Shortly after the Orange Revolution of 2004, American political scientist Alfred Stepan published an article in which he analyzed the possibilities national policy in Ukraine (Stepan A. Ukraine: Improbable demoсratic “nation-state” but possible democratic “state-nation”? // Post-Soviet affairs. - Columbia, 2005. - No. 4. pp. 279–308). The author has not specifically dealt with Ukraine before, but is a recognized specialist in the analysis of authoritarian regimes and models of their democratization.
Considering political situation in Ukraine, Alfred Stepan resorts to opposing the two models. One of them is familiar to us - the "nation-state" (nation-state). In recent years, Stepan has been developing an alternative state-nation model based on the material of Belgium, India and Spain with his long-term co-author Juan Linz and a new collaborator, a political scientist from India, Yogundra Yadav.
The goal of politics in the nation-state is to affirm a single, powerful community identity as members of the nation and citizens of the state. To do this, the state pursues a homogenizing assimilation policy in the field of education, culture and language. In the realm of electoral politics, autonomist parties are not seen as coalition partners, and separatist parties are either outlawed or marginalized. Examples of such a model are Portugal, France, Sweden, Japan. Such a policy is facilitated if only one group is mobilized in the state as a cultural community with political representation, which sees itself as the only nation in the state.
When there are two or more such mobilized groups, as was the case in Spain after Franco's death, in Canada at federation in 1867, in Belgium by the mid-twentieth century, or in India at independence, democratic leaders must choose between excluding nationalist cultures and their arrangement in the state. All of these countries eventually chose a model that should be more accurately described not as a “nation-state”, but as a “nation-state”. They decided to recognize more than one cultural, even national, identity and provide them with institutional support. Within the framework of one state, multiple, complementary identities were formed. For this, asymmetric federations were created, the practices of consociative democracy were introduced, more than one official language.
Autonomist parties were allowed to establish government in some regions, and sometimes join a coalition forming a government in the center. The task of such a model is to create loyalty among different “nations” of the state towards it on an institutional and political basis, although the polity does not coincide with the differing cultural demos.
Countries that have recently gained independence may choose a persistent and vigorous, but peaceful and democratic strategy of building a "nation-state", if the polis and cultural demos are almost the same, the political elite is united in adopting such a policy, and the international situation is at least not hostile to the implementation of such a strategy . The situation in Ukraine at the time of its independence did not correspond to any of these conditions.
Alfred Stepan emphasizes the fundamental geopolitical difference between Ukraine and those countries that he and his co-authors considered earlier in the framework of the “nation-state” model, that is, India, Belgium, Canada and Spain. None of these states had a neighbor who would pose a real irredentist threat, while Ukraine has such a potential threat from Russia. Let us note the accuracy of this assessment: in 2005, Stepan speaks of a potential irredentist threat, recognizing that at that time this topic was not seriously considered either by Russia or by the Russian citizens of Ukraine.
Comparing the models of "nation-state" and "nation-state", Alfred Stepan builds the following series of oppositions:
- adherence to one "cultural civilizational tradition" against adherence to more than one such tradition, but with the condition that adherence to different traditions does not block the possibility of identification with a common state;
- assimilation cultural policy against the recognition and support of more than one cultural identity;
- a unitary state or a mono-ethnic federation versus a federal system, often asymmetric, reflecting cultural heterogeneity.
In other works, Stepan also notes that the model of the "nation-state" is more typical of a presidential, and for the "state-nation" - a parliamentary republic.
The general theoretical principle formulated by Stepan is that the aggressive pursuit of a "nation-state" policy in the presence of more than one "mobilized national group" is dangerous for social stability and prospects for democratic development. He admits that the “nation-state” model would, in relation to Ukraine, in particular, give the Russian language the status of a second official language. States such as Belgium, India, Spain and Switzerland have more than one official language. Stepan notes that Ukraine is more likely to create a democratic political community if it does not follow an aggressive strategy of establishing a “nation-state” model.
However, he goes on to make a reservation, which is the main thesis of his article: there may be situations where the line on the "nation-state", carried out rather softly, can also facilitate the creation of multiple and complementary identities, which are so important for "nation-states" and for democracy in multiethnic societies. According to Stepan, Ukraine can serve as an example of such a situation.
