Essay on the history of a student of grade 11, school 505 Afitova Elena
Partisan movement in the War of 1812
Partisan movement, the armed struggle of the masses for the freedom and independence of their country or social transformations, conducted in the territory occupied by the enemy (controlled by the reactionary regime). Regular troops operating behind enemy lines may also take part in the Partisan Movement.
The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, the armed struggle of the people, mainly the peasants of Russia, and detachments Russian army against the French invaders in the rear of the Napoleonic troops and on their communications. The partisan movement began in Lithuania and Belarus after the retreat of the Russian army. At first, the movement was expressed in the refusal to supply the French army with fodder and food, the massive destruction of stocks of these types of supplies, which created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic troops. With the entry of the pr-ka into the Smolensk, and then into the Moscow and Kaluga provinces, the partisan movement assumed an especially wide scope. At the end of July-August, in Gzhatsky, Belsky, Sychevsky and other counties, the peasants united in foot and horseback partisan detachments armed with pikes, sabers and guns, attacked separate groups of enemy soldiers, foragers and carts, disrupted the communications of the French army. The partisans were a serious fighting force. The number of individual detachments reached 3-6 thousand people. Gained widespread fame partisan detachments G.M. Kurina, S. Emelyanova, V. Polovtseva, V. Kozhina and others. Imperial law reacted with distrust to the Partisan movement. But in an atmosphere of patriotic upsurge, some landowners and progressive generals (P.I. Bagration, M.B. Barclay de Tolly, A.P. Yermolov and others). Especially great importance the people's partisan struggle was given by the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Field Marshal M.I. Kutuzov. He saw in it a huge force capable of inflicting significant damage on the pr-ku, assisted in every possible way in the organization of new detachments, gave instructions on their weapons and instructions on the tactics of guerrilla warfare. After leaving Moscow, the front of the Partisan movement was significantly expanded, and Kutuzov, to his plans, gave it an organized character. This was largely facilitated by the formation of special detachments from regular troops operating by partisan methods. The first such detachment of 130 people was created at the end of August on the initiative of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydov. In September, 36 Cossack, 7 cavalry and 5 infantry regiments, 5 squadrons and 3 battalions acted as part of the army partisan detachments. The detachments were commanded by generals and officers I.S. Dorokhov, M.A. Fonvizin and others. Many peasant detachments, which arose spontaneously, subsequently joined the army or closely cooperated with them. Separate detachments of the formation of bunks were also involved in partisan actions. militia. The partisan movement reached its widest scope in the Moscow, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces. Acting on the communications of the French army, partisan detachments exterminated enemy foragers, captured carts, and reported valuable information about the pr-ke to the Russian command. Under these conditions, Kutuzov set before the Partisan movement broader tasks of interacting with the army and delivering strikes against individual garrisons and reserves of the pr-ka. So, on September 28 (October 10), on the orders of Kutuzov, a detachment of General Dorokhov, with the support of peasant detachments, captured the city of Vereya. As a result of the battle, the French lost about 700 people killed and wounded. In total, in 5 weeks after the Battle of Borodino in 1812, the pr-k lost over 30 thousand people as a result of partisan attacks. Throughout the retreat of the French army, partisan detachments assisted the Russian troops in pursuing and destroying the enemy, attacking his carts and destroying individual detachments. In general, the Partisan movement provided great assistance to the Russian army in defeating the Napoleonic troops and driving them out of Russia.
Causes of guerrilla warfare
The partisan movement was a vivid expression of the national character Patriotic War 1812. Having flared up after the invasion of Napoleonic troops into Lithuania and Belarus, it developed every day, took on more and more active forms and became a formidable force.
At first, the partisan movement was spontaneous, represented by performances of small, scattered partisan detachments, then it captured entire regions. Large detachments began to be created, thousands appeared folk heroes, talented organizers of the partisan struggle came to the fore.
Why, then, did the disenfranchised peasantry, mercilessly oppressed by the feudal landlords, rise to fight against their seemingly "liberator"? Napoleon did not even think about any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their disenfranchised position. If at first promising phrases were uttered about the emancipation of the serfs and there was even talk of the need to issue some kind of proclamation, then this was only a tactical move with which Napoleon hoped to intimidate the landowners.
Napoleon understood that the liberation of the Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which he feared most of all. Yes, this did not meet his political goals when entering Russia. According to Napoleon's comrades-in-arms, it was "important for him to strengthen monarchism in France and it was difficult for him to preach revolution in Russia."
The very first orders of the administration established by Napoleon in the occupied regions were directed against the serfs, in defense of the serf landowners. The interim Lithuanian "government", subordinate to the Napoleonic governor, in one of the very first decrees obliged all peasants and rural residents in general to unquestioningly obey the landlords, to continue to perform all work and duties, and those who would evade were to be severely punished, involving for this if circumstances so require, military force.
Sometimes the beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 is associated with the manifesto of Alexander I of July 6, 1812, as if allowing the peasants to take up arms and actively join the struggle. In reality, things were different. Without waiting for orders from their superiors, when the French approached, the inhabitants went into the forests and swamps, often leaving their homes to be looted and burned.
The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position, something in which they were before. The peasants also associated the struggle against foreign enslavers with the hope of liberating them from serfdom.
Peasants' War
At the beginning of the war, the struggle of the peasants took on the character of mass abandonment of villages and villages and the departure of the population to forests and areas remote from hostilities. And although it was still a passive form of struggle, it created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic army. The French troops, having a limited supply of food and fodder, quickly began to experience an acute shortage of them. This was not long in affecting the general condition of the army: horses began to die, soldiers starved, looting intensified. Even before Vilna, more than 10 thousand horses died.
The French foragers sent to the countryside for food faced not only passive resistance. One French general after the war wrote in his memoirs: "The army could only eat what the marauders, organized in whole detachments, got; Cossacks and peasants daily killed many of our people who dared to go in search." Skirmishes took place in the villages, including shootings, between French soldiers sent for food and peasants. Such skirmishes occurred quite often. It was in such battles that the first peasant partisan detachments were created, and a more active form of people's resistance was born - partisan struggle.
The actions of the peasant partisan detachments were both defensive and offensive. In the region of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, detachments of peasants - partisans made frequent day and night raids on enemy carts, destroyed his foragers, and captured French soldiers. Napoleon was forced more and more often to remind the chief of staff Berthier about the heavy losses in people and strictly ordered that an increasing number of troops be allocated to cover the foragers.
The partisan struggle of the peasants acquired the widest scope in August in the Smolensk province. It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky counties, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky counties. At first, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, they were afraid that they would later be held accountable.
In the city of Bely and Belsky district, partisan detachments attacked French parties making their way to them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychevsk partisans, police officer Boguslavskaya and retired major Yemelyanov, armed their detachments with guns taken from the French, established proper order and discipline. Sychevsk partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they destroyed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people.
