What the Russian "Katyusha" is, the German - "hell flames." The nickname that the Wehrmacht soldiers gave to the Soviet rocket artillery combat vehicle was fully justified. In just 8 seconds, a regiment of 36 BM-13 mobile units fired 576 shells at the enemy. A feature of salvo fire was that one blast wave was superimposed on another, the law of addition of impulses came into force, which greatly increased the destructive effect. Fragments of hundreds of mines, heated to 800 degrees, destroyed everything around. As a result, an area of ​​100 hectares turned into a scorched field, riddled with craters from shells. It was possible to escape only to those Nazis who, at the time of the salvo, were lucky enough to be in a securely fortified dugout. The Nazis called this pastime a "concert." The fact is that the Katyusha volleys were accompanied by a terrible roar, for this sound the Wehrmacht soldiers awarded rocket launchers with another nickname - "Stalin's organs".

See in the AiF.ru infographic what the BM-13 rocket artillery system looked like.

The birth of "Katyusha"

In the USSR, it was customary to say that the “Katyusha” was created not by any individual designer, but by the Soviet people. The best minds of the country really worked on the development of combat vehicles. The creation of rockets on smokeless powder in 1921 began employees of the Leningrad Gas Dynamics Laboratory N. Tikhomirov And V. Artemiev. In 1922, Artemiev was accused of espionage and the following year he was sent to serve his term in Solovki, in 1925 he returned to the laboratory.

In 1937, the RS-82 rockets, which were developed by Artemiev, Tikhomirov and who joined them G. Langemak, were adopted by the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Air Fleet. In the same year, in connection with the Tukhachevsky case, all those who worked on new types of weapons were subjected to a “cleansing” by the NKVD. Langemak was arrested as a German spy and shot in 1938. In the summer of 1939, aircraft rockets developed with his participation were successfully used in battles with Japanese troops on the Khalkhin Gol River.

From 1939 to 1941 employees of the Moscow Jet Research Institute I. Gvai,N. Galkovsky,A. Pavlenko,A. Popov worked on the creation of a self-propelled multiply charged rocket launcher. On June 17, 1941, she took part in a demonstration of the latest types of artillery weapons. The tests were attended People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko, his Deputy Grigory Kulik And Chief of the General Staff Georgy Zhukov.

Self-propelled rocket launchers were shown last, and at first, trucks with iron guides fixed on top did not make any impression on the tired representatives of the commission. But the volley itself was remembered by them for a long time: according to eyewitnesses, the commanders, seeing the rising column of flame, fell into a stupor for a while. Timoshenko was the first to come to his senses, he sharply turned to his deputy: “Why were they silent and did not report about the presence of such weapons?” Kulik tried to justify himself by saying that this artillery system had simply not been fully developed until recently. On June 21, 1941, just a few hours before the start of the war, after inspecting rocket launchers, he decided to deploy their mass production.

The feat of Captain Flerov

The first commander of the first Katyusha battery was Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov. The country's leadership chose Flerov to test top-secret weapons, among other things, because he showed himself well during the Soviet-Finnish war. At that time, he commanded a battery of the 94th howitzer artillery regiment, whose fire managed to break through. For his heroism in the battles near Lake Saunajärvi, Flerov was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

A full-fledged baptism of fire "Katyusha" took place on July 14, 1941. Rocket artillery vehicles under the leadership of Flerov fired volleys at the Orsha railway station, where a large number of manpower, equipment and provisions of the enemy. Here is what he wrote about these volleys in his diary Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Franz Halder: “On July 14, near Orsha, the Russians used a hitherto unknown weapon. A fiery flurry of shells burned down the Orsha railway station, all trains with personnel and military equipment of the arrived military units. The metal melted, the earth burned.

Adolf Gitler I met the news about the appearance of a new Russian miracle weapon very painfully. Chief Wilhelm Franz Canaris received a thrashing from the Fuhrer for the fact that his department had not yet stolen the drawings of rocket launchers. As a result, a real hunt was announced for the Katyushas, ​​to which chief saboteur of the Third Reich Otto Skorzeny.

Flerov's battery, meanwhile, continued to smash the enemy. After Orsha, successful operations near Yelnya and Roslavl followed. On October 7, Flerov and his Katyushas were surrounded in the Vyazma cauldron. The commander did everything to save the battery and break through to his own, but in the end he was ambushed near the village of Bogatyr. Caught in a hopeless situation, and his fighters took an unequal battle. The Katyushas fired all the shells at the enemy, after which Flerov self-detonated the rocket launcher, the rest of the batteries followed the example of the commander. To take prisoners, as well as to receive an "iron cross" for the capture of top-secret equipment, the Nazis failed in that battle.

Flerov was posthumously awarded the Order Patriotic War 1st degree. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Victory, the commander of the first Katyusha battery was awarded the title of Hero of Russia.

"Katyusha" against "donkey"

Along the front lines of the Great Patriotic War, the Katyusha often had to exchange salvos with the Nebelwerfer (German Nebelwerfer - “fog thrower”) - a German rocket launcher. For the characteristic sound that this six-barreled 150 mm mortar made when firing, soviet soldiers They called him "the donkey". However, when the soldiers of the Red Army fought off enemy equipment, the contemptuous nickname was forgotten - in the service of our artillery, the trophy immediately turned into a “vanyusha”. True, the Soviet soldiers did not have tender feelings for this weapon. The fact is that the installation was not self-propelled, the 540-kilogram jet mortar had to be towed. When fired, his shells left a thick plume of smoke in the sky, which unmasked the positions of the artillerymen, who could immediately be covered by the fire of enemy howitzers.

Nebelwerfer. German rocket launcher. Photo: commons.wikimedia.org

The best designers of the Third Reich did not manage to design their analogue of the Katyusha until the end of the war. German developments either exploded during tests at the training ground, or did not differ in firing accuracy.

Why was the volley fire system nicknamed "Katyusha"?

Soldiers at the front liked to give names to weapons. For example, the M-30 howitzer was called "Mother", the ML-20 howitzer gun - "Emelka". BM-13, at first, was sometimes called "Raisa Sergeevna", as the front-line soldiers deciphered the abbreviation RS (rocket). Who and why was the first to call the rocket launcher "Katyusha" is not known for certain. The most common versions link the appearance of the nickname:

• with a song popular during the war years M. Blanter into words M. Isakovsky"Katyusha";
• with the letter "K" embossed on the installation frame. Thus, the plant named after the Comintern marked its products;
• with the name of the beloved of one of the fighters, which he wrote on his BM-13.

*Mannerheim line- a complex of defensive structures 135 km long on the Karelian Isthmus.

**Abwehr- (German Abwehr - "defense", "reflection") - organ military intelligence and counterintelligence of Germany in 1919-1944. He was a member of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

*** The last combat report of Captain Flerov: "7 Oct. 1941 9 p.m. We were surrounded by the village of Bogatyr - 50 km from Vyazma. We will hold on to the end. No exit. Getting ready to explode. Farewell, comrades."

When soldiers and commanders asked the representative of the GAU to name the “genuine” name of the combat installation at the firing range, he advised: “Call the installation as an ordinary artillery piece. It's important to maintain secrecy."

There is no single version of why BM-13s began to be called "Katyushas". There are several assumptions:

1According to the name of Blanter's song, which became popular before the war, to the words of Isakovsky< КАТЮША>.

The version is convincing, since for the first time the battery fired on July 14, 1941 at the concentration of Nazis on the Market Square of the city of Rudnya, Smolensk Region. She shot from a high steep mountain with direct fire - the association with a high steep bank in the song immediately arose among the fighters. Finally, the former sergeant of the headquarters company of the 217th separate communications battalion of the 144th is alive rifle division 20th Army Andrey Sapronov, now a military historian, who gave her this name. The Red Army soldier Kashirin, having arrived with him after the shelling of Rudny on the battery, exclaimed in surprise: “This is a song!” “Katyusha,” Andrey Sapronov replied. Through the communication center of the headquarters company, the news about the miracle weapon named “Katyusha” became the property of the entire 20th Army within a day, and through its command, the whole country. On July 13, 2010, the veteran and “godfather” of Katyusha turned 89 years old.