Stepan gives the following arguments in favor of his thesis. In Ukraine, the preferred language is not necessarily a marker of identity. There are twice as many people who identify themselves as Ukrainians as those who use only Ukrainian when communicating. According to one study, up to 98% of those who consider themselves Ukrainians, regardless of what language they speak themselves, would like their children to be fluent in Ukrainian. Among those who identify as Russians, the percentage of those who want their children to be fluent in Ukrainian is also very high - 91% in Kyiv and 96% in Lviv.
On the basis that the vast majority of Russophones want their children to be fluent in Ukrainian, the state can, with sufficient flexibility, pursue a policy of imposing Ukrainian in the spirit of the “nation-state” model without causing tension with Russian-speaking citizens. Stepan also points out that in 2000, only 5% of respondents in Donetsk and 1% in Lvov believed that Ukraine would be better divided into two or more states. Russia, as a potential center of irredentist attraction, waged a bloody war in the Caucasus, which significantly reduced its attractiveness.
UKRAINIAN POLICY - A CHANGE OF MODEL
Three years have passed since the publication of Stepan's article. Let's try to assess how the situation in Ukraine developed and to what extent his forecasts were justified.
The period 2005-2007 was a very turbulent one politically. During this time, regular (2006) and extraordinary (2007) elections to the Verkhovna Rada were held. Their results showed that the electoral base of all political forces without exception remains strictly tied to one or another macro-region.
The government of Yulia Tymoshenko, created after the presidential elections, was dismissed six months later. It, like the cabinet that replaced him, Yuri Yekhanurov, did not include politicians who would be perceived by the east and south of the country as their representatives. In the government of Viktor Yanukovych formed after the 2006 parliamentary elections, in turn, there were no representatives of the western regions of Ukraine. The talks that arose about a possible coalition of the Party of Regions (PR) with part of the presidential "Our Ukraine" did not lead to anything.
The Yanukovych cabinet, like the Tymoshenko government before it, gradually became involved in a bitter conflict with President Viktor Yushchenko, which led to the unconstitutional dissolution of parliament and early elections in 2007. During this conflict, the Constitutional Court was actually defeated, which finally lost the opportunity to claim independence. All the conflicting parties have repeatedly used "pocket" courts of various levels, continuing to undermine the prestige of the judiciary.
The country entered 2008 with the new government of Yulia Tymoshenko, who was not slow to again enter into conflict with the weakened president. All leading political forces are unanimous that a revision of the Constitution is necessary, but each has its own vision of both the revision mechanism and the new constitutional model of power. In 2009 (if not earlier) the country will face new presidential elections. It cannot be ruled out that early parliamentary elections will be held once again before this.
Until the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada in the summer-autumn of 2007, the authorities basically pursued a restrained policy in the spirit of the “nation-state” model, the chances of success for which Stepan regarded as very high. In the east and south of the country, cautious attempts have been made to introduce some solutions in the spirit of the "nation-state" model. A number of regions and municipalities have granted official status to the Russian language. However, at the initiative of the presidential administration, these decisions were challenged in the courts and did not receive sanction at the state level.
Under the conditions of the political crisis of 2007, Ukrainization efforts in the cultural and linguistic sphere intensified sharply. In three years all higher education will be translated into Ukrainian, the law on mandatory duplication of all distribution copies of foreign films came into force. This list should also include the President's statement about the information threat from the Russian-language media, which promises a further reduction in the Russian-language product on Ukrainian television screens.
The theme of the Holodomor as a genocide of the Ukrainian people is significantly accentuated. This, at least, creates discomfort for the Russian population of the country, because the discourse of the Holodomor as genocide is accompanied by arguments that the place of the Ukrainians exterminated by the famine was taken by immigrants from Russia. The persistent efforts to glorify the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), its commander Roman Shukhevych and the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) Stepan Bandera are causing an extremely negative reaction everywhere except Galicia.
A very provocative role, both in the sphere of domestic politics and in relations with Russia, was played by the unexpectedly sharp intensification at the end of 2007 of efforts to bring Ukraine into NATO. Moscow, in response to this, in the spring of 2008, clearly stimulated the irredentist theme in its policy towards Ukraine in general and Crimea in particular. So far, the matter is limited to the speeches of such figures who, by their status, cannot be considered the “official” voices of the Russian political establishment (Yuri Luzhkov, Konstantin Zatulin). But statements of concern about the position of Russians in Ukraine were also heard in the Russian Foreign Ministry.
