Lavrenty Pylych Beria
Didn't justify the trust.
Remained from Beria
Only down and feathers.
(folk ditty 1953)
How the country said goodbye to Stalin.
Stalin, during his lifetime, appeared in the Soviet state, where atheism denied any religion - an "earthly god." Hence, his “sudden” death was perceived by millions of people as a tragedy of universal proportions. Or, in any case, the collapse of all life until this Judgment Day - March 5, 1953.
“I wanted to think: what will happen to all of us now?” the front-line writer I. Ehrenburg recalled his feelings of that day. “But I could not think. I experienced what many of my compatriots probably experienced then: numbness. Then there was a nationwide funeral, a nationwide mourning for millions of Soviet citizens, unprecedented in its scale in world history. How did the country deal with this death? This was best told in poetry by the poetess O. Bergholz, who lost her husband during the repressions, who served time on false charges:
"Heart bleeds...
Our beloved, our dear!
Grabbing your head
The Motherland is crying over You.
A 4-day mourning was declared in the country. The coffin with the body of Stalin was brought into the Mausoleum, above the entrance to which two names were inscribed: LENIN and STALIN. The end of Stalin's funeral was heralded by lingering beeps at factories across the country, from Brest to Vladivostok and Chukotka. Later, the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko said about this: “They say that this many-pipe howl, from which the blood ran cold, resembled the hellish cry of a dying mythical monster ...”. The atmosphere of general shock, the expectation that life could suddenly change for the worse, hovered in the public atmosphere.
However, there were other moods caused by the death of the seemingly immortal Leader. “Well, this one is dead ... - the legless disabled order-bearer Uncle Vanya turned to a 13-year-old neighbor who brought her felt boots to be repaired and then seriously pondered for two days: should she go to the police or not” (Quoted by Alekseevich. S. Charmed by death .).
Millions of prisoners and exiles, languishing in camps and living in settlements, took this news with joy. “Oh joy and triumph!” the exiled Oleg Volkov later described his then feelings. “Finally, the long night will dissipate over Russia. Only God defend! To reveal one's feelings: who knows how else it will turn around?... When the exiles meet, they do not dare to express their hopes, but they no longer conceal a cheerful look. Thrice cheers!"
The palette of public sentiments in the country frozen by the Stalinist dictatorship was diverse, but on the whole, an atmosphere of general shock prevailed, the expectation that life could suddenly change for the worse. However, it became clear that with the death of the one who was considered a superman and an "earthly god", power was henceforth deprived of its divine halo. Since all the successors of Stalin were at the top, they looked like “mere mortals” (according to E.Yu. Zubkova).
New collective leadership headed by G. Malenkov
Stalin had not yet died, lying in an unconscious position, when his closest associates began an open and behind-the-scenes struggle for power at the very top. To some extent, the situation of the beginning of the 1920s was repeated in the party elite, when Lenin was hopelessly ill. But this time the bill was for days and hours.
When on the morning of March 4, 1953, “a government message about the illness of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR ... Comrade Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin” was transmitted on Moscow radio, it was, in particular, reported that “... the serious illness of Comrade Stalin will entail more or less prolonged non-participation in leadership activities ... ". And as it was further reported that the government circles (the party and the government) "... seriously take into account all the circumstances related to the temporary departure of Comrade Stalin from leading state and party activities." So the party-state elite explained to the population the convening of an urgent Plenum of the Central Committee, on the distribution of power in the country and the party at the time of the incapacity of the leader who was in a coma.
According to a great specialist in this matter, historian Yuri Zhukov, already on the evening of March 3, some agreement was reached among Stalin's associates regarding the occupation of key posts in the party and government of the country. Moreover, Stalin's comrades-in-arms began to divide power among themselves, then when Stalin himself was still alive, but could not stop them in any way. Having received news from the doctors about the hopelessness of the sick leader, the comrades-in-arms began to divide the portfolios as if he were no longer alive.
The joint session of the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet began its work on the evening of March 5, again when Stalin was still alive. In the same place, the power roles were redistributed as follows: the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which Stalin had previously held, was transferred to G. M. Malenkov, who, in fact, from now on acted as the No. 1 figure in the country and represented it abroad.
Malenkov's first deputies were L.P. Beria, V.M. Molotov, N.I. Bulganin, L.M. Kaganovich. However, Malenkov, for a number of reasons, did not become the new sole leader of the party and state. The politically "dexterous" and most educated Malenkov, due to his personal qualities, was not able to become a new dictator, which cannot be said about his political "ally" - Beria.
But the power pyramid itself, which developed under Stalin, has now undergone decisive changes by his associates, who no longer reckoned with the will of the leader who departed to another world late in the evening (at 21.50 Moscow time) on March 5. The distribution of key roles in power structures was carried out behind closed doors, and leading role Beria and Malenkov played in this. According to the historian R. Pikhoy (who worked well with archival documents), on March 4, Beria sent Malenkov a note in which the most important government posts were distributed in advance, which were approved at a meeting the next day on March 5.
The Stalinist secretariat, elected at the 19th Congress, was abolished. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, consisting of 25 members and 10 candidates, was reduced to 10 members (consisting of Malenkov, Beria, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Saburov, Pervukhin, Molotov and Mikoyan) and 4 candidates; most of them entered the government.
The younger Stalinist nominees were immediately relegated to the background. This, like the very fact of the return, previously disgraced, under Stalin, Molotov to the political Olympus (he was returned to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR) was a kind of sign of the beginning of the rejection of Stalin's latest political reshuffles. According to Yuri Zhukov, the inclusion of Molotov required the growth of a new narrow leadership to the "five" - Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, Kaganovich. Such an organization of power was subsequently presented as a "collective leadership", which was largely temporary in nature, formed on the basis of a balance of conflicting views and interests of the top leadership of that time.
L. Beria received enormous power, who headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs, united after the merger of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security, which became a kind of super-ministry that also carried out a number of national economic tasks. The well-known political figure of the Soviet era O. Troyanovsky in his memoirs gives the following characterization: “Although immediately after the death of Stalin, Malenkov was considered the number one figure as chairman of the Council of Ministers, in fact, Beria played the leading role. I never came across him directly, but I knew from eyewitness accounts that he was an immoral man who did not disdain any means to achieve his goals, but possessed an extraordinary mind and great organizational skills. Relying on Malenkov, and sometimes on some other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee, he consistently led the matter to consolidate his leadership.
N.S. began to play the third key figure in the collective leadership, after Malenkov and Beria. Khrushchev, who is already in last years Stalin's rule had great political influence.
In fact, already in March 1953, 3 main centers were formed in the highest echelons of the party, headed by Stalin's associates - Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev. In this struggle, each one relied on and exploited his own nomenklatura possibilities, connected with the peculiarities of the position in the party-state system. The base of Malenkov was the government of the country, the support of Beria was the law enforcement agencies, Khrushchev was the party apparatus (Pyzhikov A.V.).
