Nuclear train of the USSR. Rocket train "Barguzin"

Russian nuclear train as a scary puzzle for the Pentagon

What do a collapsible plastic travel cup and an intercontinental ballistic missile carrying 10 nuclear warheads have in common that can wipe out any city in the world in the blink of an eye? In the early 90s, this mystery baffled more than one delegation of the US military, who managed to visit a railway station that was not marked on any map. "Knapweed" near Kostroma. Today, this rebus is ready to be offered again to colleagues from the United States, announcing the start of work on the Combat Railway Missile System (BZHRK).

well forgotten old

BZHRK is a vestige of the Cold War. A scarecrow that made more than one generation of the US military live in anxiety from the feeling that the USSR will always have the opportunity to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike on America. The secret object "Vasilyok" and several other objects near Perm and with the same innocent names hid the base of the world's only combat railway missile systems (BZHRK). Ordinary trains - the same refrigerators, passenger cars, civil coloring. Only an experienced eye of a “railroad worker” would immediately note that, unlike ordinary cars, the BZHRK has not four, but eight pairs of wheels. There are no usual windows in passenger cars. All of them were replaced by imitators protected from the inside by an armor plate. Inside, as in ordinary passenger trains, compartments for officers and ensigns, reserved seats for soldiers. There is a first-aid post, a canteen and rooms for psychological relief. The train consists of a locomotive, several passenger and freight cars. With one significant nuance - instead of civilian cargo - 3 ballistic missiles SS-24 "Scalpel".

"Scalpel" weighs more than 100 tons. It has a solid fuel engine and "cuts" at a distance of 11 thousand kilometers. Carries on 10 semi-megaton nuclear blocks of individual targeting. Each of the missiles is equipped with an anti-missile defense system and a high-precision guidance system. Actually, because of its accuracy, the rocket in the West was given the name "Scalpel", since it was intended for the surgical opening of well-protected enemy targets: underground bunkers, command posts and silos of strategic missile systems.

Under the 1993 START-2 treaty, Russia decommissioned all RT-23UTTKh missiles and destroyed them before 2003. For the disposal of "rocket trains" at the repair plant of the Strategic Missile Forces, a special "cutting" line was installed. Despite Russia's withdrawal from the START-2 treaty in 2002, during 2003-2007, all trains and launchers were disposed of, except for two demilitarized and installed as exhibits in the museum of railway equipment at the Varshavsky railway station in St. Petersburg and in the AvtoVAZ Technical Museum .

Today, against the background of the aggravation of Russian-American relations, Moscow is ready to once again take out its "trump card", which can seriously complicate the life of Washington - revive the program creation of combat railway missile systems (BZHRK). Two decades ago, this weapon was recognized as ineffective and written off as scrap. The new BZHRK, as the command assures, will be not only modern, but also super-efficient.

"The creation of a missile train - a combat railway missile system, BZHRK - will soon resume," said the deputy commander of the Strategic Missile Forces for work with personnel Andrey Filatov on the air of the radio station "Echo of Moscow". “In Soviet times, such trains carrying Molodets missiles were made in Ukraine. The materialization of this idea will take place - to be expected in the near future. In Soviet times, a lot depended on this complex, and in the West it caused ill-concealed irritation that this type of weapon was in Soviet Union", - added Filatov.

Previously, the resumption of the project and new missile trains, which may appear by 2019, were reported by sources in the military-industrial complex.

The Antidote to Disinformation

In the early 70s, our intelligence obtained American plans for the creation of the BZHRK and its photographs. For the military and political leadership of the country, it was a shock: it was almost impossible to track the train moving around the country, which means it was impossible to aim your rocket at it. It turned out that the United States was creating a strategic system against which the USSR had no antidote. If we cannot intercept, then at least we will create a similar threat, we reasoned and set such a task for the designer Vladimir Utkin, who headed the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau in Dnepropetrovsk. It took Utkin only 3 years to show the military his rocket train project. But then it turned out that the Americans themselves do not create anything of the kind. They only planted technical misinformation by photographing a mock-up of a "rocket train" against the backdrop of nature. The USA was going to do at first, but quickly changed their minds. The country's railway network is not sufficiently developed, which fettered the movement of the missile train, and a significant part of it is privately owned, which made the passage of such a train commercially unprofitable.

There was an idea to make this train underground. To lay a ring highway underground and drive a train along it: no one needs to pay, and it would be impossible to find this road from a satellite. From the practical implementation of this project was kept only by the fact that in order to launch from the subway, it was necessary to make hatches in certain places. And they, as it is easy to assume, had clear coordinates, which makes the existence of an underground missile carrier meaningless. If the Russian missiles do not hit the train itself, then it will definitely not be difficult for them to tightly clog the missile vents.

Theory and practice

In theory, Soviet missile trains were supposed to disperse throughout the country during the threatened period, merging with ordinary freight and passenger trains. It is impossible to distinguish one from the other from space. This means that the BZHRK could painlessly get away from the "disarming strike" of American ballistic missiles, and deliver its own missile salvo from any point along the route. But that's in theory. Since taking up combat duty in 1985, the BZHRK left the territory of their bases only 18 times. Passed only 400 thousand kilometers.

Veterans of the Strategic Missile Forces recall that the main "enemies" of the BZHRK were not the Americans, who insisted on their disposal under the START-2 treaty, but their own railway authorities. With the inscription on the sides "For the transport of light cargo", after the first passage through the region, literally "tied up" the railway tracks into a knot. The railway management, unable to withstand the vandalism of the military, immediately filed a petition - they say, war is war, but who will pay for the repair of the road?

There were no people willing to pay, and trains with missiles were not driven around the country, and the training of officer-drivers of rocket carriers began to be carried out on civilian trains following the proposed routes of the BZHRK. This turned out to be not only more humane in relation to the railway workers, but also much cheaper and safer. The servicemen received the necessary skills to control the train and visual representation of the route. What was actually required, because missiles can be launched from any point along the route.

The inability to use the entire territory of the country for combat patrols was also not the only problem in the operation of the BZHRK. Passed 400 thousand km. At the same time, with the declared ability to launch missiles from any point on the route, the rocket train still needed accurate topographic location. To do this, along the entire route of combat patrols, the military built special "sumps". Where the train arrived at X-hour. Tied to a point and could fire a salvo of missiles. It must be understood that these were far from “blind staging stations”, but well-guarded “strategic facilities” with an infrastructure betraying their purpose. In addition, by the time START-2 was signed, it ceased to exist. The Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, where the rockets were created, ended up in Ukraine, as did the Pavlograd plant, where the “rental cars” were made.

“It is impossible to extend the resource of any type of weapon indefinitely,” the former chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces expressed his opinion to ZVEZDA TV channel. Victor Esin. - This also applies to the BZHRK, especially considering that this unique complex was created in Ukraine. After all, today there are no longer those enterprises that were involved in its development and production. It's like upgrading a bullet when you no longer have a gun. At the Pavlograd plant, where they used to make launchers for, now they produce trolleybuses ... "

Let's get everyone

Combat Railway will be created in Russia Rocket Complex"Barguzin"

In Russia, at a new technological level, a combat railway missile system (BZHRK), called "Barguzin", said the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), Colonel General Sergei Karakaev. “The creation of the latest BZHRK is planned in accordance with instructions. It is being developed exclusively by enterprises of the domestic military-industrial complex, embodying the most advanced achievements of our military rocket science,” said the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces.