The threat of irredentism from potential, as Stepan described it in 2005, is becoming more and more real. So far very reserved on this issue, Moscow would presumably want to create controlled tensions in Crimea in order to increase the already serious doubts of many NATO leaders about the advisability of accepting Ukraine into the alliance and even offering it a pre-membership program. But irredentism is often like a genie, much easier to let out of the bottle than to put back in.
Unfortunately, the conflict between Russia and Georgia and the reaction of part of the Ukrainian leadership to it can lead to a sharp escalation of all the contradictions described and further drawing Moscow into domestic politics.
PROSPECTS FOR THE "RUSSIAN" PARTY
One of the most important issues of modern Ukrainian politics is the nature of identity, or rather, the identities of the population of the south and east of the country. The fact is that when we talk about a special East Ukrainian identity, we believe that it unites both those people who consider themselves Ukrainians by blood, but speak Russian, and those citizens of the country who identify themselves as Russians (such as according to the 2001 census, more than 17%, or 8.3 million people).
It is not known what will happen in case of further activation of the Ukrainian policy in the spirit of the "nation-state". It is very likely that a significant portion of Russian-speaking Ukrainians will accept it with more or less enthusiasm.
But hasn't state policy already crossed the line beyond which linguistic Ukrainization begins to play a mobilizing role for those more than eight million people who consider themselves Russians? For them, the issue is not to change the content of their Ukrainian identity, but to lose comfortable living conditions while maintaining Russian identity.
According to polls conducted in early 2005, only 17% of Russian citizens of Ukraine believed that the "Orange Revolution" brought them something good, against - 58% of Ukrainians. Without fear of making a mistake, one can assume that such a position of the Russians was associated with fears of worsening relations with Russia and strengthening Ukrainization.
With many of these fears confirmed and Russia beginning to play the card of irredentism, it is difficult to predict how the mood among Ukrainian citizens with Russian identity will change. Several new factors speak in favor of a possible rise in irredentist sentiment.
Serious problems in the Ukrainian economy are likely to grow in the foreseeable future. The country will have to endure another sharp increase in energy prices, a credit crunch, a rapid rise in inflation, the negative consequences of the constant postponement of structural reforms, which, in the conditions of political instability and preparations for the next elections, will be further postponed. The economic situation in Ukraine in 2008 is reminiscent of the spring-summer of 1998 in Russia.
The ever-growing level gap wages in Ukraine and Russia will soon begin to have a dangerous impact on the political situation for Ukraine. The main factor that pushed Ukrainian citizens with Russian identity away from Russia, namely the war in Chechnya, has been eliminated. The term of service in the Russian army has now been reduced to one year.
In the spring of 2007, that is, on the eve of a new aggravation of the political crisis caused by the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada and the new round of intensification of the nationalizing policy associated with it, the Ukrainian Center named after. Razumkov conducted a very important sociological study. It makes it possible to assess what the mood was at that time not only of “Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine”, but also of more specific groups, which were discussed above.
Sociologists have identified groups:
- "Russians", that is, "citizens of Ukraine, Russians by nationality, for whom Russian is their native language and who consider themselves to be part of the Russian cultural tradition and use the Russian language in everyday communication";
- "Ukrainians" - "citizens of Ukraine, Ukrainians by nationality, for whom Ukrainian is their native language, who identify themselves with the Ukrainian cultural tradition and use the Ukrainian language in everyday communication";
- "Russian-speaking Ukrainians" (that is, those who consider themselves Ukrainians by nationality); "bilingual Ukrainians" (of Ukrainian nationality and with Ukrainian as their native language);
- "bilingual Ukrainian-cultural Ukrainians", declaring Ukrainian nationality, Ukrainian language as their native language, belonging to the Ukrainian cultural tradition.
As the authors of the study rightly point out, with this approach it becomes obvious that “Russian-speaking citizens” are not an imaginary community in the sense in which Benedict Anderson used this definition, but a group with a common identity. This imaginary community exists only in the minds of researchers and commentators.
When asked whether respondents consider themselves patriots of Ukraine, the last three categories, that is, people with Ukrainian ethnic identity, but using the Russian language in everyday life, answered almost the same. A strong “yes” - from 37 to 42%, “rather yes” - from 41 to 45%, “rather no” - from 11 to 6%, a confident “no” - 3% or less. 6-7% found it difficult to answer. Positive responses in this group in the aggregate (80% or more) are almost equal to the sum of positive responses of "Ukrainians".
Against this background, the answers of the “Russians” look completely different. A confident “yes” was given by 20.4%, “rather yes” by 29%, that is, less than half of the respondents considered themselves patriots. 14% of "Russians" openly declared that they did not consider themselves patriots of Ukraine, 27% answered "rather not", 9% evaded the answer.