In the established triumvirate (Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev), Beria became the second person in the state. From now on, Beria, heading all the all-powerful punitive bodies in the country, possessed at the same time all the necessary information - a dossier on all his associates, which could be used in the fight against his political competitors (Zhilenkov M.). The triumvirators from the very beginning began to cautiously revise Stalin's policy, starting with the refusal to single-handedly make key decisions. Moreover, Malenkov and Beria played a key role in this, and not Khrushchev, as is commonly believed.
Already in Malenkov’s mourning speech at Stalin’s funeral on March 9, 1953, where foreign policy problems were discussed, an “unconventional” idea for the Stalin era appeared about “the possibility of long-term coexistence and peaceful competition of two different systems - capitalist and socialist.” In domestic policy, the main task was seen by Malenkov as “steady to achieve further improvement in the material well-being of workers, collective farmers, the intelligentsia, and all Soviet people” (cited by Aksyutin Yu.V.).
The day after Stalin's funeral (March 10), Malenkov invited the ideological secretaries of the Central Committee M. A. Suslov and P. N. Pospelov, as well as the editor-in-chief of Pravda D.T. Shepilova. Malenkov at this meeting declared to all those present about the need to “stop the policy of the cult of personality and move on to the collective leadership of the country”, reminding the members of the Central Committee how Stalin himself strongly criticized them for the cult planted around him (cited by Openkin L.A.). This was the very first stone thrown by Malenkov to debunk Stalin's personality cult, followed by others. As early as March 20, 1953, the name of Stalin ceased to be mentioned in the headlines of newspaper articles, and his citation was sharply reduced.
Malenkov himself voluntarily withdrew some of his powers when, on March 14, 1953, he resigned from the post of secretary of the Central Committee, transferring this post to Khrushchev. This to some extent divided the party and state authorities, and, of course, strengthened the position of Khrushchev, who gained control over the party apparatus. However, at that time the center of gravity was more in the government apparatus of the Council of Ministers than in the party Central Committee, which of course did not please Khrushchev.
The socio-economic program of the triumvirate was received in the first official report by G.M. Malenkov at a meeting of the fourth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 15, 1953. From Malenkov’s speech: “The law for our government is the obligation to unremittingly care for the welfare of the people, for the maximum satisfaction of their material and cultural needs ...” (“Izvestia”, 1953).
This was so far the first test of strength in the further correction of the Stalinist model economic development, with its traditional priority in favor of heavy and military industries. In 1953, the obligatory minimum for the production of workdays on collective farms, introduced in May 1939, was abolished.
Beria is a mysterious reformer
Even greater reformist fervor began to show Lavrenty Beria. He, being a power-hungry and cynical person, at the same time, of course, had a great organizational talent, probably one of the best in the post-war USSR. On March 27 of this year, on his initiative (Beria wrote a note on amnesty to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on March 26), an amnesty was announced for prisoners whose term did not exceed 5 years, as well as minors, women with children and pregnant women. In total, 1.2 million prisoners were released (except for political prisoners convicted of "counter-revolutionary crimes"), although this immediately had a negative impact on the level of crime, which literally jumped in the cities.
Due to increased crimes, parts of the internal troops were brought into Moscow, horse patrols appeared (Geller M.Ya. Nekrich A.M.). faked, and he himself was killed. In the note, in fact, Stalin, Abakumov, Abakumov's deputy Ogoltsov and the former minister of the Ministry of State Security of Belarus Tsanava were called the organizers of his murder. This was the first serious accusation against the divine idol Stalin.
On April 4, the “case of poisoning doctors” was terminated, and a week later the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a resolution “On Violation of Laws by State Security Agencies”, thereby opening up the possibility of reviewing many cases. On April 10, 1953, again at the initiative of Beria, the Central Committee of the CPSU cancels earlier decisions to justify the repressed and completely closes the so-called "Mingrelian case" (Decrees of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 9, 1951, and March 27, 1952). It was on the initiative of Beria that the dismantling of the Stalinist Gulag began. The largest “great construction projects” erected by the hands of prisoners, such as the Salekhard-Igarka railway in the tundra, the Karakum Canal and an underwater tunnel (13 km) to Sakhalin, were abandoned. The Special Conference under the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor's Office of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were liquidated, the Supreme Court received the right to review decisions on cases of special jurisdiction ("troikas", the Special Conference and collegiums of the OGPU).
On April 4, Beria signed an order in which it was forbidden to use, as it was written in this document, “savage “interrogation methods” - brutal beatings of those arrested, around-the-clock use of handcuffs on hands turned behind their backs, prolonged sleep deprivation, confinement of those arrested in a naked state in a cold punishment cell” . As a result of these tortures, the defendants were brought to moral depression, and "sometimes even to the loss of human appearance." “Using such a state of the arrested,” the order said, “the falsifying investigators slipped them fabricated “confessions” in advance about anti-Soviet and espionage-terrorist activities” (cited by R. Pikhoy).
Another part of Beria's mass amnesty policy was a decree of May 20, 1953, which removed passport restrictions for citizens released from prison, which allowed them to find work in large cities. These restrictions, according to various estimates, concerned three million people (Zhilenkov M.).
April revelations of illegal methods of state security, multiplied by the death of the chief architect repression - Stalin caused a lively protest response in the camps and exiles, as well as among the relatives of the prisoners. The editorial offices of the newspapers, the prosecutor's office and party organs literally rained down from all over the country complaints and petitions for a review of cases. It was restless in the camps themselves. On May 26, 1953, an uprising broke out in the Norilsk Gorlag, which was brutally suppressed by the troops, and the number of those killed was estimated at several hundred people.
Beria knew firsthand about the nationalist underground in the western republics of the USSR, as he mercilessly suppressed it for many years. Now he offered more flexible methods in national policy, such as: indigenization, partial decentralization of the union republics, some assumption of national and cultural characteristics. Here his innovation was expressed in proposals for a wider replacement of Russians in leading positions in the Union republics by national cadres; the establishment of national orders and even the ability to create national military units. In an acute environment political struggle for power in the Kremlin, Beria, thus, also expected to receive support and support in the person of the national elites in the union republics of the USSR. Subsequently, similar Beria undertakings in national question were regarded as "bourgeois-nationalist", as inciting "enmity and discord" between the peoples of the USSR.
The ubiquitous Beria tried to carry out transformations in foreign policy. He was clearly trying to stop what had begun cold war"with the West, the fault of unleashing which, in his opinion, lay with the adamant Stalin. The most daring was his proposal - to unite Germany from its two parts - eastern (under the control Soviet troops) and Western-controlled by the Anglo-Americans, allowing the unified German state to be non-socialist! Such a radical proposal by Beria met with an objection only from Molotov. Beria also believed that in other countries of Eastern Europe, socialism should not be accelerated along the Soviet model.
He also tried to restore relations with Yugoslavia spoiled under Stalin. Beria believed that the break with Tito was a mistake, and planned to correct it. “Let the Yugoslavs build what they want” (according to S. Kremlev).