Residents of the Roslavl district created several partisan detachments on horseback and on foot, arming them with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their county from the enemy, but also attacked marauders who made their way to the neighboring Yelnensky county. Many partisan detachments operated in the Yukhnovsky district. Having organized a defense along the Ugra River, they blocked the enemy's path in Kaluga, and provided significant assistance to the army partisans to Denis Davydov's detachment.
The largest Gzhatsk partisan detachment successfully operated. Its organizer was a soldier of the Elizavetgrad Regiment Fyodor Potopov (Samus). Wounded in one of the rearguard battles after Smolensk, Samus found himself behind enemy lines and, after recovering, immediately set about organizing a partisan detachment, the number of which soon reached 2 thousand people (according to other sources, 3 thousand). Its strike force was a cavalry group of 200 men armed and dressed in French cuirassier armor. The Samusya detachment had its own organization, strict discipline was established in it. Samus introduced a system to warn the population about the approach of the enemy by means of bell ringing and other symbols. Often in such cases, the villages were empty, according to another conventional sign, the peasants returned from the forests. Lighthouses and the ringing of bells of various sizes informed when and in what quantity, on horseback or on foot, one should go into battle. In one of the battles, the members of this detachment managed to capture a cannon. The Samusya detachment inflicted significant damage on the French troops. In the Smolensk province, he destroyed about 3 thousand enemy soldiers.
A war ends in victory when it contains the contribution of every citizen who is able to resist the enemy. When studying the Napoleonic invasion of 1812, it is impossible to miss the partisan movement. It may not have been as developed as the underground of 1941-1945, but its cohesive actions inflicted tangible damage on the motley army of Bonaparte, gathered from all over Europe.
Napoleon stubbornly walked towards Moscow following the retreating Russian army. Two corps sent to Petersburg were bogged down in sieges, and the French emperor was looking for another reason to strengthen his position. , he considered that the matter was small, and even told those close to him: "The company of 1812 is over." However, Bonaparte did not take into account some details. His army was in the depths of a foreign country, the supply was getting worse, discipline was declining, the soldiers began to loot. After that, the disobedience of the local population to the invaders, which had previously been episodic, acquired the scale of a general uprising. Uncompressed bread rotted in the fields, attempts at trade deals were ignored, it even came to the point that the peasants burned their own food supplies and went into the forests, just not to give anything to the enemy. Partisan detachments, organized by the Russian command back in July, began to actively accept replenishment. In addition to the actual combat sorties, the partisans were good scouts and repeatedly delivered very valuable information about the enemy to the army.
Detachments based on the regular army
The actions of army associations are documented and known to many. The commanders F. F. Winzingerode, A. S. Figner, A. N. Seslavin from among the officers of the regular army conducted many operations behind enemy lines. The most famous leader of these flying units was the dashing cavalryman Denis Davydov. Appointed after Borodino, he brought their activities beyond the planned minor sabotage behind enemy lines. Initially, hussars and Cossacks were selected under the command of Davydov, but very soon they were diluted by representatives of the peasantry. The biggest success was the battle near Lyakhovo, when 2,000 Frenchmen led by General Augereau were captured by joint efforts with other partisan detachments. Napoleon gave special orders for the hunt for the impudent hussar commander, but no one ever managed to carry it out.
Civil uprising
Those villagers who did not want to leave their homes tried to protect their native villages on their own. There were spontaneous self-defense units. Many reliable names of the leaders of these associations have been preserved in history. One of the first to distinguish themselves was the landlord brothers Leslie, who sent their peasants under the command of Major General A. I. Olenin. Residents of the Bogorodsk district Gerasim Kurin and Yegor Stulov received the Military Order for their services. For the same award and the rank of non-commissioned officer, ordinary soldiers Stepan Eremenko and Ermolai Chetverikov were presented - both independently managed to organize a real army of trained peasants in the Smolensk region. The story of Vasilisa Kozhina, who created a partisan detachment with the help of teenagers and women who remained in the village, was widely dispersed. In addition to these leaders, thousands of their nameless subordinates contributed to the victory. But when
The unsuccessful start of the war and the retreat of the Russian army deep into its territory showed that the enemy could hardly be defeated by the forces of regular troops alone. This required the efforts of the whole people. In the overwhelming majority of the areas occupied by the enemy, he perceived the "Great Army" not as his liberator from serfdom, but as an enslaver. The next invasion of "foreigners" was perceived by the overwhelming majority of the population as an invasion, which had the goal of eradicating the Orthodox faith and establishing godlessness.
Speaking about the partisan movement in the war of 1812, it should be clarified that the actual partisans were temporary detachments of regular military units and Cossacks, purposefully and in an organized manner created by the Russian command for operations in the rear and on enemy communications. And to describe the actions of the spontaneously created self-defense units of the villagers, the term "people's war" was introduced. Therefore, the popular movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 is integral part the more general theme of "The People in the War of the Twelfth Year".
Some authors associate the beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 with the manifesto of July 6, 1812, as if allowing the peasants to take up arms and actively join the struggle. In reality, things were somewhat different.
Even before the start of the war, the lieutenant colonel drew up a note on the conduct of an active guerrilla war. In 1811, the work of the Prussian colonel Valentini "Small War" was published in Russian. However, in the Russian army they looked at the partisans with a significant degree of skepticism, seeing in the partisan movement "a pernicious system of divisive action of the army."
People's War
With the invasion of the Napoleonic hordes, the locals initially simply left the villages and went to forests and areas remote from hostilities. Later, retreating through the Smolensk lands, the commander of the Russian 1st Western Army called on his compatriots to take up arms against the invaders. His proclamation, which was obviously based on the work of the Prussian colonel Valentini, indicated how to act against the enemy and how to wage guerrilla warfare.
It arose spontaneously and was a performance of small disparate detachments local residents and soldiers who lagged behind their units against the predatory actions of the rear units of the Napoleonic army. Trying to protect their property and food supplies, the population was forced to resort to self-defense. According to memoirs, “in every village the gates were locked; with them stood old and young with pitchforks, stakes, axes, and some of them with firearms».
The French foragers sent to the countryside for food faced not only passive resistance. In the region of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, detachments of peasants made frequent day and night raids on enemy carts, destroyed his foragers, and captured French soldiers.
Later, the Smolensk province was also plundered. Some researchers believe that it was from this moment that the war became domestic for the Russian people. Here the popular resistance also gained the widest scope. It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky counties. At first, before the appeal of M.B. Barclay de Tolly, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, fearing that they would then be held accountable. However, this process has since intensified.
Partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812
Unknown artist. 1st quarter of the 19th century
In the city of Bely and Belsky district, peasant detachments attacked parties of the French that made their way to them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychevsk detachments, police officer Boguslavsky and retired major Yemelyanov, armed their villagers with guns taken from the French, established proper order and discipline. Sychevsk partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they destroyed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people.
