The Russian-Turkish war began in April 1877. Its main goals were the liberation of the Slavic peoples from the Ottoman yoke and the final revision of the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty, concluded following the unsuccessful Crimean War for Russia.
16 (4 according to Art. Art.) July, one of the detachments of the Russian army, after crossing the Danube, captured the fortress of Nikopol. From here, the troops were to move south to take the city of Plevna, which lies at the crossroads of important routes. 7,000 infantrymen and about 1,500 cavalrymen with 46 cannons advanced to the fortress under the command of General Yuri Schilder-Shuldner. However, Osman Pasha, the commander of the Turkish troops in this direction, was almost half a day ahead of the Russian soldiers. By the time the advanced units approached the fortress, the Turks had already entrenched themselves in Plevna. The number of their garrison amounted to 15 thousand people. Despite the minority, 20 (8 according to Art. Art.) July Russian troops launched the first assault on Plevna. After the artillery bombardment, the infantry regiments went on the attack. In one place, Russian soldiers almost reached the Turkish batteries, but were driven back by a numerically superior enemy. In the other direction, they managed to occupy three rows of advanced trenches and put the Turks to flight, but, having not received reinforcements and not having enough strength to continue the attack, the Russian units retreated. Their losses amounted to more than 2,500 people, Turkish - about 2,000.
Over the next ten days, a Russian army of 30,000 with 140 guns was concentrated at Plevna. But the Turks also strengthened the garrison, bringing its number to 23 thousand soldiers and 57 guns, in addition, they erected new fortifications around the city. Deciding to take advantage of the numerical advantage, 30 (18 O.S.) July, the Russian army, after artillery preparation, launched a second assault. At the same time, the troops were actually in a frontal attack on the most fortified Turkish positions. At first, the Russian soldiers took several trenches and fortifications, but were stopped. The detachment of the skillfully and bravely acting General Mikhail Skobelev (in the battle under him one horse was killed and another wounded) also had to withdraw. The second assault on Plevna ended in failure. The Russians at the same time lost about 3 thousand killed and a thousand prisoners, the Turks - about a thousand killed. A month later, Skobelev captured Lovcha, through which Plevna was supplied, and the sortie to support the Lovech garrison, organized by Osman Pasha, ended in vain.
The failure of the second assault on Plevna did not embarrass the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. At the end of August, he decided on another attack, having received reinforcements in the form of allied Romanian troops. This time, the fortress had more than 80,000 soldiers with 424 cannons, while the Turkish army had about 35,000 people and 70 cannons. But the offensive of the Romanian troops, who misjudged the number and location of the Turkish fortifications, bogged down. Although Skobelev occupied the redoubts that approached the city itself, from which it was possible to continue the offensive, he again received no reinforcements and was forced to leave his positions. The third assault on Plevna was repulsed, 13,000 Russian soldiers and 3,000 Romanian soldiers were out of order. After that, the command invited a talented military engineer, General Eduard Totleben, on whose recommendation it was decided to abandon subsequent assaults, focusing on the blockade. In the meantime, the Turks brought the garrison to 48 thousand people and already had 96 guns. Osman Pasha for success in the defense of Plevna received from the Sultan the honorary title "Gazi" (which meant "invincible") and the order not to surrender the city in any case.
Later, with the capture of a number of fortifications near Plevna by the Russian troops, a blockade ring closed around the city. The Turks had nowhere else to wait for reinforcements, ammunition, or provisions. Nevertheless, Osman Pasha refused all offers to surrender. But he understood that the position of the besieged was becoming hopeless, and decided to make a breakthrough. November 28 (December 10 O.S.) Turkish garrison led by the commander went on the attack. The Turks, having taken, thanks to a sudden blow, the advanced Russian fortifications, were stopped, and then began to retreat, Osman Pasha was wounded. After that, the Turkish troops capitulated, 43.5 thousand soldiers were taken prisoner.
The capture of Plevna became one of the key episodes of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. The victory allowed the Russian army to successfully continue fighting and ultimately successfully end the war. The memory of the heroes of Plevna was immortalized in 1887 by the creation of a chapel-monument in Ilyinsky Square in Moscow.
background
Third assault
Returning to Pleven, surrounded by superior enemy forces, Osman Pasha began to prepare to repel a new attack. His army was replenished and reached a strength of 25,000 people, the minarets of Pleven began to be used as observation posts, the wounded were evacuated from Pleven, signs with the names of fortifications were installed in the city.