The development of the BZHRK "Barguzin" is carried out by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering. “Currently, the industry is designing the complex and creating the material part for testing,” Karakaev added. According to the commander, "the newest complex will embody the positive experience of creating and operating its predecessor - the BZHRK with the Molodets missile (RT-23 UTTKh, according to the classification - SS-24"Scalpel")".

“Of course, when reviving the BZHRK, all latest developments in the field of combat missiles. The Barguzin complex will significantly surpass its predecessor in accuracy, missile range and other characteristics, which will allow for many years, at least up to 2040 year, this complex is in the combat composition of the Strategic Missile Forces,” said S. Karakaev.

BZHRK - Combat Railway Missile System

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Combat railway missile system (abbreviated BZHRK) - a type of strategic missile systems of mobile railway basing. It is a specially designed train, in which strategic missiles (usually of an intercontinental class) are placed, as well as command posts, technological and technical systems, security equipment, personnel ensuring the operation of the complex and its life support systems.

The order "On the creation of a mobile combat railway missile system (BZHRK) with the RT-23 missile" was signed on January 13, 1969. Yuzhnoye Design Bureau was appointed as the lead developer. The main designers of the BZHRK were academicians brothers Vladimir and Alexei Utkin. VF Utkin, a specialist in solid fuel, designed the launch vehicle. A.F. Utkin designed the launch complex, as well as the cars for the rocket-carrying train.

As conceived by the developers, the BZHRK was supposed to form the basis of a retaliatory strike grouping, since it had increased survivability and with a high probability could survive after the first strike was delivered by the enemy. The only place in the USSR for the production of missiles for the BZHRK is the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant (PO Yuzhmash).

Flight tests of the RT-23UTTKh (15Zh61) rocket were carried out in 1985-1987 at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome (NIIP-53), a total of 32 launches were made. There were 18 exits of the BZHRK along the country's railways (more than 400,000 kilometers traveled). Tests were carried out in various climatic zones of the country (from tundra to deserts).

Each composition of the BZHRK received a missile regiment. More than 70 military personnel, including several dozen officers, were on the train, which was on combat duty. In the cabs of the locomotives, in the places of the drivers and their assistants, there were only military officers - officers and ensigns.

The first missile regiment with the RT-23UTTKh missile went on combat duty in October 1987, and by the middle of 1988 five regiments were deployed (15 launchers in total, 4 in the Kostroma region and 1 in the Perm region). The convoys were located at a distance of about four kilometers from each other in stationary structures, and when they took up combat duty, the convoys dispersed.

Tactical technical characteristics of the BZHRK:

Firing range, km 10100 Firing range, km 10100
Head part -10 warheads:
charge power, Mt
10 x (0.3-0.55)
head part weight, kg 4050
Rocket length, m
full - 23.3
without head part - 19
in TPK - 22.6
Maximum diameter of the rocket body, m
2,4
Starting weight, t
104,50
First stage (dimensions), m: length - 9.7
diameter - 2.4
weight, t
53,7
Second stage (dimensions), m:
length - 4.8
diameter - 2.4
Third stage (dimensions), m: length - 3.6
diameter - 2.4
PU dimensions, m length - 23.6
width - 3.2
height - 5

By 1991, three missile divisions were deployed, armed with BZHRK with RT-23UTTKh ICBMs:

  • 10th missile division in the Kostroma region;
  • 52nd Missile Division, stationed in Zvezdny ZATO ( Perm region);
  • 36th Missile Division, ZATO Kedrovy ( Krasnoyarsk region).

Each of the divisions had four missile regiments (a total of 12 BZHRK trains, three launchers each). Within a radius of 1500 km from the bases of the BZHRK, joint measures were taken with the Ministry of Railways of Russia to replace the worn-out railway track: heavier rails were laid, wooden sleepers were replaced with reinforced concrete, and the embankments were strengthened with denser gravel.

How it works

It looks like an ordinary train, which is dragged by three diesel locomotives. Ordinary mail-luggage and refrigerated wagons. But in seven of them there is a command section of a missile regiment (a command post, a communications center, a diesel power plant, dormitories for officers and soldiers, a canteen,workshop-hardware). And in nine - launch modules with "well done." Each module consists of three cars: a command post, a launcher with a rocket, and technological equipment. Well, a tank car with fuel ...

Thousands of such trains with mail and frozen fish ran over one sixth of the land. And only a very observant eye could notice that the “ref” wagons with rockets had eight-wheeled bogies, not four-wheeled ones, as usual. The weight is rather big - almost 150 tons, although the inscription "for light loads" is on the sides. And three diesel locomotives - in order, if necessary, to pull the launch modules to different ends of the immense power ...

How did he act

Rocket trains ran along the hauls only at night and bypassed large stations. During the day, they defended in specially equipped positions - they can still be seen here and there: abandoned, incomprehensible branches to nowhere, and on poles - sensors for determining coordinates, similar to barrels. Without which a quick launch of a rocket is impossible ...

The train stopped, special devices took the contact wire aside, the roof of the car leaned back - and a “well done” weighing 104.5 tons flew out of the belly of the “refrigerator”. Not immediately, only at a height of 50 meters, the main engine of the first rocket stage was launched - so that the fiery stream would not hit the launch complex and burn the rails. This train is on fire...The whole thing took less than two minutes.

The three-stage solid-propellant rocket RT-23UTTKh threw 10 warheads with a capacity of 430 thousand tons each at a distance of 10,100 km. And with an average deviation from the target of 150 meters. She had superior resistance to nuclear explosion and was able to independently restore information in her electronic "brain" after it ...

But that wasn't what irritated Americans the most. And the vastness of our land.

How did he win

There were twelve such trains. 36 missiles and, accordingly, 360 warheads near Kostroma, Perm and in the Krasnoyarsk Territory. "Well done" formed the basis of the retaliatory strike grouping, constantly moving within a radius of 1500 km from the base point. And since they did not differ from the usual trains, then, leaving for railway line, simply disappeared for enemy reconnaissance.

But in a day such a train could wave up to 1000 kilometers!

This is what pissed off the Americans. Modeling showed that even the impact of two hundred Minuteman or MX missiles (a total of 2000 warheads) can disable only 10% of the “well done”. To keep the remaining 90% under control, it was necessary to attract an additional 18 reconnaissance satellites. And the content of such a grouping eventually exceeded the cost of "Molodtsev" ...How can you not get upset?

The Americans tried to create something similar. But they suffered a technical collapse. But they unconditionally beat the Soviet peace-loving policy: in July 1991, Gorbachev unexpectedly helped them, agreeing to sign the START-1 treaty. And our "Well done" stopped combat duty on the country's highways. And soon rolled into last way to the nearest martens ...

Since 1991, after a meeting between the leaders of the USSR and Great Britain, restrictions were introduced on patrol routes of the BZHRK, they were on combat duty at a point of permanent deployment, without leaving the country's railway network. In February-March 1994, one of the BZHRK of the Kostroma division carried out a trip to the country's railway network (the BZHRK reached at least Syzran).

According to the START-2 treaty (1993), Russia was to decommission all RT-23UTTKh missiles by 2003. At the time of decommissioning, Russia had 3 divisions (Kostroma, Perm and Krasnoyarsk), a total of 12 trains with 36 launchers. For the disposal of "rocket trains" at the Bryansk repair plant of the Strategic Missile Forces, a special "cutting" line was installed. Despite Russia's withdrawal from the START-2 treaty in 2002, during 2003-2007, all trains and launchers were disposed of, except for two demilitarized and installed as exhibits in the museum of railway equipment at the Varshavsky railway station in St. Petersburg and in the AvtoVAZ Technical Museum .

