Nuclear weapons of the DPRK. In Kim's bosom: what is known about the DPRK's nuclear missile program

13 years ago, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea officially announced the creation of its own nuclear weapons.

“The negotiation process has stalled due to the anti-Korean hostile policy of the United States. As long as America brandishes a nuclear baton, intending to destroy our system at any cost, we will expand stocks nuclear weapons for the sake of protecting the historical choice of our people, freedom and socialism, ”the DPRK Foreign Ministry said on February 10, 2005.

The grin of the "paper tiger"

Potential nuclear threat in different years was assessed by the leaders of the DPRK in different ways. At one time, the country's leadership did not attach any importance to this of great importance. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung believed that a nuclear bomb was a "paper tiger".

Start of work on the creation of nuclear infrastructure North Korea began shortly after Kim Il Sung learned that the United States during the Korean War of 1950-1953 were going to drop seven nuclear bombs on the capital of the republic. Already in 1956, cooperation began between the USSR and the DPRK in this area, at first consisting in the training of specialists.

“Nuclear weapons in North Korea appeared almost immediately after the end of the Korean War. Even then, it became obvious that North Korea needed to maximize its defense capabilities, ”said Irina Lantsova, an expert on North and South Korea, an associate professor at the Department of American Studies at St. Petersburg State University, in an interview with RT.

  • Statues of North Korea's founder Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il during a military parade
  • Reuters
  • Damir Sagolj

According to Yuri Tavrovsky, a professor at the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, the main reason for the start of nuclear development in the DPRK was "a deep sense of threat from Korea's traditional opponents, such as Japan and the United States, as well as the desire to rely on one's own forces, the Juche policy."

The Koreans decided not to hope for a nuclear umbrella Soviet Union and China, says Tavrovsky. In addition, in his opinion, at that time the memory of a destructive and bloody war was still fresh.

"They (North Korean authorities - RT) came to the conclusion that only nuclear weapons can be a guarantee of non-repetition of war by conventional methods, which are extremely destructive, and they obviously believed that nuclear weapons would not be used, but would be a good defense, ”the expert believes.

Gradually, North Korea acquired the necessary infrastructure and already in 1974 joined the IAEA. At the same time, work began on the creation of Pyongyang's own nuclear weapons. Significant assistance in this was provided, in particular, by China, which allowed North Korean scientists to their facilities.

According to Tavrovsky, two main factors contributed to the success of the DPRK: "the overstrain of the economic, technical, scientific forces of North Korea itself", as well as "conscious and unconscious transfers of technology by other countries, such as the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and, possibly, Pakistan" . At the last stage, already in our time, the Koreans bought out technologies or specialists from Ukraine, from Dnepropetrovsk, where the Yuzhmash plant is located, which produced the heaviest liquid rockets for the Soviet Union, which are known in the West as Satan.

In 1985, counting on the assistance of the USSR in the construction of nuclear power plants, Pyongyang, under pressure from Moscow, signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the early 1990s, IAEA inspectors frequented the country, and the results of their checks were ambiguous.

In the spring of 1993, the DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty, and in the summer of 1994 the country left the IAEA. Subsequently, it became known that it was in 1994 that the United States almost attacked the Yongbyon reactor, North Korea's largest nuclear facility. However, after analyzing the inevitable victims, Clinton abandoned this venture.

After a visit to the DPRK by former US President Jimmy Carter, the countries managed to sign the so-called Framework Agreement at the end of 1994. According to this document, North Korea, in particular, took upon itself the obligation to stop building, as well as use the infrastructure for uranium enrichment and extract plutonium from reactors, withdraw enriched nuclear fuel from the DPRK and dismantle all facilities one way or another related to nuclear weapons.

The US was to supply fuel oil to North Korea under the agreement and build two much larger light water reactors to replace the Yongbyon reactor, which was shut down. They could not be used to produce nuclear fuel.

Dashing zero

In 2001, George W. Bush came to power in the United States, who included the DPRK in the list of "rogue states". Under him, the promised reactors were not built, but the requirements for North Korea became more and more. As early as 2002, the US announced Pyongyang's failure to comply with the Framework Agreement and accused the DPRK of continuing to enrich uranium. At the end of the year, North Korea expelled IAEA employees from its territory and announced the continuation of work on the nuclear program.

The result of a new round of confrontation between the United States and the DPRK in January 2003 was Pyongyang's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Started in the summer of 2003, the six-party talks between North Korea, China, the United States, Russia, South Korea and Japan also did not lead to anything. In 2004, North Korea refused to participate, demanding clarification about South Korea's nuclear program, which, as it turned out, had been going on for four years.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK announced the creation of nuclear weapons, but the first test was carried out only in October 2006. Several tests of new weapons by North Korea are known from 2006 to 2017.

  • Kim Jong Un watches a rocket launch
  • Reuters

In 2017, Pyongyang announced the test of a thermonuclear charge, the so-called hydrogen bomb.

Experts note that the development of the North Korean nuclear program was a forced measure.

“Already after Iraq, and then after Libya and Syria, it became clear that there are no other ways to defend sovereignty. If North Korea did not have a nuclear program, it is likely that it would have already been bombed, ”said an employee of the Institute’s Center for Korean Studies in an interview with RT. Far East RAS Konstantin Asmolov.

According to the expert, North Korea exists in an unfriendly environment, for example, from the point of view of South Korea, the DPRK as a state does not exist. Formally, the South Korean Constitution also applies to the northern territories.

Delivered to the White House

North Korea began developing a nuclear delivery vehicle in 1988. It took ten years to create the Taepodong-1 medium-range ballistic missile - the first launch was made in 1998.

From 1999 to 2005, the DPRK observed a unilateral moratorium on missile testing, introduced following negotiations with the Clinton administration in exchange for food aid.

“Dialogue with the United States ended in 2001 with the coming to power of the Bush administration, which means that we have the right to resume missile testing,” read the text of a statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry, which was published on March 3, 2005.

In subsequent years, Pyongyang continued to launch rockets, and at the end of 2012, North Korea became a space power, successfully launching the Gwangmyeongsong-3 satellite into orbit.

In 2017, which fell in the Sea of ​​Japan, became the reason for the convening of the UN Security Council. Soon another one was produced, which fell into the Pacific Ocean, flying over the Japanese island of Hokkaido.

The United States is of particular concern latest version"Hwaseong" - "Hwaseong-15", which, according to experts, can hit any target in the United States.

Today, North Korea is also an exporter of missiles. Among its largest buyers are the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Pakistan and Yemen. In addition, the Iranian carriers were presumably made on the basis of the North Korean Taekhodong-2.

Sanction pressure

The DPRK developed its nuclear program under harsh conditions, by Japan and South Korea, and by the European Union, and even by Australia. The UN was established in relation to the DPRK. Each nuclear test was followed by packages of sanctions that touched almost every area of ​​life - from cultural exchanges and remittances until the ban on the supply of various raw materials and goods.

