander II, the state was opposed by three powerful empires at that time: Ottoman, French and British. The Austrian Empire tried to maintain diplomatic neutrality.

European policy of Alexander II

The Russian emperor had the primary task of initiating a revision of the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. To do this, it was necessary to break through the political blockade and restore dialogue with European states. The foreign policy of Alexander II in relation to Europe was unusually subtle and flexible. Realizing that it would be very difficult to get out of isolation after the Polish uprising, Russian diplomacy, led by the emperor, played on the internal contradictions of the European empires.

Alexander II managed to establish relations with France and Prussia and even maintain neutrality during the war of these states. After the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War, the Russian Empire lost its main enemy, which limited the influence of the Russian crown on Crimean peninsula. A major success in diplomatic relations was achieved thanks to the efforts of Gorchakov: Russia received access to the Black Sea, the waters of which were declared neutral.

In 1873, the rapprochement between Europe and the Russian Empire was consolidated as a result of the creation of the "Union of Three Emperors" - German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian. The end of European isolation allowed Alexander II to come to grips with the Turkish issue, which by 1873 had become unusually acute.

Confrontation in the Balkans

In April 1877, hostilities were unleashed between the Russian Empire and Turkey, the reason for which was the infringement of the rights of the Slavic peoples by the Ottoman authorities. In a relatively short time, the Russian army was able to win a number of victories and capture the main military bases of the Turks.

The result of the war was the signing of the San Stefano peace agreement, according to which the states of the Balkan Peninsula received political independence from Turkey, and the Russian Empire returned the coast of Crimea, Bessarabia and the Caucasian military fortresses to its crown.

Sale of Alaska

Plans for the possible sale of Alaska to the United States arose from Alexander II during the Crimean War. Such a bold step was logically justified: the territory was very remote from the center, the supreme power belonged to the governor general, who, in fact, could carry out his own policy in Alaska without control.

This situation did not suit the emperor. Ultimately, in the spring of 1867, an agreement was signed in the US capital, according to which the Russian Empire transferred the land of Alaska to the state. The cost of the territory at that time was symbolic - 7 million dollars.

The EU is the world's largest trading power; it accounts for almost a quarter of world trade. It is also the largest importer of agricultural products and raw materials. The EU also accounts for the bulk of aid to developing countries.

Under the Lomé Convention, the EU has cooperation agreements with 69 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, including most of the world's poorest countries. With about 60 more countries, the EU has concluded bilateral agreements of various types.

In general, the EU maintains diplomatic relations with more than 130 countries of the world. It participates in the work of the OECD and has observer status at the UN. It takes part in the annual summit meetings of the seven leading Western states - represented by its four largest members - France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy, as well as the President of the EU Commission, directly representing the Union. The EU has been an active participant in the CSCE (now OSCE) process from the very beginning.

The level of "openness" of the EU economy, measured by export and import quotas, is much higher than in other centers of the world economy. However, the EU countries as a whole depend on the outside world, through which they have to satisfy 45% of their energy needs and the most necessary raw materials. The export quota averages about 25%. For individual, primarily small, Western European countries, the dependence on the external market is even more significant.

Most (up to 2/3) of the trade of the EU countries falls on mutual trade (for all EU countries this figure exceeds 50%, and for small countries - 70%), about 10% - for trade with other European member countries OECD, about 7% - for trade with the US, about 4% - for trade with Japan, about 12% - for trade with developing countries.

In addition, other countries are important markets for the Union, since the EU is the largest exporter of agricultural products. European food and textile companies are world leaders in their industry. Traditionally strong positions are occupied by the European chemical industry. It supplies world markets with about 2/3 of all exports of manufactured goods, compared with 15% of the US and 5% of Japan. The EU is the largest exporter of engineering products, even without taking into account intra-regional turnover, Western European countries account for almost 30% of its world exports (Japan - 18%, USA - 13%). A very strong position is occupied by the EU in the field of telecommunications and aerospace equipment, optoelectronics. The Western European aviation industry, which exports almost 1/3 of its output, accounts for about 1/4 of the world civil aircraft industry market. On the other hand, the negative balance of the EU balance remains in trade in high-tech information equipment, consumer electronics.

industrial the developed countries remain the main trading partners of the EU among third countries, of which the US and Japan can be singled out. The main trading partner of the EU countries is Germany.