In early May 2005, as the Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov, officially announced, the BZHRK was removed from combat duty in the Strategic Missile Forces. The commander said that in exchange for the BZHRK, from 2006, the Topol-M mobile missile system would begin to enter the troops.

On September 5, 2009, Deputy Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Vladimir Gagarin, said that the Strategic Missile Forces did not rule out the possibility of resuming the use of combat railway missile systems.

In December 2011, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Sergei Karakaev, announced a possible revival in Russian army BZHRK complexes.

On April 23, 2013, Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov announced that the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (the developer of the Bulava, Topol and Yars missiles) had resumed development work to create a new generation of railway missile systems.

The BZHRK includes: three diesel locomotives DM62, a command post consisting of 7 cars, a tank car with reserves of fuels and lubricants and three launchers (PU) with missiles. The rolling stock for the BZHRK was produced at the Kalinin Carriage Works.

The BZHRK looks like a regular train of refrigerated, mail-luggage and passenger cars. Fourteen wagons have eight wheelsets, and three have four. Three carriages are disguised as passenger fleet carriages, the rest, eight-axle, are "refrigerators". Thanks to the available reserves on board, the complex could operate autonomously for up to 28 days.

The car-launcher is equipped with an opening roof and a device for the removal of the contact network. The weight of the rocket was about 104 tons, with a launch container 126 tons. The firing range was 10100 km, the length of the rocket was 23.0 m, the length of the launch container was 21 m, the maximum diameter of the rocket body was 2.4 m. To solve the problem of overloading the launch car, special unloading devices were used , redistributing part of the weight to neighboring cars.

The rocket has an original folding nose fairing. This solution was used to reduce the length of the rocket and its placement in the car. The length of the rocket is 22.6 meters.

Missiles could be launched from any point along the route. The launch algorithm is as follows: the train stops, a special device takes aside and shorts the contact network to the ground, the launch container takes a vertical position.

After that, a mortar launch of a rocket can be carried out. Already in the air, the rocket is deflected with the help of a powder accelerator, and only after that the main engine is started. The deflection of the rocket made it possible to divert the main engine jet from the launch complex and the railway track, avoiding their damage. The time for all these operations from receiving a command from the General Staff to launching a rocket was up to three minutes.

Each of the three launchers included in the BZHRK can launch both as part of a train and autonomously.

The cost of one rocket RT-23 UTTH "Molodets" in 1985 prices was about 22 million rubles. In total, about 100 products were produced at the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant.

The official reasons for the removal of the BZHRK from service were called outdated design, the high cost of recreating the production of complexes in Russia and the preference for mobile units based on tractors.

BZHRK also had the following disadvantages:

    The impossibility of complete camouflage of the train due to the unusual configuration (in particular, three locomotives), which made it possible to determine the location of the complex using modern satellite intelligence. For a long time, the Americans could not detect the complex with satellites, and there were cases when experienced railway workers from 50 meters did not distinguish the composition covered with a simple camouflage net.

  1. Lower security of the complex (unlike, for example, mines), which can be overturned or destroyed by a nuclear explosion in the vicinity. To assess the impact of an air shock wave of a nuclear explosion, a large-scale experiment "Shift" was planned for the second half of 1990 - an imitation of a close nuclear explosion by detonating 1,000 tons of TNT (several railway echelons of TM-57 anti-tank mines (100,000 pieces) taken out of warehouses Central Group of Forces in East Germany laid out in the form of a truncated pyramid 20 meters high). The “Shift” experiment was carried out at 53 NIIP MO (Plesetsk) on February 27, 1991, when the explosion formed a funnel with a diameter of 80 and a depth of 10 m, the level of acoustic pressure in the inhabited compartments of the BZHRK reached a pain threshold of 150 dB, and the BZHRK launcher was removed from readiness, however, after carrying out the modes to bring it to the required degree of readiness, the launcher was able to conduct a “dry launch” (imitation of a launch using an electric rocket model). That is, the command post, launcher and rocket equipment remained operational.
  2. Depreciation of the railway tracks along which the heavy complex RT-23UTTKh moved.

Supporters of the use of the BZHRK, including the engineer of the launch team at the first tests of the BZHRK, the head of the group of military representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense at the Yuzhmash Production Association, Sergey Ganusov, note the unique combat characteristics of products that confidently overcame the zones missile defense. The breeding platform, as confirmed by flight tests, delivered warheads with a whole or total mass of 4 tons to a distance of 11,000 km.

One product containing 10 warheads with a yield of about 500 kilotons was enough to hit an entire European state. The press also noted the high mobility of trains capable of moving along the country's railway network (which made it possible to quickly change the location of the starting position over 1000 kilometers per day), in contrast to tractors operating in a relatively small radius around the base (tens of kilometers).

Calculations carried out by American specialists in relation to the railway variant of basing ICBMs "MX" for the US railway network show that with the dispersal of 25 trains (twice as many as Russia had in service) on sections of the railway with a total length of 120,000 km (which much more than the length of the main route of Russian railways) the probability of hitting the composition is only 10% when using 150 ICBMs of the Voevoda type for an attack.

The Yuzhnoye design bureau (Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine) was appointed the lead developer of the BZHRK with the RT-23 missile. “The task that the Soviet government set before us was striking in its enormity. In domestic and world practice, no one has ever faced so many problems. We had to place an intercontinental ballistic missile in a railway car, and yet a rocket with a launcher weighs more than 150 tons. How to do it? After all, a train with such a huge load should go along the nationwide tracks of the Ministry of Railways. How to transport a strategic missile with a nuclear warhead in general, how to ensure absolute safety on the way, because we were given an estimated train speed of up to 120 km/h. Will the bridges withstand, will the track not collapse, and the start itself, how to transfer the load to the railway track during the launch of the rocket, will the train stand on the rails during the start, how to raise the rocket to a vertical position as quickly as possible after the train stops? - Later, the general designer of the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Vladimir Fedorovich Utkin, later recalled the issues that tormented him at that moment. Nevertheless, by the mid-80s of the last century, Yuzhnoye Design Bureau made the necessary missile, and Design Bureau special engineering(KBSM, St. Petersburg, Russia) under the leadership of the General Designer, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Alexei Fedorovich Utkin, created a unique "cosmodrome on wheels".

They tested the engineering creation of the Utkin brothers in a Soviet-style hard way. Flight tests of the RT-23UTTKh (15Zh61) rocket were carried out 32 times. The experimental train made 18 accesses to resource and transport tests, during which it “dashed off” over 400 thousand km on the railways. Already after the first missile regiment with the RT-23UTTKh missile was on combat duty, the BZHRK successfully passed special impact tests. electromagnetic radiation, lightning protection and impact of a shock wave.

As a result, by 1992, three missile divisions armed with BZHRK with RT-23UTTKh ICBMs were deployed in our country: the 10th missile division in the Kostroma region, the 52nd missile division stationed in Zvezdny (Perm Territory), the 36th missile division, ZATO Kedrovy (Krasnoyarsk Territory). Each of the divisions had four missile regiments (a total of 12 BZHRK trains, three launchers each).

Alexey Fyodorovich Utkin (January 15, 1928, Zabelino village, Ryazan province - January 24, 2014, St. Petersburg) - Soviet and Russian scientist, designer of missile systems, designed the launch complex and rolling stock for the Combat Railway Missile System.

Doctor of Technical Sciences (1989), professor (1993), academician Russian Academy cosmonautics them. K. E. Tsiolkovsky (1994), St. Petersburg engineering academy(1994). Honored Worker of Science and Technology (1995), laureate of the Lenin (1976), State (1980) Prizes of the USSR.