The fact that the partial dismantling of the punitive system began to be actively carried out by Beria with the support of Malenkov and other high-ranking members of the party and Soviet leadership, today no one doubts. Disputes are based on Beria's "liberal" reformism. Why was it the main "punisher of the country" of recent decades that turned out to be the most "liberal" of all Stalin's associates? Traditionally, many authors and biographers (mostly of the liberal camp) Beria were inclined to consider his reform undertakings solely as a desire from the outset "vicious villain and intriguer" to wash off the image of the main "Stalinist executioner".
Such motives in the real, and not the "mythological-demonic" Beria (as he was represented in the 90s), of course, were present. However, it would be wrong to explain all of Beria's reformism in the short period of 1953 with these motives. Even during the life of Stalin, he repeatedly expressed the great danger to the country in continuing the course of "tightening the screws" and especially the super-exploitation of the collective farm peasantry. However, being a cautious and executive person, Beria carried out all Stalin's orders as energetically and efficiently as possible, which earned him the respect of the "master".
But with the death of the charismatic Stalin, Beria, being the person most aware of the moods of Soviet citizens, well understood the need to abandon many of the most odious repressive features of the Stalinist system. The country, compressed like a spring, living for a long time according to the laws of war, was in dire need of a respite and, finally, to make life easier.
At the same time, as a strong power-hungry personality, he certainly claimed the role of Stalin's main successor. But to do this, he had to get around his many rivals in the collective leadership, especially such political heavyweights as Malenkov (to whom he was formally subordinate). And it was possible to circumvent them only by intercepting the initiative of reform reforms in the country. And Beria did it well at first.
In fact, under the weak-willed Malenkov, Beria became the shadow ruler of the country, which, of course, could not but cause deaf discontent among many of his “comrades-in-arms”. The very logic of the struggle, unfolding in the highest echelons of power, spoke of the need to eliminate a dangerous rival who could turn into a “new Stalin”. It is not surprising that even yesterday's political associates of Beria (especially Malenkov) are joining forces to topple the most dangerous political figure, Beria, with the help of a conspiracy.
Neither ideological disputes, nor possibly different opinions on the further development of the USSR or its foreign policy were the motive for this game, the fear of Beria and his secret police played a decisive role here (Prudnikova E.A.). The leaders from the collective leadership were very worried about Beria's plans to curtail the influence of the party and subordinate the party structures to government bodies, and those, in turn, to the all-powerful Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
As documents of that time testify, Khrushchev and Malenkov played a leading role in the conspiracy against Beria, relying on party activists and all members of the Presidium of the Central Committee. It was they who brought into action the most significant political component - the army, or rather the military leadership, and, above all, marshals N.A. Bulganin and G.K. Zhukov (Pozharov Alexey). June 26, 1953 during a meeting of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which then turned into a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, as all its members were present.
At this meeting, Khrushchev voiced accusations against Beria: revisionism, an "anti-socialist approach" to the situation in the GDR, and even spying for Great Britain in the 20s. When Beria tried to protest the accusations, he was arrested by a group of generals led by Marshal Zhukov.
In hot pursuit, the investigation and trial of the all-powerful marshal from Lubyanka began. Along with the real crimes of Beria in organizing “illegal repressions” (which, by the way, were organized by all his “accusers”), Beria was charged with a whole set of standard charges for that time: espionage in favor of foreign states, his enemy activities aimed at eliminating the Soviet worker the peasant system, the desire for the restoration of capitalism and the restoration of the rule of the bourgeoisie, as well as in moral decay, in the abuse of power (the Politburo and the Beria case. Collection of documents).
His closest associates from the security agencies got into the “Beria gang”: Merkulov V.N., Kobulov B.Z. Goglidze S.A., Meshik P.Ya., Dekanozov V.G., Vlodzimirsky L.E. They were also repressed.
From last word Beria at the trial on December 23, 1953: “I have already shown the court that I plead guilty. For a long time I hid my service in the Musavatist counter-revolutionary intelligence service. However, I declare that, even while serving there, I did nothing harmful. I fully acknowledge my moral decay. Numerous connections with women, which have been mentioned here, are a disgrace to me as a citizen and a former member of the party. ... Recognizing that I am responsible for the excesses and perversions of socialist legality in 1937-1938, I ask the court to take into account that I did not have selfish and hostile goals. The reason for my crimes is the situation of that time. ... I do not consider myself guilty of trying to disorganize the defense of the Caucasus during the Great Patriotic War. When sentencing me, I ask you to carefully analyze my actions, not to consider me as a counter-revolutionary, but to apply to me only those articles of the Criminal Code that I really deserve. (Quoted by Dzhanibekyan V.G.).
Beria was shot on the same day, December 23, in the bunker of the headquarters of the Moscow Military District in the presence of the USSR Prosecutor General R. A. Rudenko. The first shot, on his own initiative, was fired from a personal weapon by Colonel-General (later Marshal Soviet Union) P. F. Batitsky (according to the memoirs of the prosecutor A. Antonov-Ovseenko). As in the recent past, the massive demonization of the image of Beria in the Soviet press caused outrage among Soviet citizens, who literally began to compete with each other in sophistication to brand the "fierce enemy" more strongly. Here's how gr. Alekseev (Dnepropetrovsk region) poetically expressed his righteous anger at Beria:
"I do not ask, I demand by right
Wipe you snake off the face of the earth.
You raised a sword for my honor and glory,
Let it fall on your head." (TsKhSD. F.5. Op. 30. D.4.).
Beria turned out to be a convenient "scapegoat" for everyone, especially for his associates, who also had their hands "elbow-deep in blood." It was on Beria that almost all the crimes of the Stalin era were hanged. Especially the destruction of the leading cadres of the party. Like, it was he who, having rubbed himself into the confidence of Stalin, deceived the “great leader”. Acting through Stalin, Beria killed many innocent people.
It is significant that at that moment Stalin was beyond criticism. According to A. Mikoyan, who commented on the time before the XX Congress of the CPSU (1956): “We did not immediately give a correct assessment of Stalin. Stalin died, we did not criticize him for two years ... We psychologically did not reach such criticism then.
Khrushchev vs. Malenkov
The fall of Beria was the end of the first triumvirate. The prestige and influence of Khrushchev, the main organizer of the anti-Beria plot, increased significantly. Malenkov lost his support in party circles and was now increasingly dependent on Khrushchev, who relied on the party apparatus. Khrushchev could not yet dictate his decisions, but Malenkov could no longer act without Khrushchev's consent. Both still needed each other (Geller M.Ya., Nekrich A.M.).
The struggle between the two political heavyweights took place over socio-economic programs. The initiator of the new course was initially G. Malenkov. In August 1953, Malenkov formulated a new course that provided for the social reorientation of the economy and the priority development of light industry (Group B).