Differences in expectations of the development of the linguistic and cultural situation emerge even sharper. Only 4% of “Russians” agree that the Ukrainian language should be the only state language, 13% would be satisfied with the recognition of Russian official language in some regions, and 70% believe that Russian should be the second state language. Another 10% generally believe that Russian should be the only state language of the country. Almost a mirror situation in the group of "Ukrainians".
“Russian-speaking Ukrainians” in this matter are quite close to “Russians”: 49% of respondents in these groups are in favor of two state languages. However, among those "Russian-speaking Ukrainians" who speak Ukrainian, only slightly more than 20% agree to give Russian the status of a second state language.
In the question of what cultural tradition will prevail in Ukraine in the future, only 6% of “Russians” are ready to put up with the undivided dominance of Ukrainian culture, 50% believe that different traditions will prevail in different regions, and 24% that the Russian tradition will prevail. In groups where they speak Ukrainian, those who agree with the dominance of the Ukrainian cultural tradition invariably prevail, although only among “Ukrainians” do such citizens make up an absolute majority (59%).
Interestingly, when asked what definition of the Ukrainian nation people consider preferable, in all groups the most popular answer is “civil nation, including all citizens of Ukraine” (“Russians” and “Russian-speaking Ukrainians” - 43 and 42%, the rest - according to 35%. However, the sum of the remaining answers, emphasizing the ethnic character of the nation in different ways, in all groups of “Ukrainians” is greater than the percentage of answers emphasizing the civic principle.
In general, these data confirm that "Russian-speaking Ukrainians" would like equal status for the Russian language and culture, but are ready to accept "nation-state" policies, while "Russians" strongly reject such policies. It is logical to assume that Last year among them, the level of discomfort and the potential for political mobilization in an irredentist spirit have increased.
We also note the obvious disappointment in the politics of the Party of Regions among those voters who attach paramount importance to the issue of the status of the Russian language and culture. The Party of Regions has not demonstrated perseverance in implementing its slogans in this area and, largely for this reason, is gradually losing the support of the electorate. A niche is emerging for a new political force that can position itself as a "Russian party". "Russians" make up 17% of the population, and the party could count on the creation of a faction in the Verkhovna Rada, even if the barrier to entry is higher than the current 3%.
POTENTIAL OF INSTABILITY
So, after three years since the publication of Stepan's article, it can be stated that as a result of the intensification of the policy in the spirit of the "nation-state", as well as Russia's steps to use the irredentist theme in relations with Ukraine, the risks have increased. Chronologically, it was Kiev’s forcing of politics in the spirit of the “nation-state” that preceded the activation of the irredentist factor in Russian politics, created certain conditions for it, and partly provoked this activation (which should not be understood as an indulgence for Russia).
The main destabilizing impulses come from President Viktor Yushchenko. All the steps listed above were initiated by the head of state and those small parties on which he still relies. It is Yushchenko who is the main actor in carrying out the policy of memory described above. He even tries to pass through parliament such a version of the law on the Holodomor, which would provide for criminal liability for denying the characterization of the Holodomor as genocide, initiates a discussion of this topic in international organizations– UN, Council of Europe, OSCE. It was Yushchenko who initiated the appeal to NATO to provide Ukraine with a Membership Action Plan (MAP) in the alliance, and he persistently tried to push through such a decision on the eve of the Bucharest summit of the alliance both domestically and internationally. After the August war in Georgia, the topic of an external (Russian) threat may become decisive in Ukrainian politics.
Lacking a majority in parliament, Viktor Yushchenko rules through decrees, many of which are contrary to the constitution. Having lost popularity and desperately trying to retain power, the president is the author of all destabilizing steps in the institutional sphere. Their list for the last year alone includes the unconstitutional dissolution of parliament, an attempt to push their own version of the new Constitution (dramatically expanding the powers of the president) through a referendum bypassing the Verkhovna Rada, discrediting the Constitutional Court, which still does not work in full force, constant interference in the sphere of government prerogatives .