Industrial goods account for about 80% of total EU imports from the US. Manufacturing and transport equipment is the most important group of goods imported from the US, accounting for about 1/2 of the total EU imports from the US. Imports of raw materials (SMTC 0-4) account for 13.5% of total EU imports from the US.

Imports of the three most important groups of SMTCs imported from the US, which include office equipment and computers, other manufactured goods and electrical equipment, account for about 30% of total EU imports from the US. Imports of office equipment and computers from the US account for 37% of the total EU imports of this product. Goods, the need for imports of which is met to a large extent by imports from the USA, include oilseeds (49% of all imports of this product to the EU countries are provided by imports from the USA), measuring instruments (48.4%), chemical materials and products , nes (not previously classified anywhere) (44.4%), power generators (43.9%) and other transport equipment (43%).

Exports of industrial goods account for about 86% of total exports from EU countries to the United States, and exports of manufacturing and transport equipment - about 45%, raw materials - about 10%.

The main products exported to the US from EU countries are vehicles (about 10% of total exports from EU countries to the US). About 20% of the total vehicle exports from EU countries are to the USA. The next important group of goods exported to the United States are power generators and special equipment. These three product groups accounted for 23% of total EU exports to the US. Goods that are exported mainly to the US are power generators, office equipment, and computers and beverages.

EU countries import 4 groups of goods from Japan (vehicles, office equipment, electrical equipment), n.e.s. and audio and television equipment, which account for over 60% of all EU imports from Japan. Vehicle imports account for about 25% of all EU imports from Japan and more than 50% of total vehicle imports.

Exports of EU countries to Japan are less homogeneous than imports, and the list of exported goods is wider. As well as in imports, vehicles are the largest group of goods exported to Japan from EU countries. They account for about 1/6 of total EU exports to Japan and 1/12 of total EU vehicle exports. In addition to vehicles, the largest commodity groups in exports are medical equipment, pharmaceutical products and other manufactured goods.

The EU has a well established bilateral trade relationship with Switzerland based on the existing free trade agreement of 1972. Since 1994 the EU and Switzerland have organized negotiations covering a wide range of specific sectors. Seven new agreements in the areas of free movement of people, air and land transport, scientific and technological cooperation, Agriculture entered into force in the summer of 2002. From June 2001, negotiations in various areas of statistics, environment, agricultural trade and cooperation against fraud, while negotiations regarding taxation were just beginning. In April 2002, the European Commission proposed to open negotiations with Switzerland in four new areas, including the establishment of an FTA in the area of ​​services.

Trade relations with Asia continue to be an important priority. The Asia-Europe Economic Relations (ASEM), established in 1996, links the EU and 15 Member States with Japan, China, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Brunei in a dialogue process aimed at trade facilitation and improved investment between all partners. The most recent Trade Assistance Action Plan defines a variety of goals, intends to reduce and eliminate barriers to organize trade in the areas of standards, customs, IPR, AV, and electronic commerce. In trading terms, ASEM's Asian partners provide approximately 26% of world exports in 2000 with the EU being their largest partner and the EU having the second largest importing region.

The long-term and continuity of Russian-European cooperation is already today ensured by a solid international legal and international political contractual basis. Although, as in any large and complex international process, various alternatives are possible, nevertheless, the main prospect of economic relations between Russia and Europe emerges quite clearly. This is a stable partnership for years and decades to come, which will ensure the gradual development of a single economic space that includes Russia in the EU zone.

The main spheres of application of efforts both by each of the parties and bilateral ones for a sufficiently long period are also clear. Among them are the development of new joint programs for energy cooperation, including the supply of Russian gas to Europe (a third of the total European demand), oil, and electricity; new space cooperation projects; a system of mutual measures in the field of nuclear safety; other scientific and technical projects that are covered by the Framework Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation between the EU and Russia, signed in 2000.