On August 8, 1953, Malenkov delivered a speech at the 6th session of the USSR Supreme Council, in which he noted the unfavorable situation in agriculture and urged: “The urgent task is to sharply increase the provision of the population with food and industrial products - meat, meat, fish, oil, sugar, confectionery, clothes, shoes, dishes, furniture. In his speech, Malenkov proposed to halve the agricultural tax for collective farmers, to write off the arrears of previous years, and also to change the principle of taxation of the villagers.
The new premier also called for a change in the attitude towards the personal farming of collective farmers, to expand housing construction, to develop trade and retail. In addition, to significantly increase investment in the development of the light, food, and fishing industries.
Malenkov's proposals, fateful for millions of the masses, were accepted. The plan of the fifth five-year plan, which began in 1951, was as a result revised in favor of light industry. In the course of the reforms, the size of household plots of collective farmers increased by 5 times, and the tax on them was halved. All old debts from collective farmers were written off. As a result, in 5 years the village began to produce 1.5 times more food. This made Malenkov among the people the most popular politician of that time. And the peasants even had such a tale that Malenkov is “Lenin's nephew” (Yuri Borisenok). At the same time, the economic course of Malenkov was perceived with caution by the party and economic elite, brought up on the Stalinist approach of "heavy industry at any cost." Malenkov's opponent was Khrushchev, who at that time defended the slightly corrected old Stalinist policy, but in favor of the predominant development of the "A" group. "Narodnik" Khrushchev (as Stalin once called him) was at that time much more conservative in his political programs than Beria and Malenkov.
But Malenkov, finally, called for a fight against the privileges and bureaucracy of the party and state apparatus, noting "complete disregard for the needs of the people", "bribery and the decay of the moral character of the communist" (Zhukov Yu. N.). Back in May 1953, on the initiative of Malenkov, a government decree was adopted that halved the remuneration of party officials and eliminated the so-called. "envelopes" - additional remuneration that is not subject to accounting (Zhukov Yu.N.).
It was a serious challenge to the main owner of the country - the party apparatus. Malenkov literally played "with fire", it is not surprising that he immediately turned against himself the mass of the party elite, who were accustomed to considering themselves the main manager of state property. And this, in turn, gave N. S. Khrushchev a chance, acting as a defender of the interests of this party and economic elite and relying on it, to neutralize another competitor in the struggle for power.
Historian Yuri Zhukov cites evidence that party apparatchiks literally bombarded Khrushchev with requests for the return of surcharges for them in envelopes and an increase in their amounts. As in the 20s, the rivalry between the leaders was only masked by political programs, but most of all it took place between the leaders headed by two political forces: the government and economic apparatus represented by Malenkov and the party represented by Khrushchev. Obviously, the second force was more powerful and more consolidated.
Already in August 1953, Khrushchev made a "knight's move", he was able to return the previously canceled "envelopes" to the party workers and returned the unpaid amounts to the party apparatchiks for 3 months. The support of bureaucrats from the Central Committee, regional committees and city committees elevated Khrushchev to the pinnacle of power. As a result, the September Plenum of the Central Committee, having restored the post of first secretary of the Central Committee, immediately gave it to Khrushchev, his "defender". As Khrushchev's son-in-law Adjubey pointed out, "he only seemed to be a simple-minded person and even wanted to look like that" (Boris Sokolov).
From that time on, Khrushchev, relying on the powerful support of the party apparatus, began to confidently bypass his main rival, Malenkov. Khrushchev was now catching up, trying to win the approval of the masses as well. That is why at the September (1953) Plenum of the Central Committee, Khrushchev spoke, in essence, with the repetition of Malenkov's proposals - to support rural development and stimulate lung development industry, but on its own behalf.
The fact that the party bureaucracy was on the side of Khrushchev and fully supported him is evidenced by this fact. In November 1953, a meeting was held in the Central Committee, in which G. Malenkov once again delivered a speech condemning bribery among the staff of the apparatus. According to the memoirs of F. Burlatsky, there was a painful silence in the hall, "bewilderment was mixed with fear." It was broken only by Khrushchev's voice: “All this, of course, is true, Georgy Maximilianovich. But the apparatus is our backbone.” The hall responded to this remark with stormy and enthusiastic applause.
By the end of 1953, the situation in party and government circles had developed in such a way that there was no longer a triumvirate, but not even a duumvirate (Malenkov and Khrushchev). Khrushchev outplayed Malenkov on the very “main field”, becoming the head of the party, the backbone of Soviet statehood. However, Khrushchev's leadership throughout the country was not yet so obvious. The form of collective leadership was preserved, and Malenkov, as prime minister, had even more weight in government circles. But his power and influence in the state was much inferior to the authority of Khrushchev, a more ambitious and powerful man. Khrushchev became the new leader of the entire country, in which the processes of de-Stalinization were gaining momentum.
The death of Stalin on March 5, 1953 contributed to the beginning of the struggle for power within the CPSU party. This struggle continued until 1958.
Struggle for power after Stalin at the initial stage it was conducted between Melenkov and Beria. Both of them spoke out for the fact that the functions of power should be transferred from the hands of the CPSU to the state. The struggle for power after Stalin between these two people lasted only until June 1953, but it was during this short historical period that the first wave of criticism of Stalin's personality cult fell. For members of the CPSU, the coming to power of Beria or Malenkov meant a weakening of the role of the party in governing the country, since this point was actively promoted by both Beria and Malenkov. It was for this reason that Khrushchev, who at that time headed the Central Committee of the CPSU, began to look for ways to remove from power, first of all, Beria, who he saw as the most dangerous opponent. Members of the Central Committee of the CPSU supported Khrushchev in this decision. As a result, on June 26, Beria was arrested. It happened at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers. Soon Beria was declared an enemy of the people and an opponent of the Communist Party. The inevitable punishment followed - execution.
The struggle for power after Stalin continued into the second stage (summer 1953 - February 1955). Khrushchev, who had removed Beria from his path, was now Malenkov's main political rival. In September 1953, the Congress of the Central Committee of the CPSU approved Khrushchev as the General Secretary of the Party. The problem was that Khrushchev did not hold any public office. At this stage of the struggle for power, Khrushchev secured the support of the majority in the party. As a result, Khrushchev's position in the country became noticeably stronger, while Malenkov lost his position. This was largely due to the events of December 1954. At this time, Khrushchev arranged a process against the leaders of the MGB, who were accused of forging documents in the "Leningrad case". Malenkov was heavily compromised as a result of this process. As a result of this process, Bulganin removed Malenkov from the post he held (head of government).
The third stage, in which struggle for power after Stalin, began in February 1955 and continued until March 1958. At this stage, Malenkov united with Molotov and Kaganovich. The united "opposition" decided to take advantage of the fact that they had a majority in the party. At the next congress, which took place in the summer of 1957, the post of first secretary of the party was eliminated. Khrushchev was appointed minister Agriculture. As a result, Khrushchev demanded the convening of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, since, according to the party charter, only this body could make such decisions. Khrushchev, taking advantage of the fact that he was the secretary of the party, personally selected the composition of the Plenum. The vast majority of people who supported Khrushchev turned out to be there. As a result, Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov were dismissed. This decision was made by the Plenum of the Central Committee, arguing that all three were anti-party activities.