According to Lantsova, North Korea has achieved a very good result under tough sanctions: significant progress has been made in the work on the nuclear missile program - this applies to both delivery vehicles and the nuclear weapons themselves.

From the side of the United States, pressure on North Korea intensified with the coming to power of Donald Trump, who had already managed to threaten the DPRK with complete annihilation.

“The United States has a lot of strength and patience, but if we have to defend ourselves, then we will have no choice but to completely destroy the DPRK. Rocket Man (- RT) embarked on a suicide mission, ”said the head of the White House, speaking at the UN.

However, the real danger posed by the DPRK raises serious doubts among experts. According to Tavrovsky, the likelihood that North Korea will be the first to launch a nuclear strike is minimal.

“The North Koreans have achieved all their goals. They have achieved what they have been malnourished for many years, overworked. They practically created a nuclear missile shield, this has already been recognized by all the opponents of the DPRK, ”the expert is sure.

Meanwhile, Asmolov admits the possibility that North Korea could act first if provoked.

“If the North Korean leadership is confident that there are no peaceful alternatives and that they are already going to be killed, they will naturally act on the “hit first” principle,” the expert emphasized.

The North Korean leadership demonstrated a resolute attitude and independence of its policy on the eve of the start of the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang. On February 8, 2018, a military parade was held in the capital of the DPRK, Pyongyang, in honor of the 70th anniversary of the People's Democratic Republic. Traditionally, the celebrations take place in April. However, the country's authorities decided to hold the event in February, timed to coincide with the anniversary of the founding of the regular army of North Korea. At the parade, a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile "Hwaseong-15".

"As long as the hostile policy of the United States persists, the mission of the people's army, which acts as a powerful sword to protect the country, will continue," North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said, speaking at a parade in front of the military.

On February 10, 2005, North Korea officially announced the creation of nuclear weapons. This caused concern in the United States and Japan and became the reason for the introduction of tough sanctions against the republic. Restrictive measures did not stop the leadership of the DPRK, and in 2017 the country got a ballistic missile, according to experts, capable of delivering a deadly charge to the territory of the United States. However, according to experts, the likelihood that North Korea will strike first is minimal. How the DPRK created a nuclear missile shield - in the material RT. 13 years ago, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea officially announced the creation of its own nuclear weapons.

“The negotiation process has stalled due to the anti-Korean hostile policy of the United States. As long as America brandishes a nuclear baton, intending to destroy our system at any cost, we will expand our stocks of nuclear weapons in order to protect the historical choice of our people, freedom and socialism," the DPRK Foreign Ministry said on February 10, 2005.

The grin of the "paper tiger"

The potential nuclear threat in different years was assessed by the leaders of the DPRK in different ways. At one time, the country's leadership did not attach much importance to this. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung believed that a nuclear bomb was a "paper tiger".

The beginning of work on the creation of the nuclear infrastructure of North Korea began shortly after Kim Il Sung learned that the United States during the Korean War of 1950-1953 was going to drop seven nuclear bombs on the capital of the republic. Already in 1956, cooperation began between the USSR and the DPRK in this area, at first consisting in the training of specialists.

“Nuclear weapons in North Korea appeared almost immediately after the end of the Korean War. Even then, it became obvious that North Korea needed to maximize its defense capabilities, ”said Irina Lantsova, an expert on North and South Korea, an associate professor at the Department of American Studies at St. Petersburg State University, in an interview with RT.

According to Yuri Tavrovsky, a professor at the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, the main reason for the start of nuclear development in the DPRK was "a deep sense of threat from Korea's traditional opponents, such as Japan and the United States, as well as the desire to rely on one's own forces, the Juche policy."

The Koreans decided not to rely on the nuclear umbrella of the Soviet Union and China, Tavrovsky believes. In addition, in his opinion, at that time the memory of a destructive and bloody war was still fresh.

“They (the North Korean authorities - RT ) came to the conclusion that only nuclear weapons can be a guarantee of non-repetition of war by conventional methods, which are extremely destructive, and they obviously believed that nuclear weapons would not be used, but would be a good defense,” the expert believes .

Gradually, North Korea acquired the necessary infrastructure and already in 1974 joined the IAEA. At the same time, work began on the creation of Pyongyang's own nuclear weapons. Significant assistance in this was provided, in particular, by China, which allowed North Korean scientists to their facilities.

According to Tavrovsky, two main factors contributed to the success of the DPRK: "the overstrain of the economic, technical, scientific forces of North Korea itself", as well as "conscious and unconscious transfers of technology by other countries, such as the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and, possibly, Pakistan" . At the last stage, already in our time, the Koreans bought out technologies or specialists from Ukraine, from Dnepropetrovsk, where the Yuzhmash plant is located, which produced the heaviest liquid rockets for the Soviet Union, which are known in the West as Satan.

In 1985, counting on the assistance of the USSR in the construction of nuclear power plants, Pyongyang, under pressure from Moscow, signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the early 1990s, IAEA inspectors frequented the country, and the results of their checks were ambiguous.

In the spring of 1993, the DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty, and in the summer of 1994 the country left the IAEA. Subsequently, it became known that it was in 1994 that the United States almost attacked the Yongbyon reactor, North Korea's largest nuclear facility. However, after analyzing the inevitable victims, Clinton abandoned this venture.

After a visit to the DPRK by former US President Jimmy Carter, the countries managed to sign the so-called Framework Agreement at the end of 1994. According to this document, North Korea, in particular, took upon itself the obligation to stop building, as well as use the infrastructure for uranium enrichment and extract plutonium from reactors, withdraw enriched nuclear fuel from the DPRK and dismantle all facilities one way or another related to nuclear weapons.

The US was to supply fuel oil to North Korea under the agreement and build two much larger light water reactors to replace the Yongbyon reactor, which was shut down. They could not be used to produce nuclear fuel.

Dashing zero

In 2001, George W. Bush came to power in the United States, who included the DPRK in the list of "rogue states". Under him, the promised reactors were not built, but the requirements for North Korea became more and more. As early as 2002, the US announced Pyongyang's failure to comply with the Framework Agreement and accused the DPRK of continuing to enrich uranium. At the end of the year, North Korea expelled IAEA employees from its territory and announced the continuation of work on the nuclear program.

The result of a new round of confrontation between the United States and the DPRK in January 2003 was Pyongyang's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The six-party talks between North Korea, China, the United States, Russia, South Korea, and Japan that began in the summer of 2003 also came to nothing. In 2004, North Korea refused to participate, demanding clarification about South Korea's nuclear program, which, as it turned out, had been going on for four years.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK announced the creation of nuclear weapons, but the first test was carried out only in October 2006. Several tests of new weapons by North Korea are known from 2006 to 2017.

In 2017, Pyongyang announced the test of a thermonuclear charge, the so-called hydrogen bomb.

Experts note that the development of the North Korean nuclear program was a forced measure.