2According to the abbreviation "KAT" - there is a version that the rangers called the BM-13 exactly that - "Kostikovskiye automatic thermal" (according to another source - "Cumulative artillery thermal"), by the name of the project manager, (although, given the secrecy of the project, the possibility of exchanging information between rangers and front-line soldiers is doubtful).

3 Another option is that the name is associated with the “K” index on the mortar body - the installations were produced by the Kalinin plant (according to another source, the Comintern plant). And the front-line soldiers liked to give nicknames to weapons. For example, the M-30 howitzer was nicknamed "Mother", the ML-20 howitzer gun - "Emelka". Yes, and BM-13 at first was sometimes called "Raisa Sergeevna", thus deciphering the abbreviation RS (missile).

4The fourth version suggests that this is how the girls from the Moscow Kompressor plant, who worked at the assembly, dubbed these cars.

5Another, exotic version. The guides on which the shells were mounted were called ramps. The forty-two-kilogram projectile was lifted by two fighters harnessed to the straps, and the third usually helped them, pushing the projectile so that it exactly lay on the guides, he also informed the holders that the projectile had risen, rolled, rolled onto the guides. It was supposedly that they called him “Katyusha” - the role of those who held the projectile and rolled up was constantly changing, since the calculation of the BM-13, unlike barrel artillery, was not explicitly divided into loader, pointer, etc.

6 It should also be noted that the installations were so secret that it was even forbidden to use the commands “plee”, “fire”, “volley”, instead of them they sounded “sing” or “play” (to start it was necessary to turn the handle of the electric coil very quickly), which , perhaps, was also associated with the song "Katyusha". And for the infantry, the volley of Katyushas was the most pleasant music.

7 There is an assumption that initially the nickname "Katyusha" had a front-line bomber equipped with rockets - an analogue of the M-13. And this nickname jumped from an airplane to a rocket launcher through the same shells.

And further Interesting Facts about the names of the BM-13:

• On the North-Western Front, the installation was at first called "Raisa Sergeevna", thus deciphering the RS - that is, a rocket.

• IN German troops these machines were called "Stalin organs" because of the external resemblance of the rocket launcher to the pipe system of this musical instrument and the powerful stunning roar that was produced when the rockets were launched.

• During the battles for Poznan and Berlin, the M-30 and M-31 single launchers received the nickname "Russian faustpatron" from the Germans, although these shells were not used as an anti-tank weapon. From a distance of 100-200 meters, the guardsmen pierced any walls with the launches of these shells.

Since the advent of rocket artillery - RA, its units have been subordinate to the Supreme High Command. They were used to reinforce rifle divisions defending in the first echelon, which significantly increased their firepower and increased stability in a defensive battle. The requirements for the use of new weapons are massiveness and surprise.

It is also worth noting that during the Great Patriotic War, the Katyusha repeatedly fell into the hands of the enemy (the first was captured on August 22, 1941, southeast of Staraya Russa by Manstein's 56th motorized corps, and the BM-8-24 installation, captured Leningrad Front, even became the prototype of the German rocket launchers 8 cm Raketen-Vielfachwerfer.

During the battle for Moscow, due to the difficult situation at the front, the command was forced to use rocket artillery divisionally. But by the end of 1941, the number of rocket artillery in the troops increased significantly and reached 5-10 divisions in the armies operating in the main direction. Controlling the fire and maneuver of a large number of divisions, as well as supplying them with ammunition and other types of provisions, became difficult. By decision of the Stavka, in January 1942, the creation of 20 guards mortar regiments was begun. Each battery had four combat vehicles. Thus, a volley of only one division of 12 BM-13-16 GMP vehicles (Stavka directive No. 002490 prohibited the use of RA in an amount less than a division) could be compared in strength with a volley of 12 heavy howitzer regiments of the RVGK (48 howitzers of 152 mm caliber per regiment) or 18 RVGK heavy howitzer brigades (32 152 mm howitzers per brigade).
The emotional effect was also important: during the salvo, all missiles were fired almost simultaneously - in a few seconds, the ground in the target area was literally plowed up by rockets. The mobility of the installation made it possible to quickly change position and avoid the enemy's retaliatory strike.

On July 17, 1942, a salvo of 144 launchers equipped with 300-mm rockets was heard near the village of Nalyuchi. This was the first use of a somewhat less famous related weapon - "Andryusha".

In July-August, the 42nd Katyushas (three regiments and a separate division) were the main striking force of the Mobile Mechanized Group of the Southern Front, which held back the advance of the German 1st Panzer Army south of Rostov for several days. This is even reflected in the diary of General Halder: "increased Russian resistance south of Rostov"

In August 1942, in the city of Sochi, in the garage of the Caucasian Riviera sanatorium, under the leadership of the head of the mobile repair shop No. 6, a military engineer of the III rank A. Alferov, a portable version of the installation was created on the basis of M-8 shells, which later received the name "mountain Katyusha". The first "mountain Katyushas" entered service with the 20th Mountain Rifle Division and were used in battles at the Goyth Pass. In February - March 1943, two divisions of "mountain Katyushas" became part of the troops defending the legendary bridgehead on Malaya Zemlya near Novorossiysk. In addition, 4 installations based on railcars were created in the Sochi locomotive depot, which were used to protect the city of Sochi from the shore. The minesweeper "Mackerel" was equipped with eight installations, which covered the landing on Malaya Zemlya

In September 43rd, the Katyusha maneuver along the front line made it possible to carry out a sudden flank attack on the Bryansk Front.During the artillery preparation, 6,000 rockets and only 2,000 barrels were used up. As a result, the German defense was "rolled up" in the strip of the whole front - for 250 kilometers.

What the Russian "Katyusha" is, the German - "hell flames." The nickname that the Wehrmacht soldiers gave to the Soviet rocket artillery combat vehicle was fully justified. In just 8 seconds, a regiment of 36 BM-13 mobile units fired 576 shells at the enemy. A feature of salvo fire was that one blast wave was superimposed on another, the law of addition of impulses came into force, which greatly increased the destructive effect.

Fragments of hundreds of mines, heated to 800 degrees, destroyed everything around. As a result, an area of ​​100 hectares turned into a scorched field, riddled with craters from shells. It was possible to escape only to those Nazis who, at the time of the salvo, were lucky enough to be in a securely fortified dugout. The Nazis called this pastime a "concert." The fact is that the volleys of "Katyushas" were accompanied by a terrible roar, for this sound the Wehrmacht soldiers awarded rocket mortars with another nickname - "Stalin's organs".

The birth of "Katyusha"

In the USSR, it was customary to say that the “Katyusha” was created not by any individual designer, but by the Soviet people. The best minds of the country really worked on the development of combat vehicles. In 1921, N. Tikhomirov and V. Artemiev, employees of the Leningrad Gas Dynamics Laboratory, began to create rockets on smokeless powder. In 1922, Artemiev was accused of espionage and the following year he was sent to serve his term in Solovki, in 1925 he returned to the laboratory.

In 1937, the RS-82 rockets, which were developed by Artemiev, Tikhomirov and G. Langemak, who joined them, were adopted by the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Air Fleet. In the same year, in connection with the Tukhachevsky case, all those who worked on new types of weapons were subjected to a “cleansing” by the NKVD. Langemak was arrested as a German spy and shot in 1938. In the summer of 1939, aircraft rockets developed with his participation were successfully used in battles with Japanese troops on the Khalkhin Gol River.

From 1939 to 1941 employees of the Moscow Reactive Research Institute I. Gvai, N. Galkovsky, A. Pavlenko, A. Popov worked on the creation of a self-propelled multiply charged rocket launcher. On June 17, 1941, she took part in a demonstration of the latest types of artillery weapons. The tests were attended by People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko, his deputy Grigory Kulik and Chief of the General Staff Georgy Zhukov.