The struggle for power after Stalin was actually won by Khrushchev. The party secretary understood how important the post of chairman of the council of ministers is in the state. Khrushchev did everything to take this post, since Bulganin, who held this position, openly supported Malenkov in 1957. In March 1958, the formation of a new government began in the USSR. As a result, Khrushchev achieved his appointment to the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers. At the same time, he retained the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In fact, this meant Khrushchev's victory. The struggle for power after Stalin was over.
Who ruled after Stalin in the USSR? It was Georgy Malenkov. His political biography was a truly phenomenal combination of ups and downs. At one time, he was considered the successor to the leader of the peoples and was even the de facto leader of the Soviet state. He was one of the most experienced apparatchiks and was famous for his ability to calculate many moves ahead. In addition, those who were in power after Stalin had a unique memory. On the other hand, he was expelled from the party during the Khrushchev era. They say he has not been rehabilitated so far, unlike his associates. However, the one who ruled after Stalin was able to endure all this and remain faithful to his cause until death. Although, they say, in old age he overestimated a lot ...
Career start
Georgy Maksimilianovich Malenkov was born in 1901 in Orenburg. His father worked for railway. Despite the fact that noble blood flowed in his veins, he was considered a rather petty employee. His ancestors were from Macedonia. The grandfather of the Soviet leader chose the army path, was a colonel, and his brother was a rear admiral. The mother of a party leader was the daughter of a blacksmith.
In 1919, after graduating from the classical gymnasium, George was drafted into the Red Army. The following year, he joined the Bolshevik Party, becoming a political worker for an entire squadron.
After the Civil War, he studied at the Bauman School, but, having dropped out of school, began working in the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee. It was 1925.
Five years later, under the patronage of L. Kaganovich, he began to head the organizational department of the capital's city committee of the CPSU (b). Note that Stalin really liked this young official. He was intelligent and devoted to the general secretary...
Selection Malenkov
In the second half of the 1930s, there were purges of the opposition in the capital's party organization, which became the prelude to future political repressions. It was Malenkov who then led this "selection" of the party nomenklatura. Later, with the sanction of the functionary, almost all the old communist cadres were repressed. He himself came to the regions in order to intensify the fight against "enemies of the people." He used to be a witness to interrogations. True, the functionary, in fact, was only an executor of the direct instructions of the leader of the peoples.
Roads of war
When the Great Patriotic War broke out, Malenkov managed to show his organizational talent. He had to professionally and fairly quickly solve many economic and personnel issues. He has always supported developments in the tank and rocket industries. In addition, it was he who made it possible for Marshal Zhukov to stop the seemingly inevitable collapse of the Leningrad Front.
In 1942, this party leader ended up in Stalingrad and was engaged, among other things, in organizing the defense of the city. On his orders, the urban population began to evacuate.
In the same year, thanks to his efforts, the Astrakhan defensive region was strengthened. So, modern boats and other watercraft appeared in the Volga and Caspian flotilla.
Later, he took an active part in the preparation of the battle on Kursk Bulge, after which he focused on the restoration of the liberated territories, heading the appropriate committee.
post-war period
Malenkov Georgy Maximilianovich began to turn into the second figure in the country and the party.
When the war ended, he dealt with issues related to the dismantling of German industry. By and large, this work has been constantly criticized. The fact is that many of the influential departments tried to get this equipment. As a result, an appropriate commission was created, which made an unexpected decision. German industry was no longer dismantled, and enterprises based in the territories East Germany, began to produce goods for the Soviet Union, as reparations.
Rise of a functionary
In mid-autumn 1952, the Soviet leader instructed Malenkov to make a report at the next congress of the Communist Party. Thus, the party functionary, in fact, was presented as Stalin's successor.
Apparently, the leader put forward him as a compromise figure. She suited both the party elite and the security forces.
A few months later, Stalin was gone. And Malenkov, in turn, became the head of the Soviet government. Of course, before him this post was held by the deceased general secretary.
Malenkov's reforms
Malenkov's reforms began literally immediately. Historians also call them "perestroika" and believe that this reform could greatly change the entire structure of the national economy.
The head of government in the period after Stalin's death declared to the people absolutely new life. He promised that the two systems - capitalism and socialism - would coexist peacefully. He was the first leader of the Soviet Union to warn against atomic weapons. In addition, he was determined to put an end to the politics of the cult of personality by moving to the collective leadership of the state. He recalled that the late leader criticized the members of the Central Committee for the cult planted around him. True, there was no significant reaction to this proposal of the new prime minister at all.
In addition, the one who ruled after Stalin and before Khrushchev decided to lift a number of bans - on crossing borders, foreign press, customs transit. Unfortunately, new head tried to present this policy as a natural continuation of the previous course. That is why Soviet citizens, in fact, not only did not pay attention to "perestroika", but also did not remember it.
Career decline
By the way, it was Malenkov, as the head of government, who came up with the idea to halve the remuneration of party officials, that is, the so-called. "envelopes". By the way, before him, Stalin offered the same thing shortly before his death. Now, thanks to the relevant resolution, this initiative has been implemented, but it has caused even greater irritation on the part of the party nomenklatura, including N. Khrushchev. As a result, Malenkov was removed from his post. And all his "perestroika" was practically curtailed. At the same time, "ration" bonuses to officials were restored.
Nevertheless, the ex-head of government remained in the cabinet. He directed all Soviet power plants, which began to work much more successfully and more efficiently. Malenkov also promptly resolved issues related to the social arrangement of employees, workers and their families. Accordingly, all this increased his popularity. Even though she was already tall. But in the middle of the summer of 1957 he was "exiled" to the hydroelectric power station in Ust-Kamenogorsk, in Kazakhstan. When he arrived there, the whole city rose to meet him.
Three years later, the former minister headed the thermal power plant in Ekibastuz. And also on arrival, a lot of people appeared who carried his portraits ...
Many did not like his well-deserved fame. And the very next year, the one who was in power after Stalin was expelled from the party, sent to retire.
Last years
Once retired, Malenkov returned to Moscow. He retained some privileges. In any case, he bought food in a special store for party officials. But, despite this, he periodically went to his dacha in Kratovo by train.
And in the 80s, the one who ruled after Stalin suddenly turned to Orthodox faith. This was, perhaps, his last "turn" of fate. Many saw him in the temple. In addition, he periodically listened to radio programs about Christianity. He also became a reader in churches. By the way, in these years he lost a lot of weight. Perhaps that is why no one touched him and did not recognize him.
He died at the very beginning of January 1988. He was buried at the Novokuntsevsky churchyard in the capital. Note that he was buried according to the Christian rite. In the Soviet media of those times there were no reports of his death. But there were obituaries in Western periodicals. And very extensive...