Economic relations between the EU and Russia, as well as similar relations between other states and integration entities, are far from idyllic. Concrete economic (and political) interests constantly collide and give rise to collisions. The EU countries make claims against Russia, including quite fair ones, talking about the excessive closeness of the Russian market and excessive protectionism, about the imperfection of laws, corruption and theft that impede a civilized investment policy. Russia condemns the EU for discrimination against Russian exports of goods and capital, excessive severity of anti-dumping measures and other foreign trade restrictions left over from the Cold War against countries with, as it was then called, centralized economies.

In relations between Russia and the EU, there are also "painful" points, the points of view of the parties do not always coincide.

The main concerns of the Russian side:

anti-dumping procedures;

quotas for deliveries of Russian steel products;

a ban on the import of lynx and wolf skins into the EU;

restrictions on access to the EU market for Russian products of the nuclear cycle;

conditions for the provision of space launch services to Russia;

granting of "social" preferences by the European Union to Russia;

the planned enlargement of the EU and possible negative consequences for Russia from this enlargement.

The main problem associated with the conduct of EU anti-dumping investigations against Russia remains the failure to fully recognize the market status of the Russian economy.

The criteria of "marketability" proposed by the EU are excessively strict, ambiguous, and, moreover, inadequate to the earlier steps taken by the EU towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics. It was assumed that the CES amendments in the field of anti-dumping in relation to Russia would allow Russian enterprises to receive more fair conditions for conducting anti-dumping investigations, but in practice these amendments did not bring the expected results.

The situation with the unconditional recognition of the market status of the Russian economy is significantly aggravated after the adoption by the EU Council of the Regulation, which contains a provision providing for the preservation of the status of a country with a non-market economy in relation to Russia and other CIS countries and after accession to the WTO. The Russian side insists on revising this wording.

The main concerns of the European side:

measures taken by Russia to regulate the alcohol market;

insufficient presence in Russia financial institutions EU countries;

regulation of the Russian market of insurance services;

issues of protection of intellectual property rights;

issues of standardization, certification and conformity assessment of goods and services;

introduction by Russia of a number of export duties, in particular on waste and scrap of ferrous and non-ferrous metals;

uncertainty and lack of transparency in trade regulation practices at the regional level;

Russia's ban on imports of table eggs from the EU;

collection by Russia of fees for overflights of aircraft on the Trans-Siberian routes.

However, the existing extensive legal framework, and especially the daily practice of interaction, help level differences and eliminate difficulties. Evidence of this is the 3-3.5-fold increase in foreign trade between Russia and the EU over the past decade and the increase (though on a much more modest scale) of European investment in Russia.

Foreign economic relations of Russia with the EU countries and the USA.

Thus, the European Union is the main sales market for Russian exports, as well as the largest supplier of imported goods to Russia. Russia's most important trading partners in the European Union are Germany (trade turnover $15 billion) and Italy ($9.1 billion). These two countries account for about 40% of Russian exports to Europe and 30% of European imports come from them. The USA is the fifth trading partner of Russia after Germany, Belarus, Ukraine and Italy, however, the trade turnover with the USA is 7.5 times less than with the European Union.

The role of Russia as a trading partner for the European Union is much more modest. Russia is the EC's fifth largest trading partner. Russia accounts for only 2.8% of exports and 4.6% of imports of EU countries. However, for individual commodity items, the importance of Russia is much higher. For example, Russia provides 17% of European energy imports.

The structure of Russian exports to the EU is dominated by fuel and raw materials (up to 90%), while consumer goods and equipment are mainly imported (estimated at 66-67%).

Energy carriers make up 67% of Russian exports to the EU. The leaders in terms of volumes of fuel and energy raw materials imported from Russia are Germany and Italy: over half (54%) of all energy carriers exported to the European Union are supplied to these two countries. A significant part of Russian exports of metals (35%), timber and cellulose (30%), and chemical products (24%) are supplied to the EU markets.