Self-propelled rocket launchers were shown last, and at first, trucks with iron guides fixed on top did not make any impression on the tired representatives of the commission. But the volley itself was remembered by them for a long time: according to eyewitnesses, the commanders, seeing the rising column of flame, fell into a stupor for a while. Timoshenko was the first to come to his senses, he sharply turned to his deputy: “Why were they silent and did not report about the presence of such weapons?” Kulik tried to justify himself by saying that this artillery system had simply not been fully developed until recently. June 21, 1941, just a few hours before the start of the war, Supreme Commander Joseph Stalin, after inspecting the rocket launchers, decided to deploy their mass production.

The feat of Captain Flerov

Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov became the first commander of the first Katyusha battery. The country's leadership chose Flerov to test top-secret weapons, among other things, because he showed himself well during the Soviet-Finnish war. At that time, he commanded a battery of the 94th howitzer artillery regiment, whose fire managed to break through the Mannerheim Line*. For his heroism in the battles near Lake Saunajärvi, Flerov was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

A full-fledged baptism of fire "Katyusha" took place on July 14, 1941. Rocket artillery vehicles under the leadership of Flerov fired volleys at the Orsha railway station, where a large number of enemy manpower, equipment and provisions were concentrated. Here is what Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, wrote in his diary about these volleys: “On July 14, near Orsha, the Russians used hitherto unknown weapons. A fiery flurry of shells burned down the Orsha railway station, all trains with personnel and military equipment of the arrived military units. The metal melted, the earth burned.

Adolf Hitler met the news about the appearance of a new Russian miracle weapon very painfully. Abwehr chief ** Wilhelm Franz Canaris received a thrashing from the Fuhrer for the fact that his department had not yet stolen the blueprints for rocket launchers. As a result, a real hunt was announced for the Katyushas, ​​to which the main saboteur of the Third Reich, Otto Skorzeny, was involved.

Flerov's battery, meanwhile, continued to smash the enemy. After Orsha, successful operations near Yelnya and Roslavl followed. On October 7, Flerov and his Katyushas were surrounded in the Vyazma cauldron. The commander did everything to save the battery and break through to his own, but in the end he was ambushed near the village of Bogatyr. Finding themselves in a hopeless situation, Flerov *** and his fighters accepted an unequal battle. The Katyushas fired all the shells at the enemy, after which Flerov self-detonated the rocket launcher, the rest of the batteries followed the example of the commander. To take prisoners, as well as to receive an "iron cross" for the capture of top-secret equipment, the Nazis failed in that battle.

Flerov was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Victory, the commander of the first Katyusha battery was awarded the title of Hero of Russia.

Katyusha" against "donkey"

Along the front lines of the Great Patriotic War, the Katyusha often had to exchange salvos with a Nebelwerfer (German Nebelwerfer - “fog thrower”) - a German rocket launcher. For the characteristic sound that this six-barreled 150-mm mortar made when firing, Soviet soldiers nicknamed it "donkey". However, when the soldiers of the Red Army fought off enemy equipment, the contemptuous nickname was forgotten - in the service of our artillery, the trophy immediately turned into a “vanyusha”. True, the Soviet soldiers did not have tender feelings for this weapon. The fact is that the installation was not self-propelled, the 540-kilogram jet mortar had to be towed. When fired, his shells left a thick plume of smoke in the sky, which unmasked the positions of the artillerymen, who could immediately be covered by the fire of enemy howitzers.

The best designers of the Third Reich did not manage to design their analogue of the Katyusha until the end of the war. German developments either exploded during tests at the training ground, or did not differ in firing accuracy.

Why was the volley fire system nicknamed "Katyusha"?

Soldiers at the front liked to give names to weapons. For example, the M-30 howitzer was called "Mother", the ML-20 howitzer gun - "Emelka". BM-13, at first, was sometimes called "Raisa Sergeevna", as the front-line soldiers deciphered the abbreviation RS (rocket). Who and why was the first to call the rocket launcher "Katyusha" is not known for certain. The most common versions link the appearance of the nickname:

With M. Blanter's song, popular during the war years, to the words of M. Isakovsky "Katyusha";
- with the letter "K" embossed on the installation frame. Thus, the plant named after the Comintern marked its products;
- with the name of the beloved of one of the fighters, which he wrote on his BM-13.

Katyusha - Weapon of victory

The history of the creation of the Katyusha dates back to pre-Petrine times. In Russia, the first rockets appeared in the 15th century. TO late XVI centuries in Russia, the device, methods of manufacturing and combat use of missiles were well known. This is convincingly evidenced by the "Charter of military, cannon and other matters relating to military science", written in 1607-1621 by Onisim Mikhailov. Since 1680, there was already a special Rocket Institute in Russia. In the 19th century, missiles designed to destroy manpower and materiel of the enemy were created by Major General Alexander Dmitrievich Zasyadko. Zasyadko began work on the creation of rockets in 1815 on his own initiative at his own expense. By 1817, he managed to create a high-explosive and incendiary combat rocket on the basis of an illuminating rocket.
At the end of August 1828, a guards corps arrived from St. Petersburg under the besieged Turkish fortress of Varna. Together with the corps, the first Russian missile company arrived under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V. M. Vnukov. The company was formed on the initiative of Major General Zasyadko. The rocket company received its first baptism of fire near Varna on August 31, 1828 during the attack of the Turkish redoubt, located by the sea south of Varna. Nuclei and field bombs and ship guns, as well as rocket explosions, forced the defenders of the redoubt to take refuge in holes made in the moat. Therefore, when the hunters (volunteers) of the Simbirsk regiment rushed to the redoubt, the Turks did not have time to take their places and provide effective resistance to the attackers.

On March 5, 1850, Colonel Konstantin Ivanovich Konstantinov, the illegitimate son of Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich from a relationship with actress Clara Anna Laurens, was appointed commander of the Rocket Institute. During his tenure in this position, 2-, 2.5- and 4-inch missiles of the Konstantinov system were adopted by the Russian army. The weight of combat missiles depended on the type of warhead and was characterized by the following data: a 2-inch rocket weighed from 2.9 to 5 kg; 2.5-inch - from 6 to 14 kg and 4-inch - from 18.4 to 32 kg.

The firing ranges of the missiles of the Konstantinov system, created by him in 1850-1853, were very significant for that time. So, a 4-inch rocket equipped with 10-pound (4,095 kg) grenades had a maximum firing range of 4150 m, and a 4-inch incendiary rocket - 4260 m, while a quarter-pound mountain unicorn mod. 1838 had a maximum firing range of only 1810 meters. Konstantinov's dream was to create an air rocket launcher that fired rockets from a balloon. The experiments carried out proved the great range of missiles fired from a tethered balloon. However, it was not possible to achieve acceptable accuracy.
After the death of K. I. Konstantinov in 1871, rocket business in the Russian army fell into decay. Combat missiles were occasionally and in small quantities used in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. More successfully rockets were used in the conquest Central Asia in the 70s and 80s of the XIX century. They played a decisive role in the capture of Tashkent. The last time Konstantinov's missiles were used in Turkestan was in the 90s. XIX years century. And in 1898 combat missiles were officially withdrawn from service with the Russian army.
New impetus for development missile weapons was given during the First World War: in 1916, Professor Ivan Platonovich Grave created gelatin powder, having improved the smokeless powder of the French inventor Paul Viel. In 1921, the developers N. I. Tikhomirov, V. A. Artemiev from the gas-dynamic laboratory began to develop rockets based on this gunpowder.

At first, the gas-dynamic laboratory, where rocket weapons were created, had more difficulties and failures than successes. However, enthusiasts - engineers N. I. Tikhomirov, V. A. Artemiev, and then G. E. Langemak and B. S. Petropavlovsky stubbornly improved their "brainchild", firmly believing in the success of the case. Extensive theoretical developments and countless experiments were required, which eventually led to the creation at the end of 1927 of the 82-mm fragmentation rocket with a powder engine, and after it the more powerful 132 mm caliber. Test firing conducted near Leningrad in March 1928 was encouraging - the range was already 5-6 km, although the dispersion was still large. For many years it was not possible to significantly reduce it: the original concept involved a projectile with plumage that did not go beyond its caliber. After all, a pipe served as a guide for him - simple, light, convenient for installation.