The two largest political forces in Ukraine - the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) and the PR - seem to demonstrate an understanding of the mechanisms that Stepan and his colleagues describe in the "nation-state" model. Both advocate a parliamentary (or parliamentary-presidential) republic. PR is against forcing relations with NATO. BYuT does not demonstrate activity in this issue, and also does not emphasize the themes of the Holodomor and the UPA in its rhetoric. The PR opposes the rehabilitation of the UPA and the politicization of the Holodomor theme. Neither BYuT nor the Party of Regions have so far been characterized by rhetoric in the spirit of the "nation-state". The PR supports a significant expansion of the powers of the regions, in times of crisis even putting forward the demand for federalization, which the forces of the "orange" camp consider only as separatist. However, there is every reason to believe that for the PR the idea of federation is not of fundamental, but of situational significance.
All this testifies to the real possibility of a significant reformatting of the Ukrainian political scene, which would make it possible to slow down the dangerous trends of 2007. However, in the context of acute political confrontation and deep mutual distrust various forces to each other, the chances for a further deepening of the crisis are much greater. The international environment also contributes to this.
An important destabilizing factor is that, due to the peculiarities of the career of Yushchenko's main rival and BYuT leader Yulia Tymoshenko, no one will undertake to guarantee her adherence to democratic methods of politics if she gains full power. These fears were further confirmed in March 2008, when the BYuT succeeded in removing the mayor of Kiev, Leonid Chernovetsky, in flagrant violation of democratic procedures. BYuT generally actively undermines the position of the mayors of large cities, if they are not among its supporters.
Meanwhile, Stepan notes that in conditions where the federalization of Ukraine is difficult due to the irredentist factor, the country could use the experience of the Scandinavian countries, where the lack of a federation is partly compensated by the very wide powers of municipalities. However, the new elections held in Kiev inflicted a painful defeat on BYuT and ended with the re-election of Chernovetsky.
The democratic nature of the PR also raises reasonable doubts. Strictly speaking, no prominent political force in Ukraine provides reliable guarantees of commitment to democracy.
In the struggle around the mechanism for adopting a new Constitution and approving the principles that should be laid down in it, all social forces are guided primarily by momentary political interests. It is important that in the debate about the desirable form of government the topic of federation is not discussed at all, and when justifying the preference of a parliamentary republic over the presidential motive, the “nation-state” motive does not sound either from the BYuT or from the Party of Regions.
Thus, we see how in the three years that have passed since the publication of Alfred Stepan's article, many of his predictions and warnings have come true. There are two important additions to his analysis.
First, he did not sufficiently take into account the identification heterogeneity of the population of the east and south of the country (although Stepan paid more attention than many researchers to the differences in the position of “Russian-speaking Ukrainians” and “Russians”).
Secondly, the observance of due moderation in the policy of Ukrainization turned out to be a very difficult task. Describing a possible successful strategy for Ukraine, Stepan proposes a moderate policy in the spirit of the "nation-state", since the construction of a "nation-state" is impossible, and the choice of a "nation-state" model is complicated by foreign policy circumstances. Such a political structure worked successfully under a relatively centralized system during the times of Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, but it turned out to be rather fragile. The weakening presidential power under Yushchenko sacrificed this moderate course in the face of an intensified struggle for power.
If the political mobilization of the Russian citizens of Ukraine results in the creation of a "Russian" party, then Kiev will face a difficult problem. Satisfying the demands for raising the status of the Russian language and carrying out other measures in the spirit of the “nation-state” model will impede the process of “soft” Ukrainization of “Russian-speaking Ukrainians” that has been successfully proceeding so far. The continuation of the Ukrainization policy in the spirit of the “nation-state” will lead to a further increase in the level of discomfort for more than eight million “Russians” and create new opportunities for strengthening irredentism.
Two questions come to the fore.
First- how and when will the crisis of power be overcome and what configuration of political forces will emerge at the end of the crisis? There is no doubt that the nation-state policy will continue, but it is not clear whether the new power coalition will continue the line of its activation or try to return to the former moderate course. So far, the chances of an early end to the political crisis in Ukraine look very modest.
Second– will it be possible to return to the previous policy by the time the crisis is over, or has the disruption of 2007-2008 already launched processes that will force the strategy described by Stepan to be written off as a missed opportunity? Today no one can confidently answer these questions.
A nation state is a state formed by an ethnos (nation) on the basis of an ethnic territory and embodying the political independence and independence of the people. The theoretical and ideological basis of such a state was the principle of nationality, under the flag of which the economically and politically strengthened bourgeoisie fought against obsolete feudalism. The desire to create a nation-state is largely due to the fact that the preservation of the socio-economic (or ultimately ethnic) integrity of the nation is possible only if it is within the framework of one state. The formation of a nation-state most of all satisfies these requirements. community development and therefore is the tendency of every national movement.