In the list of goods with the largest share in the volume of trade, nuclear reactors are in the top three. Presumably, this reflects the import of radioactive waste for processing in Russia or the import of raw materials for the production of nuclear fuel. The rating of other key goods reflects the features of the foreign trade structure described above.

Trade turnover recorded by the State Customs Committee grew by more than a third, while trade with the EU increased by 44% over the same period, and the US - by only 5%. Imports from the EU grew by about 32% in two years, but in trade with the EU there was an increase in exports from Russia (by 48%).

Among the main problems in the development of Russia's trade relations with the countries of the European Union and the United States, the following can be noted.

The entry of new members into the European Union will mean the spread of EU trade norms and standards to them, and, as a result, the possible restriction of sales markets for Russian exports.

Russia's ratification of the Unified Energy Charter will mean liberalization of access to Russian transport infrastructure and may lead to a decrease in Russian energy exports.

Thus, the European Union is the main trading partner of Russia and accounts for more than 50 percent. all trade of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, Russia is the fifth largest trading partner of the EU after the US, Switzerland, China and Japan and accounts for about 5 percent. all EU trade.

The structure of bilateral trade reflects the comparative advantages of the two economies, where fuel and commodities make up the bulk of Russian exports, while capital and finished industrial and consumer goods are imported from the EU. Currently, Russia provides more than 20% of the EU's need for imported fuel. A significant part of Russian goods supplied to the Community markets is included in the EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), under which import duties are lower than the rates established by the most favored nation regime.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) governs political, economic and cultural relations between the EU and Russia. Under the terms of the PCA, Russia enjoys most favored nation status, which means there are no quantitative restrictions on exports, except for some steel products (representing only 4% of bilateral trade). At the same time, the EU and Russia signed a Joint Statement addressing Russia's concerns about EU enlargement, in particular in the areas of tariffs, steel, trade protection, agricultural and veterinary issues, energy and transit of goods.

The EU is slowly, with difficulty, coming out of the crisis. Against this backdrop, in 2012, a number of multidirectional trends emerged to an even greater extent. The first is integration, gradually leading the EU to federalization. This also applies to institutional changes, where progress has been made. The second trend can be characterized as “delimitation”: against the backdrop of deepening integration, there is an even greater qualitative stratification of the EU member states.

The demarcation goes on two levels (as defined by H. Van Rompuy Їtwotears): the first is between the eurozone and the non-eurozone, the second is the stratification between countries better and worse adapted, adapted to the processes of integration and globalization.

At the same time, both old EU members (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal) and new ones fall into the second group. The old "others" are the countries most affected by the crisis.

Young "other EU" - in the majority suffered much less (the reasons are different, as we wrote about in previous forecasts). But in a situation where they are “taken away” from their powers at the supranational level, they either seek support from stable neighbors (Sweden), or unite in small groups: for example, activities

The Visegrad Group, which arose more than 20 years ago, and one of its main tasks was the entry of member countries into the EU and NATO. Thus, within the EU, along with federalization and deepening integration, there is a process of sub-regionalization.

crisis phenomena recent years- both financial and economic in Europe, and political in the Middle East and North Africa - were reflected in the ideological sphere, where multidirectional processes are also more and more clearly observed. Against the backdrop of the dominance of tolerance and political correctness, even in the most prosperous countries, the growth of nationalism continues, which is already legally represented, not only at the national, but also at the supranational level, for example, in the European Parliament.

In 2012, most of the EU leaders' time was consumed by dealing with the aftermath of the economic crisis. The sense of chaos experienced in 2011 has subsided. The President of the European Council, H. van Rompuy, was forced to warn governments against complacency, reminding them that the solution of the accumulated problems is urgent. But the conditions for the rapid adoption of agreed decisions have not yet developed:

Economically driven protests in many member states are shrinking the base of support for any deal reached at the EU level, and populist forces are easily turning the EU into a target for harsh criticism. In November 2012, the largest protest action in recent decades took place in Europe - in a general strike announced by the European Trade Union Confederation, millions of residents from 23 EU countries took part in demonstrations to express dissatisfaction with austerity measures and cuts in public spending.