In 1933, engineer I. T. Kleimenov proposed to make a more developed plumage, more than twice the caliber of the projectile in its scope. The accuracy of fire increased, and the flight range also increased, but new open - in particular, rail - guides for shells had to be designed. And again years of experiments, searches...
By 1938, the main difficulties in creating mobile rocket artillery had been overcome. Employees of the Moscow RNII Yu. A. Pobedonostsev, F. N. Poida, L. E. Schwartz and others developed 82-mm fragmentation, high-explosive fragmentation and thermite shells (PC) with a solid propellant (powder) engine, which was launched by a remote electric fuse.

The baptism of fire RS-82, mounted on I-16 and I-153 fighter aircraft, took place on August 20, 1939 on the Khalkhin Gol River. Details about this event are described here.

At the same time, for firing at ground targets, the designers proposed several options for mobile multi-shot multiple rocket launchers (by area). Engineers V. N. Galkovsky, I. I. Gvai, A. P. Pavlenko, A. S. Popov took part in their creation under the guidance of A. G. Kostikov.
The installation consisted of eight open guide rails interconnected into a single whole by tubular welded spars. 16 132-mm rocket projectiles weighing 42.5 kg each were fixed using T-shaped pins on top and bottom of the guides in pairs. The design provided for the ability to change the angle of elevation and turn in azimuth. Aiming at the target was carried out through the sight by rotating the handles of the lifting and turning mechanisms. The installation was mounted on the chassis of a ZiS-5 truck, and in the first version, relatively short guides were located across the vehicle, which received the general name MU-1 (mechanized installation). This decision was unsuccessful - when firing, the car swayed, which significantly reduced the accuracy of the battle.

Shells M-13, containing 4.9 kg each explosive, provided a radius of continuous destruction by fragments of 8-10 meters (when the fuse is set to "O" - fragmentation) and an actual defeat of 25-30 meters. In the soil of medium hardness, when the fuse was set to "3" (deceleration), a funnel was created with a diameter of 2-2.5 meters and a depth of 0.8-1 meter.
In September 1939, the MU-2 reactive system was created on a three-axle ZIS-6 truck more suitable for this purpose. The car was a cross-country truck with dual-tire rear axles. Its length with a 4980 mm wheelbase was 6600 mm, and the width was 2235 mm. The same in-line six-cylinder water-cooled carburetor engine was installed on the car, which was also installed on the ZiS-5. Its cylinder diameter was 101.6 mm, and the piston stroke was 114.3 mm. Thus, its working volume was equal to 5560 cubic centimeters, so that the volume indicated in most sources is 5555 cubic meters. cm is the result of someone's mistake, subsequently replicated by many serious publications. At 2300 rpm, the engine, which had a 4.6-fold compression ratio, developed a good 73-strong power for those times, but due to the heavy load, the maximum speed was limited to 55 kilometers per hour.

In this version, elongated rails were installed along the car, the rear of which was additionally hung on jacks before firing. The mass of the vehicle with a crew (5-7 people) and full ammunition was 8.33 tons, the firing range reached 8470 m. substances. The three-axle ZIS-6 provided the MU-2 with quite satisfactory mobility on the ground, allowing it to quickly make a march maneuver and change positions. And to transfer the car from the traveling position to the combat position, 2-3 minutes were enough. However, at the same time, the installation acquired another drawback - the impossibility of direct fire and, as a result, a large dead space. Nevertheless, our gunners subsequently learned how to overcome it and even began to use Katyushas against tanks.
On December 25, 1939, the Red Army Artillery Directorate approved the 132-mm M-13 rocket projectile and the launcher, which was named BM-13. NII-Z received an order for the manufacture of five such installations and a batch of rockets for military testing. In addition, the artillery department of the Navy also ordered one BM-13 launcher for the day it was tested in the coastal defense system. During the summer and autumn of 1940, NII-3 manufactured six BM-13 launchers. In the autumn of the same year, the BM-13 launchers and a batch of M-13 shells were ready for testing.

On June 17, 1941, at a training ground near Moscow, during the inspection of samples of new weapons of the Red Army, salvo launches were made from BM-13 combat vehicles. People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Tymoshenko, People's Commissar of Armaments Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff General of the Army Zhukov, who were present at the tests, praised the new weapon. Two prototypes of the BM-13 combat vehicle were prepared for the show. One of them was loaded with high-explosive fragmentation rockets, and the second - with illumination rockets. Volley launches of high-fragmentation rockets were made. All targets in the area where the shells fell were hit, everything that could burn on this section of the artillery route burned. The participants in the shootings highly appreciated the new missile weapons. Immediately at the firing position, an opinion was expressed about the need for the earliest adoption of the first domestic installation of the MLRS.
On June 21, 1941, just a few hours before the start of the war, after examining samples of rocket weapons, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin decided to start mass production of M-13 rockets and the BM-13 launcher and to start forming rocket military units. Due to the threat of an impending war, this decision was made, despite the fact that the BM-13 launcher had not yet passed military tests and had not been worked out to a stage that would allow mass industrial production.

On July 2, 1941, the first experimental rocket artillery battery in the Red Army under the command of Captain Flerov set out from Moscow for the Western Front. On July 4, the battery became part of the 20th Army, whose troops occupied the defense along the Dnieper near the city of Orsha.

In most books about the war - both scientific and artistic - Wednesday, July 16, 1941, is named the day of the first use of the Katyusha. On that day, a battery under the command of Captain Flerov struck a hit at the Orsha railway station, which had just been occupied by the enemy, and destroyed the trains that had accumulated on it.
However, in fact, the Flerov battery was first used at the front two days earlier: on July 14, 1941, three volleys were fired at the city of Rudnya, Smolensk region. This town with a population of only 9 thousand people is located on the Vitebsk Upland on the Malaya Berezina River, 68 km from Smolensk, at the very border of Russia and Belarus. On that day, the Germans captured Rudnya, and a large number of military equipment. At that moment, on the high steep western bank of the Malaya Berezina, the battery of Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov appeared. From a western direction unexpected for the enemy, she hit the market square. As soon as the sound of the last volley ceased, one of the gunners named Kashirin loudly sang the song “Katyusha”, popular in those years, written in 1938 by Matvey Blanter to the words of Mikhail Isakovsky. Two days later, on July 16, at 15:15, Flerov's battery struck at the Orsha station, and an hour and a half later, at the German crossing over Orshitsa. On that day, signal sergeant Andrey Sapronov was seconded to Flerov's battery, who provided communication between the battery and the command. As soon as the sergeant heard about how Katyusha went to the high, steep bank, he immediately remembered how rocket launchers had just entered the same high and steep bank, and, reporting to the headquarters of the 217th separate communications battalion The 144th Infantry Division of the 20th Army about the fulfillment of a combat mission by Flerov, the signalman Sapronov said: "Katyusha sang perfectly well."