After Stalin's death
The guards immediately saw that Stalin had lost consciousness, shifted him to the sofa and immediately called the direct boss - Ignatiev. He immediately arrived with Khrushchev and with Stalin's attending physician Smirnov. The doctor diagnosed intoxication and offered to let Stalin sleep and not disturb him. Since Stalin wet himself when he lost consciousness, the bodyguards agreed with this proposal of Smirnov. But when Stalin didn’t get up for dinner, they called Ignatiev again, and he or Khrushchev deceived the bodyguards, telling them that they were talking to Stalin over a direct wire, he feels embarrassed, he doesn’t need anything and he asks him not to disturb. But when even in the evening no movement was found in Stalin's rooms, the guards panicked, entered and saw that Stalin was lying in the same position as on the night of March 1. Terrified, the bodyguards began to call Ignatiev and Khrushchev, at the same time looking for Stalin's son Vasily. Khrushchev and Ignatiev arrived on the night of March 2 and brazenly told the bodyguards that they were not here last night, they had not spoken to them during the day, the bodyguards had just called them for the first time and it was the bodyguards themselves who had not followed the leader. However, Khrushchev relented, he and Ignatiev could save the bodyguards if they told the doctors and members of the Government who had gone to see Stalin that Stalin had just had an attack. The bodyguards lost heart and repeated this lie. And those three of them who later tried to tell the truth were killed by Ignatiev's people, as "scoundrels who want to tell the West the intimate details of Stalin's death."
Beria, of course, felt something was wrong, but at that time he did not yet know who to suspect. Having received the management of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security, Beria also remained the first deputy head of the Government, resolving all issues in this post - from economic to diplomatic. At the same time, he created a hydrogen bomb, which was successfully tested a month and a half after his assassination - on August 12, 1953. Moreover, after the death of Stalin, Beria was the only one who knew this project in detail, since at the plenum of the Central Committee in June 1953, at which he was “exposed”, Beria was blamed for setting the test date himself, without agreeing it with the Government and the Presidium, and this suggests that, besides him, there were no more senior leaders of the USSR who would have known how things were really going on creating hydrogen weapons.
The matter would be simplified if Beria received the special services "on the go", but they first had to be reorganized, that is, reassigned people to several hundred posts. Worse, any appointment or removal had to be coordinated with Ignatiev, who oversaw the law enforcement agencies. And Beria, finding time to work in the united Ministry of Internal Affairs, first of all takes measures to remove Ignatiev from the road. He gives an order to the investigators leading the “doctors' case” to prepare indictments in two weeks for the espionage and terrorist activities of the doctors, but the investigators have no evidence, and the prosecutor's office releases the suspected doctors. Beria, contrary to the requirements of the Presidium, publishes a message about this in the newspapers, in which he emphasizes that illegal methods of investigation were used against doctors. To confirm the guilt of Ignatiev, he arrests Ryumin. By these actions, Beria demands from the Presidium to let him arrest Ignatiev, but Khrushchev, who headed the Presidium, understands why Beria needs Ignatiev, and defends him - Ignatiev is only dismissed from the post of Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and at the end of April, at the insistence of Beria, they are simply expelled from the members Central Committee, but not from the party. Then Beria arrests Ogoltsov, and then Stalin's attending physician, Smirnov.
Khrushchev does not have great hopes that Ogoltsov and Smirnov will long remain under the questions of Beria himself (although torture has just been condemned and banned), and since March Khrushchev has already prepared Strokach, ready to accuse Beria of conspiracy, but Beria is always in the country , and Strokach will not stand a confrontation with him. Finally, in June 1953, Khrushchev succeeded in getting the decision to send Beria (the most "free" leader in the USSR) to oversee the liquidation of the Nazi rebellion in Germany. In Beria's absence, Khrushchev presents Strokach to the Presidium with his message that Beria planned to overthrow the USSR government a few days after returning from Berlin. The Presidium coordinates Khrushchev's proposal to instruct Moskalenko and Batitsky to detain Beria in order to organize a confrontation with Strokach. But Batitsky and Moskalenko, in collusion with Khrushchev, kill Beria, allegedly as a result of Beria's resistance during detention. Khrushchev invites the bewildered Presidium to inform the country that Beria has been arrested and an investigation is underway. The Presidium agrees, most likely not realizing that now all of them, together with members of the Central Committee, have become Khrushchev's accomplices in the murder of Beria. Khrushchev initiates the replacement of the Prosecutor General by the bastard from Ukraine Rudenko, and he begins to fabricate a “conspiracy case”, arresting innocent people. Trying to get out of one crime, the members of the Presidium and the Government became more and more entangled by Khrushchev in the next, justifying themselves "by the interests of politics, the world communist movement," etc. As a result, they justified in December 1953 the murder of innocent judges and prosecutors by scum Beria’s colleagues as “members of his gang”, agreed with the lies in the newspapers that Beria was allegedly shot by a court verdict, agreed with the judicial murders of Ryumin, Abakumov and many others.
But it is unlikely that anyone in the Government of the USSR and in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU knew, and many did not even guess, that Khrushchev was the murderer of Stalin. And Khrushchev almost immediately took steps to hide all traces of this murder from everyone, including the party and state nomenklatura. Immediately, all medical documents on Stalin's treatment were destroyed, his archive was destroyed, Stalin's attending physician Smirnov and Ogoltsov were released. In 1954, the doctors who treated Stalin and performed an autopsy on his body were arrested and sent to the North.
Khrushchev is doing everything so that his accomplices, who know that he is a murderer, would not run into the top leaders of the USSR and accidentally spill the beans. Restored to the Central Committee, Khrushchev sends Ignatiev to the periphery as secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee, but since Ignatiev has the opportunity to communicate with many in this post, he is sent to retire at the age of 55. Ogoltsov was rehabilitated back in August 1953, but they were not reinstated in the service, and since the lieutenant general, even in retirement, was close to many people, in 1958, by order of Khrushchev, they fabricated a case on Ogoltsov’s excess of power during the war in besieged Leningrad, deprived his titles, they are expelled from the party - they make him a pariah that few people will believe. And Ogoltsov quietly lived the rest of his life, rejoicing that he was not killed, as simpler witnesses. And those were dealt with harshly: in addition to Stalin's three bodyguards, the head of the laboratory that produces poisons, Mairanovsky, who tried to blackmail Khrushchev, was also killed.
Khrushchev is afraid of even a hint that the party nomenklatura was plotting against Stalin. In 1954, when Stalin was still glorified out of habit and no one doubted that he was an outstanding leader of the Soviet people, Khrushchev rehabilitated those involved in the "Leningrad case" - Kuznetsov, Voznesensky, Popkov and others. At this moment, Timashuk's last finest hour has come - so that she does not blurt out about Kuznetsov's role in the murder of Stalin, she is again awarded the Order, now of the Red Banner of Labor, making her a cavalier of all labor orders of the USSR.
But for Khrushchev and the party nomenklatura, the question of Stalin’s ideas remains unresolved - if Stalin is left as a leader equal to Lenin, then as the party nomenclature’s power role is restored, willy-nilly, many will have a question - why Khrushchev is leading the party in a different course than he led before his death her Stalin? It was impossible to explain this without spitting on Stalin. And Khrushchev, at the head of the top party functionaries, decides to disgrace the 20th Congress.