Destruction of trains

Twelve Soviet rocket trains became a toothache for the Americans. The extensive railway network of the USSR (let me remind you that each train carrying 30 nuclear charges on board could move 1 thousand km per day), the presence of numerous natural and artificial shelters did not allow determining their location with a sufficient degree of certainty, including with the help of satellites . After all, the United States also made attempts to create such trains in the 60s of the last century. But nothing came of it. According to foreign sources, a prototype BZHRK until 1992 was tested at the US railway range and the Western Missile Range (Vandenberg Air Force Base, California). It consisted of two standard locomotives, two launch cars with MX ICBMs, a command post, supply system cars and cars for personnel. The launch car, where the rocket was located, was almost 30 m long, weighing about 180 tons and, like in the USSR, had eight wheelsets.

But at the same time, American engineers, unlike the Soviet ones, failed to create effective mechanisms for lowering the contact network and retracting the rocket during its launch away from the train and railway tracks (the MX rocket was originally designed for a silo-based version). Therefore, the launch of missiles by American BZHRK was supposed to be from specially equipped launch sites, which, of course, significantly reduced the factor of stealth and surprise. In addition, unlike the USSR, the US has a less developed rail network, and the railroads are owned by private companies. And this created many problems, ranging from the fact that civilian personnel would have to be involved to control the locomotives of rocket trains, ending with problems with the creation of a centralized control system for combat patrols of the BZHRK and the organization of their technical operation.

On the other hand, while working on the project of their BZHRK, the Americans, in fact, confirmed the conclusions of the Soviet military about the effectiveness of this "weapon of retaliation" as such. The US military intended to receive 25 BZHRK. According to their calculations, with the dispersal of such a number of missile trains on sections of the railway with a total length of 120 thousand km, the probability of hitting these BZHRK 150 Soviet Voevoda ICBMs is only 10 (!)%. That is, if we apply these calculations to Soviet missile trains, then 150 American MX missiles will be able to hit no more than 1-2 Soviet BZHRK. And the remaining 10, three minutes after the start of the attack, will bring down a salvo of 300 nuclear charges (30 missiles of 10 charges each) on the United States. And if we take into account that by 1992 combat railway missile systems in the Soviet Union were already being produced in SERIES, then the picture for the Americans turned out to be quite sad. However, what happened next happened to dozens, if not hundreds of unique Soviet military engineering developments. First, at the insistence of Great Britain, since 1992, Russia put its BZHRK "on a joke" - in places of permanent deployment, then - in 1993, undertook, according to the START-2 treaty, to destroy all RT-23UTTKh missiles within 10 years. And although this agreement, in fact, never entered into force, in 2003-2005, all Russian BZHRK were removed from combat duty and disposed of. The external appearance of two of them can now only be seen in the museum of railway equipment at the Varshavsky railway station in St. Petersburg and at the AvtoVAZ Technical Museum.

How it was destroyed

“You must destroy the missile trains” was the categorical condition of the Americans at the signing of the START-2 Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. And in 1993, Yeltsin went for it, to the indescribable joy of the Pentagon: the Yankees hastily allocated money for the destruction of the hated missiles and even provided the latest cutting line for this. Along the way, consoling us: they say, the railway “Molodets” will be replaced by the automobile “Topol”.
But the first one carries ten warheads, and the second - one ...

The mistake was realized, but it was too late: the treaty forbade the development of new missile systems of this type. The restrictions were lifted only after the signing of START-3: Obama's advisers decided that it was no longer possible for Russia to rise from the ashes, because the Soviet BZHRK (combat railroad missile systems) were made in Ukraine.

"Scalpel" "Poplar" is not a hindrance

BZHRK were officially removed from combat duty in May 2005. It was assumed that their functions would be taken over by Topol-M mobile missile systems. However, this decision still looks ambiguous. The question is not even that the Topol-M carries one charge, but the RT-23UTTX had 10 of them. In the end, the Topol-M is being replaced by the Yars (R-24), which has more charges . And the question is not even that after the collapse of the USSR, the production of "Scalpels" remained in Ukraine and no one, even in delirium of fever, will now see the opportunity to resume the production of ballistic missiles for military railway complexes there. The question is the fundamental incorrectness of opposing the BZHRK and ICBM carriers on an automobile platform. “It is time to finally realize that soon the mobile ground-based ICBM will lose all meaning, our Topol-M missiles will turn into a defenseless target and will not be able to survive the first strike against them. Not to mention the fact that the rockets standing in the forest are not protected from the usual small arms terrorists. So all the talk about hypersonic speeds, maneuvering warheads and other novelties do not make any sense, since these missiles simply will not survive before a retaliatory strike. The position of mobile rail-based ICBMs (BZHRK) is not so tragic, since these missiles can move across the vast territories of our country, and it is not so easy to detect them in ordinary train flows, especially since special tunnels can be created in the mountainous regions of the country, in which could, if necessary, hide the BZHRK. However, in the context of the growth of terrorism in Russia, one should think deeply before deciding to recreate the BZHRK. Undermining by terrorists such a train with missiles equipped with nuclear warheads, and even an ordinary accident, can lead to unpredictable tragic consequences, ”doctor of technical sciences, professor Yuri Grigoriev is convinced.

“The mobility of mobile Topol-Ms is limited to a certain radius around their main base. It is naive to think that with modern means of space reconnaissance, a metal object with a length of more than 24 meters, a diameter of about 3.5 and a height of almost 5 meters, besides emitting a large number of heat and electromagnetic radiation, can be hidden. The branching of the railway network provides the BZHRK with greater secrecy compared to unpaved complexes. From the announced plans for the production of Topol-M ICBMs, it is not difficult to assume that by 2015 only two missile divisions will be armed with new missiles - 54 mobile launchers and 76 silos. Is a retaliatory strike possible after a raid by hundreds of Minutemen, and is it not too wasteful to unilaterally reduce our nuclear missile potential? The preservation, even with modernization and testing, of 36 BZHRK launchers with missiles, each of which carried 10 warheads, 25-27 times more powerful than those dropped on Hiroshima, despite all possible collisions, would be far from the worst (according to the criterion "efficiency-cost") option" is also emphasized by Yuri Zaitsev, Academic Advisor of the Academy of Engineering Sciences of the Russian Federation.

Be that as it may, but after the refusal of the Americans and Europeans to give Russia guarantees that the anti-missile defense system they are creating in Europe will not be used against our country, the revival of the production of BZHRK seems to be one of the most effective responses to this threat. “Precisely by 2020, due to the emergence of new modifications of the SM-3 interceptor missiles, EuroPRO will be able to intercept Russian ICBMs. Given this circumstance, Moscow is forced to take adequate countermeasures,” emphasizes Igor Korotchenko, director of the Center for Analysis of the World Arms Trade.

Therefore, since the end of 2011, the voices of the Russian military began to sound again that it is necessary to revive the production of military railway missile systems in our country. And with the advent of Dmitry Rogozin to the government and the appointment of the new Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, this topic began to take on a concrete shape. “The leadership of the Ministry of Defense presented a report supreme commander and the task was set to conduct a preliminary design of the BZHRK within the framework of the state armaments program and the state defense order. The main executor of this work is the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, the deadline for completion of preliminary design is the first half of 2014. It was reported that there is a need to return to consideration of the issue of a new BZHRK, taking into account its increased survivability and branching of our railway network, ”Sergei Karakaev, commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, told reporters.