To lock the Turks in Pleven, the Russians moved to Gorny Dubnyak and Telish. For the capture of Gorny Dubnyak, 20,000 people and 60 guns were allocated, they were opposed by a garrison of 3,500 soldiers and 4 guns. Having started the battle on the morning of October 24, the Russian grenadiers, at the cost of huge losses, captured both redoubts. The Turks offered fierce resistance and fought to the last bullet, but, having lost their redoubts, capitulated. The losses were: 1500 Turks (another 2300 were captured), 3600 Russians.
In Telish, the defense was successful, the Turkish garrison repulsed the attack, inflicting huge losses on the attackers in manpower. About 1,000 Russian soldiers died in the battle against 200 among the Turks. It was possible to capture Telish only with the help of powerful artillery fire, but the success of this shelling was not so much in the number of Turkish defenders killed, which was small, but in the demoralizing effect that forced the garrison to surrender.
A complete blockade of Pleven began, Russian guns periodically attacked the city. The Russian-Romanian army besieging Pleven consisted of 122 thousand people against 50 thousand Turks who had taken refuge in Pleven. The blockade of the city led to the depletion of provisions in it, the army of Osman Pasha suffered from diseases, lack of food and medicine. Meanwhile, Russian troops are conducting a series of attacks: in early November, Skobelev's troops occupied and held the first ridge of the Green Mountains, repelling enemy counterattacks. On November 9, the Russians attacked in the direction of the Southern Front, but the Turks repulsed the attack, losing 200 soldiers against 600 for the Russians. Russian attacks on the fortifications of Yunus-tabia and Gazi-Osman-tabia were also unsuccessful. On the thirteenth, the Russians launched an attack on the fortification of Yunus-bey-tabiya, losing 500 people, the Turks lost 100 defenders. On the 14th, at midnight, the Turks repulsed the attack on Gazi-Osman-tabia. As a result of these actions, the Russians lost 2300 people, the Turks - 1000. From the next day there was a lull. Pleven was surrounded by 125,000 Russian-Romanian troops with 496 guns, its garrison was completely cut off from the outside world. Knowing that food in the city would run out sooner or later, the Russians offered the defenders of Pleven to surrender, to which Osman Pasha replied with a decisive refusal:
“... I prefer to sacrifice our lives for the benefit of the people and in defense of the truth, and with the greatest joy and happiness I am ready to shed blood rather than shamefully lay down arms”
(quoted by N.V. Skritsky "The Balkan Gambit").
Monument in Moscow
Due to the lack of food in the besieged city, shops were closed, soldiers' rations were reduced, most of residents suffered from diseases, the army was exhausted
140 years ago, on September 11-12, 1877, the third assault on Plevna took place. In the course of a stubborn and bloody battle, the Russian-Romanian troops achieved some success. The breakthrough of the Skobelev detachment on September 11 in the southern direction could decide the outcome of the battle in favor of the Russian army. But higher Russian command refused to regroup forces to the south and did not support Skobelev's detachment with reserves. As a result, the Turks counterattacked the next day and drove our troops back. The third assault on the Turkish fortress ended in the defeat of the allies.
Storm preparation
Simultaneously with the organization of the attack on Lovcha, the Russian high command was preparing a new assault on Plevna. They planned to throw the Russian-Romanian Western Detachment against the Turkish stronghold: 52.1 thousand Russians and 316 guns, 32 thousand Romanians and 108 guns. In total - 84.1 thousand people 424 guns. The army of the Turkish commander Osman Pasha consisted of 32 thousand people and 70 guns. The Allies had a great superiority in manpower and artillery. However, the task was very difficult. The Turks turned Plevna into a strong fortified area, consisting of a system of redoubts and trenches. The approaches to the fortifications were shot through. The most powerful fortifications were in the northeast and south.