The most serious disagreements remain over the problems of financing the activities of the European Union, and at the extraordinary November and December summits of EU leaders, it was not possible to reach a compromise on the draft long-term budget for 2014-2020.

The idea of ​​the UK to cut costs is supported mainly by seven other donor countries, which form the bulk of the EU budget. They are opposed in the negotiations by a group of 16 countries chaired by Poland and Portugal, for the development and support of which the EU annually spends many billions of euros. It is possible that the member countries will not be able to agree on the budget for the next seven-year period even in a year. In this case, in 2014 the EU will have to live on the budget of 2013, increased by 2% to adjust for inflation.

The growing divergence of the vectors of internal political development of the leading EU countries, first of all, France, Germany and Great Britain, has become noticeable. The personal temperament of the leaders of these countries also does not contribute to their compatibility.

Only by the end of 2012 did an open discussion begin about the strategic prospects of the EU and the possible formation of a full-fledged federal structure, the mention of which had previously been avoided.

In foreign policy, the modest possibilities of the EU were further limited by election campaigns in key partner countries - Russia and the United States, which temporarily reduced the ability to negotiate and carry out long-term planning.

In 2013, a significant part of the unfinished negotiations on anti-crisis policy, possible changes in the legal framework and on the details of the institutional structure of the EU will pass. Due to the dynamics of the political process in the leading EU member states (federal elections in Germany, delayed decisions on the strategic course of the UK), one should not expect significant upheavals during the year. The EU will be preoccupied with the recovery of economic growth, and the political forces in power will take credit for any signs of improvement in the economy. In 2013, the release of resources necessary for the implementation of new large-scale projects in the field of foreign and security policy is not planned.

At the end of November, the European Commission presented a blueprint for moving towards a "genuine" economic and monetary union, pointing to its current incompleteness.

A set of measures to strengthen economic mechanisms, if implemented, will also lead to greater political cohesion. It may be necessary to amend the fundamental treaties that form the legal basis of the EU. Under these conditions, some countries will strive for greater cohesion, but the UK will try to create an opportunity for itself to remain in the common economic area and decision-making bodies of the EU, refusing to fulfill obligations in other areas.

Key decisions in the EU are still made by the heads of state and government of member states. In a stable situation, they would hardly agree to strengthening the positions of the EU communitarian bodies, but if such a step is recognized as the only tool capable of providing a way out of the crisis, most countries will agree to take it.

Since EU countries failed to agree on a new seven-year framework budget in 2012, this work will need to be accelerated and completed in the first half of 2013.

The compromise, most likely, will not contain provisions that fundamentally change the nature of the financial support of the EU, however, in the process of negotiations, governments will be able to demonstrate their willingness to fight for the rational use of taxpayers' money. The task of the leading politicians and institutions of the EU is to prevent the transformation of the framework budget into a stagnation budget under the influence of austerity measures. Despite numerous challenges, EU officials remain confident of success. The common understanding does not disappear that all member states and partners of the EU are interested in preserving and strengthening the European Union and the eurozone.

In the longer term, it can be assumed that, with all the difficulties and internal contradictions experienced by the European Union, a rather long period of EU enlargement will now be followed by a period of deepening integration and consolidation processes. Today, the EU, according to some analysts, is on the verge of another "restart", the first of which was in 1986, and the second in 1992. Evidence of this is the return to the slogan of the Federation of Nation States. However, in this case, most likely, the final formation of a Europe of “two speeds” is inevitable: representatives of the first will focus on the interstate nature of the state, and the second - on the national one. This process will go hand in hand with increasing internal differentiation within the EU, and within the Member States as well (Belgium, UK-Scotland, Spain-Catalonia). european union economy politics

Institutional reforms in the EU. The role of J. Barroso

The year 2012 was marked by a number of significant institutional developments in the architecture of the European Union and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as its key element.