Residents of the Roslavl district created several peasant detachments on horseback and on foot, arming the villagers with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their county from the enemy, but also attacked marauders who made their way to the neighboring Yelnensky county. Many peasant detachments operated in the Yukhnovsky district. Organizing defense along the river. Ugra, they blocked the path of the enemy in Kaluga, provided significant assistance to the army partisan detachment D.V. Davydov.
In the Gzhatsk district, another detachment was also active, created from peasants, headed by an ordinary Kiev Dragoon Regiment. The detachment of Chetvertakov began not only to protect the villages from marauders, but to attack the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him. As a result, in the entire space of 35 versts from the Gzhatskaya pier, the lands were not devastated, despite the fact that all the surrounding villages lay in ruins. For this feat, the inhabitants of those places "with sensitive gratitude" called Chetvertakov "the savior of that side."
Private Eremenko did the same. With the help of the landowner Michulovo, by the name of Krechetov, he also organized a peasant detachment, with which on October 30 he exterminated 47 people from the enemy.
The actions of the peasant detachments were especially intensified during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, they widely deployed the front of the struggle in the Smolensk, Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces.
Fight Mozhaisk peasants with French soldiers during and after the Battle of Borodino. Colorized engraving by an unknown author. 1830s
In the Zvenigorod district, peasant detachments destroyed and captured more than 2 thousand French soldiers. Here the detachments became famous, the leaders of which were the volost head Ivan Andreev and the centurion Pavel Ivanov. In the Volokolamsk district, such detachments were led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost head Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Filipp Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, peasant detachments united up to 2 thousand people. History has preserved for us the names of the most distinguished peasants from the Bronnitsky district: Mikhail Andreev, Vasily Kirillov, Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratiev, Vladimir Afanasyev.
Don't shut up! Let me come! Artist V.V. Vereshchagin. 1887-1895
The largest peasant detachment in the Moscow region was a detachment of Bogorodsk partisans. In one of the first publications in 1813 about the formation of this detachment, it was written that “the economic volosts Vokhnovskaya head, centurion Ivan Chushkin and the peasant, Amerevsky head Yemelyan Vasilyev gathered peasants under their jurisdiction, and also invited neighboring ones.”
The detachment numbered in its ranks about 6 thousand people, the leader of this detachment was the peasant Gerasim Kurin. His detachment and other smaller detachments not only reliably protected the entire Bogorodsk district from the penetration of French marauders, but also entered into an armed struggle with the enemy troops.
It should be noted that even women participated in sorties against the enemy. Subsequently, these episodes were overgrown with legends and in some cases did not even remotely remind of real events. A typical example is with, to which popular rumor and propaganda of that time attributed no less than leadership of a peasant detachment, which in reality was not.
French guards under escort of Grandmother Spiridonovna. A.G. Venetsianov. 1813
A gift for children in memory of the events of 1812. Caricature from the series I.I. Terebeneva
Peasant and partisan detachments fettered the actions of the Napoleonic troops, inflicted damage on the enemy's manpower, and destroyed military property. The Smolensk road, which remained the only protected postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly subjected to their raids. They intercepted French correspondence, especially valuable delivered to the main apartment of the Russian army.
The actions of the peasants were highly appreciated by the Russian command. “Peasants,” he wrote, “from the villages adjacent to the theater of war inflict the greatest harm on the enemy ... They kill the enemy in large numbers, and deliver those taken prisoner to the army.”
Partisans in 1812. Artist B. Zworykin. 1911
According to various estimates, more than 15 thousand people were taken prisoner by peasant formations, the same number were exterminated, significant stocks of fodder and weapons were destroyed.
In 1812. Captured French. Hood. THEM. Pryanishnikov. 1873
During the war, many active members of the peasant detachments were awarded. Emperor Alexander I ordered to award people subordinate to the count: 23 people "in command" - insignia of the Military Order (George Crosses), and the other 27 people - a special silver medal "For Love of the Fatherland" on the Vladimir ribbon.
Thus, as a result of the actions of military and peasant detachments, as well as militias, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to expand the zone controlled by him and create additional bases for supplying the main forces. He failed to gain a foothold either in Bogorodsk, or in Dmitrov, or in Voskresensk. His attempt to get additional communications that would link the main forces with the corps of Schwarzenberg and Rainier was thwarted. The enemy also failed to capture Bryansk and reach Kiev.
Army partisan detachments
Army partisan detachments also played an important role in the Patriotic War of 1812. The idea of their creation arose even before the Battle of Borodino, and was the result of an analysis of the actions of individual cavalry units, by the will of circumstances that fell into the rear communications of the enemy.
The first partisan actions were started by a cavalry general who formed a "flying corps". Later, on August 2, already M.B. Barclay de Tolly ordered the creation of a detachment under the command of a general. He led the combined Kazan Dragoon, Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of the city of Dukhovshchina on the flanks and behind enemy lines. Its number was 1300 people.
Later, the main task of the partisan detachments was formulated by M.I. Kutuzov: “Since now autumn time comes, through which the movement of a large army becomes completely difficult, then I decided, avoiding a general battle, to wage a small war, because the separate forces of the enemy and his oversight give me more ways to exterminate him, and for this, being now 50 miles from Moscow from with the main forces, I give up important parts from myself in the direction of Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk.
Army partisan detachments were created mainly from the most mobile Cossack units and were not the same in size: from 50 to 500 people or more. They were tasked with sudden actions behind enemy lines to disrupt communications, destroy his manpower, strike at garrisons, suitable reserves, deprive the enemy of the opportunity to get food and fodder, monitor the movement of troops and report this to the main apartment of the Russian army. Between the commanders of the partisan detachments, interaction was organized as far as possible.
The main advantage of partisan detachments was their mobility. They never stood in one place, constantly on the move, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The actions of the partisans were sudden and swift.
The partisan detachments of D.V. Davydova, etc.
The personification of the entire partisan movement was the detachment of the commander of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Denis Davydov.
The tactics of the actions of his partisan detachment combined a swift maneuver and striking an enemy unprepared for battle. To ensure secrecy, the partisan detachment had to be on the march almost constantly.
The first successful actions encouraged the partisans, and Davydov decided to attack some enemy convoy going along the main Smolensk road. On September 3 (15), 1812, a battle took place near Tsarev-Zaimishch on the big Smolensk road, during which the partisans captured 119 soldiers, two officers. At the disposal of the partisans were 10 food carts and a cart with cartridges.
M.I. Kutuzov closely followed the brave actions of Davydov and attached great importance to the expansion of the partisan struggle.
In addition to the Davydov detachment, there were many other well-known and successfully operating partisan detachments. In the autumn of 1812, they surrounded the French army in a continuous mobile ring. The flying detachments included 36 Cossack and 7 cavalry regiments, 5 squadrons and a team of light horse artillery, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and 22 regimental guns. Thus, Kutuzov gave the guerrilla war a wider scope.