The unsuccessful experience of the first two assaults on Plevna showed that it was impossible to take the fortress without first destroying the enemy defenses. Therefore, it was decided to subject the enemy positions to heavy bombardment and only then go on the assault. Artillery was tasked with destroying enemy fortifications, suppressing Turkish artillery, and demoralizing the garrison. The general idea of using artillery was outlined as follows: “Set up strong artillery, including 20 siege guns, and make preliminary infantry attacks, prolonged shelling of enemy fortifications, while at the same time gradually approaching the enemy infantry position, supporting it by advancing at close range masses of field artillery and, having finally defeated the enemy fortifications and artillery with a mass of our artillery shells, then attack with infantry. However, it was impossible to solve this problem, since there were no large-caliber guns and ammunition for them to destroy the Turkish fortifications. But the Russian command did not take this circumstance into account. Thus, serious mistakes were made already at the planning stage.
At 6 o'clock on August 26 (September 7), 1877, artillery preparation began. It lasted four days, until August 29 (September 10). On the right flank, 36 Romanian and 46 Russian guns participated in it. In the center - 48 Russian guns. There was no preparation on the left flank. The fire was directed at the most important fortifications of Plevna, but it was not effective enough. Artillery was unable to destroy the redoubts and trenches and upset the enemy defense system. At night they approached the Turkish fortifications and the next day they continued shelling enemy positions. Again, no tangible results were achieved. During the shelling, the Turks left the fortifications for shelters or to the rear, and at night they returned and corrected all the damage.
On August 27 (September 8), Romanian troops captured the enemy's advanced trench near the Grivitsky redoubt. Great importance had an advance of Russian troops on the left flank, where two ridges of the Green Mountains were occupied on the southern approaches to Plevna. A detachment of cavalry under the command of General Loshkarev advanced to the fortified camp from the west. Attempts by Turkish troops to push the enemy back to their original position by counterattacks did not reach their goal.
On August 28 (September 9), artillery preparation continued. Prolonged shelling of the fortress led to a large consumption of ammunition. “Although our batteries have moved forward,” wrote D. A. Milyutin, “and they are generally operating successfully, however, a positive result has not yet been noticeable, and meanwhile the head of artillery, Prince Masalsky, is already complaining about the immoderate expenditure of charges and the difficulty of their timely replenishment. Flying and mobile parks barely have time to deliver. General Zotov instructed not to rush to start the assault on the enemy’s fortified area, but “to patiently let artillery do its job of destroying barriers, moral exhaustion and material disorganization of the defender.” It was decided to continue to bring the batteries closer to enemy positions, where the terrain allows, and to continue artillery preparation for some more time. However, four days of intensive artillery preparation did not give serious results. Nevertheless, at the military council on August 29 (September 10), it was decided to start the assault the next day.
Thus, on August 26 (September 7) - August 29 (September 10), Russian and Romanian guns fired on Turkish fortifications. Despite the duration of artillery preparation and a large number of fired shells, the Turkish garrison failed to inflict tangible losses, the damage to the fortifications of Plevna was also insignificant, the Turks easily restored the damaged buildings in between shelling their positions.
By this time, the allied forces were covering Plevna from the north, east and south. The right wing was made up of Romanian troops, having the 3rd and 4th infantry divisions on the heights north and northeast of Grivitsa, and the 2nd division in reserve. In the center, between Grivitsa and Radishevo, was the 9th Corps, and between Radishevo and Tuchenitsky Creek - the 4th Corps. The left wing consisted of a detachment of Prince Imeretinsky, who occupied the area between the Tuchenitsky stream and the village of Krishin. The general reserve of the Western Detachment was located behind the 4th Corps south of Radishevo.
Romanian troops with part of the forces of the 9th Army Corps (1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division) were to attack from the northeast, in order to capture the Grivitsky redoubts. The troops of the 4th corps received the task of advancing on Plevna from the southeast, directing the main efforts to seize the Omar-bey-tabiya redoubt. The detachment of General M. D. Skobelev, allocated from the troops of Prince Imeretinsky, was supposed to attack the enemy from the south. The beginning of the assault was scheduled for 15 hours. The following tasks were assigned to the artillery: “At dawn, from all batteries, open the most intensified fire on enemy fortifications and continue it until 9 o'clock in the morning. At 9 o'clock at the same time and suddenly stop all firing at the enemy. At 11 o'clock in the afternoon, intensified artillery fire was opened again and continued until one o'clock in the afternoon. From an hour to 2.5 hours, again stop on all batteries, and at 2.5 hours again start an enhanced cannonade, stopping it only on those batteries, the operation of which can be prevented by the advancing troops.