In conditions when the leaders of the EU member states were forced to be cautious, refraining from ambitious initiatives, President of the European Commission J. Barroso tried to take on the role of strategist. In his annual State of the Union address, he called for a "federation of nation-states". The term "federation" directly likens the EU to a state and is therefore sharply rejected by Eurosceptics, whose positions are quite strong in a number of EU countries. However, a careful reading of the projects introduced by the EU institutions in 2012 to improve the management of the main areas of the Union's life indicates an undoubted trend towards its “federalization”.

The current composition of the European Commission must exercise its powers until 2015.

Accordingly, in case of successful implementation of the institutional initiatives put forward in 2012, Barroso has a unique chance to win the laurels of one of the most influential and successful Presidents of the European Commission.

In the autumn of 2012, in various documents of the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the speeches of the President of the European Council, the Project for a “Deep and True Economic and Monetary Union” was presented - an ambitious plan for the creation of a truly integrated full economic, long-term (at least 5 years) banking and budgetary (fiscal) union. The plan implies more binding coordination of the processes of development and adoption of national decisions in the field of macroeconomic and budgetary policy, in fact, at the supranational level (i.e. with the direct participation of supranational institutions), as well as transferring to them the competence to authorize national measures, as well as supervise their implementation. This also applies to tax and employment policies.

Economic discipline must be complemented by greater solidarity within the new union. It is supposed to create an autonomous budget of the eurozone, including to support those countries that are carrying out painful structural reforms.

A number of priority measures are planned for 2013, allowing their adoption in the form of secondary EU law and aimed at strengthening supranational supervisory and enforcement mechanisms in the economic and fiscal spheres. Thus, it is planned to accelerate the implementation of the so-called “package of six legislative acts”, which strengthens the enforcement mechanisms of the Stability and Growth Pact, and also establishes a new tool to prevent/correct macroeconomic imbalances, the growth of which was characteristic of the EMU economies throughout the “zero” years. The European Commission, within the framework of this reform agenda, is lobbying for the early adoption of a “double package” aimed at strengthening supervision over the development and implementation of the budgetary policy of the eurozone states.

It is also planned to include the provisions of the intergovernmental Treaty on stability, coordination and management in the EMU in the secondary law of the EU. This logic is embedded in the bills of the "double package". The Treaty itself, which is in the process of being ratified, establishes that state budgets must be balanced or have a surplus. Article 3 (paragraphs 1e and 2) of the Treaty prescribes the establishment of a correction mechanism at the national level, that is, in addition to the Stability and Growth Pact, where the launch of the procedure for eliminating excessive deficits is authorized by the Council.

The budgetary pact requires the incorporation of its rules into national legislation, preferably of a constitutional nature. It is noteworthy that the Treaty will enter into force upon its ratification by 12 of the 17 states that make up the euro area. This principle of "ratification majority" speaks of a general trend in the development of the EU associated with the formation of a more cohesive "core" surrounded by a less "advanced" periphery.

As for the “banking” union, the main measure planned in the short term will be the launch of a unified supervisory mechanism for the activities of banks. Supervision will gradually spread to all banks in the euro area, starting with the largest. The new unified banking supervision mechanism, in which the ECB plays a key role, will allow banks to be recapitalized directly through the European Stability Mechanism, which began its work on October 8, 2012. A unified set of banking rules is being developed. After the creation of the supervisory mechanism, it is planned to establish a single mechanism for the restructuring of problem banks. The Growth and Employment Pact adopted at the June European Council summit with a budget of 120 billion euros is already being implemented.

It is planned to establish a new financial instrument to support structural reforms, investment in the development of energy, transport and telecommunications infrastructure.

The main forces for moving towards a "banking, fiscal and political union" were the countries of the European "core" - Germany and France. Despite disagreements among their leaders on how to save the eurozone, the founding countries of the EU are united in their intention to provide " more Europe". This aspiration was reaffirmed in the official statement "The Future of Europe" issued on 18 September 2012 following the meeting in Warsaw of the foreign ministers of eleven member states. In addition to France and Germany, the meeting was attended by representatives of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal. The scale of the institutional and political changes proposed by the ministers is more ambitious than the rejected EU constitution. The ministers proposed to return to the idea of ​​an EU president elected by direct elections in the member states; to strengthen the powers of the Foreign Service; create a European border police and even a European army; abolish the principle of unanimity in matters of common foreign and security policy in order to harmonize it.