Most often, partisan detachments set up ambushes and attacked enemy transports and convoys, captured couriers, and freed Russian prisoners. Every day, the Commander-in-Chief received reports on the direction of movement and actions of enemy detachments, repulsed mail, protocols of interrogation of prisoners and other information about the enemy, which were reflected in the log of military operations.
A partisan detachment of Captain A.S. was operating on the Mozhaisk road. Figner. Young, educated, fluent in French, German and Italian, he found himself in the fight against a foreign enemy, not being afraid to die.
From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of General F.F. Wintzingerode, who, by allocating small detachments to Volokolamsk, to the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked the access of Napoleon's troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region.
With the withdrawal of the main forces of the Russian army, Kutuzov advanced from the Krasnaya Pakhra region to the Mozhaisk road in the area with. Perkhushkovo, located 27 miles from Moscow, a detachment of Major General I.S. Dorokhov as part of three Cossack, hussar and dragoon regiments and half a company of artillery in order to "make an attack, trying to destroy enemy parks." Dorokhov was instructed not only to observe this road, but also to strike at the enemy.
The actions of the Dorokhov detachment were approved in the main apartment of the Russian army. On the first day alone, he managed to destroy 2 squadrons of cavalry, 86 charging trucks, capture 11 officers and 450 privates, intercept 3 couriers, recapture 6 pounds of church silver.
Having withdrawn the army to the Tarutinsky position, Kutuzov formed several more army partisan detachments, in particular detachments, and. The actions of these units were of great importance.
Colonel N.D. Kudashev with two Cossack regiments was sent to the Serpukhov and Kolomenskaya roads. His detachment, having established that there were about 2,500 French soldiers and officers in the village of Nikolsky, suddenly attacked the enemy, killed more than 100 people and took 200 prisoners.
Between Borovsk and Moscow, the roads were controlled by a detachment of Captain A.N. Seslavin. Him with a detachment of 500 people (250 Don Cossacks and a squadron of the Sumy Hussar Regiment) was instructed to operate in the area of the road from Borovsk to Moscow, coordinating their actions with the detachment of A.S. Figner.
In the Mozhaisk region and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I.M. Vadbolsky as part of the Mariupol Hussars and 500 Cossacks. He advanced to the village of Kubinsky to attack enemy carts and drive away his parties, having mastered the road to Ruza.
In addition, a detachment of a lieutenant colonel of 300 people was also sent to the Mozhaisk region. To the north, in the region of Volokolamsk, a detachment of a colonel operated, near Ruza - a major, behind Klin towards the Yaroslavl tract - Cossack detachments of a military foreman, near Voskresensk - major Figlev.
Thus, the army was surrounded by a continuous ring of partisan detachments, which prevented it from carrying out foraging in the vicinity of Moscow, as a result of which a massive loss of horses was observed in the enemy troops, and demoralization intensified. This was one of the reasons why Napoleon left Moscow.
The partisans A.N. were the first to learn about the beginning of the advance of French troops from the capital. Seslavin. At the same time, he, being in the forest near the village. Fomichevo, personally saw Napoleon himself, which he immediately reported. About Napoleon's advance to the new Kaluga road and about the cover detachments (corps with the remnants of the avant-garde) was immediately reported to the main apartment of M.I. Kutuzov.
An important discovery of the partisan Seslavin. Unknown artist. 1820s.
Kutuzov sent Dokhturov to Borovsk. However, already on the way, Dokhturov learned about the occupation of Borovsk by the French. Then he went to Maloyaroslavets to prevent the advance of the enemy to Kaluga. The main forces of the Russian army also began to pull up there.
After a 12-hour march, D.S. By the evening of October 11 (23), Dokhturov approached Spassky and united with the Cossacks. And in the morning he entered the battle on the streets of Maloyaroslavets, after which the French had only one way to retreat - Staraya Smolenskaya. And then be late report A.N. Seslavin, the French would have bypassed the Russian army near Maloyaroslavets, and what the further course of the war would have been is unknown ...
By this time, the partisan detachments were reduced to three large parties. One of them under the command of Major General I.S. Dorohova, consisting of five infantry battalions, four cavalry squadrons, two Cossack regiments with eight guns, on September 28 (October 10), 1812, went to storm the city of Vereya. The enemy took up arms only when the Russian partisans had already burst into the city. Vereya was liberated, and about 400 people of the Westphalian regiment with a banner were taken prisoner.
Monument to I.S. Dorokhov in the city of Vereya. Sculptor S.S. Aleshin. 1957
Continuous exposure to the enemy was of great importance. From 2 (14) September to 1 (13) October, according to various estimates, the enemy lost only about 2.5 thousand people killed, 6.5 thousand Frenchmen were taken prisoner. Their losses increased every day due to the active actions of the peasant and partisan detachments.
To ensure the transportation of ammunition, food and fodder, as well as road safety, the French command had to allocate significant forces. Taken together, all this significantly affected the moral and psychological state of the French army, which worsened every day.
The great success of the partisans is considered to be the battle near the village. Lyakhovo west of Yelnya, which occurred on October 28 (November 9). In it partisans D.V. Davydova, A.N. Seslavin and A.S. Figner, reinforced by regiments, 3,280 in all, attacked Augereau's brigade. After a stubborn battle, the entire brigade (2 thousand soldiers, 60 officers and Augereau himself) surrendered. This was the first time that an entire enemy military unit had surrendered.
The rest of the partisan forces also continuously appeared on both sides of the road and disturbed the French vanguard with their shots. Davydov's detachment, like the detachments of other commanders, all the time followed on the heels of the enemy army. The colonel, who followed the right flank of the Napoleonic army, was ordered to go ahead, warning the enemy and raiding individual detachments when they stopped. A large partisan detachment was sent to Smolensk in order to destroy enemy stores, convoys and individual detachments. From the rear of the French, the Cossacks M.I. Platov.
The partisan detachments were used no less vigorously in the completion of the campaign to expel the Napoleonic army from Russia. Detachment A.P. Ozharovsky was supposed to capture the city of Mogilev, where there were large enemy rear depots. On November 12 (24), his cavalry broke into the city. And two days later, the partisans D.V. Davydov interrupted communication between Orsha and Mogilev. Detachment A.N. Seslavin, together with the regular army, liberated the city of Borisov and, pursuing the enemy, approached the Berezina.
At the end of December, the entire detachment of Davydov, on the orders of Kutuzov, joined the vanguard of the main forces of the army as his vanguard.
guerrilla war, deployed near Moscow, made a significant contribution to the victory over Napoleon's army and the expulsion of the enemy from Russia.