On August 2, 1941, the chief of artillery of the Western Front, Major General I.P. Kramar, reported: “According to the statements of the commanders of the rifle units and the observations of artillerymen, the surprise of such a massive fire inflicts heavy losses on the enemy and has such a strong effect on morale that enemy units flee in panic. It was also noted there that the enemy was fleeing not only from areas fired upon by new weapons, but also from neighboring ones located at a distance of 1-1.5 km from the shelling zone.
And here is how the enemies told about the Katyusha: “After a volley of Stalin’s organ from our company of 120 people,” the German chief corporal Hart said during interrogation, “12 survived. and out of five heavy mortars - not a single one.
The debut of jet weapons, stunning for the enemy, prompted our industry to speed up the serial production of a new mortar. However, for the "Katyushas" at first there were not enough self-propelled chassis - carriers of rocket launchers. They tried to restore the production of ZIS-6 at the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant, where the Moscow ZIS was evacuated in October 1941, but the lack of specialized equipment for the production of worm axles did not allow this to be done. In October 1941, the T-60 tank was put into service with the BM-8-24 installation mounted in place of the turret. She was armed with RS-82 rockets.
In September 1941 - February 1942, NII-3 developed a new modification of the 82-mm M-8 projectile, which had the same range (about 5000 m), but almost twice as much explosive (581 g) compared to aviation projectile (375 g).
By the end of the war, the 82-mm M-8 projectile with a TS-34 ballistic index and a firing range of 5.5 km was adopted.
In the first modifications of the M-8 rocket projectile, a rocket charge was used, made from ballistic-type nitroglycerin gunpowder grade N. The charge consisted of seven cylindrical pieces with an outer diameter of 24 mm and a channel diameter of 6 mm. The length of the charge was 230 mm, and the weight was 1040 g.
To increase the range of the projectile, the rocket chamber of the engine was increased to 290 mm, and after testing a number of charge design options, the specialists of the OTB of plant No. 98 worked out a charge of NM-2 gunpowder, which consisted of five checkers with an outer diameter of 26.6 mm, a channel diameter of 6 mm and 287 mm long. The weight of the charge was 1180 g. With the use of this charge, the range of the projectile increased to 5.5 km. The radius of continuous destruction by fragments of the M-8 (TC-34) projectile was 3-4 m, and the radius of the actual destruction by fragments was 12-15 meters.

Rocket launchers were also equipped with STZ-5 tracked tractors, Ford-Marmont, International Jimsey and Austin off-road vehicles received under Lend-Lease. But the largest number of Katyushas were mounted on all-wheel drive three-axle Studebaker cars. In 1943, M-13 shells with a welded body, with a ballistic index TS-39, were put into production. The shells had a GVMZ fuse. NM-4 gunpowder was used as fuel.
The main reason for the low accuracy of missiles of the M-13 (TS-13) type was the eccentricity of the thrust of the jet engine, that is, the displacement of the thrust vector from the axis of the rocket due to the uneven burning of gunpowder in checkers. This phenomenon is easily eliminated by rotating the rocket. In this case, the momentum of the thrust force will always coincide with the axis of the rocket. The rotation imparted to a feathered rocket in order to improve accuracy is called cranking. Crank rockets should not be confused with turbojet rockets. The cranking speed of the feathered missiles was several tens, in the extreme case, hundreds, revolutions per minute, which is not enough to stabilize the projectile by rotation (moreover, the rotation occurs in the active part of the flight while the engine is running, and then stops). The angular velocity of turbojet projectiles without feathering is several thousand revolutions per minute, which creates a gyroscopic effect and, accordingly, a higher hit accuracy than that of feathered projectiles, both non-rotating and cranking. In both types of projectiles, rotation occurs due to the outflow of powder gases from the main engine through small (several millimeters in diameter) nozzles directed at an angle to the axis of the projectile.

We called rockets with rotation due to the energy of powder gases UK - improved accuracy, for example, M-13UK and M-31UK.
The M-13UK projectile, however, differed in its design from the M-13 projectile in that there were 12 tangential holes on the front centering thickening through which part of the powder gases flowed. The holes are drilled so that the powder gases, flowing out of them, create a torque. The M-13UK-1 shells differed from the M-13UK shells in the device of stabilizers. In particular, M-13UK-1 stabilizers were made of steel sheet.
Since 1944, new, more powerful BM-31-12 installations with 12 M-30 and M-31 mines of 301 mm caliber, weighing 91.5 kg each (firing range - up to 4325 m) began to be produced on the basis of the Studebakers. To increase the accuracy of fire, the M-13UK and M-31UK projectiles with improved accuracy were created and mastered in flight.
The projectiles were launched from tubular guides of a honeycomb type. The transfer time to combat position was 10 minutes. When a 301-mm projectile containing 28.5 kg of explosives burst, a funnel 2.5 m deep and 7-8 m in diameter was formed. In total, 1184 BM-31-12 vehicles were produced during the war years.

The share of rocket artillery on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War was constantly increasing. If in November 1941 45 Katyusha divisions were formed, then on January 1, 1942 there were already 87 of them, in October 1942 - 350, and at the beginning of 1945 - 519. By the end of the war, there were 7 divisions in the Red Army, 40 separate brigades, 105 regiments and 40 separate divisions of guards mortars. Not a single major artillery preparation took place without Katyushas.

Fighting vehicle BM-13 "Katyusha". Guards jet mortar BM-13 consists of a launcher, missiles and a specially adapted vehicle on which it is mounted. The launcher was originally attached to the chassis of the ZIS-6. The installations were also equipped with STZ-5 tracked tractors, ZIL-151 vehicles, Ford-Marmont, International Jimsea and Austin off-road vehicles received under Lend-Lease. But the largest number of Katyushas were mounted on Studebaker all-wheel drive three-axle vehicles. Launcher. Eight guides are fixed on the lifting boom, each of which has two grooves (top and bottom), along which rocket projectiles slide when launched. The guides are connected to each other by means of three transverse parts in the so-called complex of guides, mounted on the lifting boom. It is welded from pipes and can be rotated in a vertical plane around its horizontal axis. The axle is located at the rear of the base mounted on the swing frame. A predetermined shooting angle is attached to the guides by a lifting mechanism, with the help of which they are fixed in a certain position on the swivel frame. The swivel frame rotates around a vertical axis. The latter is installed on the brackets of the base of the swivel frame. To orient it, and hence the arrow with guides in a horizontal plane during firing, a directional mechanism is used. The base of the swivel frame is rigidly fixed to the vehicle chassis. It has a curved guide groove (part of an arc of a circle) in which the front support of the launcher swing frame slides. "Katyusha" is loaded with rocket shells from behind. Accidental falling out of missiles is prevented by locks installed in each rail. They are designed so that when the rocket shells are installed in the guides, the pins of the shells are passed forward, preventing them from moving down. To ignite the rocket charge in the combustion chamber, there are special contacts placed in each guide. When charging the "Katyusha", these contacts are joined with the contacts of the electric-powder igniters of rocket projectiles. Through them, current is transmitted to the powder igniters from the battery installed on the car. The launch pad is located in the driver's cab.
Tactical and technical characteristics of the rocket artillery combat vehicle BM-13
Rocket caliber, mm - 132
Number of guides, pcs - 16
The greatest angle of rise, hail. - 45
The smallest angle of rise, hail. - 7
Field (sector) of firing in the horizontal plane (direction to the target), deg. ±10
Volley production time, from 7 -10
Firing range, m - 8470
Weight launcher BM-13, kg - 2200 kg
Weight of the combat vehicle BM-13 (together with the launcher), kg - 6200 kg

Rocket M-13.
The M-13 projectile consists of a head and a body. The head has a shell and a combat charge. A fuse is fixed in front of the head. The housing provides the flight of the rocket projectile and consists of a skin, a combustion chamber, a nozzle and stabilizers. In front of the combustion chamber there are two electro-powder igniters. On the outer surface of the shell of the combustion chamber there are two guide pins screwed on the thread, which serve to hold the rocket projectile in the guide mounts. 1 - fuse retaining ring, 2 - GVMZ fuse, 3 - detonator block, 4 - bursting charge, 5 - warhead, 6 - igniter, 7 - chamber bottom, 8 - guide pin, 9 - powder rocket charge, 10 - rocket part, 11 - grate, 12 - nozzle throat, 13 - nozzle, 14 - stabilizer, 15 - remote fuse check, 16 - AGDT remote fuse, 17 - igniter.

Voronezh Katyusha

The Great Patriotic War showed the world the crushing striking force and power Soviet weapons. At the same time, about three-quarters of the models of guns and up to half of the types of small arms with which the Armed Forces of the USSR came to victory were created and put into mass production already during the war. Among these types of weapons, a special place is occupied by the BM-13 guards mortar - the legendary "Katyusha", whose lyrical name, according to one version, originates from the letter "K", the brand of the manufacturer - the Voronezh plant named after. The Comintern, which launched the production of this formidable weapon literally in the very first days of the war.