The implementation of such a reform would require a revision of the Lisbon Treaty. Bearing in mind that not all Member States signed the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, initiated by Germany, at the beginning of the year, the ministers put forward an unprecedented proposal: to approve future versions of the EU treaties not unanimously, but by a qualified majority in order to these treaties could operate, albeit only in the states that ratified them.

The EU faces extremely difficult tasks. However, the financial and economic crisis also created the prerequisites for their solution, strengthening the federalist aspirations of the EU leaders.

Germany remains the main donor and engine of integration. The crisis has clearly revealed the existing divergence between areas subject to supranational (communitarian) regulation and areas based on intergovernmental cooperation, including common foreign and security policy. However, progress towards fiscal, banking and political union, plans for a deeper reform of the institutional structure of the European Union than in the Lisbon Treaty will inevitably entail a strengthening of the common foreign and security policy.

Weakness of peacekeepers. The European Union regularly demonstrates insufficient coherence in the foreign policies of its members and low efficiency in upholding once defined priorities. First of all, this is noticeable in the example of the EU policy towards regional conflicts.

The EU is most concerned about "hot spots" located near its borders, in particular in the post-Soviet space. At the same time, in mediating the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, the European Union noticeably yields to the initiative of Russia and the United States (the latter actively use the OSCE institutions). The EU's calculation is connected rather not with direct mediation, but with the beneficial impact on the conflict of the process of rapprochement between Moldova and the EU, but noticeable results here can appear only in the medium term. In the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, none of the mediators is able to counteract the growth of tension. The EU is represented in the settlement process only indirectly - through the member countries participating in the OSCE Minsk Group: France (group co-chair), Germany, Italy, Sweden and Finland. In Georgia, the EU remains the only actor providing an international presence in the conflict region through its observation mission, which, however, does not have access to the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and, apparently, will not be able to get it in the near future. The expansion of the scope of the mission is also not included in the plans of the EU.

Even more problematic for the EU, as well as for other international actors, is the impact on the Middle East settlement process. The European Union has to reckon with strong lobbying groups that support each of the parties. Formally launched at the end of 2005, the EU border mission at the Rafah checkpoint between Egypt and the Gaza Strip is not functioning and, most likely, will not be able to resume its work due to Israel's position in this regard. Differences between the EU and Israel deepened as a result of a vote in the UN General Assembly on November 30, 2012 on the issue of granting Palestine the rights of an observer country. The Israeli position among the EU countries was supported only by the Czech Republic, while there is no question of unity of approaches within the EU, since 14 member countries supported the Palestinian application, and 12 abstained.

On the Iranian issue, the EU tried to play an active role, but failed to prove its effectiveness as a mediator. Neither the United States nor Russia place significant hopes for a settlement involving the EU.

The unique opportunities for increasing the role in North Africa, which appeared as a result of the "Arab spring", the EU failed to use. This situation is unlikely to change in the coming year. The leading EU countries prefer to act in the region on a bilateral basis, without using communitarian mechanisms. The formally launched EU mission to provide humanitarian assistance to resolve the conflict in Libya did not start work.

Weakened by internal contradictions, the new political regimes of the states of the region are not yet inclined to consider the EU as a support for their own development.

The EU presence in Afghanistan, where a limited police mission is deployed and EU member states participate in the International Security Assistance Force, will be reduced. The EU will be able to influence what is happening in this country only indirectly, through partnerships with the United States, Russia, China and the countries of Central Asia.