“Already after Iraq, and then after Libya and Syria, it became clear that there are no other ways to defend sovereignty. If North Korea did not have a nuclear program, it is likely that it would have already been bombed, ”said Konstantin Asmolov, an employee of the Center for Korean Studies at the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in an interview with RT.

According to the expert, North Korea exists in an unfriendly environment, for example, from the point of view of South Korea, the DPRK as a state does not exist. Formally, the South Korean Constitution also applies to the northern territories.

Delivered to the White House

North Korea began developing a nuclear delivery vehicle in 1988. It took ten years to create the Taekhodong-1 medium-range ballistic missile - the first launch was made in 1998.

From 1999 to 2005, the DPRK observed a unilateral moratorium on missile testing, introduced following negotiations with the Clinton administration in exchange for food aid.

"Dialogue with the United States ended in 2001 with the coming to power of the Bush administration, which means that we have the right to resume missile testing," read the text of a statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry, which was published on March 3, 2005.

In subsequent years, Pyongyang continued to launch rockets, and at the end of 2012, North Korea became a space power, successfully launching the Gwangmyeongsong-3 satellite into orbit.

In 2017, the launch of the Hwaseong-14 rocket, which fell into the Sea of ​​Japan, became the reason for the convening of the UN Security Council. Soon, another North Korean Hwaseong-12 missile was fired, which fell into the Pacific Ocean, flying over the Japanese island of Hokkaido.

The United States is particularly concerned about the latest version of the Hwaseong, the Hwaseong-15, which, according to experts, can hit any target in the United States.

Today, North Korea is also an exporter of missiles. Among its largest buyers are the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Pakistan and Yemen. In addition, the Iranian carriers were presumably made on the basis of the North Korean Taekhodong-2.

Sanction pressure

The DPRK developed its nuclear program under severe sanctions imposed by both the United States, Japan and South Korea, as well as the European Union, and even Australia. The UN Security Council committee on sanctions against the DPRK was created. Each nuclear test was followed by packages of sanctions that affected almost all areas of life - from cultural exchanges and money transfers to a ban on the supply of various raw materials and goods.

According to Lantsova, North Korea has achieved a very good result under tough sanctions: significant success has been achieved in the work on the nuclear missile program - this applies to both delivery vehicles and the nuclear weapons themselves.

From the US side, pressure on North Korea intensified with the coming to power of Donald Trump, who had already managed to threaten the DPRK with complete destruction.

“The United States has a lot of strength and patience, but if we have to defend ourselves, then we will have no choice but to completely destroy the DPRK. Rocket Man (Kim Jong-un - RT ) has embarked on a suicide mission," the head of the White House said, speaking at the UN.

However, the real danger posed by the DPRK raises serious doubts among experts. According to Tavrovsky, the likelihood that North Korea will be the first to launch a nuclear strike is minimal.

“The North Koreans have achieved all their goals. They have achieved what they have been malnourished for many years, overworked. They practically created a nuclear missile shield, this is already recognized by all the opponents of the DPRK,” the expert is sure.

Meanwhile, Asmolov admits the possibility that North Korea could act first if provoked.

“If the North Korean leadership is confident that there are no peaceful alternatives and that they are already going to be killed, they will naturally act on the principle of “hit first,” the expert emphasized.

The North Korean leadership demonstrated a resolute attitude and independence of its policy on the eve of the start of the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang. On February 8, 2018, a military parade was held in the capital of the DPRK, Pyongyang, in honor of the 70th anniversary of the People's Democratic Republic. Traditionally, the celebrations take place in April. However, the country's authorities decided to hold the event in February, timed to coincide with the anniversary of the founding of the regular army of North Korea. A new type of intercontinental ballistic missile Hwaseong-15 was demonstrated at the parade.

"As long as the hostile policy of the United States persists, the mission of the people's army, acting as a powerful sword to defend the country, will continue," North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said, speaking at a parade in front of the military.

In the article we will talk about the testing of nuclear weapons in North Korea, as well as other countries that may pose a threat. Let's take a closer look at this issue from all sides, as well as study nuclear tests in Korea and talk about the potential of other countries.

North Korean nuclear missile program

This is the conditional name for a set of research works on the creation of nuclear charges in All data are based on official documents or statements by the government of the country, since the developments are hidden. The authorities assure that all tests are exclusively peaceful in nature and are aimed at studying outer space. In the winter of 2005, it officially declared nuclear weapons and a year later it made the first explosion.

It is known that after the war, the United States regularly threatened North Korea with the possibility of using nuclear weapons. Ruler Kim Il Sung, being under the protection of the USSR, was calm in this regard until he learned that the US planned to drop 7 nuclear charges on Pyongyang during the Korean War. This was a powerful impetus to the fact that Korea began research into nuclear energy. 1952 is generally considered to be the beginning of North Korea's nuclear activities. The country acted jointly with the USSR, which provided considerable assistance. Since the 1970s, the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea has begun. Agreements were concluded with China, which allowed researchers to visit its test sites.

In 1985, under strong pressure from the USSR, the DPRK signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

First test

In the fall of 2006, the country's authorities announced that the first nuclear test had been successfully carried out. The official statement said that it was an underground test that would serve the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. The study took place at the Pungeri test site, which is located in the north-east of the republic, less than 200 km from the border with Russia. The tremor caused earthquakes in Japan, the USA, Australia, South Korea and Russia.

After that, the question of whether North Korea had nuclear weapons was no longer raised. Chinese authorities were warned 2 hours before the explosion. World powers, including Russia and China, as well as the highest echelons of power in the European Union and NATO, have been critical of nuclear weapons testing. Political leaders openly expressed their displeasure. Because of this, the weapons of which deserve attention, immediately came to combat readiness.

Second test

In the spring of 2009, a second test took place, the power of which was much greater. After the explosion, in 9 languages, Korea's international radio broadcast that their people came out in support of the weapons test, as the threat from the United States appears regularly. Korea, in turn, is simply taking drastic measures to possibly protect its territory.

At the same time, South Korea joined the countries that reacted negatively to this state of affairs. The US government even put forward sanctions against the DPRK. In response, the authorities said that if mass searches were carried out, Korea would take it as the start of a war.

Third test

In the winter of 2013, the republic publicly announced that it intended to conduct another test. In February, researchers from the United States noticed tremors, the localization of which was located approximately in the area of ​​​​the North Korean nuclear test site. The UN announced the discovery of a strange seismic phenomenon that has signs of an explosion. On the same day, the North Korean authorities announced a successful experiment. On December 12, 2012, North Korean researchers launched a new satellite into orbit, which caused a crisis in the country. Relations between the United States, South Korea, Japan and North Korea have become very tense.

Still wondering if North Korea has nuclear weapons and how many? It will be useful to know that in 2015 he officially announced that the country has a hydrogen bomb. Analysts said with confidence that, most likely, developments in this direction are underway, but there are no ready-made warheads yet.