A problem arose - if you accuse Stalin of what he was accused of - in the "cult of personality", then everyone will have a question: "What does Stalin have to do with it? After all, he never praised himself and did not exalt himself. You smoked incense for him - the delegates of the XX Congress. Therefore, Stalin was accused of killing "honest communists." It was impossible to openly blame Stalin for this, since the events were still fresh in memory and everyone would have a question: “What does Stalin have to do with it? After all, he personally did not condemn a single "honest communist" to death, they were sentenced to death by you, the delegates of the 20th Congress. It turns out a discrepancy: they shouted about one thing, and accused of another, but this discrepancy was not accidental, there would be an exact calculation. In 1938, Hitler took advantage of the murder of his lover by a Jewish bugger - a German from the German embassy in Paris - and organized a grandiose Jewish pogrom in Germany. It would seem that from this pogrom of Germany only harm in connection with the indignation of the whole world. Actually it is not. By allowing some Germans to loot Jewish shops and set fire to synagogues, and for others to silently look at this and not interfere with these crimes, Hitler rallied the Germans against the Jews and around him, since nothing unites the crowd of the townsfolk like a common meanness. Khrushchev repeated the feat of Hitler. In terms of combating the “cult of personality”, he gave to some inhabitants to destroy monuments to Stalin, tear his portraits, burn his books, and the rest to look at it indifferently. And the layman, having committed meanness, will never admit to it - he will claim to death that his meanness was actually needed and useful to everyone. Khrushchev, like Hitler, vilely rallied the townsfolk around him.
Easily and quickly, Khrushchev found morally and mentally handicapped freaks among writers, journalists and historians who, for small handouts, began to slander the era of Stalin, confident that they were fighting “for democracy” by pouring mud and lies on the brightest period in the history of Russia and the USSR.
When Khrushchev was removed from his posts and retired in 1964, he was obliged to confess, at the very least, to Brezhnev, who replaced him, that he killed Stalin. Otherwise, out of ignorance, Brezhnev could not have taken steps to conceal this crime, and so in 1981 Brezhnev gave the command to kill Fedorova, who had imprudently gathered in the United States. And all the General Secretaries, including, of course, Gorbachev, knew about Khrushchev's murder of Stalin. Everyone was silent, since objectively Khrushchev committed this crime, albeit for his own motives, but still for their, the party nomenklatura, benefit, in the name of their power. Brezhnev, in his own way a good-natured and even somewhat conscientious layman, having learned the truth about Stalin's death, poked at the mongrels of the press and history, slander against Stalin was reduced, memoirists under Brezhnev were obliged to write respectfully about Stalin, respectfully showed him in films and described in novels.
But it was Brezhnev who finally turned the party and the country on an anti-Stalinist course, and hopes for Communism were finished. If Khrushchev crossed out the Stalinist reorganization of the party, then Brezhnev crossed out the Stalinist Constitution, dragging his Constitution through the already decorative Supreme Soviet with an article on the inequality of Soviet people:
“Article 6. The leading and guiding force of Soviet society, the core of its political system, state and public organizations is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people.
Armed with Marxist-Marxist-Leninist teachings, the Communist Party determines the general perspective of the development of society, the line of domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, directs the great creative activity of the Soviet people, imparts a systematic, scientifically substantiated character to their struggle for the victory of communism.
All party organizations operate within the framework of the Constitution of the USSR.
From now on, any greedy scoundrel who joined the CPSU for careeristic reasons began to determine the development of the country. Not all the people as under Communism, but only the party nomenklatura! During this period, people were still joining the party, but the fate of the CPSU and the USSR had already been decided.
Under Gorbachev, it became necessary to once again spit on the brightest period in the history of the USSR in order to justify the destruction of the Soviet Union. But the conditions have changed compared to Khrushchev's - freedom of speech was declared. It has become impossible to establish control over who says what and who prints what. And it was urgently required not to let the opposition know either about the conspiracy of the party nomenklatura against Stalin, or that Khrushchev had killed him, or that for which he had killed. Otherwise, the question would immediately arise of what constitutes Gorbachev's party nomenklatura and what it is doing under the guise of perestroika.
Therefore, since the late 80s, the fabrication of false documents allegedly stored in the archives began in order to divert any researcher from thinking about the murder of Stalin, in order to give a different explanation for the motives for the actions of historical figures of that era. From this need, the “Mikhoels Case”, “Beria’s Letters”, “Abakumov’s Letters”, etc., appeared.
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Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Joseph Stalin died on March 5 at 21:50. From 6 to 9 March, the country was plunged into mourning. The coffin with the body of the leader was exhibited in Moscow in the Hall of Columns. About one and a half million people took part in the mourning events.
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Stalin went into Russian history as a symbol of greatness. The main achievements of the Stalin era were industrialization, victory in the Great Patriotic war and building a nuclear bomb. The foundation that the leader left allowed the country to achieve nuclear parity with the United States and launch rockets into space, ”said Dmitry Zhuravlev, doctor of historical sciences, political scientist, in an interview with RT.
At the same time, according to the expert, the Soviet people paid a huge price for the great achievements in the Stalin era (1924-1953). by the most negative phenomena, according to Zhuravlev, there were collectivization, political repressions, labor camps (the Gulag system) and the grossest neglect of elementary human needs.
The riddle of the death of the leader
Stalin was distinguished by a pathological distrust of doctors and neglected their recommendations. Serious degradation of the health of the leader began in 1948. The last public speech of the Soviet leader took place on October 14, 1952, at which he summed up the results of the XIX Congress of the CPSU.
- Joseph Stalin speaks at the closing session of the 19th Congress of the CPSU
- RIA News
The last years of his life, Stalin spent a lot of time at the "near dacha" in Kuntsevo. On March 1, 1953, state guards found the leader motionless. They reported this to Lavrenty Beria, Georgy Malenkov and Nikita Khrushchev.
Prompt medical assistance to Stalin was not provided. Doctors came to examine him only on March 2. What happened in the first days of March at the "near dacha" is a mystery to historians. The question of whether it was possible to save the leader's life still remains unanswered.
The son of Nikita Khrushchev is sure that Stalin became a "victim of his own system." His associates and doctors were afraid to do anything, although it was obvious that the leader was in a critical condition. According to official information, Stalin was diagnosed with a stroke. The disease was not announced, but on March 4, the party elite, apparently anticipating the imminent death of the leader, decided to break the silence.
- A line of people wishing to say goodbye to Joseph Stalin at the House of the Unions, Moscow
- RIA News
“On the night of March 2, 1953, I.V. Stalin suffered a sudden cerebral hemorrhage that captured vital areas of the brain, resulting in paralysis of the right leg and right arm with loss of consciousness and speech, ”the article in the Pravda newspaper said.