In relations with Russia - the EU in 2013, as shown, in particular, by the last December 2012 Russia-EU summit, there will hardly be significant progress or breakthroughs in the main areas - energy, visa, modernization and innovation. Also, there are no conditions for signing a new basic agreement. At the same time, showwillgoon Russia, for which Europe is not only the main trading partner (50% of the turnover in goods, more than 40% in services, more than 70% of the volume of accumulated investments in the Russian economy), but also the main external resource for modernization, in 2013 even at the stage of exiting the recession, we will have to continue to deal with a weakening global player. In part, the crisis in Europe played into the hands of Moscow. The rivalry in the European NIS was practically irrelevant. Under these conditions, in August 2012, with the yet to be signed agreement on a free trade zone between Ukraine and the EU, Russia managed to "add pressure" to Kiev to ratify the agreement on a free trade zone with the CIS. Taking into account the priority of the goal of creating a free trade area with the European Union, Russia took into account European legal norms and included them in the rules of the CU and the CEEA. In general, Russia's integration efforts in the post-Soviet space do not raise objections in Europe and are not considered there as an obstacle to the signing of a new RF-EU treaty. At least at the political level, there are no statements about Russia's neo-imperial plans in the CIS.

The European Union made significant efforts to solve the problems that prevented Russia from joining the WTO, which was one of the main foreign policy achievements common with the EU and the USA

Russia in 2012 WTO membership (as well as plans to join the OECD) remove a significant number of trade and economic disputes that prevent the signing of a new agreement with the EU.

It was the weakening of the EU's international positions, the offensive in the economic sphere of China, the roughness in relations with the United States, the financial and economic crisis, as well as the issues that arose in 2012 in connection with alternative energy sources, that strengthened European approaches to Russia, although this is not articulated. , which is the “forced partnership”. Moreover, on the issues that concern Russia most of all - visas, energy and modernization.

Europe, at the insistence of Russia, has adopted and is implementing a plan of "joint steps" for the transition to a visa-free regime for short-term trips of citizens. However, it will hardly be possible to achieve a visa-free regime already in 2014, as planned by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Problems with alternative energy sources (decreasing enthusiasm for shale gas, unwillingness to accept LNG and the unstable situation in the Persian Gulf, where it mainly comes from) are already resulting in giving Nord Stream the status of European transport networks that came into operation. Negotiations on the same issue are also underway with regard to the South Stream, which, in addition to the South European countries, has been joined by France, Germany, Italy, and Austria. That defacto takes these major projects beyond the scope of Russia's disagreements with the EU because of the EU's Third Energy Package. At the December 2012 RF-EU summit, the issue was acute. However, the lack of a real alternative for the exporter and importer in the foreseeable (5-7 years), as well as the interest of large European companies that have invested in these energy projects, it can be assumed that, despite the likely negative information background, the parties will reach a compromise. At the same time, prejudices will remain strong for a long time, defeating sound economic calculation in relation to Russia and its business (as was the case in 2012 in the case of the participation of a Russian private manufacturer mineral fertilizers Akron in a tender for the purchase of a stake in the Polish company Azoty Tarnow).

Europe and, to an even greater extent, Russia are faced with the need for reindustrialization, and in the context of a growing demographic crisis, an influx of migrants, and deepening confessional and civilizational contradictions (“the failure of multiculturalism”). In this regard, especially against the background of Europe's skeptical, negative attitude towards Russian internal political affairs, different understanding of the essence of modernization, the real breakthrough in 2012 was the reconciliation of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Polish Church.

Bilateral relations are improving. In 2012, a visa-free regime was established between the Kaliningrad region and the adjacent Polish voivodeships.

The practice of relations with the European Union shows that Russia will have to continue to use both institutional and bilateral formats and mechanisms for developing relations with its European neighbors. At the same time, as in relations with many CIS countries, Russia is faced in Europe with the phenomenon of a generational change of elites. First of all, this concerns possible changes in connection with the forthcoming elections in 2013 in Germany.

Shifts of generations of society are also important. This means, firstly, the need for an even more pragmatic approach to relations. Secondly, a correct and thoughtful change of historical landmarks in appeal to the young and middle-aged generations of Europeans, and with regard to the Second World War, and the velvet revolutions of the 90s