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet Union already possessed samples of rocket artillery and had a successful experience of its use. The development of rockets (RS) on smokeless powder was started by N.I. Tikhomirov and V.A. Artemyev back in 1921. Their many years of work culminated in the great success of Soviet rocket science - in 1928, the world's first smokeless powder rocket was successfully tested. By 1933, two samples of rockets had been created - the fragmentation RS-82 and the high-explosive fragmentation RS-132. At the same time, the efforts of laboratories working on this topic are united - the Jet Research Institute is being created in Moscow. Soon, within its walls, several hundred prototype shells and launchers were made, designed to be installed under the wing of an aircraft. In 1935, the first launches of RS-82 rockets from I-15 fighters at the training ground began, and in 1937 military tests began. Their successful completion made it possible in December 1937 to adopt the RS-82 air-to-air projectile for I-15 and I-16 fighters and in July 1938 RS-132 air-to-ground projectiles for SB bombers.

After the adoption of rockets into service in aviation, the Main Artillery Directorate set the Reactive Research Institute the task of creating a reactive field multiple launch rocket system based on RS-132 shells. The specified tactical and technical task was issued to the institute in June 1938. In accordance with this task, by the autumn of 1939, the institute developed a new 132-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectile, which later received the official name M-13 and the MU-2 launcher. In the summer of the same year, RS-82 rockets were first tested in dogfights against the Japanese militarists in the area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol river. These battles fully confirmed the assumption that a qualitatively new type of ammunition was born - a rocket with a solid propellant engine. The combat successes of the "eres" confirmed the need and accelerated the development of missile weapons for the ground forces.

Head of Department

In September 1939, tests of the MU-2 installation were carried out and, according to the results, it was accepted by the Main Artillery Directorate for field tests. After modifications in 1940, the world's first mobile multiple launch rocket launcher successfully passed factory and field tests. She received the army designation BM-13-16, or simply BM-13, and a decision was made on its industrial production. RNII received an order for the manufacture of five such installations and a batch of rockets for military testing. In addition, the Navy Artillery Directorate also ordered one BM-13 launcher to be tested in the coastal defense system. The People's Commissariat of Ammunition was not slow to start organizing the mass production of rockets, taking into account the large scale of their expenditure. In 1940, the serial production of M-13 and M-8 rockets was launched, their mass production was fully mastered before the start of the war.

It turned out to be more difficult to establish mass production of launchers. Only in February 1941, the People's Commissariat of General Engineering issued an order to organize at the Voronezh plant. The Comintern for the production of BM-13 machines. The Voronezh plant was ordered to produce a prototype by July 1 and 40 more pieces by the end of 1941.

Director of the plant Comintern Fyodor Nikolaevich Muratov was urgently summoned to the people's commissariat. Returning to the plant two days later, he immediately familiarized the head of the department, Pyotr Semenovich Gavrilov, with the order of the people's commissariat and instructed him to select a group of intelligent designers to work out the drawings in the coming days. The created group included the leading machine designer Nikolai Andreevich Pucherov, the chief technologist of the plant Serafim Semenovich Silchenko, designers Mikhail Ivanovich Pavlov, Alexander Alexandrovich Yakovlev and Nikolai Nikolaevich Avdeev.

BM-13 rocket artillery combat vehicle: 1 - switch, 2 - armored shields
cabins, 3 - a package of guides, 4 - a gas tank, 5 - the basis of a rotary frame,
6 - lifting screw casing, 7 - lifting frame, 8 - marching support, 9 - stopper,
10 - swivel frame, 11 - M-13 projectile, 12 - brake light, 13 - jacks,
14 - launcher battery, 15 - towing spring, 16 - bracket
sight, 17 - the handle of the lifting mechanism, 18 - the handle of the rotary mechanism,
19 - spare wheel, 20 - junction box.

Within a week, drawings of the launcher with the BM-13-16 code arrived at the plant from the RNII. The installation consisted of eight open guide rails interconnected into a single whole by tubular welded spars. 16 132-mm rocket projectiles were fixed using T-shaped pins on top and bottom of the guides in pairs. The design provided for the ability to change the angle of elevation and turn in azimuth. Aiming at the target was carried out through a sight with a conventional artillery panorama by rotating the handles of the lifting and turning mechanisms. The installation was mounted on the chassis of a three-axle truck ZIS-6. The guides were installed along the car, the rear of which was additionally hung on jacks before firing.

At first, it was only supposed to look at the drawings of the RNII in order to adapt them technologically to factory conditions in order to establish mass production. However, it soon became clear that some nodes needed serious fine-tuning. ON THE. Pucherov expressed doubts about the reliability of the screw fasteners of the guide rails in the field. It was necessary to increase the reliability of the most critical node so that it could withstand any load under the most adverse operating conditions. To speed up the work and quickly agree on fundamental design changes, three employees of the jet research institute arrived at the plant. They were Ivan Isidorovich Gvai, head of the department of the Institute, Vladimir Nikolaevich Gvalkovsky, lead designer, and Sergei Ivanovich Kalashnikov, technologist. In order to maintain the strictest secrecy when working with drawings, a group of designers and technologists was allocated a small room on the second floor of an administrative building. Work on "Katyusha" began to boil almost around the clock.

After a thorough and comprehensive discussion, it was decided to replace the complex curly guides, paired with two "cheeks" made of sheet steel, with an I-beam. This replacement increased the strength of the assembly and at the same time simplified its manufacture.

The next weak link was the remote fire control panel, with a cable length of 25 meters. To fire a shot, the installation commander had to take a coil-drum from the cockpit, run twenty-five meters with it into a pre-prepared shelter and close sixteen contacts by turning the handle. After the salvo was made, the cable should be quickly wound up and put back into the cockpit. All this greatly reduced the maneuverability of the installation. At the suggestion of the electrical engineers of the plant, Yakov Mikhailovich Tupitsyn and Evgeny Yakovlevich Nizovtsev, it was decided to mount the fire control panel in the cab of the truck, installing it next to the control panel of the car. This modification allowed to significantly reduce the time of the volley. To ensure the safety of the commander and driver, an armored shield 5 mm thick was installed above the cockpit.

The contactors for igniting the squibs in the rocket projectile were also radically redesigned. Instead of the lamellar ones provided for by the project, they put stock ones. They, as shown by tests, reliably ensured the ignition of squibs.

Significant design changes were made to other nodes. The locking part was re-designed, the swivel frame and the design of the supporting truss were changed, the horizontal and vertical aiming mechanisms were brought together, which greatly facilitated the control of fire.

On June 15-17, 1941, five vehicles, manufactured in the experimental workshops of the RNII by order of the Main Artillery Directorate, were exhibited at a review of new types of weapons of the Red Army, which was again held near Moscow. The BM-13 was inspected by Marshal Timoshenko, People's Commissar for Armaments Ustinov, People's Commissar for Ammunition Vannikov and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov. During the inspections, a volley of four combat vehicles was fired, which were highly appreciated by the leaders of the party and government. And on June 21, literally a few hours before the start of the Great Patriotic War, following the results of the review, the government decided to urgently deploy the mass production of M-13 rockets and the BM-13 launcher.

The factory director

Chief Engineer
factory

On the morning of June 22, the heads of workshops, departments and services gathered in the plant director's office. The director of the plant Muratov was absent, he was urgently summoned to Moscow. The emergency meeting was held by the chief engineer of the plant Viktor Pavlovich Chernogubovsky. He announced that, in agreement with the trade union, the plant would immediately switch to work in two shifts with a working day at eleven o'clock. Summing up, Chernogubovsky emphasized that the work would have to be done with increasing tension, since many workers would be mobilized into the Red Army in the coming days. Indeed, already on the second and third days of the war, about four hundred people were called up from the factory.

The director, who returned from Moscow, brought the task of speeding up the production of launchers. By July 1, it was necessary to submit not one, but two experimental installations, and already in July, it was necessary to produce thirty combat vehicles, and in August one hundred. The plant urgently switched to the production of military products. In the workshops engaged in the manufacture of purely peaceful goods, they found machines suitable for new work and set them up for the production of parts for launchers.