The function of the BZHRK at the same time, obviously, remains the same - to strike back at any target on Earth. But both the missile itself and the launch complex, quite obviously, will be different than the Soviet BZHRK Molodets with the Scalpel ICBM. As for the rocket, it is obvious that it will be one of the Yars modifications, suitable in size for a standard 24-meter refrigerated car with multiple warheads. At the same time, however, the range of its firing is not yet clear. From the words of Colonel General Karakaev, it could be concluded that the designers would try to reduce the weight of the rocket for the new BZHRK by almost half compared to the Scalpel - up to 50 tons. And this is understandable, since the new missile system, obviously, is tasked with becoming even more inconspicuous (remember the eight-axle Molodets launchers and its three locomotives) and more passable (that is, the new BZHRK should move along ANY railway tracks of a huge country without any prior preparation). But the most suitable missile for this - the RS-26 Rubezh, whose flight design tests should be completed this year, so far flies only at a distance of no more than 6 thousand kilometers. "Scalpel" flew 10 thousand km, "Yars", as stated, flies 11 thousand km.

The designers also have new ideas for locomotives for the BZHRK. At the time of the development of Molodtsov, the total power of three DM62 diesel locomotives (a special modification of the M62 serial diesel locomotive) was 6 thousand hp. The power of the current mainline freight two-section diesel locomotive 2TE25A Vityaz, which is mass-produced by Transmashholding, is 6,800 hp. However, there are also completely exotic (so far) ideas. Back in the early 80s of the last century in our country, a constructive version of the nuclear carrier with a fast neutron reactor BOR-60 (thermal power 60 MW, electrical power 10 MW) was developed. However, this machine did not go into production, although it could provide the BZHRK with almost unlimited autonomy. But over the past few years, Russian Railways has run a locomotive running on liquefied natural gas - a gas turbine locomotive, which was created back in 2006 on the basis of one of Nikolai Kuznetsov's gas turbine engines. In 2009, during testing, a prototype of this machine set a record entered in the Guinness Book of Records: it drove a train of 159 wagons with a total weight of 15 thousand tons (!) along the experimental ring. And on one gas station, he can go almost 1000 km. In general, an almost ideal vehicle for cruising a combat railway missile system, for example, in the Russian part of the Arctic.

At the same time, the new BZHRK itself, apparently, will already appear in the new State Armaments Program - for the period from 2016 to 2025, which is now being prepared by the government. Therefore, Russian locomotive designers still have a little time to “fit in” there with their new or old, but so far unrealized development. source-source-source-

In Russia, a new nuclear weapon is being prepared for the final stage of testing - the combat railway missile system (BZHRK) "Barguzin", created on the basis of its predecessor, the BZHRK "Molodets" (SS-24 Scalpel), which was on combat duty from 1987 to 2005 and It was withdrawn from service by agreement with the United States in 1993. What forced Russia to return to the creation of these weapons again? When the Americans once again confirmed the deployment of their missile defense facilities in Europe in 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin rather harshly formulated Russia's response to this. He officially stated that the creation of an American missile defense system actually "nullifies our nuclear missile potential", and announced that our answer would be "the development of strike nuclear missile systems." One of these complexes was the Barguzin BZHRK, which the US military especially did not like , causing them serious concern, since its adoption makes the presence of US missile defense as such practically useless. The predecessor of "Bargruzin" "Well done" Until 2005, the BZHRK was already in service with the Strategic Missile Forces. Its lead developer in the USSR was Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (Ukraine). The only rocket manufacturer is the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant. Tests of the BZHRK with the RT-23UTTH Molodets missile (according to NATO classification - SS-24 Scalpel) in the railway version began in February 1985 and ended by 1987. The BZHRK looked like ordinary trains made of refrigerated, mail-luggage and even passenger cars. Inside each train there were three launchers with Molodets solid-propellant missiles, as well as the entire system for their support with a command post and combat crews. The first BZHRK was put on combat duty in 1987 in Kostroma. In 1988, five regiments were already deployed (a total of 15 launchers), and by 1991, three missile divisions: near Kostroma, Perm and Krasnoyarsk, each consisted of four missile regiments (a total of 12 BZHRK trains). Each train consisted of several cars . One car is a command post, the other three - with an opening roof - launchers with missiles. Moreover, it was possible to launch rockets both from the planned parking lots and from any point on the route. To do this, the train stopped, a contact suspension of electrical wires was removed with a special device, the launch container was placed in a vertical position, and the rocket started.
The complexes stood at a distance of about four kilometers from each other in stationary shelters. Within a radius of 1500 kilometers from their bases, together with the railway workers, work was carried out to strengthen the track: heavier rails were laid, wooden sleepers were replaced with reinforced concrete, embankments were littered with denser gravel. only professionals (launch modules with a rocket had eight wheelsets each, the rest of the support cars had four each). During the day, the train could cover about 1200 kilometers. The time of his combat patrol was 21 days (thanks to the reserves on board, he could work autonomously for up to 28 days). The BZHRK was attached great importance, even the officers who served on these trains had higher ranks than their counterparts in similar positions in the mine complexes.
Soviet BZHRKshock to Washington Rocketeers tell either a legend, or a true story that the Americans themselves allegedly pushed our designers to create the BZHRK. They say that once our intelligence received information that in the United States they are working on the creation of a railway complex that can move through underground tunnels and, if necessary, appear from under the ground at certain points in order to launch a strategic missile unexpectedly for the enemy. Photographs were even attached to the intelligence report this train. Apparently, these data made a strong impression on the Soviet leadership, since it was immediately decided to create something similar. But our engineers approached this issue more creatively. They decided: why drive trains underground? You can put them on conventional railways, disguised as freight trains. It will be easier, cheaper and more efficient. Later, however, it turned out that the Americans conducted special studies that showed that in their conditions the BZHRK would not be effective enough. They simply slipped us misinformation in order to once again shake up the Soviet budget, forcing us, as it seemed to them then, to useless expenses, and the photo was taken from a small full-scale layout.
But by the time all this became clear, it was already too late for Soviet engineers to work back. They, and not only in the drawings, have already created a new nuclear weapon with an individual-guided missile, a range of ten thousand kilometers with ten warheads with a capacity of 0.43 Mt and a serious set of means to overcome missile defense. In Washington, this news caused a real shock. Still would! How do you determine which of the "freight trains" to destroy in the event of a nuclear strike? If you shoot at all at once, no nuclear warheads will be enough. Therefore, in order to track the movement of these trains, which easily escaped the field of view of tracking systems, the Americans had to keep a constellation of 18 spy satellites almost constantly over Russia, which cost them very dearly. Especially when you consider that the US intelligence services have never been able to identify the BZHRK on the patrol route. Therefore, as soon as in the early 90s political situation allowed, the United States immediately tried to get rid of this headache. At first, they obtained from the Russian authorities that the BZHRK would not ride around the country, but would be laid up. This allowed them to constantly keep over Russia instead of 16-18 spy satellites, only three or four. And then they persuaded our politicians to finally destroy the BZHRK. Those officially agreed under the pretext of supposedly "the expiration of the warranty period for their operation."
How the "Scalpels" were cut The last combat personnel was sent for remelting in 2005. Eyewitnesses said that when the wheels of cars rattled on the rails in the twilight of the night and the nuclear “ghost train” with the Scalpel missiles set off on its last journey, even the strongest men could not stand it: tears rolled down from the eyes of both gray-haired designers and rocket officers . They said goodbye to unique weapons, in many combat characteristics superior to everything that was available and was even planned to be adopted in the near future. Everyone understood that this unique weapon in the mid-1990s, it became a hostage to political agreements between the country's leadership and Washington. And unselfish ones. Apparently, therefore, each new stage the destruction of the BZHRK in a strange way coincided with the next tranche of the International Monetary Fund loan. The refusal of the BZHRK had a number of objective reasons. In particular, when Moscow and Kiev "fled" in 1991, it immediately hurt Russia's nuclear power. Almost all of our nuclear missiles during the Soviet era were made in Ukraine under the guidance of Academicians Yangel and Utkin. Of the 20 types that were then in service, 12 were designed in Dnepropetrovsk, at the Yuzhnoye design bureau, and produced there, at the Yuzhmash plant. BZHRK was also made in Ukrainian Pavlograd.
But every time it became more and more difficult to negotiate with the developers from Nezalezhnaya to extend their service life or upgrade. As a result of all these circumstances, our generals had to report with a sour face to the country's leadership that “in accordance with the planned reduction in the Strategic Missile Forces, another BZHRK was removed from combat duty.” But what to do: the politicians promised - the military are forced to fulfill. At the same time, they perfectly understood: if we cut and remove missiles from combat duty due to old age at the same pace as in the late 90s, then in just five years, instead of the existing 150 Voevods, we will not have any of these heavy missiles. And then no light Topols will make the weather any more - and at that time there were only about 40 of them. For the American missile defense system, this is nothing. For this reason, as soon as Yeltsin vacated the Kremlin office, a number of people from the country's military leadership, at the request of the rocket men, began to prove to the new president the need to create a nuclear complex similar to the BZHRK. And when it became finally clear that the US plans to create its own missile defense system were not going to be abandoned under any circumstances, work on the creation of this complex really began. And now, in the very near future, the States will again receive their former headache, now in the form of a new BZHRK generation called "Barguzin". Moreover, as the rocket scientists say, these will be ultra-modern missiles, in which all the shortcomings that the Scalpel has have been eliminated.
"Barguzin"main trump card against US missile defense The main drawback noted by the opponents of the BZHRK is the accelerated wear and tear of the railway tracks along which it traveled. They often had to be repaired, about which the military and the railway workers had eternal disputes. The reason for this was heavy rockets - weighing 105 tons. They did not fit in one car - they had to be placed in two, reinforcing wheel sets on them. Today, when the issues of profit and commerce have come to the fore, Russian Railways is probably not ready, as it was before, to infringe on its interests for the sake of national defense, and also bear the cost of repairing the canvas in the event that a decision is made that BZHRK should again run on their roads. It is the commercial reason, according to some experts, that today could become an obstacle to the final decision to adopt them. However, now this problem has been removed. The fact is that there will no longer be heavy missiles in the new BZHRK. The complexes are armed with lighter RS-24 missiles, which are used in the Yars complexes, and therefore the weight of the wagon turns out to be comparable to the usual one, which makes it possible to achieve perfect camouflage of the combat personnel. True, the RS-24s have only four warheads, and there were dozen. But here it must be borne in mind that the Barguzin itself is carrying not three missiles, as it was before, but already twice as many. This, of course, is all the same - 24 against 30. But we should not forget that the Yars are practically the most modern development and the probability of overcoming missile defense is much higher than that of their predecessors. The navigation system has also been updated: now you do not need to set the coordinates of targets in advance, everything can be changed quickly.
Such a mobile complex can cover up to 1,000 kilometers per day, cruising along any railway lines in the country, indistinguishable from a regular train with refrigerated cars. The time of "autonomy" is a month. There is no doubt that the new BZHRK grouping will become a much more effective response to the US missile defense system than even the deployment of our Iskander tactical missiles near the borders of Europe, which are so feared in the West. There is also no doubt that the idea of ​​​​a BZHRK is for the Americans clearly will not like it (although theoretically their creation will not violate the latest Russian-American agreements). BZHRK at one time formed the basis of a retaliatory strike grouping in the Strategic Missile Forces, since they had increased survivability and with a high probability could survive after the first strike was delivered by the enemy. The United States was no less afraid of him than the legendary "Satan", since the BZHRK was a real factor in inevitable retribution. Until 2020, five regiments of the BZHRK "Barguzin" are planned to be put into service - these are 120 warheads, respectively. Apparently, the BZHRK will become the strongest argument, in fact, our main trump card in the dispute with the Americans regarding the advisability of deploying a global missile defense system.