Material prepared by the Research Institute (Military History)
Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
The unsuccessful start of the war and the retreat of the Russian troops deep into the territory of the state showed that the enemy could hardly be defeated by the forces of one regular army. To defeat a strong enemy, the efforts of the entire Russian people were needed. In the overwhelming majority of the counties occupied by the enemy, people perceived Napoleon's troops not as liberators from serfdom, but as rapists, robbers and enslavers. The actions of the invaders only confirmed the opinion of the people - the European hordes robbed, killed, raped, and rampaged in the temples. The next invasion of foreigners was perceived by the overwhelming majority of the people as an invasion that had the goal of eradicating Orthodox faith and affirm godlessness.
When studying the theme of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, it should be remembered that partisans were then called temporary detachments of regular troops and Cossacks, which were purposefully created by the Russian command to act on the flanks, in the rear and communications of the enemy. The actions of spontaneously organized self-defense units of local residents were designated by the term "people's war".
Some researchers associate the beginning of the partisan movement during the war of 1812 with the manifesto Russian emperor Alexander I of July 6, 1812, which, as it were, allowed the people to take up and actively join the fight against the French. In reality, the situation was somewhat different, the first pockets of resistance to the invaders appeared in Belarus and Lithuania. And often the peasants did not make out where the invaders were, and where their nobles collaborating with them were.
People's War
With the invasion of the "Great Army" in Russia, many local residents initially simply left the villages and went to the forests and areas remote from hostilities, taking away their livestock. Retreating through the Smolensk region, the commander-in-chief of the Russian 1st Western Army M.B. Barclay de Tolly called on his compatriots to take up arms against the enemy. Barclay de Tolly's appeal informed him how to act against the enemy. The first detachments were formed from local residents who wanted to protect themselves and their property. They were joined by soldiers who had fallen behind their units.
French foragers gradually began to face not only passive resistance, when cattle were driven into the forest, food was hidden, but also the active actions of the peasants. In the area of Vitebsk, Mogilev, Orsha, the peasant detachments themselves attacked the enemy, making not only night, but also daytime attacks on small enemy units. French soldiers were killed or taken prisoner. The people's war gained its widest scope in the Smolensk province. It covered Krasnensky, Porechsky counties, and then Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky counties.
In the city of Bely and Belsky district, the peasants attacked parties of French foragers moving towards them. Police officer Boguslavsky and retired major Emelyanov led the Sychev detachments, establishing proper order and discipline in them. In just two weeks - from August 18 to September 1, they made 15 attacks on the enemy. During this time, they destroyed more than 500 enemy soldiers and captured over 300. Several cavalry and foot peasant detachments were created in the Roslavl district. They not only defended their county, but also attacked enemy units that operated in the neighboring Yelnensky county. Peasant detachments were also active in the Yukhnovsky district, they interfered with the advance of the enemy to Kaluga, assisted the army partisan detachment of D.V. Davydov. In the Gzhatsk district, a detachment created by Yermolai Chetvertakov, a private of the Kiev Dragoon Regiment, gained great fame. He not only defended the lands near the Gzhatsk pier from enemy soldiers, but also attacked the enemy himself.
The people's war gained even greater scope during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, the peasant movement assumed a significant character not only in Smolensk, but also in Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces. So, in the Zvenigorod district, people's detachments destroyed or captured more than 2 thousand enemy soldiers. The most famous detachments were led by the volost head Ivan Andreev and the centurion Pavel Ivanov. Detachments led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost head Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Filipp Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov operated in the Volokolamsk district. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, local detachments included up to 2 thousand warriors. The largest peasant detachment in the Moscow region was the connection of the Bogorodsk partisans, it included up to 6 thousand people. It was headed by the peasant Gerasim Kurin. He not only reliably defended the entire Bogorodsk district, but he himself struck at the enemy.
It should be noted that Russian women also took part in the fight against the enemy. Peasant and army partisan detachments acted on enemy communications, fettered the actions of the "Great Army", attacked individual enemy units, destroying the enemy's manpower, his property, and interfered with the collection of food and fodder. The Smolensk road, where the postal service was organized, was subjected to regular attacks. The most valuable documents were delivered to the headquarters of the Russian army. According to some estimates, the peasant detachments destroyed up to 15 thousand enemy soldiers, about the same number were taken prisoner. Due to the actions of militia, partisan and peasant detachments, the enemy was unable to expand the zone controlled by him and get additional opportunities to collect food and fodder. The French failed to gain a foothold in Bogorodsk, Dmitrov, Voskresensk, capture Bryansk and go to Kiev, create additional communications to connect the main forces with the corps of Schwarzenberg and Rainier.
Captured French. Hood. THEM. Pryanishnikov. 1873
army squads
Army partisan detachments also played an important role in the campaign of 1812. The idea of their creation appeared even before the Battle of Borodino, when the command analyzed the actions of individual cavalry units, which, by chance, fell into enemy communications. The first partisan actions were started by the commander of the 3rd Western Army, Alexander Petrovich Tormasov, who formed the "flying corps". In early August, Barclay de Tolly formed a detachment under the command of General Ferdinand Fedorovich Wintzingerode. The number of the detachment was 1.3 thousand soldiers. Wintzingerode received the task of covering the St. Petersburg highway, operating on the flank and behind enemy lines.
M.I. Kutuzov attached great importance to the action of partisan detachments, they were supposed to wage a "small war", to exterminate individual detachments of the enemy. Detachments were usually created from mobile, cavalry units, often Cossack ones, they were most adapted to irregular warfare. Their number was usually insignificant - 50-500 people. If necessary, they interacted and combined into larger compounds. Army partisan detachments were given the task of delivering surprise attacks behind enemy lines, destroying his manpower, disrupting communications, attacking garrisons, suitable reserves, disrupting actions aimed at obtaining food and fodder. In addition, the partisans performed the role of army intelligence. The main advantage of partisan detachments was their speed and mobility. The detachments under the command of Wintzingerode, Denis Vasilyevich Davydov, Ivan Semyonovich Dorokhov, Alexander Samoilovich Figner, Alexander Nikitich Seslavin and other commanders received the greatest fame.
In the autumn of 1812, the actions of the partisan detachments took on a wide scope, as part of the army flying detachments, there were 36 Cossack and 7 cavalry regiments, 5 separate squadrons and a team of light horse artillery, 5 infantry regiments, 3 jaeger battalions and 22 regimental guns. The partisans set up ambushes, attacked enemy carts, intercepted couriers. They made daily reports on the movement of enemy forces, transmitted captured mail, information received from prisoners. Alexander Figner, after the capture of Moscow by the enemy, was sent to the city as a scout, he cherished the dream of killing Napoleon. He failed to eliminate the French emperor, but thanks to his extraordinary resourcefulness and knowledge foreign languages, Figner was able to obtain important information that he transmitted to the main apartment (headquarters). Then he formed a partisan (sabotage) detachment from volunteers and stragglers, which operated on the Mozhaisk road. His enterprises so disturbed the enemy that he attracted the attention of Napoleon, who put a reward on his head.