Nation-states usually took shape in conditions where the formation of nations and the formation of the state took place simultaneously, in connection with which political boundaries most often coincided with ethnic ones. Thus, the states of Western Europe and Latin America arose. This was typical, normal for the capitalist period of development. Since in the countries of Western Europe, where the formation of nations began for the first time in history, this process coincided with the emergence and centralization of states that developed in territories with a predominantly ethnically homogeneous population, the term “nation” itself acquired a political meaning here - the belonging of people to one, “national ", to the state. The principle of "one nation - one state" began to be promoted in Europe during the French Revolution. In Europe for a long time there was a point of view that nation state is the optimal model for the organization of society. nation states
formed here in the form of a monarchy, parliamentary and presidential republics.
After World War I, at the instigation of US President Woodrow Wilson, the principle of "one nation, one state" is applied in Central and Eastern Europe. The borders of new countries are cut along national lines. This helped to remove many of the old contradictions, but gave rise to new ones. The fundamental difficulty of successfully applying such an approach is that even if one tries to objectively determine the dividing lines between nations, it is impossible to do so consistently. There are almost no ethnically homogeneous massifs that would not mix in a significant part of their border or deep territories with other national borders, which, being enclosed within the borders of another national state, would not turn into national minorities. Yes, section Ottoman Empire and the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in Europe were marked by the creation of small states, the process of fragmentation into which was called "Balkanization", and with a negative meaning.
The states of Europe and other continents within the boundaries that we know were formed over several centuries. Most of them have become mononational. In this regard, the term "nation" itself acquired a political meaning - the belonging of people to one "national" state. In this case, the term "nation" is used in a statist sense and refers to states that have arisen on the principle of "one nation - one state." Consequently, the concept of "nation-state" is valid only for mono-national states.
The nation state creates the necessary conditions for the economic, social, cultural progress of the people, for the preservation of the national language, traditions, customs, etc. Therefore, the creation of their own statehood is the desired goal of each ethnic group. However, all ethnic groups cannot achieve this goal. This requires at least two conditions: compactness of residence and small number.
In this regard, more than once scientific literature the question of whether statehood is an obligatory, necessary sign of a nation was discussed. Most researchers think not. In practice, when attributing one or another ethnic community to a nation, it is often special meaning attached to the presence of her own state. This is largely due to the fact that the preservation of the socio-economic (and ultimately ethnic) integrity of the nation is possible only if it is within the framework of one state. However, "one's own" state is by no means an obligatory sign of a nation. History knows many examples of the presence of several nations in the composition of one state. The Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, Russian empires included various nations that did not have their own statehood. It is also known that the Polish nation was deprived of its statehood for a long time, but did not cease to be a nation.
In modern conditions, the concept of "nation state" is used in two meanings.. First, to designate states with an absolute majority of an ethnically homogeneous population. These national states include Japan, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Greece, Poland, Hungary, France, most Arab and Latin American countries, where representatives of the titular nation make up 90 or more percent of the population of these states. Secondly, the concept of a nation-state is also used in relation to those states where, in addition to the titular nation, significant groups of other ethnic entities live. However, historically, a state was formed on this territory, bearing the name of the largest ethnic group settled in this territory. Among these states are Romania, Sweden, Finland, Syria, Iraq, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, etc. Due to the growth of interstate migrations and the multi-ethnic population, the number of such nation-states will gradually increase.
It should be noted that although in Russian Federation the state-forming nation - Russians - makes up 82% of the population, it does not belong to the category of nation-states, but is a multinational state. This is due to the fact that in addition to Russians, dozens of indigenous peoples live on the territory of Russia, many of which have formed here into a nation and have their own national statehood, being part of the Russian Federation. Therefore, Russia is the ethnic territory of many non-Russian peoples, who, together with the Russians, constitute a multinational people.
After the October Revolution, most of the peoples living in the territory Russian Empire, created various forms of national-state formations and nation-states. Moreover, the forms of national statehood chosen by ethnic groups did not remain unchanged: they improved and developed. Most peoples have passed from the original lower form to a higher form of national statehood. For example, the Kyrgyz ethnos in a short period has gone from an autonomous region to a union republic within the USSR.