In January 2016, the South Korean authorities shared information that the DPRK was allegedly preparing to test a hydrogen bomb. Scouts said that tritium production was established in North Korea, it is necessary to create a bomb, and a new underground tunnel is being built. In the winter of 2017, on the orders of Kim Jong-un, the first explosion of a thermonuclear bomb was carried out near the Chinese border. This information was confirmed by Chinese researchers. In the autumn of the same year, information was officially confirmed that the DPRK possessed a hydrogen bomb.

Fourth test

In the winter of 2016, North Korea again reminded of itself. The nuclear power carried out another explosion and soon announced that the first successful one had passed. However, experts from all over the world showed some distrust of these words and doubted that it was the hydrogen bomb that had been detonated. They insisted that the explosion should have been more powerful, several hundred thousand million tons. It was equated to what happened in 2009. In terms of power, it was compared with the bomb that exploded in Hiroshima.

Fifth test

In the autumn of 2016, a powerful seismic explosion occurred in the country in the morning. The epicenter was located in the village, not far from the Pungeri test site. US geologists have classified seismic tremors as an explosion. A little later, the DPRK officially announced the success of its fifth nuclear test.

Sixth test

On September 3, 2017, the most powerful tremors were recorded in North Korea. They were noticed by seismic stations in many countries. This time, scientists agreed that the explosion was ground. It occurred in the afternoon local time in the area of ​​the Pungeri test site. Officially, the Korean authorities announced the successful test of a nuclear warhead. The power of the explosion was incredible and 10 times higher than that which was in the fall of 2016. A few minutes after the first shock, the US Geological Survey recorded another one. Multiple landslides were visible from the satellite.

Country

When North Korea acquired nuclear weapons, it joined the so-called "Nuclear Club", consisting of states that possess varying amounts of such weapons. List of countries that legally own capacities: France, China, Great Britain, Russia and the USA. The illegitimate owners are Pakistan, India and North Korea.

It should be mentioned that Israel is not officially considered the owner of nuclear weapons, but many world experts are sure that the country has its own secret developments. However, many states at one time were engaged in the development of such weapons. In addition, not everyone signed the NPT in 1968, and many of those who signed it did not ratify it. That is why the threat still exists.

USA

Let's start the list of countries with nuclear weapons with the United States. The basis of its power lies in ballistic missiles on submarines. It is known that at the moment the United States has more than 1,500 warheads. After the Second World War, the production of weapons increased dramatically, but in 1997 it was discontinued.

Russia

So, the list of countries with nuclear weapons is continued by the Russian Federation, which owns 1,480 warheads. It also has ammunition that can be used in naval, strategic, missile and aviation forces.

During the last decade, the number of weapons in Russia has significantly decreased due to the signing of a treaty on mutual disarmament. The Russian Federation, like the United States, signed the 1968 treaty, so it is on the list of countries that legitimately own nuclear weapons. At the same time, the presence of such a threat allows Russia to adequately defend its political and economic interests.

France

We have already understood how strong the North Korean army is, but what about the European countries? France, for example, owns 300 warheads that can be used on submarines. Also, the country has about 60 multiprocessors that can be used for military aviation. The stockpile of this country's weapons seems negligible compared to the volumes of the United States and Russia, but this is also significant. France fought for independence for a very long time in terms of developing its own weapons. Researchers tried to invent a supercomputer, tested nuclear weapons. But all this lasted until 1998, after which all developments were destroyed and stopped.

Great Britain

This country owns approximately 255 nuclear weapons, of which more than 150 are in full readiness for use on submarines. Inaccuracies in the number of weapons in the UK are due to the fact that the principles of policy prohibit posting detailed information about the quality of weapons. The country is not trying to increase its nuclear potential, but in no case is it going to lower it. There is an active policy of curbing the use of lethal weapons.

China, India, Pakistan

We'll talk about how many nuclear weapons North Korea has later, but for now let's focus on China, which has about 240 nuclear weapons. According to unofficial data, it is believed that there are about 40 intercontinental missiles and about 1,000 short-range missiles. The government does not give any exact data on the number of weapons, assuring that they will be kept at a minimum level to guarantee security.

Also, the Chinese authorities claim that they will never use weapons of this type first, and if they have to use them, they will not be directed to countries that do not have nuclear weapons. What to say global community reacts very positively to such statements.

We have already considered the nuclear weapons of North Korea, but what about such a multifaceted country as India? Experts believe that it refers to states that possess lethal weapons illegitimately. It is believed that the military stock consists of thermonuclear and nuclear warheads. There are also ballistic missiles, short and medium range missiles. Despite the fact that the country owns nuclear weapons, there is no discussion of this on the world stage and no information is provided, which upsets the world community.

In Pakistan, according to experts, there are about 200 warheads. However, this is only unofficial data, since there is no exact information. The public reacted very harshly to all nuclear weapons tests in this country. Pakistan has received a lot of economic sanctions from almost all countries in the world, except Saudi Arabia, since she was connected with him by contracts for the supply of oil.

The armament of which is clearly sufficient, is still the main world threat. The government does not want to provide any approximate information on the number of weapons. It is known that there are medium-range missiles and the Musudan mobile missile system. Due to the fact that the DPRK regularly tests its weapons and even publicly declares that it has them in the country, economic sanctions are regularly imposed on it. Six-party talks between the countries have been underway for a long time, but despite all this, Korea is not going to stop its research.

As for the above-mentioned negotiations, they began in 2003. The participants were the USA, Russia, Japan, South Korea. The first three rounds of negotiations that took place in 2003-2004 did not bring any practical result. The fourth round was held without the participation of Pyongyang - the capital of the DPRK. This happened because of a new crisis in North Korea's relations with America and Japan.

At all stages of the negotiations, it is about the same thing - for the country to curtail its nuclear program and destroy the weapons it has created. The United States offered Korea economic benefits and a full guarantee that there would be no more aggression and threats from their side. However, when all participating countries demanded that the DPRK completely curtail all its activities, and even under the control of the IAEA, Korea resolutely refused.

Later, the country nevertheless softened its conditions and agreed to temporarily freeze its research in exchange for the supply of fuel oil on the most favorable terms for Korea. However, by this time the United States and Japan were no longer enough to freeze, they wanted a complete cessation of the nuclear program. Naturally, the DPRK did not accept such conditions.

Subsequently, the United States managed to agree with Korea on a temporary freeze of all tests for a good reward. However, after that, the participating countries began to demand the most desirable thing - to completely stop and destroy all developments. Once again, Korea rejected such conditions.

Negotiations are still ongoing, and similar situations occur: as soon as the DPRK makes concessions, even more is demanded of it. Korea, in turn, under no pretext agrees to curtail its nuclear missile program.