BZHRK on the patrol route / Photo: Press Service of the Strategic Missile Forces

In 2020, the Russian armed forces will receive a new generation of trains with ballistic missile launchers. The Barguzin combat missile railway system will be armed with six RS-24 Yars missiles against three Scalpel ICBMs from its predecessor, the Molodets BZHRK.

It will be impossible to spot the train - in addition to modern means of camouflage, it will be equipped with electronic warfare systems and other devices that increase stealth. The BZHRK divisional set will consist of five trains, each of which will be equated to a regiment.

Former Chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces Viktor Yesin / Photo: Press Service of the Strategic Missile Forces


"The creation of the Barguzin is Russia's response to the deployment by the Americans of a global missile defense system," Viktor Esin, former head of the Strategic Missile Forces Main Staff, said.

Earlier, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel-General Sergei Karakaev, spoke about the adoption of the Barguzin into service in 2019, but the timing of the work on the creation of the train was shifted by a year due to the difficult financial situation. The draft design of the BZHRK has been created, design documentation is being developed. In 2017, Vladimir Putin will be presented with a detailed report on the topic and a plan for the deployment of missile trains.

The Barguzin BZHRK will be armed with six RS-24 Yars missiles against three Scalpel ICBMs from its predecessor, the Molodets BZHRK / Image: oko-planet.su


"The new BZHRKs will significantly surpass their predecessor Molodets in accuracy, missile range and other characteristics. This will allow this complex to be in the combat composition of the Strategic Missile Forces for many years, at least until 2040. Thus, the troops are returning to a three-species grouping, containing mine, mobile and rail-based complexes," said S. Karakaev.

Sergei Karakaev / Photo: Press Service of the Strategic Missile Forces


Of the 12 Soviet missile trains, 10 were destroyed in accordance with the START-2 treaty, two were transferred to museums. They were replaced by Topol-M mobile ground missile systems, which are significantly inferior to trains in terms of mobility and invulnerability. At the same time, it is not difficult to restore the BZHRK system: unique technical solutions and design developments, ground infrastructure, including rocky tunnels, where no intelligence will find a train and a nuclear strike will not reach, have been preserved.


The elusive "well done"

According to legend, the idea to use trains to launch ballistic missiles was thrown to the Soviet Union by the Americans. After the creation of railway missile systems in the United States was considered an expensive, difficult and impractical project, the CIA proposed to misinform Soviet intelligence: they say that such trains are being created in America - and let the Russians pump billions into a utopia.

The operation was carried out, but its result was unexpected - the Soviet Union created the Molodets missile trains, which immediately became a headache for the Pentagon. To track them, a constellation of satellites was put into orbit, and in the late 80s - when the BZHRK had already entered the routes - a container with tracking equipment was sent from Vladivostok to Sweden by rail under the guise of commercial cargo. Soviet counterintelligence officers quickly "figured out" the container and removed it from the train. American General Colin Powell once admitted to the creator of the BZHRK, Academician Alexei Utkin: "Looking for your rocket trains is like a needle in a haystack."