To the north of Moscow, a large detachment of General Winzingerode operated, which, having allocated small formations to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked the enemy’s access to the northern regions of the Moscow region. Dorokhov's detachment was actively operating, which destroyed several enemy teams. A detachment under the command of Nikolai Danilovich Kudashev was sent to the Serpukhov and Kolomenskaya roads. His partisans made a successful attack on the village of Nikolskoe, killing more than 100 people and capturing 200 enemy soldiers. Seslavin's partisans operated between Borovsk and Moscow, he had the task of coordinating his actions with Figner. Seslavin was the first to reveal the movement of Napoleon's troops to Kaluga. Thanks to this valuable report, the Russian army managed to block the enemy's path at Maloyaroslavets. In the Mozhaisk region, a detachment of Ivan Mikhailovich Vadbolsky operated, under his command was the Mariupol hussar regiment and five hundred Cossacks. He established control over the Ruza road. In addition, a detachment of Ilya Fedorovich Chernozubov was sent to Mozhaisk, a detachment of Alexander Khristoforovich Benkendorf acted in the Volokolamsk region, Viktor Antonovich Prendel at Ruza, behind the Klin in the direction of the Yaroslavl tract - the Cossacks of Grigory Petrovich Pobednov, etc.
An important discovery of the partisan Seslavin. Unknown artist. 1820s.
In fact, the "Great Army" of Napoleon in Moscow was surrounded. Army and peasant detachments prevented the search for food and fodder, kept the enemy units in constant tension, this significantly affected the moral and psychological state of the French army. The active actions of the partisans became one of the reasons that forced Napoleon to decide to leave Moscow.
On September 28 (October 10), 1812, several united partisan detachments under the command of Dorokhov stormed Vereya. The enemy was taken by surprise, about 400 soldiers of the Westphalian regiment with a banner were captured. In total, in the period from 2 (14) September to 1 (13) October, due to the actions of partisans, the enemy lost only about 2.5 thousand people killed and 6.5 thousand enemies were captured. To ensure security on communications, the supply of ammunition, food and fodder, the French command had to allocate more and more forces.
October 28 (November 9) at the village. Lyakhovo, west of Yelnya, the partisans of Davydov, Seslavin and Figner, reinforced by units of V.V. Orlova-Denisov, were able to defeat an entire enemy brigade (it was the vanguard of the 1st Infantry Division of Louis Barage d'Illier). After a fierce battle, the French brigade under the command of Jean-Pierre Augereau capitulated. The commander himself and 2 thousand soldiers were captured. Napoleon was extremely angry when he learned about what had happened, he ordered the division to be disbanded and an investigation into the behavior of General Baraguet d'Illier, who showed indecision and did not provide timely assistance to Augereau's brigade, The general was removed from command and fell under House arrest on his estate in France.
The partisans were also active during the retreat of the "Great Army". Platov's Cossacks attacked the rear units of the enemy. Davydov's detachment and other partisan formations acted from the flanks, followed the enemy army, raiding individual French units. Partisan and peasant detachments made a significant contribution to the common cause of victory over Napoleon's army and the expulsion of the enemy from Russia.
Cossacks attack the retreating French. Drawing by Atkinson (1813).
The most massive form of struggle of the masses of Russia against the invaders was the struggle for food. From the very first days of the invasion, the French demanded from the population a large number bread and fodder to supply the army. But the peasants did not want to give bread to the enemy. Despite a good harvest, most of the fields in Lithuania, Belarus and the Smolensk region remained unharvested. On October 4, the head of the police of the Berezinsky subprefecture, Dombrovsky, wrote: “I am ordered to deliver everything, but there is nowhere to take it from ... There is a lot of bread in the fields that was not harvested because of the disobedience of the peasants.”
From passive forms of resistance, the peasants are increasingly beginning to move to active, armed ones. Everywhere - from the western border to Moscow - peasant partisan detachments begin to emerge. In the occupied territory, there were even areas where there was neither French nor Russian administration and which were controlled by partisan detachments: Borisovsky district in the Minsk province, Gzhatsky and Sychevsky districts in Smolensk, Vokhonskaya volost and the vicinity of the Kolotsky monastery in Moscow. Usually, such detachments were led by wounded or stragglers due to illness, regular soldiers or non-commissioned officers. One of such large partisan detachments (up to 4 thousand people) was led in the Gzhatsk region by soldier Yeremey Chetvertakov.
Yeremey Vasilyevich Chetvertakov was an ordinary soldier of the dragoon cavalry regiment, which in August 1812 was part of the rearguard of the Russian army under the command of General Konovnitsyn. In one of these skirmishes on August 31 with the vanguard of the French troops rushing to Moscow, near the village of Tsarevo-Zaimishche, the squadron in which Chetvertakov was located, got into a difficult mess: he was surrounded by French dragoons. A bloody battle ensued. Paving its way with sabers and pistol fire, a small Russian squadron escaped from the encirclement, but at the very last moment a horse was killed near Chetvertakovo. Having fallen, she crushed the rider, and he was taken prisoner by the enemy dragoons surrounding him. Chetvertakov was sent to a prisoner of war camp near Gzhatsk.
But the Russian soldier was not like that to put up with captivity. Guard duty in the camp was forcibly mobilized into the "great army" Slavs-Dalmatians, who only became "French" in 1811 after the inclusion of the so-called Illyrian provinces on the coast of the Adriatic Sea - Dalmatia into the French Empire. Chetvertakov quickly found a common language with them and on the fourth day of captivity, with the help of one of the guard soldiers, fled.
At first, Yeremey Vasilyevich tried to get through to his own. But this turned out to be a difficult task - enemy horse and foot patrols loomed everywhere. Then the savvy soldier made his way along the forest paths from the Smolensk road to the south and went to the village of Zadkovo. Without waiting for any order, Chetvertakov, at his own peril and risk, began to create a partisan detachment from the inhabitants of this village. The serfs unanimously responded to the call of an experienced soldier, but Chetvertakov understood that one impulse was not enough to fight a strong and well-trained enemy. After all, none of these patriots knew how to use weapons, and for them the horse was only a draft force to plow, mow, carry a cart or sleigh.
Almost no one knew how to ride, and the speed of movement, maneuverability were the key to success partisan. Chetvertakov began by creating a "partisan school". To begin with, he taught his wards the elements of cavalry riding and the simplest commands. Then, under his supervision, the village blacksmith forged several homemade Cossack pikes. But it was necessary to get and firearms. Of course, he was not in the village. Where to get? Only the enemy.