PEACE AND SECURITY

NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF THE DPRK

Park Sang Hoon

Institute of Foreign Policy and National Security (Republic of Korea) Republic of Korea, Seoul, Seocho-gu Seocho-dong, 13-76-2, 137-863

The article analyzes modern aspects of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on the example of international approaches to the nuclear program of the DPRK, as well as the efforts of the world community to resolve it, especially through the Six-Party Talks.

Key words: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), IAEA, North Korea, nuclear program, nuclear issue, Six-Party Talks.

After Caribbean Crisis 1962, which almost led to a world nuclear missile war, the USSR and the USA, as the leading nuclear powers, came to the conclusion that, firstly, the arms race should be limited to some extent, and secondly, that the access of new members in the "nuclear club" should be closed. As a result, in 1968, the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, as well as about fifty other countries that had already determined for themselves that they did not need their own nuclear weapons, signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into force in 1970 After France and the People's Republic of China joined it in 1992, all five nuclear powers - permanent members of the UN Security Council - became its members. However, unfortunately, this did not stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Back in the 1970s. Israel created its first nuclear devices, and cooperated in this area with the apartheid regime in the Republic of South Africa. A few years would have been enough for Shah Iran to acquire the potential to create nuclear weapons, but this was prevented by the 1979 revolution. At the same time, all these countries categorically denied even the existence of such intentions.

The situation changed in 1998, when India and Pakistan, which are not members of the NPT, joined the "nuclear club" on a whim. The situation was further exacerbated when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) first withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and then officially announced that it had conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, followed by another in 2009.

but there were also suspicions about the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

From a formal legal point of view, India and Pakistan cannot be condemned for violating the provisions of the NPT, since they are not members of it. Both countries argue that they need nuclear weapons solely in self-defense against each other, but could join the NPT - provided the other side joins. But this is unlikely, because India has another potential adversary that "legitimately" possesses nuclear weapons - China. Iran, in fact, is suspected only of striving to become a "threshold state", which the NPT does not prohibit being.

The situation with North Korea is completely different. It openly declares that it has carried out nuclear tests and that it has nuclear weapons. At the same time, in addition to the border with the Republic of Korea, it also has common borders with two nuclear, but not hostile powers - the PRC and Russia, and also deals with the nuclear-armed forces of the United States of America based in the region, which it considers as its own. most dangerous enemy. Therefore, it is clear that the possibility of North Korea giving up nuclear weapons on a reciprocal basis with any or all three regional nuclear powers is completely absent - it is possible only unilaterally. This makes the North Korean nuclear issue particularly complex and complex, and it has many dimensions or levels. It seems appropriate to comprehend it at three levels - global, regional and national.

At the global level, this problem is a serious threat to the nonproliferation regime as negative example for other countries. This fact obvious to any unprejudiced investigator.

At the regional level, conflict over this issue is at the heart of a broader security problem in Northeast Asia. It seems reasonable to fear that if, with the appearance of a nuclear potential in North Korea, there are doubts about the readiness of the United States to fulfill its obligations to protect allies, then the latter, most likely, will also rush to possess nuclear weapons.

At the national level, the DPRK's military nuclear program is the main obstacle to economic development North and South Korea, for inter-Korean reconciliation and, ultimately, the reunification of the country. This level includes factors and processes at the level of individual states involved in the conflict and their governments. At this level, the steps taken by the Republic of Korea (RK), the United States, China, Russia and Japan are most influential in the development of the situation.

It should be recalled that in response to the US withdrawal of its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in September 1991, the ROK and the DPRK signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation in December of the same year, and in January of the following year, the Joint Declaration of North and South on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, already in 1993, the first nuclear crisis broke out, when the DPRK suspended its participation in the NPT for a very short time. And then the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kim Yong Sam, closely linked the nuclear issue with progress in the

ronnih relations. In 1994, the mediation of former US President John Carter helped the parties to agree to a summit, but sudden death DPRK leader Kim Il Sung eliminated the prospects for negotiations.

Nevertheless, the DPRK remained in the NPT, and in 1998 the new South Korean President Kim Dae-jung began to actively carry out fundamental new policy comprehensive and active engagement with the North, which continued throughout the presidency of his successor Roh Moo-hyun. However, this policy of "sunshine heat" symbolized by the "Kim-Kim" summits, i.e. Kim Dae-chung and the new leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong Il (2000) and the No-Kim summit, i.e. No Moo Hyun with Kim Jong Il (2007), has spread mainly to economic and humanitarian exchanges. It was never able to launch the peace process because the North refused to discuss security issues, including the nuclear issue.

Thanks to the signing of the Framework Agreement, reached through a series of bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea in 1994, the first nuclear crisis ended, but the prerequisites for it remained. With the onset of the second nuclear crisis in 2003, new platform to discuss the problem were the Six-Party Talks with the participation of both Korean states, the United States, China, Russia and Japan. However, such important breakthroughs as the Joint Declaration of September 19, 2003 and the Agreement of February 13, took place only thanks to bilateral US-North Korean negotiations.

Part of the reason why the North Korean nuclear issue has not been seriously discussed at the inter-Korean level is the lack of will on the part of the former South Korean governments. They tended to deal only with simpler issues, retreating without serious objection to Pyongyang's refusal to discuss the nuclear issue. Secondly, characteristics the North Korean nuclear crisis over the years have become different and have gone beyond the North-South relationship. The framework of the Six-Party Talks provided for the participation of the ROK in the discussion of the nuclear problem, but in this way they themselves limited the possibility of resolving it on an inter-Korean basis. Therefore, the dropping of the nuclear issue from the agenda of inter-Korean meetings was partly due to the lack of will on the part of Seoul, but the main reason is the characteristics of the problem that have changed over the past twenty years.

After the inauguration of President Lee Myung-bak in South Korea in February 2008, inter-Korean relations remain tense, especially in terms of opposing views on the implementation of the agreements reached as a result of two inter-Korean summits in 2000 and 2007. From the new administration's point of view, a decade of "sunshine" policy, inter-Korean dialogues and exchanges, South-to-North cooperation and aid have failed to push North Korea to abandon its nuclear program.

The new South Korean administration began to pay more attention to the problem of denuclearization. At the same time, she made it clear that if the North demonstrates its determination to give up nuclear weapons, then the South is ready to implement a comprehensive program for the development of inter-Korean economic cooperation. Pyongyang was extremely dissatisfied with such changes and began

express this by building up hostile propaganda and real physical measures against the Republic of Kazakhstan. This was also reflected in the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2009, for which the ROK, the United States, and Japan laid the blame on Pyongyang, although the DPRK did not admit its involvement, and Russia and China took the position of supporters of the presumption of innocence and in shelling the North Korean artillery of the South Korean island for the next year, and in other actions.