The disadvantage of the operation plan was that the disposition was sent out only a few hours before the start of the assault, and the troops did not have enough time to carefully organize the attack. The direction of the main attack was also incorrectly chosen (as in previous assaults). The Allies planned to storm Plevna from the three most fortified sides. The opportunity was not used to carry out a roundabout maneuver, to attack the Turkish garrison from the western direction, where the Turks had almost no fortifications. The day of the third assault was also unsuccessfully chosen - because of weather conditions. All night and half a day on August 30 (September 11), 1877, it rained, then it was replaced by a drizzle. The soil was soaked, which prevented the movement of artillery and troops, visibility was poor. The assault had to be postponed. But it was the day of the royal name day, and no one dared to make such an offer. In his memoirs, the former chairman of the committee of ministers, P. A. Valuev, wrote that "if not for the 30s, we would not have stormed Plevny."
Storm
At 6 o'clock on August 30 (September 11), 1877, artillery preparation began. Thick fog covered the battlefield and interfered with the gunners. As a result, a good plan for the use of artillery that day could not be fully implemented. Artillery was unable to fully support the advancing infantry.
On the right flank at 15 o'clock, the Romanian troops launched an attack on two Grivitsky redoubts, which were located at a distance of about 400 meters from each other. Suffering heavy losses from rifle and artillery fire, the Romanians attacked the fortifications three times, but were not successful. The unfired Romanian soldiers, having met stubborn resistance from the enemy, were confused. Then the 1st brigade of the 5th infantry division under the command of Lieutenant General M.V. Rodionov was put forward to help them. The Romanians, with the arrival of the Russians, perked up and again went into battle. The Russian-Romanian troops went on the fourth attack and, at the cost of heavy losses, captured the Grivitsky redoubt No. 1. The Turks tried to recapture the redoubt, but they were thrown back. The Allies could not advance further. The Turks took measures to strengthen the defense in this direction. “The Grivitsky redoubt remained with us,” wrote D. A. Milyutin, “but the Turks managed to build new fortifications against it, while ours, having sat in the redoubt, did nothing all day to firmly establish itself in it, and did not even import artillery in it.
In the central sector, due to a mistake, the attack began not at 15 o'clock, as was the plan of the operation, but around noon. Russian troops came under heavy fire from the Omar redoubt. The Russian command consistently threw regiment after regiment into battle, but without success. Russian troops suffered heavy losses - about 4.5 thousand people. As a result, the Russian regiments went on the attack at different times, entered the battle in parts, and acted frontally. Such attacks were easily repelled by the enemy. The infantry offensive itself was poorly prepared by artillery. The strongest Turkish fortification in this direction - the Omar redoubt was not destroyed.
The battle on the Romanian part of the redoubt at c. Grivitsa. G. Dembitsky
The Russian troops achieved the greatest success on the left wing, where Skobelev's detachment operated. Here the enemy occupied positions that the chief of staff of the Western Detachment and its de facto leader, General P. D. Zotov, considered Plevna's "strategic and tactical key". They stretched from the southwest to the northeast, from a group of redoubts near the village of Krishin to the redoubts of Kavanlyk and Isa-Aga. Ahead of this position, Turkish troops occupied the third ridge of the Green Mountains. Skobelev considered the capture of the Kavanlyk and Isa-Aga redoubts (they were later called Skobelevsky) to be the main task. At dawn, artillery preparation began, and at 10 o'clock our troops went on the offensive and knocked the enemy down from the third ridge of the Green Mountains. The Turks retreated.
General Skobelev began to carry out the main task - the assault on the two main Turkish fortifications in this direction. True, the nature of the terrain did not favor the success of the Russian troops. In order to get to the redoubts, the advancing troops had to descend along the gentle northern slope of the third ridge into a hollow in which the Zelenogorsk stream flowed in steep, inaccessible banks for artillery. There was only one bridge across the stream. Having crossed the stream, it was necessary to climb a steep slope to a height where strong enemy fortifications No. 1 (Kavanlyk) and No. 2 (Isa-Aga) were located, which were connected by a deep trench. Ahead of the redoubts, on the slope, were located rifle trenches.