According to the Constitution of 1977, there were 53 nation-states and national-state formations in the USSR: 15 union republics, 20 autonomous republics, 8 autonomous regions and 10 autonomous regions. In accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993, the Russian Federation includes 21 republics (national states), some of them are binational, for example, Kabardino-Balkaria, and even multinational (Dagestan); one autonomous region and 10 autonomous regions. In fact, all republics and national-state formations are multi-ethnic. Therefore, the republics within the Russian Federation are the statehood not only of the “titular” nation, but of the entire multi-ethnic people of this republic, citizens of all nationalities living on their territory.
On this day:
Days of Death 1979 He died - a Soviet archaeologist, a specialist in the archeology of Moldova, the main works are devoted to the Slavic settlement of the territory of Moldova. 1996 Died Yakov Ivanovich Sunchugashev- Specialist in the history of ancient mining and metalworking, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Honored Scientist of the Republic of Khakassia.a state formed on the historically established ethnic territory of a particular nation (ethnos) and embodying its sovereignty.
Historically G.n. usually took shape where the beginning of the formation of a nation (ethnos) coincided in time with the formation of the state, in connection with which state borders most often basically coincided with ethnic ones (for example, in Western Europe and Latin America). Creation of G.N. one of the most important trends in social development, especially in early stages national movements. The national in statehood finds its expression in its construction according to the national-territorial principle; the functioning of state bodies and the conduct of office work in the relevant state language; in a wide representation in the bodies of G.n. the nationality that gave him the name and is the "titular"; in reflecting national characteristics in legislation, etc.
The concept of "G.N." in ethnic terms, it is used in a double sense. First, to designate states with an almost homogeneous national (ethnic) composition of the population (Japan, North and South Korea, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Bangladesh, Denmark, Brazil, Poland, Iceland, Hungary, many Arab countries especially in the Arabian Peninsula). And, secondly, when characterizing a state that currently has a more or less noticeable part of a non-national population, but historically formed on the territory of the settlement of one nation, one ethnic group as a result of its self-determination and therefore bearing its name (Bulgaria, Sweden, Finland, Turkey , Syria, Australia, New Zealand and etc.).
Great Definition
Incomplete definition ↓
NATIONAL STATE
one of the most important principles of the organization of modern statehood, which arose as a result of the collapse of traditional social connections and a sharp increase in the mobility of the population in the process of developing commodity-capitalist relations. The nation state as a political and legal reality arises from the need to clarify the traditional status of the state's subjects, who now, unlike foreigners, are subject to more stringent criteria of political loyalty, as well as civil rights and obligations defined by law. One of the most important functions of the nation state was the regulation of population migration. The principle of the nation-state is determined primarily by the system international relations and is not only the realization of the desire of national movements to create their own statehood. This is the meaning of the international recognition of new states or, on the contrary, non-recognition of separatism and rebellious territories; this also explains the tough policy of rich countries in relation to poor migrants.
The real subject of the nation state can be two kinds of nations: ethnic and civil origin. The first type of nation is created by ethnicity, which gives such objective criteria of nationality as a common origin, mutual language, common religion, common historical memory, common cultural identity. Accordingly, a nation-state with a single ethnic basis seeks to identify its political boundaries with ethno-cultural ones. Such kind of national states are typical, for example, for Central and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, etc.). A nation of civil origin has a non-ethnic (and in this sense cosmopolitan) ideology (mythology) as its starting point. This role can be played by: the idea of popular sovereignty, "human rights", the communist worldview, etc. In any case, a nation of civil origin emphasizes the non-natural aspects of the national community, although it also implies the presence of such natural unifying moments as a common (state) language, common cultural and historical traditions, etc. The classical states formed from nations of civil origin were France and the United States. In the 20th century, such a type of nations of civil origin as "socialist nations" arose, many of which were composed of several ethnic communities (USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, etc.). Although the populations of many nation-states of civil origin are multi-ethnic, this does not in itself mean that they are less cohesive than the populations of nation-states of mono-ethnic origin. However, as historical experience shows (in particular, the collapse of the "socialist nations"), the politics of large ethnic groups creates a potential or actual threat to the existence of civil nations.