Regarding the United States, it can be noted that, in contrast to the Clinton administration, which supported the policy of "solar heat", the initial approach of the George W. Bush administration to the problem was vague. Secretary of State C. Powell announced continuity, that the Republican administration "will pick up what President Clinton left behind." In June 2001, the Bush administration announced its strategy for North Korea, which it defined as stepping up implementation of the Framework Agreement while taking a more comprehensive approach to negotiations. However, the Bush administration's "sunshine" policy soon became an irritant in US-South Korea relations. Under Bush, the US has taken a more reserved stance on bringing the DPRK into cooperation. With North Korea pushing hard for bilateral talks with the US, the US has opted for multilateral talks involving the ROK, China, Japan, and Russia to share responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation. This is especially true in the post-September 11, 2001 period, when the United States unveiled a new strategy to prevent international terrorism and the use of WMD, justifying this by saying that political and military deterrence strategies based on reacting to what has already happened are no longer adequate.

The Bush administration quickly lost confidence in the Six-Party Talks. Differences between core interests, negotiating styles and domestic priorities of each participating country complicated this process. The remaining five participants in the talks managed to bring the DPRK back to the negotiating table and work out agreements on the implementation of the Joint Statement. But the talks came up against Pyongyang's unwillingness to agree to mandatory clear verification.

Critics of George W. Bush's policy in the United States accused her of inadequacy, that she caused a rise in confrontation with North Korea, led to the inaction of the Framework Agreement and forced the formation of the mechanism of the Six-Party Talks without a clear understanding of how these steps were supposed to ensure the curtailment of the North Korean nuclear program . It further noted that the administration was overly busy with the invasion of Iraq, where no nuclear weapons were found, while the real and urgent nuclear threat on the Korean Peninsula was allowed to spiral out of control. When the outcome of the Iraq war turned out to be problematic, the Bush administration failed to secure an end to internal debate, and this severely limited its ability to shift to a policy of engaging North Korea in constructive cooperation with some major, attractive proposal.

By the time the Obama administration came to power, North Korea reportedly possessed enough plutonium to produce six to eight nuclear weapons and showed little interest in taking steps to build on its earlier commitments. The Obama administration has declared its commitment to diplomatic methods. However, North Korea rejected these approaches and in 2009 denounced the 1992 Joint Inter-Korean Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, expelled inspectors from the International Agency for atomic energy(IAEA), from its recommissioned nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, left - possibly temporarily - the Six-Party Talks, saying it "would no longer participate in such talks" and carried out a second nuclear test. In response, the US stated that its vital interest was the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korea's military nuclear program.

People's Republic of China since the early 1990s avoided an active role during the first North Korean nuclear crisis. At that time, China emphasized its principle of non-intervention and emphasized that the problem should be solved by the parties directly involved. However, when the second crisis erupted, he abandoned the role of cautious observer and took a more active position. After North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003, China organized the Tripartite Talks in April 2003 between the United States and North Korea as a prologue to the Six-Party, and in August 2003 all six parties met for the first time. , and, remarkably, in Beijing.

China's approach is driven by its need to maintain domestic stability and promote economic development. driving force China's resistance to the harsh international response to the actions of the DPRK are fears that the collapse of the North Korean regime or the economic crisis caused by strict sanctions could generate a huge flow of North Korean refugees across the common border. At the same time, Beijing sometimes makes a constructive contribution to the development and application of tough UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea. He wants to improve his image in the world and build a more positive relationship with the United States, and his role as chairman of the Six-Party Talks and, in fact, the lead mediator between the parties, was designed to help achieve these goals.

Considering China's close relationship with the DPRK and its incomparable influence on it, China, in the event of a deeper involvement in the solution of the North Korean nuclear problem, would play a key role in any resolution of it. North Korea's dependence on China for economic ties and political patronage makes it a powerful and authoritative force. The PRC's approach to the DPRK apparently reflects at the same time a genuine desire to prevent international sanctions that could destabilize that country, and an equally genuine desire to keep Pyongyang from taking any rash steps.

Since North Korea's second nuclear test in May 2009, China has become more receptive to the idea of ​​new UN sanctions.

But it did not find a real embodiment. The reason is that while the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is desirable for China, a more immediate priority for Beijing is to keep North Korea on the peninsula as a viable ally. In theory, China could use its position as a major source of energy, food and other vital goods to force Pyongyang to abandon its military nuclear program. However, in reality, Beijing is very afraid possible consequences use of such a powerful "lever". Beijing is most concerned about the possibility of military action on the peninsula, the collapse of the state in the North, the flow of North Korean refugees to China, and, even more so, such a reunification of Korea that would lead to a US military presence north of the 38th parallel. Therefore, although China is in favor of resuming the negotiation process, its value to Beijing should not be exaggerated. Compared to keeping the DPRK, it ranks much lower on the priority scale of Chinese diplomacy.

Participation Russian Federation the Six-Party Talks has remained cautious but principled all along and based on two principles, namely a "nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula" and a "peaceful resolution of the conflict". Russia's position is fully consistent with its consistent commitment to the NPT. It was the USSR that persuaded the DPRK to sign the NPT and ensure the possibility of the work of IAEA inspectors as a condition for its long-term cooperation with Pyongyang. Only after that did Moscow agree to supply the DPRK with four light-water nuclear reactors.

Russia is concerned not only that North Korean nuclear weapons will jeopardize the overall balance of power in Northeast Asia, pushing Japan and South Korea to create such weapons and, accordingly, accelerating the Chinese nuclear buildup, but also that North Korea has them will harm global non-proliferation efforts. The costs associated with an arms race in the region would be very high, and the chain reaction of nuclear proliferation in the world would be very serious. Russia is also directly concerned to avoid armed conflict or any unexpected changes on the Korean Peninsula. Due to the geographical proximity to North Korea, an unexpected collapse of the regime or the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would be detrimental to the Russian Far East, since, as you know, both radiation and refugees do not recognize state borders.

These considerations have led Russia to resist any proposal for the use of force or any other scheme aimed at abrupt regime change in the DPRK. Russia takes the view that a negotiated solution to the current nuclear crisis can be found and believes that threats, sanctions and accusations against North Korea could be counterproductive. At the same time, information messages about contacts have long been Russian diplomats with North Korean colleagues contain the same statement that Russia hopes for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks.

As for Japan, as a country that survived Hiroshima and is experiencing Fukushima, it is also extremely concerned about the North Korean nuclear issue. Stability in Northeast Asia is critical to the economic well-being of this country, and the military nuclear program of the DPRK (like the missile program) is perceived by Japan as a direct threat to national security. The main goal of Japan's policy towards the DPRK is to normalize, in cooperation with the US and the ROK, relations with it by resolving the North Korean nuclear problem.