Photo: vk.com

Indeed, the BZHRK, which went on combat duty, instantly disappeared among the thousands of trains traveling along the extensive railway network of the Soviet Union. Outwardly, "Molodets" was disguised as the usual mixed train: passenger cars, mail, silver refrigerators.

True, some cars had not four pairs of wheels, but eight - but you can’t count them from a satellite. The BZHRK was set in motion by three diesel locomotives. Lest it be conspicuous, in the late 80s large freight trains began to drive three-section locomotives. By 1994, 12 BZHRKs were in service with three missiles each.

folding rocket

During the creation of "Molodets" a lot of complex problems had to be solved. The length of the wagon with the launcher should not exceed 24 meters - otherwise it will not fit into the railway infrastructure. Such short ballistic missiles were not made in the USSR. The most compact ICBM weighs over 100 tons. How to make sure that the composition with three launchers does not crush the railway tracks? How to save a train from the hellish flames of a launching rocket? Over the rails contact network - how to get around it? And this is not all the questions that arose before the designers.

The creation of the BZHRK was carried out by the famous academic brothers Alexei and Vladimir Utkin. The first one made a train, the second one made a rocket for it. For the first time in the USSR, an ICBM was made solid-propellant, with a multiple reentry vehicle. The RT-23 (according to NATO classification SS-24 Scalpel) consisted of three stages and threw 10 thermonuclear warheads with a capacity of 500 kilotons over 11 thousand kilometers. In order for the "Scalpel" to fit in a railway car, the nozzles and fairing were made retractable.


Retractable rocket nozzles / Photo: vk.com


While Vladimir Utkin was inventing a folding rocket, his brother Alexei was conjuring over a sliding train. The design bureau of special engineering designed a launcher with a carrying capacity of 135 tons on four biaxial bogies. Part of its gravity was transferred to neighboring cars. The car was disguised as a refrigerator with fake sliding doors on the sides. In fact, the roof opened, and powerful hydraulic jacks came out from under the bottom, resting against concrete slabs on the sides of the railway track. The BZHRK was equipped with unique retractable devices that diverted the contact wire to the side. In addition, the area where the launch took place was de-energized.

The launch of the rocket was mortar: the powder charge threw the Scalpel out of the launch container to a height of 20 meters, the corrective charge diverted the nozzles away from the train, the first stage engine turned on and with a smoke trail characteristic of solid fuel rockets SS-24 went into the sky. Invisible and invulnerable By 1991, three missile divisions with 12 BZHRK were deployed: in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Kostroma and Perm Regions. Within a radius of 1,500 kilometers from the places of deployment of the connections, the railway track was modernized: wooden sleepers were replaced with reinforced concrete, heavy rails were laid, embankments were strengthened with denser gravel.

Out of combat duty, the BZHRK were in shelter. Then they advanced to a certain point of the railway network and were divided into three. The locomotives took the launchers to the launch sites - usually they were located around the point in a triangle. Each train included a fuel tank (also disguised as a refrigerator) and a piping system that allowed locomotives to be refueled on the go. There were also sleeping cars for calculation, supplies of water and food. The autonomy of the rocket train was 28 days.

Having worked out the launch of missiles at one point, the train went to the next - there were more than 200 of them in the Soviet Union. In a day, the BZHRK could travel over a thousand kilometers. For reasons of secrecy, routes were laid past large stations, and if it was impossible to bypass them, rocket trains passed them without stopping and at dawn, when there were fewer people. The railway workers called the BZHRK "train number zero."

Since the rocket train was planned as a retaliatory weapon, in 1991 the "Shine" experiments - on the effects of electromagnetic radiation - and "Shift" were carried out. The latter simulated a nuclear explosion of kiloton power. At the training ground in Plesetsk, 650 meters from the BZHRK, 100 thousand anti-tank mines were detonated, taken out of warehouses in eastern Germany and laid in a 20-meter pyramid. A funnel with a diameter of 80 meters formed at the site of the explosion, the sound pressure level in the habitable compartments of the BZHRK reached the pain threshold (150 decibels). One of the launchers showed deactivation, but after rebooting the onboard computer system, it launched a rocket.

Type of strategic missile systems of mobile railway basing. It is a specially created railway train, in the cars of which strategic missiles (mainly of the intercontinental class), as well as command posts, technological and technical systems, security equipment, personnel ensuring the operation of the complex and its life support systems are located.

The name "Combat railway missile system" is also used as a proper name for the Soviet missile system 15P961 "Molodets" (RT-23 UTTKh), the only BZHRK brought to the stage of adoption and serial production. 15P961 "Well done" was on alert in the Strategic Missile Forces Armed Forces USSR and Russia in the period from 1987 to 1994 in the amount of 12 units. Then (by 2007) all the complexes were dismantled and destroyed, with the exception of two transferred to museums.

On the railways of the USSR and Russia had symbol train number zero.

The first studies on the use of a train as a carrier of strategic missiles appeared in the 1960s. Work in this direction was carried out both in the USSR and in the USA.

Story

IN USA

The idea of ​​rail-based ballistic missiles was first considered in detail in the United States in the early 1960s. The advent of the Minuteman solid-propellant ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile), which did not need pre-launch refueling, was resistant (unlike early liquid-fuel rockets) to vibration and shaking in motion, made it possible for the first time to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles from a moving platform. It was assumed that trains with missiles would be regularly redeployed between pre-calculated positions - since ICBMs of that time needed to accurately determine the coordinates of the launch site for their inertial navigation system to work - and thus would be practically invulnerable to Soviet missile attack.

In the summer of 1960, as part of a theoretical study, Operation Big Star was carried out, in which prototypes of future railway launch complexes moved along US railroads. The purpose of the exercises was to test the mobility of the complexes, the possibility of their dispersal along the railways in use. As a result of the operation in 1961, a project was prepared and a prototype of a railway train was assembled, which could carry five Minuteman missiles on specially reinforced platforms.

It was assumed that the first mobile Minutemen would enter service in the summer of 1962. The US Air Force expected to deploy 30 trains carrying a total of 150 missiles. However, the cost of the project was too high. Mine launchers for the Minutemen were considered a more effective solution - cheap (compared to the mine rigs of the previous Atlas and Titan liquid ICBMs) and protected from existing Soviet ICBMs, which at that time had extremely low accuracy. In the summer of 1961 the project was closed; the created prototypes of launch trains were used as transporters for the delivery of Minutemen from factories to mine deployment bases.

In 1986, the idea of ​​a railroad deployment was adopted for the new American LGM-118A "Peacekeeper" heavy ICBM, also known as the MX. When designing this heavy ICBM, much attention was paid precisely to its ability to survive a surprise Soviet missile attack directed against the nuclear forces of the US Armed Forces. Many different proposals for basing the MX were considered, but in the end it was decided to deploy 50 MX missiles in conventional silos from Minuteman ICBMs, and another 50 on special trains.

Each such train - designated as the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison - would have to carry two heavy ICBMs with 10 individually targetable warheads each. Thus, it was supposed to deploy 25 trains, which, dispersed over the US rail network and constantly changing position, would be practically invulnerable to a Soviet attack.

In 1990, the prototype train was tested, but by this time cold war already ended, and in 1991 the entire program was curtailed. In our time, the US Air Force has no plans to develop new similar railway systems or new heavy ICBMs.

In the USSR/Russia

The order "On the creation of a mobile combat railway missile system (BZHRK) with the RT-23 missile" was signed on January 13, 1969. The Yuzhnoye design bureau was appointed as the main developer. The leading designers of the BZHRK were academicians brothers Vladimir and Alexei Utkin.