"Similarity of a palace coup"
Retired KGB colonel, counterintelligence officer Igor Prelin believes that the leader's entourage understood the inevitability of his imminent death and was not interested in Stalin's recovery.
“These people were interested in him (Stalin. — RT) rather left, for two reasons. They feared for their position and well-being that he would remove them, remove them and repress them. And secondly, of course, they themselves rushed to power. They understood that Stalin's days were numbered. It was clear that this was the final, ”Prelin said in an interview.
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The main contenders for the role of leader of the Soviet state were the former head of the NKVD Lavrenty Beria, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers Georgy Malenkov, first secretary of the Moscow regional committee Nikita Khrushchev and member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU Marshal Nikolai Bulganin.
During the period of Stalin's illness, the party elite redistributed the highest public office. It was decided that Malenkov would take the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers, which belonged to the leader, Khrushchev would become the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (the highest position in the party hierarchy), Beria would receive the portfolio of the minister of internal affairs, and Bulganin the minister of defense.
The unwillingness of Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev and Bulganin to save the life of the leader in every possible way and the redistribution of government posts gave rise to a widespread version of the existence of an anti-Stalinist conspiracy. The conspiracy against the leader was objectively beneficial to the party elite, Zhuravlev believes.
- Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Lavrenty Beria, Matvey Shkiryatov (front row from right to left), Georgy Malenkov and Andrey Zhdanov (second row from right to left)
- RIA News
“Hypothetically, some semblance of a palace coup was possible, since open opposition to the leader was completely excluded. Nevertheless, the conspiracy theory and the violent death of Stalin did not receive concrete evidence. Any versions on this subject are private opinions that are not based on documentary evidence, ”Zhuravlev stated in an interview with RT.
The collapse of the main contender
The post-Stalin regime in 1953-1954 is often referred to as "collegiate administration". Powers in the state were distributed among several party bosses. However, historians agree that under the beautiful veneer of “collegiate management” there was a fierce struggle for absolute leadership.
Malenkov, being the curator of the most important defense projects of the USSR, had close ties with the country's military elite (Marshal Georgy Zhukov is considered one of Malenkov's supporters). Beria wielded enormous influence over the security agencies, the key institutions of power in the Stalin era. Khrushchev enjoyed the sympathy of the party apparatus and was perceived as a compromise figure. Bulganin had the weakest positions.
At the funeral, the first to carry the coffin with the leader from the House of Trade Unions was Beria (left) and Malenkov (right). On the podium of the mausoleum in which Stalin was buried (in 1961 the leader was reburied near the Kremlin wall), Beria stood in the center, between Malenkov and Khrushchev. This symbolized his dominant position at that time.
Beria united under his authority the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security. On March 19, he replaced almost all the heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Union republics and regions of the RSFSR.
However, Beria did not abuse power. It is noteworthy that his political program coincided with the democratic initiatives expressed by Malenkov and Khrushchev. Oddly enough, but it was Lavrenty Pavlovich who began reviewing the criminal cases of those citizens who were accused of anti-Soviet conspiracies.
On March 27, 1953, the Minister of the Interior signed the Decree "On Amnesty". The document allowed the release of citizens convicted of malfeasance and economic crimes from places of detention. In total, more than 1.3 million people were released from prisons, and criminal proceedings were terminated against 401,000 citizens.
Despite these moves, Beria was strongly associated with the repressions that were carried out during the Stalin era. On June 26, 1953, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was summoned to a meeting of the Council of Ministers and detained, accused of espionage, falsification of criminal cases and abuse of power.
His closest associates were convicted of wrecking activities. On December 24, 1953, the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced Beria and his supporters to death penalty. The ex-minister of internal affairs was shot in the bunker of the headquarters of the Moscow military district. After the death of the main contender for power, about ten functionaries who were part of the "Beria gang" were arrested and convicted.
Khrushchev's triumph
The removal of Beria became possible thanks to the alliance between Malenkov and Khrushchev. In 1954, a struggle broke out between the head of the Council of Ministers and the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
- Georgy Malenkov
- RIA News
Malenkov advocated the elimination of the excesses of the Stalinist system both in politics and in the economy. He called for leaving the leader's personality cult in the past, improving the situation of collective farmers and focusing on the production of consumer goods.
The fatal mistake of Malenkov was an indifferent attitude towards the party and state apparatus. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers reduced the salaries of officials and repeatedly accused the bureaucracy of "complete disregard for the needs of the people."
“The main problem of Stalinism for the leaders of the CPSU was that anyone could fall under the rink of repression. The party apparatus is tired of this unpredictability. He needed guarantees of a stable existence. This is exactly what Nikita Khrushchev promised. In my opinion, it was this approach that became the key to his victory, ”said Zhuravlev.
In January 1955, the head of the USSR government was criticized by Khrushchev and his party comrades for failures in economic policy. On February 8, 1955, Malenkov left the post of head of the Council of Ministers and received the portfolio of the Minister of Power Plants, retaining his membership in the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Malenkov's post was taken by Nikolai Bulganin, and Georgy Zhukov became Minister of Defense.
Such an attitude towards a political rival was intended to emphasize the beginning of a new era, where a sparing attitude towards the Soviet nomenklatura reigns. Nikita Khrushchev became her symbol.
"Hostage of the system"
In 1956, at the XX Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev delivered a famous speech about debunking the cult of personality. The period of his reign is called the thaw. From the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, hundreds of thousands of political prisoners were released, the labor camp system (GULAG) was completely dismantled.
- Joseph Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev greet the participants of the May Day demonstration on the podium of the Mausoleum of V.I. Lenin
- RIA News
“Khrushchev was able to become his own for the apparatus. Debunking Stalinism, he said that the leaders of the Bolshevik party should not have been subjected to repression. However, in the end, Khrushchev became a hostage of the control system he created himself, ”Zhuravlev stated.
As the expert explained, Khrushchev, in dealing with his subordinates, was distinguished by excessive harshness. He traveled a lot around the country and in personal meetings with the first secretaries of the regional committees subjected them to the most severe criticism, making, in fact, the same mistakes as Malenkov. In October 1964, the party nomenclature removed Khrushchev from the post of first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Council of Ministers.
“Khrushchev took competent steps to become the leader of the USSR for some time. However, he was not going to radically change the Stalinist system. Nikita Sergeevich limited himself to correcting the most obvious shortcomings of his predecessor, ”said Zhuravlev.
- First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Nikita Khrushchev
- RIA News
According to the expert, the key problem of the Stalinist system was the requirement of constant labor and military feat from the Soviet people. Most of the projects of Stalin and Khrushchev benefited the USSR, but catastrophically little attention was paid to the personal needs of citizens.
“Yes, under Khrushchev, the elite and society breathed more freely. However, man still remained a means to achieve grandiose goals. People are tired of the endless pursuit of records, they are tired of calls for self-sacrifice and the expectation of the onset of a communist paradise. This problem was one of the key reasons for the subsequent collapse of Soviet statehood, ”summed up Zhuravlev.
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