At the same time, the Japanese side regularly raises the issue of abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents in the past. Tokyo's position on the issue of these abductions is delicately criticized by the rest of the Six-Party Talks, who believe that progress on denuclearization should not be held hostage to this important, but much more specific issue. However, without his decision, Tokyo refuses to provide any energy assistance or other positive incentives to North Korea. In September 2002, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il apologized to Prime Minister D. Koizumi for the kidnappings, apparently believing that this would remove or at least soften the issue. However, on the contrary, the very recognition of the fact of abductions sharply worsened the attitude of Japanese public opinion towards the DPRK. Of course, this issue definitely needs a final resolution, but it is more likely only in an atmosphere of improved bilateral relations. In principle, it can be stated that of all five of Pyongyang's counterparties in the negotiations, Tokyo apparently took the toughest position, thereby exposing cracks in the regional multilateral system and provoking sharp disagreements about procedural issues and principles regarding the development of the negotiation process.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons provided a fundamental, though not 100% effective, legal framework for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. In April 2010, the US and Russia signed a new START treaty, ratified eight months later, and then at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, 47 world leaders unanimously agreed to work to reduce the vulnerability of nuclear materials to terrorists.

In the context global problem non-proliferation solution of the North Korean nuclear problem is not only an issue concerning inter-Korean relations, even if it causes the greatest concern among the ROK, but also an important regional and global task. However, tougher norms and better institutions alone are unlikely to solve the North Korean nuclear issue, as it has grown out of that country's domestic and international security deficits, as well as its unique history and leaders' worldview.

The experience of studying the foreign policy of the DPRK shows that it is very consistent in its own way. If any changes occur in it, then they are due to changes in the internal environment and external influences. As for the former, for all the apparent immutability of the inner life

nor, it differs in some respects from what it was thirty years ago. The influence of external factors - for example, sanctions - is limited by the balance of power and by far from the coinciding interests of the states present in the region, all of which would like changes to one degree or another, but none - catastrophic upheavals. Because of this, the significance of the change of leaders in North Korea should not be exaggerated. Of course, Kim Jong Il's foreign policy differed in some details from the line of his father Kim Il Sung, but no one will undertake to determine under which of them it was tougher or, on the contrary, prone to compromise.

Likewise, it is difficult to speculate whether the DPRK will return to negotiations and, if so, in what format. After the death of Kim Jong Il, there was a reasonable impression that in the context of humanitarian assistance and compensation for the freezing of the nuclear program, including through the promotion of a peaceful nuclear program, as well as thanks to the "sunshine" policy pursued by the Kim Dae-jung administration, this country would gradually open up to the outside world and move to a more peaceful position. However, in the new century these hopes were almost not justified.

By taking into account this experience in relation to the new leader Kim Jong-un, one can only assume that Pyongyang's positions on foreign policy issues, including the problem of denuclearization, are likely and most likely to be formed as a resultant of the positions of various informal groupings in the ruling elite, which, in turn, will increasingly be determined not so much by ideological attitudes as by real material interests. It can be assumed that the DPRK, in essence, although without declaring it, will also seek to solve its problems primarily through contacts with the United States and China as the main geopolitical actors in the region, and only secondarily with their regional allies and partners.

LITERATURE

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Byung-joon Ahn. South-North Korean Relations and the North Korean Nuclear Challenge // Coping with Korea's Security Challenge. - Vol. 2. - Future of ROK-US Alliance, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 2003.

David C. Kang. Kim "s Nuclear Obsession // The National Interest online, 13 April 2010. URL: http://nationalinterest.org

Hillary Clinton, Press Conference at ASEAN Summit, 22 July 2009. URL: http://www.state.gov/ secretary/rm/2009a/july/126320.htm

Natalya Bazhanova. North Korea's Decision to Develop an Independent Nuclear Program // North Korean Nuclear Program. Security, Strategy and New Perspectives from Russia. - N.Y., L.: Routledge, 2000.

Sun Bae Kim. How Can an Inter-Korean Summit Contribute to the Denuclearization of North Korea? // Policy Forum Online 10-035, 1 July 2010, Nautilus Institute.

Patrick M. Morgan. The Role of the United States in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis // Korean Security in a Changing East Asia. - N.Y.: Praeger Security International, 2006.

Press availability conducted between Colin Powell and Swiss Foreign Minister on March 6, 2001. URL: http://2001-2009. state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/1116. htm.

Shades of Red: China's Debate over North Korea // Crisis Group Asia Report No. 179, 2 November 2009.

Ted Galen Carpenter. False Hopes // The National Interest online, 11 March 2010. URL: http://nationalinterest.org

The Korean Peninsula: Challenges and Opportunities for Russia // CSCAP Russian National Committee Report, September 2010.

Yevgeniy P. Bazhanov, James C. Moltz. China and the Korean Peninsula: Managing an Unstable Triangle // North Korean Nuclear Program. Security, Strategy and New Perspectives form Russia. - N.Y., L.: Routledge, 2000.

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NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF THE DPRK

Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (Republic of Korea) Republic of Korea, Seoul, Seocho-dong, Seocho-gu, 137-8631, 3-76-2

The article analyzes the contemporary aspects of the nuclear weapon nonproliferation issue as exemplified by the international approaches to the DPRK nuclear weapons program, as well as the international community efforts to resolve it, in particular via the Six-Party Talks.

Key words: Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), IAEA, North Korea, nuclear program, nuclear problem, Six-Party Talks.

Kim Jong-un, unlike his relatives and predecessors, does not at all blackmail the world with nuclear developments, but creates a real nuclear missile arsenal.

Explosion for the holiday

On September 9, 2017, North Korea marked the 69th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with another nuclear test.

First, several countries at once recorded increased seismic activity in North Korea, which could mean an explosion of a nuclear charge.

Then the fact of conducting nuclear tests was officially confirmed by Pyongyang. "North Korea will continue to take measures to strengthen the national nuclear forces in quantitative and qualitative terms, in order to ensure the dignity and right to exist of the country in the face of the growing nuclear threat from the United States," the official North Korean news agency KCNA said in a statement.

South Korea, the US and Japan have initiated an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, which is expected to raise the issue of tightening sanctions against Pyongyang.

The problem, however, is that the sanctions on the DPRK are practically non-existent. Moreover, significant progress is being made in North Korea's nuclear missile program.

How it all began

Back in the years of the Korean War, the US command considered the possibility of launching nuclear strikes on the North. Although these plans were not realized, the North Korean leadership was interested in gaining access to technologies that would allow the creation of weapons of this type.

The USSR and China, acting as allies of the DPRK, were cool about these plans.

Nevertheless, in 1965, with the help of Soviet and Chinese specialists, a nuclear research center was founded in Yongbyon, where the Soviet nuclear reactor IRT-2000 was installed. Initially, it was assumed that the reactor would be used for work exclusively on peaceful programs.

In the 1970s, Pyongyang, relying on the support of China, began the first work on the creation of nuclear weapons.

In 1985, the Soviet Union got the DPRK to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In exchange for this, the USSR supplied Korea with a gas-graphite research reactor with a capacity of 5 MW. An agreement was also signed on the construction of a nuclear power plant in North Korea with four light water reactors of the VVER-440 type.

President Clinton's failed war

The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the situation in the world. The West and South Korea expected the imminent fall of the North Korean regime, while at the same time conducting peace negotiations with it, counting on the liberalization of the political system and its dismantling according to the version of Eastern Europe.