And so, 50 of the best trained partisans on horseback, armed with homemade pikes and axes, made their first raid under cover of night. Napoleon's troops marched along the Smolensk road in a continuous stream towards the Borodino field. To attack such an armada is suicide, although everyone was burning with impatience and eager to fight. Not far from the road, in the forest, Chetvertakov decided to set up an ambush, expecting that some small group of the enemy would deviate from the route in search of food and feed for the horses. And so it happened. About 12 French cuirassiers left the road and went deep into the forest, heading towards the nearest village of Kravnoy. And suddenly trees fell on the path of the cavalrymen. With a cry of "Ambush! Ambush!" the cuirassiers were about to turn back, but here, on their way, century-old firs collapsed right on the road. Trap! Before the French had time to come to their senses, bearded men with pikes and axes flew at them from all sides. The fight was short. All 12 perished on a deaf forest road. The partisans got ten excellent cavalry horses, 12 carbines and 24 pistols with a supply of charges for them.
But the Russian dragoon was in no hurry - after all, none of his troops had ever held a cavalry carbine or a pistol in their hands. First you had to learn how to use weapons. Chetvertakov himself went through this science for two whole years as a recruit of a reserve dragoon regiment: he learned to load, shoot from a horse, from the ground, standing and lying, and not just shoot at God's light like a pretty penny, but aiming. Yeremey led his detachment back to the partisan base in Zadkovo. Here he opened the "second class" of his "partisan school" - he taught the peasants how to use firearms. Time was running out, and there were few powder charges. Therefore, the course is accelerated.
Armor was hung on the trees and they began to shoot at them as at targets. Before the peasants had time to practice shooting a couple of times, a sentinel galloped up on a lathered horse: "The French are coming to the village!" Indeed, a large detachment of French foragers, led by an officer and a whole convoy of food trucks, moved through the forest to Zadkovo.
Eremey Chetvertakov gave the first military command - "In the gun!" The French are twice as many, but on the side of the partisans is ingenuity and knowledge of the area. Again an ambush, again a short battle, this time with no longer target shooting, and again success: 15 invaders remain lying on the road, the rest hastily flee, leaving ammunition and weapons. Now it was time to fight in earnest!
Rumors about the successes of Zadkov's partisans under the command of a dashing dragoon who had escaped from captivity spread widely throughout the district. Less than two weeks had passed since the last battle, when peasants from all the surrounding villages reached out to Chetvertakov: "Take it, father, under your command." Soon the partisan detachment of Chetvertakov reached three hundred people. A simple soldier showed remarkable commanding thinking and ingenuity. He divided his squad into two parts. One carried out sentinel service on the border of the partisan region, preventing small groups of foragers and marauders from entering it.
The other became a "flying detachment" that carried out raids behind enemy lines, in the vicinity of Gzhatsk, to the Kolotsky Monastery, to the city of Medyn.
The partisan detachment grew steadily. By October 1812, he had already reached a strength of almost 4 thousand people (a whole partisan regiment!), This allowed Chetvertakov not to be limited to the destruction of small gangs of marauders, but to smash large military formations. So, at the end of October, he utterly defeated a battalion of French infantry with two guns, captured the food looted by the invaders and a whole herd of cattle taken from the peasants.
During the French occupation of Smolensk province most of The Gzhatsk district was free from invaders - the partisans vigilantly guarded the borders of their "partisan region". Chetvertakov himself turned out to be an extremely modest person. When the army Napoleon hurriedly fled from Moscow along the Old Smolensk road, the dragoon gathered his army, bowed low to them "for serving the tsar and the fatherland", dismissed the partisans home, and he rushed to catch up with the Russian army. In Mogilev, where General A. S. Kologrivov formed reserve cavalry units, Chetvertakov was assigned to the Kiev Dragoon Regiment, as an experienced soldier, promoted to non-commissioned officer. But no one knew that he was one of the partisan heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812. Only in 1813, after the peasant partisans of the Gzhatsk district themselves turned to the authorities with a request to recognize the merits of "Chetvertak" (this was his partisan nickname) as the "savior of the Gzhatsk district", who again became commander-in-chief after the death of M. I. Kutuzov M. B. Barclay de Tolly awarded the "Kiev Dragoon Regiment of non-commissioned officer Chetvertakov for his exploits, rendered in 1812 against the enemy, with the insignia of the Military Order" (St. George's Cross, the highest award for soldiers of the Russian army). Chetvertakov fought bravely during the foreign campaign of the Russian army in 1813-1814. and ended the war in Paris. The partisan detachment of Yeremey Chetvertakov was not the only one. In the same Smolensk province in the Sychevsky district, a partisan detachment of 400 people was led by a retired Suvorov soldier S. Emelyanov. The detachment spent 15 battles, destroyed 572 enemy soldiers and captured 325 people. But often ordinary peasants also became the heads of partisan detachments. For example, in the Moscow province there was a large detachment of the peasant Gerasim Kurin. What especially struck the invaders was the participation of women in the partisan movement. History has preserved to this day the exploits of Vasilisa Kozhina, the headman of the farm Gorshkov, Sychevsky district, Smolensk province. She also matched the "lace-maker Praskoveya" (her last name remained unknown) from the village of Sokolovo in the same Smolensk province.
Especially many partisan detachments arose in the Moscow province after the occupation of Moscow by the French. The partisans no longer limited themselves to attacks on individual foragers from an ambush, but fought real battles with the invaders. For example, the detachment of Gerasim Kurin waged such continuous battles from September 25 to October 1, 1812. On October 1, partisans (500 horse and 5 thousand foot) defeated a large detachment of French foragers in a battle near the village of Pavlov Posad. 20 wagons, 40 horses, 85 rifles, 120 pistols, etc. were captured. The enemy was missing more than two hundred soldiers.
For your selfless actions Gerasim Kurin received the St. George Cross from the hands of M. I. Kutuzov himself.
It was the rarest case of rewarding a non-military person, and even a serf. Along with the peasant partisan detachments, on the initiative of Barclay de Tolly and Kutuzov, from August 1812, the so-called military (flying) partisan detachments from regular and irregular (Cossacks, Tatars, Bashkirs, Kalmyks) troops began to be created.
Military partisan detachments. Seeing the stretching of enemy communications, the lack of a continuous line of defense, roads not protected by the enemy, the Russian military command decided to use this to strike with small flying detachments of cavalry sent to the rear " great army". The first such detachments were created even before the Smolensk battle by Barclay de Tolly (August 4 - the military partisan detachment of F.F. Wintsengerode). The Wintsengerode detachment initially acted in the rear of the French troops in the Vitebsk and Polotsk region, and with the abandonment of Moscow urgently moved on the Petersburg road directly in the vicinity of the "second capital". Then a detachment of military partisans of I.I. near Dibich, cavalry regiments.Along with them, small (150-250 people) mobile cavalry military partisan teams acted.The initiator of their creation was the famous partisan poet Denis Davydov who received support Bagration and Kutuzov. Davydov also led the first such maneuverable detachment of 200 hussars and Cossacks shortly before the Battle of Borodino.