V. F. Utkin, a specialist in solid fuel topics, created a launch vehicle. A.F. Utkin created the launch complex, as well as cars for the rocket-carrying train. As conceived by the creators, the BZHRK was supposed to form the basis of a retaliatory strike grouping, since it had increased survivability and, with a high probability, could survive after the first strike was struck by the enemy. The only place in the USSR for the production of missiles for the BZHRK is the Pavlograd Mechanical Plant (PO Yuzhmash).

“The task that the Soviet government set before us was striking in its enormity. In domestic and world practice, no one has ever faced so many problems. We had to place an intercontinental ballistic missile in a railway car, and a missile with a launcher weighs more than 150 tons. How to do it? After all, a train with such a huge load should move along the nationwide tracks of the Ministry of Railways. How to transport a strategic missile with a nuclear warhead in general, how to ensure absolute safety on the way, because we were given an estimated train speed of up to 120 km / h. whether the bridges, whether the track will collapse, and the start itself, how to transfer the load to the railway track during the launch of the rocket, will the train stand on the rails during the start, how to raise the rocket to a vertical position as quickly as possible after the train stops?
- V. F. Utkin, General Designer of Yuzhnoye Design Bureau

Flight tests of 15Zh61 missiles of the RT-23 UTTKh complex took place in 1985-1987. at the Plesetsk cosmodrome (NIIP-53), a total of 32 launches were carried out. 18 exits of the BZHRK were made along the country's railways (more than 400 thousand kilometers were covered). The tests took place in various climatic zones of the country (from tundra to deserts).

Each composition of the BZHRK received a missile regiment. More than 70 military personnel, including several dozen officers, were on the train, which was on combat duty. In the cabs of the locomotives, in the places of the drivers and their assistants, there were only military officers - officers and ensigns.

The first missile regiment with RT-23UTTKh went on combat duty in October 1987, and by the middle of 1988, five regiments were deployed (15 launchers in total, 4 in the Kostroma region and 1 in the Perm region). The convoys were located at a distance of about four kilometers from each other in stationary structures, and when they took up combat duty, the convoys dispersed.

By 1991, three missile divisions were deployed, armed with BZHRK with RT-23UTTKh ICBMs:

10th Guards Rocket Division in the Kostroma Region;
-52nd Missile Division stationed in Zvezdny ZATO (Perm Territory);
-36th Missile Division, ZATO Kedrovy (Krasnoyarsk Territory).
Each of the divisions had a command and four missile regiments (a total of 12 BZHRK trains, three launchers each). Within a radius of 1500 km from the bases of the BZHRK, joint measures were taken with the Ministry of Railways to replace the worn-out railway track: heavier rails were laid, wooden sleepers were replaced with reinforced concrete, and embankments were strengthened with denser gravel.

Since 1991, after a meeting between the leaders of the USSR (Gorbachev) and Great Britain (Thatcher), restrictions were imposed on the patrol routes of the BZHRK, they were on combat duty at a permanent deployment point, without leaving the country's railway network. In February - March 1994, one of the BZHRK of the Kostroma division carried out a trip to the country's railway network (the BZHRK reached at least Syzran).

According to the START-2 treaty (1993), Russia was to decommission all RT-23UTTKh missiles by 2003. At the time of decommissioning, Russia had three rds (Kostroma, Perm and Krasnoyarsk), a total of 12 trains with 36 launchers. For the disposal of "rocket trains" at the Bryansk repair plant of the Strategic Missile Forces, a special "cutting" line was assembled. Despite Russia's withdrawal from the START-2 treaty in 2002, during 2003-2007, all trains and launchers were disposed of (destroyed), except for two demilitarized and installed as exhibits in the museum of railway equipment at the Varshavsky railway station in St. Petersburg and in AvtoVAZ Technical Museum.

In early May 2005, as the Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov, officially announced, the BZHRK was removed from combat duty in the Strategic Missile Forces. The commander said that in exchange for the BZHRK, from 2006, the Topol-M ground mobile missile system would begin to enter the troops.

On September 5, 2009, Deputy Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Vladimir Gagarin, said that the Strategic Missile Forces did not rule out the possibility of resuming the use of combat railway missile systems.

In December 2011, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General Sergei Karakaev, announced the possible revival of BZHRK complexes in the Russian army.

On April 23, 2013, Deputy Defense Minister Yu. Borisov announced the resumption of development work by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (developer of the Bulava, Topol and Yars missiles) to create a new generation of railway missile systems.

In December 2013, information appeared in the press about the revival of BZHRK complexes in Russia on a new technological base as a response to the US Global Instant Strike program. The Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT) at the beginning of 2014 will complete work on the preliminary design of the BZHRK. New complex The BZHRK, armed with an ICBM with a multiple reentry vehicle designed on the basis of the Yars, will be disguised as a standard refrigerated car, the length of which is 24 meters with a missile length of 22.5 meters.

The new model of the BZHRK will be called "Barguzin".

Advantages and disadvantages

The official reasons for the removal of the BZHRK from service were called outdated design, the high cost of recreating the production of complexes in Russia and the preference for mobile units based on tractors.

BZHRK also had the following disadvantages:

The impossibility of complete camouflage of the train due to the unusual configuration (in particular, three diesel locomotives), which made it possible to determine the location of the complex using modern satellite reconnaissance equipment. For a long time, the Americans could not detect the complex with satellites, and there were cases when even experienced railway workers from 50 meters could not distinguish a train covered with a simple camouflage net.

Lower security of the complex (unlike, for example, mines), which can be overturned or destroyed by a nuclear explosion in the vicinity. To assess the impact of an air shock wave of a nuclear explosion, a large-scale experiment "Shift" was planned for the second half of 1990 - an imitation of a close nuclear explosion by detonating 1000 tons of TNT (several railway echelons of TM-57 anti-tank mines (100 thousand units) taken out from the warehouses of the Central Group of Forces in East Germany, laid out in the form of a truncated pyramid 20 meters high). The “Shift” experiment was carried out at 53 NIIP MO (Plesetsk) on February 27, 1991, when the explosion formed a funnel with a diameter of 80 and a depth of 10 m, the level of acoustic pressure in the inhabited compartments of the BZHRK reached a pain threshold of 150 dB, and the BZHRK launcher was removed from readiness, however, after carrying out the modes to bring it to the required degree of readiness, the launcher was able to conduct a “dry launch” (imitation of a launch using an electric rocket model). That is, the command post, launcher and rocket equipment remained operational.

Depreciation of the railway tracks along which such a heavy complex moved.

Supporters of the BZHRK operation, including the engineer of the launch team at the first tests of the BZHRK, the head of the group of military representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense at the Yuzhmash Production Association, Sergey Ganusov, note the unique combat characteristics of the products that confidently overcame the anti-missile defense zones. The breeding platform, as confirmed by flight tests, delivered warheads with a whole or total mass of 4 tons to a distance of 11 thousand km. One product containing 10 warheads with a yield of about 500 kilotons was enough to hit an entire European state. The press also noted the high mobility of trains capable of moving along the country's railway network (which made it possible to quickly change the location of the starting position over 1000 kilometers per day), in contrast to tractors operating in a relatively small radius around the base (tens of kilometers).

Calculations carried out by American specialists, in relation to the railway variant of basing ICBMs "MX" for the US railway network, show that with the dispersal of 25 trains (twice as many as Russia had in service) on sections of the railway with a total length of 120,000 km ( which is much longer than the length of the main track of Russian railways) the probability of hitting the train is only 10% when using 150 ICBMs of the Voevoda type for an attack.

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