As a result of the processes of modernization and globalization, the distinction of nation-states mentioned above is becoming more and more relative. On the one hand, none of the modern ethno-national states is completely mono-ethnic, and ethnic minorities existing or appearing in it are in no hurry to assimilate into the dominant (titular) ethnicity (nation). On the other hand, no nation-state of civil origin has ever been quite a "melting pot" for the ethnic characteristics of its citizens. The latter, expressing full loyalty to the national state and developing a cultural identity consistent with it, at the same time can retain important features of their ethnic origin (language, traditions), such as, for example, "Russian Armenians" in the Russian Federation or "American Chinese" in the USA . Taking into account the growing convergence of various types of nation-states, a number of common features can be distinguished for them:
Incomplete definition ↓
A special type of state, characteristic of the modern world, in which the government has power over a certain territory, the majority of the population are citizens who feel themselves part of a single nation. Nation-states appeared in Europe, but in modern world they are distributed globally.
Great Definition
Incomplete definition ↓
nation state
nation-state), public.territ. an education that has the status of a state with appropriately drawn up borders (self-determination), and the people living in it are united in self-identification based on a common culture, history, race, religion and language and consider themselves a nation. N.g. forms a single and sovereign polit, community, authorities to-rogo majority of us. recognized as legitimate (legitimacy). Almost all state-va in order to nurture a sense of nat. participation use, although not always successfully, symbolism, rituals, shrines, the education system, the media and weapons. strength. N.g. are subject international law on the basis of mutual recognition and membership in the international. org-tions, for example. UN. However, after the collapse of the columns, the system of borders pl. state-in were carried out artificially, without regard to ethnic. and religions, idiosyncrasies, which led to the inevitable division of us. on the basis and minorities. In such formations, the likelihood of conflicts is very high.
Great Definition
Incomplete definition ↓
One of the most important principles of the organization of modern statehood, which arose as a result of the collapse of traditional social ties and a sharp increase in the mobility of the population in the process of developing commodity-capitalist relations. The nation state as a political and legal reality arises from the need to clarify the traditional status of the state's subjects, who now, unlike foreigners, are subject to more stringent criteria of political loyalty, as well as civil rights and obligations defined by law. One of the most important functions of the nation state was the regulation of population migration. The principle of the nation-state is determined primarily by the system of international relations and is not only the realization of the desire of national movements to create their own statehood. This is the meaning of the international recognition of new states or, on the contrary, non-recognition of separatism and rebellious territories; this also explains tough policy rich countries in relation to poor migrants.
The real subject of the nation state can be two kinds of nations: ethnic and civil origin. The first kind of nation is created by ethnicity, which gives such objective criteria of national identity as a common origin, a common language, a common religion, a common historical memory, a common cultural identity. Accordingly, a nation-state with a single ethnic basis seeks to identify its political boundaries with ethno-cultural ones. Such kind of national states are typical, for example, for Central and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, etc.). A nation of civil origin has a non-ethnic (and in this sense cosmopolitan) ideology (mythology) as its starting point. This role can be played by: the idea of popular sovereignty, "human rights", the communist worldview, etc. In any case, a nation of civil origin emphasizes the non-natural aspects of the national community, although it also implies the presence of such natural unifying moments as a common (state) language, common cultural and historical traditions, etc. The classical states formed from nations of civil origin were France and the United States. In the 20th century, such a type of nations of civil origin as "socialist nations" arose, many of which were composed of several ethnic communities (USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, etc.). Although the populations of many nation-states of civil origin are multi-ethnic, this in itself does not mean that they are less cohesive than the populations of nation-states of mono-ethnic origin. However, as historical experience shows (in particular, the collapse of "socialist nations"), the politics of large ethnic groups creates a potential or actual threat to the existence of civil nations.
As a result of the processes of modernization and globalization, the distinction of nation-states mentioned above is becoming more and more relative. On the one hand, none of the modern ethno-national states is completely mono-ethnic, and ethnic minorities existing or appearing in it are in no hurry to assimilate into the dominant (titular) ethnicity (nation). On the other hand, no nation-state of civil origin has ever been quite a "melting pot" for the ethnic characteristics of its citizens. The latter, expressing full loyalty to the national state and developing a cultural identity consistent with it, at the same time can retain important features of their ethnic origin (language, traditions), such as, for example, "Russian Armenians" in the Russian Federation or "American Chinese" in the USA . Taking into account the growing convergence of various types of nation-states, a number of common features can be distinguished for them:
National language as a means of official communication;
The system of officially adopted national-state symbols (coat of arms, flag, etc.);
State monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and on taxation;
Rational-bureaucratic administration and common legislation for all;
Stable currency with national symbols;
Access to the labor market and social guarantees for "citizens" and corresponding restrictions for "non-citizens";
If possible, a unified education system;
Development and promotion of national-patriotic ideas and symbols.
priority of national interests in foreign policy.
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