Davydov's detachment acted at first against small 180 enemy groups (forage teams, small convoys, etc.). Gradually, Davydov's team was overgrown with recaptured Russian prisoners. "In the absence of Russian uniforms, I dressed them in French uniforms and armed them with French guns, leaving them Russian caps instead of shakos," ^ wrote later D. Davydov. “Soon, Davydov already had 500 people. This allowed him to increase the scope of operations. On September 12, 1812, Davydov’s detachment defeated a large enemy convoy in the Vyazma region. 276 soldiers, 32 carts, two trucks with cartridges and 340 guns were captured, which Davydov handed over to the militias.
The French were seriously alarmed, seeing the successful actions of the Davydov detachment in the Vyazma region. For: his defeat, a 2,000-strong punitive detachment was allocated, but all efforts were in vain - local peasants warned Davydov in time, and he left the punishers, continuing to smash the enemy’s convoys and repulsing Russian prisoners of war. Subsequently, D.V. Davydov generalized and systematized the military results of the actions of military partisans in two of his works of 1821: "Experience in the theory of partisan actions" and "Diary of partisan actions in 1812", where he rightly emphasized the significant effect of this new for the 19th century. forms of war to defeat the enemy.
The successes of the military partisans prompted Kutuzov to actively use this form of fighting the enemy during the retreat from Borodino to Moscow. Thus, a large detachment of military partisans (4 cavalry regiments) arose under the command of another illustrious partisan, General I. S. Dorokhov.
Dorokhov's detachment successfully smashed enemy transports on the Smolensk road from September 14 to September 14, capturing more than 1.4 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. Major Detachment Operation Dorohova was the defeat of the French garrison in the city of Vereya on September 19, 1812. The Westphalian regiment guarding the city from Junot's corps was utterly defeated. It is characteristic that the peasant partisan detachment of the Borovsky district also participated in the assault along with the military partisans.
The obvious successes of the detachments of Davydov and Dorokhov, and the rumor about their victories quickly spread throughout all the central provinces of Russia and in the Russian army, stimulated the creation of new detachments of military partisans. During his stay at the Tarutino position, Kutuzov created several more such detachments: captainovA. N. Seslavin and A. S. Figner, colonels I. M. Vadbolsky, I. F. Chernozubov, V. I. Prendel, N. D. Kudashev and others. All of them acted on the roads leading to Moscow.
Figner's detachment acted especially boldly. The commander of this detachment was distinguished by unbridled courage. Even during the retreat from Moscow, Figner obtained permission from Kutuzov to remain in the capital to carry out an assassination attempt on Napoleon. Disguised as a merchant, he monitored Napoleon's headquarters in Moscow day after day, creating a small detachment of urban partisans along the way. The detachment smashed the guards of the invaders at night. Figner failed to make an attempt on Napoleon, but he successfully applied his experience as a military intelligence officer, leading the partisans. Having hidden his small team in the forest, the commander himself, in the form of a French officer, went to the Mozhaisk road, collecting intelligence data. The Napoleonic soldiers could not even imagine that the officer who spoke brilliantly in French was a partisan in disguise. Indeed, many of them (Germans, Italians, Poles, Dutch, etc.) understood only commands in French, explaining themselves to each other in that unimaginable jargon that could only conditionally be called French.
Figner and his detachment more than once got into difficult alterations. Once they were surrounded on three sides by punishers. It seemed that there was no way out, we had to give up. But Figner came up with a brilliant military stratagem: he changed half of the detachment into French uniforms and staged a fight with the other part. The real French stopped, waiting for the end and preparing wagons for trophies and prisoners. Meanwhile, the "French" pushed the Russians back to the forest, and then they disappeared together.
Kutuzov praised Figner's actions and put him in charge of a larger detachment of 800 men. In a letter to his wife, handed over with Figner, Kutuzov wrote: "Look at him intently, he is an extraordinary person. I have never seen such a height of soul, he is a fanatic in courage and patriotism ..."
Setting a clear example of patriotism, M. I. Kutuzov sent his son-in-law and adjutant, Colonel Prince N. D. Kudashev, to military partisans. | Like Davydov, Kudashev led a small mobile detachment of 300 Don Cossacks and, leaving Tarutino in early October 1812, began to actively operate in the area of the Serpukhov road.
On October 10, at night, with a sudden blow, the Don people defeated the French garrison in the village of Nikolsky: out of more than 2,000, 100 were killed, 200 were captured, the rest fled in panic. 16 prisoners. On October 17, near the village of Alferov, the Kudashev Dons again ambushed another Napoleonic cavalry detachment stretched along the Serpukhov road and again captured 70 people.
Kutuzov closely followed the military partisan successes of his beloved son-in-law (he called him "my eyes") and wrote with pleasure to his wife - his daughter: "Kudashev is also a partisan and does well."
On October 19, Kutuzov ordered that this "small war" be expanded. In his letter to his eldest daughter in St. Petersburg on October 13, he explained his intention in this way: “We have been standing in one place for more than a week (in Tarutino. - V.S.) and looking at each other with Napoleon, everyone is waiting for time. Meanwhile, in small parts we fight every day and still successfully everywhere. Every day we take almost three hundred people into full and lose so little that almost nothing ... ".
But if Napoleon really waited (and in vain) for peace with Alexander I, then Kutuzov acted - he expanded the "small war" around Moscow. The detachments of Figner, Seslavin and Kudashev operating near Tarutino were ordered from October 20 to October 27, 1812 to walk along the rear of the Napoleonic army - from Serpukhov to Vyazma - with small maneuverable detachments, no more than 100 people each. The main task is reconnaissance, but battles should not be neglected. The commanders of the military partisans did just that: smashing individual military units and foraging teams of the enemy along the way (only Kudashev's detachment captured 400 people and recaptured 100 wagons with food), they collected valuable information about the deployment of enemy troops. By the way, it was Kudashev, looking through the papers found with one of the killed French staff officers, who discovered the secret order of the chief of staff of the "great army" Marshal Berthier about sending "all burdens" (i.e., property looted in Moscow. - V. S.) to Mozhayskaya road and further to Smolensk, to the west. This meant that the French intended to leave Moscow soon. Kudashev immediately forwarded this letter to Kutuzov.
It confirmed the strategic calculation of the great Russian commander. As early as September 27, almost a month before the French left the "first throne", he wrote to his eldest daughter (not without intent - she was a lady of state at court and was well-behaved to the tsar's wife): "I won the battle before Moscow (on Borodino. - In C), but it is necessary to save the army, and it is intact. Soon all our armies, that is, Tormasov, Chichagov, Wittgenstein and others, will act towards the same goal, and Napoleon will not stay in Moscow for a long time ... "
Military partisans brought a lot of trouble and anxiety to Napoleon. He had to divert significant forces from Moscow to guard the roads. So, to protect the segment from Smolensk to Mozhaisk, parts of Victor's reserve corps were put forward. Junot and Murat received an order to strengthen the protection of the Borovsk and Podolsk roads. But all efforts were in vain. Kutuzov had every reason to inform the tsar that "my partisans instilled fear and horror in the enemy, taking away all means of food."
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