At about 3 p.m., Skobelev's troops stormed the enemy fortifications. The Vladimir and Suzdal regiments advancing in the first echelon suffered heavy losses from enemy fire, and lay down near the Zelenogorsk stream. Skobelev threw into the attack the second echelon - the Revel regiment. Our troops attacked again, but this offensive was stopped by the strong fire of the Turkish army. Skobelev threw his last, third echelon into the attack - the Libau regiment and two rifle battalions. And he led the attack. Our troops reached the enemy, hand-to-hand combat began. At 16:30, Russian troops took the Kavanlyk redoubt, after a stubborn battle, at 18:00, the Isa-Aga redoubt was occupied. Turkish troops, having received reinforcements from the reserve, made several attempts to dislodge the enemy, but to no avail. Shooting continued throughout the night.
In fact, Skobelev's detachment opened the way to Plevna itself. There were no longer any Turkish fortifications in front of the troops of the detachment and the city. A situation was created in which the further development of the offensive gave the entire city into the hands of the Russians. Panic began in the ranks of the Turkish army, the enemy soldiers were tired of a fierce battle. However, Skobelev's detachment also needed serious reinforcements. The soldiers fought in the morning, were tired, many had not slept for 2-4 days. The detachment lost a lot of people, the troops had to be reduced to combined teams with random commanders at the head. There were mountains of corpses everywhere. There was a groan of the wounded, who had no one to take away. Ammunition was running out. All reserves have been used. The soldiers could not even dig in, since there was no trench tool, but, “despite fatigue, hunger, fatigue in battle, the soldiers felt the need to dig in and did not spare the rest of their strength for this. They dug or, rather, dug the ground with bayonets, cleavers, scraped with manners, raked out with their hands, just to somehow cover themselves from fire from three sides ”(Kuropatkin. Actions of General Skobelev’s detachments in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1-878, part .I.). For the construction of barriers, even the corpses of their own and Turkish soldiers were used.
The further development of events depended on who would more accurately assess the situation and send reserves to this area. Skobelev promptly demanded that reinforcements be sent, but this was categorically refused to him. Neither the commander-in-chief nor Nepokoichitsky agreed to expose the Bolgarenskoe highway, did not believe that the Turks would dare to expose other directions in order to push back Skobelev's detachment. The Russian high command had the opportunity to regroup forces to the south and take the city itself. But the Russian command refused to regroup forces to the south and did not support the Skobelev detachment with reserves, believing that the assault had failed and there was no point in supporting the success of the Russian general. Although it was still possible to correct the mistakes of the attack plan and the failure of the troops of the right flank and center by introducing fresh reserves on the Russian left flank, achieving a decisive victory, albeit at an unnecessarily high price. Thus, the Russian command did not understand the benefits of the current situation, created in connection with the breakthrough of the flank of the Turkish defense and Skobelev's exit to Plevna itself, did not use the real opportunity to win a decisive victory. The breakthrough of fresh Russian troops into Plevna itself decided the outcome of the battle for the entire fortified area. So, the Russian command itself refused a sure chance of victory.
On August 31 (September 12), 1877, there was no active hostilities on the right flank and in the center. The Turks made one attack on the Grivitsky redoubt No. 1, but it was repulsed. The Turkish commander-in-chief Osman Pasha, unlike the Russian command, correctly assessed the situation and, given the great danger from the Skobelev detachment, which occupied two of the most important fortifications of the Turkish army near Plevna itself, decided to throw large forces against him. Osman Pasha almost widow strengthened his right flank, transferring 15 fresh battalions to this direction, taken from various defense sectors and from the general reserve of the Plevna garrison. The inaction of the main forces of the Russian-Romanian army in other directions contributed to the fulfillment of the plan of the Turkish commander. At the same time, Skobelev’s detachment was not even supported by strong reinforcements, so that he would keep these fortifications in the hands of the Russian army, which would help in the future offensive. Krylov, who temporarily commanded the 4th Corps, sent to the redoubts only the Shuisky regiment, exhausted by the battle of September 11 and weak (1300 people). In addition, the regiment was late, it had to be used only to cover the retreat of Skobelev's detachment. Together with Shuisky, Krylov sent the Yaroslavl regiment, but Zotov took him to his general reserve.
On the morning of August 31 (September 12), the Turks launched a decisive counteroffensive against the Skobelev redoubts. Our troops repelled four Turkish attacks. Then the Turkish commander ordered the fifth attack to withdraw all reserves, reducing the composition of the garrisons in trenches and redoubts to the extreme in all other positions. To inspire the counterattacking units, it was ordered to carry a green banner in front of them, and the mullahs in the camps to sing prayers. Behind the attacking troops, Osman Pasha placed a battery and two cavalry regiments, ordering them to shoot at anyone who decides to retreat.