The United States, in exchange for abandoning its nuclear program, promised Pyongyang economic and technical assistance in the development of the peaceful atom. North Korea responded by agreeing to allow IAEA inspectors into its nuclear facilities.




Relations began to deteriorate sharply after IAEA inspectors suspected of concealing a certain amount of plutonium. Based on this, the IAEA demanded a special inspection of two spent nuclear fuel storage facilities, which were not declared, but was refused, motivated by the fact that the facilities have nothing to do with the nuclear program and are of a military nature.

As a result, in March 1993, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Negotiations with the United States made it possible to slow down this process, but on June 13, 1994, North Korea not only abandoned the treaty, but also withdrew from the IAEA.

During this period, according to Newsweek magazine in 2006, the administration of US President Bill Clinton ordered to study the issue of conducting a military operation against North Korea. The military report stated that the operation would cost $100 billion, and the forces of South Korea and the United States would lose about a million people, and the loss of the US army would be at least 100,000 people killed.

As a result, the United States again returned to the tactics of negotiations.

Threats and promises

In late 1994, with the assistance of former US President Jimmy Carter, a "framework agreement" was reached, according to which North Korea pledged to abandon the nuclear weapons program in exchange for deliveries of fuel oil and the creation of two new nuclear reactors on light water, which cannot be used for work on nuclear weapons.

For several years, stability was established. Both sides, however, fulfilled their obligations only partially, but the internal difficulties in the DPRK and the distraction of the United States on other problems ensured a stable situation.

A new escalation began in 2002, when President George W. Bush came to power in the United States.

In January 2002, in his speech, Bush included the DPRK in the so-called "axis of evil." Together with the intention to create a global missile defense system, this caused serious concern in Pyongyang. The North Korean leadership did not want to share the fate of Iraq.

In 2003, negotiations began on the nuclear program of the DPRK with the participation of China, the United States, Russia, South Korea and Japan.

No real progress has been made on them. The aggressive policy of the United States gave rise to the confidence in the DPRK that it was possible to ensure its own security only if it had its own atomic bomb.

In North Korea, they did not particularly hide the fact that research work on nuclear issues continue.

Bomb: Birth

Exactly 12 years ago, on September 9, 2004, a strong explosion was recorded by a South Korean reconnaissance satellite in a remote area of ​​the DPRK (Yangando Province), not far from the border with China. A crater visible from space remained at the site of the explosion, and a huge mushroom cloud with a diameter of about four kilometers grew over the scene.

On September 13, the DPRK authorities explained the appearance of a cloud similar to a nuclear mushroom by explosive work during the construction of the Samsu hydroelectric power station.

Neither South Korean nor American experts have confirmed that it really was a nuclear explosion.

Western experts believed that the DPRK did not have the necessary resources and technologies to create a full-fledged atomic bomb, and we were talking about a potential rather than an immediate danger.

On September 28, 2004, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK stated at a session of the UN General Assembly that North Korea had already turned enriched uranium obtained from 8,000 reprocessed fuel rods from its nuclear reactor into a nuclear weapon. He stressed that the DPRK had no other choice in creating a nuclear deterrence force at a time when the United States declared its goal the destruction of the DPRK and threatened with preventive nuclear strikes.

On February 10, 2005, the DPRK Foreign Ministry for the first time officially announced the creation of atomic weapons in the country. The world treated this statement as another Pyongyang bluff.

A year and a half later, on October 9, 2006, the DPRK announced for the first time that it had successfully tested a nuclear charge, and its preparation was publicly announced before that. The low power of the charge (0.5 kilotons) raised doubts that it was a nuclear device, and not ordinary TNT.

Speed ​​up in North Korean

On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted another nuclear test. The power of the underground nuclear explosion, according to the Russian military, ranged from 10 to 20 kilotons.

Four years later, on February 12, 2013, North Korea conducted another atomic bomb test.

Despite the adoption of new sanctions against the DPRK, the opinion persisted that Pyongyang was far from creating powerful devices that can be used as real weapons.

On December 10, 2015, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced that his country had a hydrogen bomb, which meant a new step in the creation of nuclear weapons. On January 6, 2016, another test explosion was carried out, which the DPRK announced as a test of a hydrogen bomb.

South Korean sources call the current test the most powerful in the entire nuclear program of the DPRK. It is also noteworthy that the interval between tests turned out to be the shortest in all the years, which indicates that Pyongyang has made serious progress in terms of improving technology.

More importantly, North Korea said the test was part of the development of nuclear warheads that could be placed on ballistic missiles.

If this is true, then official Pyongyang has come close to creating a real combat nuclear weapon, which is fundamentally changing the situation in the region.

Rockets fly farther

Media reports about the situation in the DPRK, often coming from South Korean sources, give the wrong impression of North Korea. Despite the poverty of the population and other problems, this country is not backward. There are quite enough specialists in advanced industries, including nuclear and missile technologies.

The inhabitants talk about the tests of North Korean missiles with a chuckle - it exploded again, again it did not fly, it fell again.

Military experts monitoring the situation say that North Korean specialists last years made a major technological breakthrough.

By 2016, the DPRK had created a mobile single-stage liquid-propellant ballistic missile "Hwaseong-10" with a firing range of about three thousand kilometers.

In the summer of this year, the Pukkykson-1 rocket was successfully tested. This solid-propellant missile is designed to arm submarines. Its successful launch was made from a submarine of the DPRK Navy.

This does not fit at all with the idea of ​​North Korea as a country with rusty old Soviet planes and Chinese tanks.

Experts pay attention - the number of tests in the DPRK in recent years has been growing rapidly, and the technique is becoming more and more complicated.

Within a few years, North Korea is able to create a missile with a range of up to 5000 km, and then a full-fledged intercontinental ballistic missile. Moreover, it will be equipped with a real nuclear warhead.

What to do with North Korea?

There is little doubt that sanctions against the DPRK will be tightened. But previous experience says that this does not affect Pyongyang in any way.

Moreover, Comrade Kim Jong-un, unlike his relatives and predecessors, does not at all blackmail the world with nuclear developments, but creates a real nuclear missile arsenal.

Moreover, even the frank irritation of the main ally, Beijing, which is not interested in escalating the situation in the region, does not stop him.

The question arises: what can be done with North Korea? Even those who perceive Comrade Kim's regime extremely negatively are convinced that it will not be possible to stir up the situation from within. Neither friend nor foe can convince Pyongyang to "behave well".

A military operation against North Korea today will cost the United States much more than it did in the early 1990s, when the Clinton administration made similar plans. In addition, neither Russia nor China will allow a war near their borders, which has every prospect of turning into the Third World War.

Theoretically, Pyongyang could satisfy the guarantees that ensure the preservation of the regime and the absence of attempts to dismantle it.

That's just recent history teaches that the only such guarantee in modern world is the "nuclear baton" that North Korea is working on.





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