By that time, work on the revision, adaptation of the change in the drawings at the Voronezh plant was successfully completed. The production of parts for the assembly of prototypes began. There were a lot of difficulties, as in the development of any new machine. First of all, there were no metalworking machines of the required length. The enterprise had only one planer for processing guides - the most important unit BM-13, and even that one of the hopelessly outdated Butler design, with a very solid production experience. The length required for the guides was decent - five meters. arose serious problems and when bending guide troughs, also having a five-meter length. There were no bending devices at the factory. At first, the troughs had to be welded from three parts, which caused great technological difficulties in their processing. Welds needed to be carefully cleaned for subsequent assembly with guides.

For the production of test samples of rocket launchers, a specialized assembly shop No. 4 was organized, the head of which was Yakov Efimovich Leibovich. The most qualified workers of A.T. were sent here from the very first days. Milyaeva, E.G. Myakisheva, M.V. Gunkina, I.D. Pakhorsky, V.N. Strelkov, electricians A.M. Stakhurlova, G.A. Fedorenko, masters S.S. Zatsepin, M.F. Anisimova, I.E. Yurov. The operational management of the shops was also carried out by the head of the production department, Nikolai Semenovich Rozanovskiy, and the senior engineer of the first department, Nikolai Antonovich Ivanov.

The most time-consuming task turned out to be the assembly of the guide beam assembly with spars and the general installation of this assembly with the entire supporting structure of the launcher. Of particular difficulty was that the grooves of the eight guide beams must be strictly parallel, the deviation was allowed no more than two millimeters. In addition, it should be noted that there was no experience in assembling such systems yet, and some nodes had to be redone several times. The best assemblers of machines I.E., Yurov, I.S. Bakhtin, M.F. Anisimov, S.S. Zatsepin literally did not close their eyes for days. In many respects, only thanks to their vast experience and selfless work, test samples of the installation were assembled on time.

Engineer-
constructor

Leading
constructor

And now, on the fifth day of the war, on June 26, this long-awaited and exciting moment finally came. In the assembly shop, around two ready-made pilot plants, a team of assemblers and all the factory authorities gathered - director F. N. Muratov, chief engineer V. P. Chernogubovsky, chief technologist S. S. Silchenko, designer N. A. Pucherov, head of the workshop Ya. E. Leibovich. And also - the leading designer V. N. Galkovsky and the representative of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, a military engineer of the second rank A. G. Mrykin.

But it was too early to celebrate the victory. Leading designer Galkovsky assessed the installation with an experienced eye and immediately demanded a caliper. The designer's suspicions were confirmed - the distance between the axes of the grooves of the paired guides did not correspond to the drawings, it was less than the calculated one. The audit showed that this was done at the direction of the head of the department of the RNII I. I. Gvai. Ivan Isidorovich came to the Komintern plant for the second time, when the drawings were basically worked out, and, looking at the guide assembly, ordered to slightly reduce the dimensions between the guide axes in order to reduce the width of the entire package.

In the project, on paper, it looked quite logical, but now, in the finished installation, the trained eye of the designer immediately noticed a serious defect: during the very first salvo, the rocket stabilizers could hit each other.

There was an order to two brigades of assemblers to urgently remount the guide beams, setting between them the dimensions previously provided for by the project. The task was completed in a shock manner, after a few hours of hard work, the assemblers and craftsmen breathed a sigh of relief - the first prototypes were ready. The installations were immediately accepted by representatives of the Main Artillery Directorate at the plant. Now the formidable war machines were on their way to Moscow.

The next day, two cars, carefully covered with a tarpaulin, left the gates of the factory and headed for Moscow along the Zadonskoye Highway. In addition to two combat installations, there was a truck in which there were guard soldiers armed with grenades and light machine guns and fuel supply. Motor vehicles with BM-13 were driven by Stepan Stepanovich Bobreshov and Mitrofan Dmitrievich Artamonov. The installation was accompanied by two workers and a senior engineer of the first department, Nikolai Antonovich Ivanov. Twenty hours later, the cars arrived at the People's Commissariat of Defense, where Ivanov received Required documents and the direction to the military warehouse for live missiles, missiles, in order to immediately follow the field tests.

After successful tests, on the same day, June 28, five installations previously manufactured at the RNII and two Voronezh "Katyushas" were combined into a battery to be sent to the front and check the quality of the new weapon, its combat effectiveness. Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov, a student of the F. Dzerzhinsky Military Artillery Academy, was appointed commander of the first separate experimental battery of rocket mortars. Already on July 2, 1941, the battery was sent from Moscow to the Western Front, and on July 14, the Flerov battery, with about three thousand shells, took up a combat position near Orsha, on the banks of the Dnieper, from where it dealt its first crushing blow to the enemy. Mortar fire turned to dust the trains with manpower and equipment accumulated at the station. Artillerymen not only inflicted serious damage on the enemy. They brought on him the horror that haunted the Nazis throughout the war at the mere mention of this formidable weapon.

And at the plant there was an intense search for reserves to increase production military weapons. On one of the last days of June, Muratov gathered in his office the heads of the shops, their deputies, and the shift supervisors. He was preoccupied and stern. Only the first samples of cars were handed over. Too much time was spent on the processing of drawings, and other unforeseen difficulties were encountered in mastering this technologically complex machine. Muratov spoke of the critical importance of the rocket launcher to the hard-fought Red Army. He criticized managers for being slow in mastering the production of the most labor-intensive parts, for allowing marriage, for the fact that many craftsmen are engaged in work unusual for them - getting blanks for machine operators, running from shop to shop. It was about setting a strict plan for the production of cars for each month. At the same time, it was necessary to take into account all the possibilities of each workshop, take into account every minute of working time, do everything so that not a single machine operator is idle due to the lack of workpieces or tools.

However, the plant was not ready for such a radical restructuring of all work. At the end of June, the factory received four planers, but their tables were short, and it was impossible to make guide beams on them. At an emergency meeting with the chief engineer, it was decided to lengthen the machine tables on their own. It was necessary to urgently complete the drawings of the details of the extensions, make models, make iron castings, and perform processing. While these works were being carried out, changes were being coordinated, holes were dug in the workshop for the foundations of elongated machines, anchor bolts were laid and poured with concrete. The work went on around the clock. New machines were put into operation five days ahead of schedule.

Of course, it is not easy to reconstruct machine tools, to reorganize the entire working rhythm in accordance with wartime. And all this was possible to do in super record time only thanks to the dedication of the workforce and leaders. They worked day and night, almost without breaks. All forces were given to production by the chief engineer V.P. Chernogubovsky and mechanic P.I. Larin. There was no workshop, shift or department where these leaders would not visit for at least one day, ready to provide assistance with advice and deed.

Troubles arose in the machine shop with the manufacture of starting guide beams. The main difficulty was that the guide beam, five meters long, went through two operations on a planer. During the first operation, the extra part of the metal of the edges of the I-profile was removed, the supporting planes were carefully planed on both sides and grooves were selected in them twenty wide, eight millimeters deep. Then the beam was removed from the machine and trough guides made of sheet steel three millimeters thick were riveted onto the planed planes. The beam with attached troughs was returned to the planer, grooves eleven millimeters wide were cut in it. Moreover, between the guide edges of the trough and the grooves, it was necessary to maintain the strictest parallelism, because the accuracy of the movement of the projectile and the accuracy of fire depended on this.

Chief technologist
S. S. Silchenko

Workshop foreman

The site team spent a lot of effort and nerves because of the guide beams, but at first a lot of details still went to waste. The director of the plant, F. N. Muratov, was forced to convene a meeting specifically on this issue. The heads of workshops A. G. Puzoshchatov and S. P. Zakharov, the chief technologist S. S. Silchenko, craftsmen, the most qualified planers were invited to it. The meeting was also attended by a representative State Committee Defense and secretary of the regional party committee A. A. Ivanov.