In the meantime, after the fourth Turkish attack was repulsed, the position of the troops of the Russian left wing became hopeless. Skobelev in his report described the state of the redoubts as follows: “The redoubts presented by this time (3.5 o'clock in the afternoon) a terrible picture. The mass of corpses of Russians and Turks lay in heaps. The interior of the redoubt was especially filled with them. In the deep trench that connected the redoubts, longitudinal shots of the enemy were laid down by dozens of people at once, and the piles of corpses that filled the trench alternated with the still living defenders. On redoubt No. 2, a part of the parapet facing the city of Plevna was made of corpses. On redoubt No. 1, three guns of the 5th battery of the 3rd artillery brigade were partly mangled and deprived of servants and horses. The remaining two guns of the 2nd artillery brigade, which also lost their servants, I ordered to be taken away earlier. The gun in the redoubt was also knocked out. I took out the rings from the gun in case they fell into the hands of the Turks. The position of the Russians in the rear of the redoubts was also difficult. Kuropatkin wrote about it this way: “The section of the position between the third ridge and the redoubts presented a picture that was also painful: thousands of wounded and corpses lay on this site. Hundreds of bodies ... lying mixed with Turkish corpses decomposed and polluted the air.
The last fifth attack at 4 p.m. was led by the Turkish commander Osman Pasha himself. During the defense of the Kavanlyk redoubt, its commandant, Major F. Gortalov, heroically died. However, despite the heroism and steadfastness of the Russian soldiers, the Turkish army was able to recapture the redoubts. Russian troops retreated in an organized manner, carrying away the wounded.
General M. D. Skobelev on horseback. N. D. Dmitriev-Orenburgsky
Results
Thus, the third assault on Plevna, despite the high military prowess, dedication and stamina of Russian and Romanian soldiers and officers, ended in failure. Allied troops suffered serious losses. 13 thousand Russians and 3 thousand Romanians were killed. Particularly serious losses were on the left wing: the troops lost 6.5 thousand people killed and wounded, which was 44% of the officers and 41% of the soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the troops of Skobelev and Imeretinsky. The Turks determined their losses at 3 thousand people. Apparently it was underestimated.
The failure of the third assault was caused by a number of reasons, based on the mistakes of the Russian high command. Many mistakes were “inherited” from the first and second assaults on Plevna, that is, they did not bother to work on the mistakes. Among the reasons for the failure of the assault: poor intelligence of the location of the Turkish army and its defense system; underestimation of the forces and means of the enemy; a template offensive in the same directions on the most fortified sections of the Turkish fortified area; the lack of maneuver by troops to attack Plevna from the west, where the Turks had almost no fortifications; refusal to transfer the main efforts to a more promising direction, where Skobelev's detachment successfully broke through; lack of interaction between groupings of troops advancing in different directions (when some troops advanced, others stood still) and clear control of all allied forces. In addition, they could not organize a full-fledged artillery preparation with the involvement of large-caliber guns - the Turkish fortifications were almost not damaged during the shelling, the Turks quickly restored them. Poorly chosen day for the attack.
As the historian N. I. Belyaev noted: “Third Plevna clearly showed that during the 2.5 months of the war the Russian high command did not learn anything, did not take into account any of its previous mistakes and managed to add new ones to the old mistakes. Ultimately, it must be admitted that the third assault on Plevna was not based on real calculation, but was built only on the basis of one valor of a Russian soldier, on the unexpected appearance of favorable accidents, on a “maybe” ”(N. I. Belyaev. Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878).
The lack of a unified command played a negative role. Formally, the Western detachment was headed by the Romanian prince Karl, in fact, the head of the troops was the chief of staff of the detachment, General Zotov. The Romanian troops were run by their general Cernata. Near Plevna were the Russian Emperor Alexander II, the Minister of War D. A. Milyutin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Danube Army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. Everything did not allow for clear control of the allied forces.
The unsuccessful outcome of the third assault on Plevna forced the Russian high command to change the way it dealt with the enemy. On September 1 (13), Tsar Alexander II arrived near Plevna and convened a military council, at which he raised the question of whether the army should remain near Plevna or whether it was necessary to retreat across the Osma River. The chief of staff of the Western Detachment, Lieutenant General P. D. Zotov, and the chief of artillery of the army, Lieutenant General Prince N. F. Masalsky, spoke out in favor of the retreat. For the continuation of the struggle for the fortress, Major General K. V. Levitsky, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Danube Army, and Minister of War D. A. Milyutin advocated.
The situation was not as dangerous as some generals saw it. Allied Russian-Romanian troops in the Balkans numbered 277 thousand people. Ottoman Empire had an army of 350 thousand, but only about 200 thousand people could put up against the allies. The main grouping of the Russian army, which consisted of more than 100 thousand people with 470 guns, was located near Kalafat, Lovcha and Plevna. The enemy countered these troops with 70,000 soldiers and 110 guns stationed in the area of Vidin, Orkhaniye and Plevna. Therefore, Milyutin insisted on continuing operations in the Plevna area. At the same time he suggested new way fight with the enemy. In his opinion, it was necessary to abandon direct assaults on Plevna and break the enemy's resistance with the help of a blockade. Milyutin correctly noted that the army in the field, without large-caliber artillery of mounted fire, would not be able to reliably suppress and destroy enemy fortifications, therefore, victory in a frontal assault was unlikely. In the event of a complete siege, however, a quick success can be achieved, since the Turkish army does not have reserves for waging a long-term struggle. Indeed, the enemy was already in a bad position. On September 2 (14), 1877, Osman Pasha reported to the high command that shells and food were running out, there were no reinforcements, and losses had greatly weakened the garrison. The Turkish commander noted that the army was placed "in the need to retreat, but it is very difficult to carry out the retreat."
As a result, Alexander II supported Milyutin's point of view. Changes were made in the leadership of the Western Detachment. Engineer-General E. I. Totleben, summoned from St. Petersburg, was appointed assistant to the commander of the detachment of the Romanian prince Karl. He was a hero of the Crimean War of 1853-1856. General Zotov returned to command of the 4th Corps. The entire cavalry was subordinated to the brave and decisive I.V. Gurko. These changes have improved troop management. In addition, the newly arrived Guards Corps joined the Western Detachment: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Guards Infantry and 2nd Guards Cavalry Divisions, and the Guards Rifle Brigade. The correct siege of Plevna began, which eventually led to victory.
11/28/1877 (11/12). - The capture of Plevna by Russian troops. Surrender of the Turkish army by Osman Pasha
Discussion: 8 comments
I am surprised to read the description of this magnificent monument. BUT now this is a falsification: almost the entire monument was made of black granite, it sparkled in the sun and was really monumental. Now it's just a rusty layout, a fake. It hurts to look at this sacrilege!
I ask you to comment on the Wikipedia article, where it is reported that 1,700 Russian soldiers died during the capture of Plevna, but you have other data. Apparently you need to make a remark to Wikipedia about the unreliability of their data, and indeed the entire article written, as it seemed to me, in an anti-Russian vein.
Wikipedia writes: "80-90 thousand people took part from the Russian-Romanian troops, 1700 of them were lost during the breakthrough." The figure includes not only Russians, but also Romanians. And LOST does not mean killed, the wounded were also included in the losses. So I don’t see a contradiction with what is written in this article: “The capture of Plevna cost the Russians 192 killed and 1252 wounded.”
"AT last battle 80-90 thousand people took part from the Russian-Romanian troops, 1700 of them were lost during the breakthrough. Turkish losses, due to complete exhaustion and congestion, amounted to about 6000 people. The remaining 43,338 Turkish soldiers surrendered; a significant number of them died in captivity. At the end of the war, 15581 Turkish veterans from the army of Osman Pasha were awarded a silver medal for the heroic defense of Plevna.
Do you think that the Russians and Romanians were counted together and killed and wounded, but how to count the losses of the Turks? After all, only those who remained were taken prisoner, in your opinion, the wounded Turks were not taken prisoner? That they were allowed to die in Plevna, or were they treated like prisoners? And were the Russian veterans awarded?
Dear Ekaterina. The exact source of the Wikipedia data is not indicated there - a list of references is provided. Source of information used in this article: "Russian Heroes of the War of 1877: Description of the Russian-Turkish War". Translation from German. Moscow: Edition of the B. Post bookstore, 1878. (See: Collection: historical documents http://historydoc.edu.ru/catalog.asp?cat_ob_no=&ob_no=13875)
The figures given refer only to the last assault on Plevna. Of course, earlier there were losses that were not taken into account here: about 31 thousand people - according to the Sov. military enc. I have now included this clarification in the article so that there are no misunderstandings. Thank you for your attention to this issue.