A more thorough study of the beam processing technology revealed insufficient rigidity of its fastening on the machine. Boris Lvovich Tagintsev, head of the guide beam section, remembered one device that he had previously used for other purposes. I found it with difficulty, figured out what was happening, and it turned out: with minor alterations, it can be used to process guide beams. Boris Lvovich told Muratov in detail about his plan and requested that he be transferred to a machine tool in order to try out the innovation with his own hands. The director agreed.

Tagintsev immediately went to the workshop, and twelve hours later the device was mounted on a Butler planer. Things went well. Strong and rigid fastening of the guide beam on the machine eliminated vibration. The military representative accepted the part made with the help of a new device from the first presentation. Now there was another problem in turn: reducing the time for processing the beam. To speed up this operation, Tagintsev and Fedin proposed a special tool holder, into which three incisors were inserted at once. This simple device allowed to significantly increase the productivity of the machine.

A simple cutter was used to process the edges of the guide trough. Installing and refilling it was difficult and time consuming. Avdeev and Tagintsev developed the design of a special somewhat unusual cutter, shaped like a tea saucer. Around the circumference of the disk with a diameter of 132 mm, 6 hard alloy plates were soldered. The plates were arranged symmetrically at an angle of 60 degrees. Each pair of such plates made it possible to process both edges of the guide trough at once, while achieving exceptionally high processing accuracy.

Throughout July, intensive preparations for the introduction of a strictly daily schedule in the shops continued. The party bureau, the factory committee of the trade union, the Komsomol organization, and the large-circulation newspaper Kominternovets were energetically engaged in this matter. Large, beautifully designed posters were hung out at the main entrance of the plant. They updated the results of the activities of each workshop twice a day. We significantly increased the area for assembly work by adapting two large spans of the steel structure shop. Strengthened the leadership of some units. So, the communist Dmitry Ivanovich Zhirov was appointed head of the assembly shop No. 3, and the chief mechanic of the plant, party member Pavel Ivanovich Larin, was sent to the assembly shop No. 4.

The results of organizational and political-mass work were not slow to tell. All subsequent months, up to the evacuation of the plant to the Urals, the daily schedule was the law for each production team, it made it possible to establish a clear production of all components and parts, and significantly increase the number of manufactured launchers.

On July 2, 1941, the Bureau of the Voronezh Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution on the speedy establishment and increase in the production of military weapons at the Comintern plant. By this resolution, the regional committee of the party connected other enterprises of the city to the manufacture of formidable weapons. So, the Kalinin Machine-Building Plant began to produce beams for the guide trough. He also had to deal with the lengthening of the planer table first. This work was carried out by a group of designers from the department of the chief mechanic under the leadership of Yu. P. Smirnov. But even when the machines were redone, many of the problems that were observed in the initial period of manufacturing the first beams at the Comintern plant were repeated here. The beams were often deformed, they had to be straightened with great difficulty on special massive slabs, which took a lot of time.

The technologist A.P. Molchanov and the head of the machine shop K.P. Tarasov gave a lot of effort, energy, inventions to debugging the technological process. For days they did not leave the planers A.I. Pankov, I.A. Zverev, M.V. Shedagubov, A. Perelygin. It turned out that it is impossible to remove large-section chips for a given length and a complex beam profile. There was a threat of disruption to the schedule for the manufacture of this important detail. Then it was decided that roughing should first be done by milling. For this purpose, we used the assembly of disk shears with a roller conveyor available at the plant. The re-equipment of the milling unit was made by the designer F. E. Durov, and the technologist A. P. Molchanov designed the original mandrel with a set of disk cutters. For the final processing of beams on a planer, the smallest allowance was left. The thing went.

Kalinin also completely manufactured the so-called lifting unit. It included rather complex parts: a screw with a two-start tape thread, a nut and two bevel gears. The cutting of a threaded pair was entrusted to highly qualified turners S. Boev, P. Zotov, I. Komarov. It turned out to be more difficult with cutting bevel gears. I had to hastily restore the old gear cutting machine. This work was carried out in a short time under the leadership of the head of the mechanical repair shop L. Ya. Agarkov, who spent more than one sleepless night with the machine operators.

Various assemblies and parts for the launcher were manufactured by the teams of the Lenin Machine-Building Plant, the Dzerzhinsky Steam Locomotive Repair Plant, and the Elektrosignal plant. The Institute of Chemical Technology also joined them, in the mechanical laboratory of which sighting sights with an optical part were mastered. Therefore, the "Katyushas" assembled at the Comintern plant can rightly be called Voronezh.

Regional committee party kept under constant control the production of military weapons. At eleven o'clock at night, meetings were held in the office of F. N. Muratov following the results of the day. They were often attended by the first secretary of the regional committee, Vladimir Dmitrievich Nikitin, or the secretary for industry, Alexander Alexandrovich Ivanov. They provided invaluable assistance to the Communist International in organizing the rhythmic supply of parts by other factories in the city, as well as in the uninterrupted supply of metal and other materials. A. A. Ivanov was almost hopelessly in the Comintern factory. Together with Party Committee Secretary Ivan Efimovich Brovin, he often visited workshops and departments. At shift changes for five to eight minutes, he made a report on the situation on the fronts, informed about the working life of the city and the entire region. Heartfelt conversation, specific examples, the invocative word of the Party mobilized people for the fastest completion of an exceptionally responsible task.

In August, difficulties began to increase with the transportation of launchers to Moscow. Their delivery on railway platforms was impossible due to the frequent enemy air raids on the road. Most of the factory drivers were drafted into the army from the very first days of the war, and there were also not enough cars. And here assistance was provided by the regional and city committees of the party. Industrial enterprises and various economic organizations were instructed to allocate the necessary number of cars and drivers to ensure emergency transportation of launchers to Moscow.

The column of cars was necessarily accompanied by a responsible employee of the enterprise, approved by the director of the plant - the head of the department, designer, technologist, engineer. On the way, it was strictly forbidden to stop in settlements and at gas stations. Short stops for refueling with fuel, which they always carried with them, for technical inspection of cars were arranged in an open field or in a sparse forest with good overview terrain. Breaking up cars in a column while driving was not allowed under any circumstances, drivers had the right to drive cars even at a red traffic light.

A well-established dispatching service contributed to the successful work of the entire plant team. At the disposal of the chief dispatcher of the enterprise there was a switchboard with loud-speaking installations in workshops and departments. Clearly organized communication allowed planners and foremen to keep in touch all the time and at any moment to make the most correct decision on any issue. The head of the factory telephone exchange, August Petrovich Yagund, put a lot of work and ingenuity into the introduction of a widely branched dispatch communication (at that time it was a novelty).

In 1972 on the territory of the plant
a monument to the BM-13 installation was erected.
photo by S. Kolesnikov from the archive of the newspaper “Commune”.

Day by day, along with alarming front-line reports, labor tension grew. When the fascist hordes found themselves on the outskirts of Moscow, the slogan "More combat vehicles for the defenders of the capital!" was hung out in the workshops of the plant! People wholeheartedly accepted this call, understanding the danger looming over the Motherland, and brought the production of rocket launchers to five or six a day.

The production of installations at the Comintern plant continued until autumn. And in October the front came close to the upper Don. Enemy aircraft began to appear more and more often over the city. First scouts, and soon bombers. The decision was made to evacuate. The Moscow Kompressor plant was appointed the leading enterprise for the production of launchers.

The Komintern plant was evacuated beyond the Urals to the village of Maly Istok, where the plant "Uralelektromashina" resumed production of parts for rocket launchers as soon as possible. And although a small number of combat vehicles were assembled at the Istok plant, its team provided a significant amount of parts to the Uralelectromashina plant, where the main assembly of the BM-13 installations was established.

In a short time, the Kominternists also mastered the mass production of 82-mm mortars and uninterruptedly supplied the Red Army with them throughout the war.

Savchenko A.A. © www.site
The article uses drawings and illustrations from the magazine Modeler-Constructor.