31 thousand Russian losses are all losses - killed, wounded, etc., and not just those killed
We found something to compare with, on Wikipedia most of the articles are written in an anti-Russian vein, even if there are no Russians there)))
What's the matter? What if a person was not killed, but wounded so that he cannot fight, then he is not lost to the army? Or did he not lose his health in the battle? Why is it necessary to divide the losses into those killed and not killed? So the number of losses should also count those who were not killed!
November 28 (December 11 according to the "new style"), 1877. The capture of Plevna by Russian troops. Surrender of the Turkish army by Osman Pasha
Monument to the Heroes of Plevna in Moscow (1887)
During the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. for the liberation of the Balkan Slavs, the Turkish fortress of Plevna in Bulgaria was a serious threat to the right flank and rear of the Russian army, it chained its main forces to itself and slowed down the advance into the Balkans.
After a bloody four-month siege and three unsuccessful attacks, food supplies ran out in the besieged army of Osman Pasha, and on November 28 at 7 o'clock in the morning he made the last attempt to break through to the west of Plevna, where he threw all his forces. The first furious pressure forced our troops to retreat from the advanced fortifications. But the artillery fire of the second line of fortifications did not allow the Turks to break out of the encirclement. The grenadiers went on the attack and drove the Turks back. From the north, the Romanians attacked the Turkish line, and from the south, General Skobelev broke into the city.
Osman Pasha was wounded in the leg. Realizing the hopelessness of his situation, he threw out in several places White flag. When Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich appeared on the battlefield, the Turks had already surrendered. The last assault on Plevna cost the Russians 192 killed and 1252 wounded, the Turks lost up to 4000 people. 44 thousand surrendered, including Osman Pasha. Nevertheless, on the personal order of Emperor Alexander II, for the bravery of the saber shown by the Turks, his saber was returned to the wounded and captured Turkish general.
In just four months of the siege and fighting near Plevna, about 31 thousand Russian soldiers died. However, this was a turning point in the war: the capture of this fortress allowed the Russian command to release over 100 thousand people for the offensive, and a month later the Turks requested a truce. The Russian army occupied Andrianopol without a fight and approached Constantinople, but the Western powers did not allow Russia to occupy it, threatening to break off diplomatic relations (and England - and mobilization). Emperor Alexander II did not risk a new war, since the main goal was achieved: the defeat of Turkey and the liberation of the Balkan Slavs. So it seemed. Negotiations began on this. On February 19, 1878, peace was signed with Turkey at San Stefano. And although the Western powers did not allow then to achieve the complete unification of the Bulgarian lands, this war became the basis for the future independence of a united Bulgaria.
Battle of Plevna November 28, 1877
On the day of the tenth anniversary of the heroic battle, in the center of Moscow at the beginning of Ilyinsky Square, a chapel-monument to the grenadiers who fell in the battle near Plevna was consecrated. The chapel was built on the initiative and voluntary donations of the surviving grenadiers - participants in the Battle of Plevna. The author of the project was academician of architecture V.O. Sherwood. The cast-iron octagonal chapel ends with a tent with an Orthodox cross trampling the Muslim crescent. Its side faces are decorated with 4 high reliefs: a Russian peasant blessing his grenadier son before a campaign; a Janissary tearing a child out of the hands of a Bulgarian mother; a grenadier capturing a Turkish soldier; a Russian warrior breaking the chains from a woman personifying Bulgaria. On the sides of the tent there are inscriptions: "Grenadiers to their comrades who fell in the glorious battle near Plevna on November 28, 1877", "In memory of the war with Turkey in 1877-78" and a list of the main battles - "Plevna, Kars, Aladzha, Hadji Vali" . In front of the monument there are cast-iron pedestals with the inscriptions "For the benefit of the crippled grenadiers and their families" (there were mugs for donations on them). In the interior of the chapel, decorated with polychrome tiles, there were picturesque images of Saints Alexander Nevsky, John the Warrior, Nicholas the Wonderworker, Cyril and Methodius, bronze plates with the names of the dead grenadiers - 18 officers and 542 soldiers.
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