State Committee for the State of Emergency. GKChP (State Committee for the State of Emergency) State Committee for the State of Emergency

Introduction

Chapter 1. The state of the USSR at the time of the collapse

1 Economic status

2 Political state

3 Relations between the USSR, RSFSR and other union republics

Chapter 2. State Committee for the State of Emergency

1 Prerequisites for the creation of the State Emergency Committee, its composition

3 Consequences of the August coup

4 Evaluation of the GKChP

Conclusion

Bibliography

Attachment 1. Interview with Alexander Tsipko

Annex 2. Commentary by Valery Khomyakov

Appendix 3. Andrey Parshev's interview

Annex 4. Questionnaire. What is the GKChP for you?

Appendix 5. Respondents who took part in the survey

Annex 6. Survey summary

Introduction

In August 2011, they once again recalled the events of 20 years ago - the collapse of the greatest power - the USSR.

Two decades ago, events took place that are interpreted as the "August Putsch". These events became a turning point that finally determined the further course of events and made it impossible to preserve the USSR.

Then, in a desperate attempt to save the country that was falling apart before our eyes, a group of top Soviet leaders tried to close the control of the state on itself. This attempt ended in failure. How do we see these events through the prism of the past two decades, and what is the main lesson that we should learn?

RelevanceThe theme is that the events of August 19-21, 1991 led to a lot of unrest, changes in the life of the country, the entire world community. The collapse of the USSR marked the beginning of a long-term process of changing the world and regional balances of power: economic, political, military. The whole system of international relations has become less stable and less predictable.

Different sources say different things. It is difficult to find a capacious historical and political assessment of the events that took place. This question seems to be ambiguous and poorly studied. Studying the topic of the State Emergency Committee, I got acquainted with the statements of some political scientists and philosophers of our time: Alexander Tsipko, philosopher, publicist; Valery Khomyakov, CEO National Strategy Council; Andrey Parshev, political scientist, editor-in-chief of the Algorithm publishing house.

The purpose of this work is to identify the impact of the events that took place on August 18-21 on the life of the country.

Tasks ahead of me:

To assess the economic and political state of the union;

Give an assessment of the relations of the USSR with other union republics;

Consider the chronicle of the events of the "August coup" and evaluate them.

Now let's take a look at those last years the existence of the USSR, or rather the last two dozen of them, where I will try to show the reasons for the collapse of such a strong state as it was at that time. Let us consider the events of August 1991 and give them an assessment.

Chapter 1. The state of the USSR at the time of the collapse

.1 Economic condition

In the early 1970s, all the trappings of a turn to a market economy were dealt a blow. The very word "market" has become a sign of unreliability. Since the second half of the 70s. the organization of industrial production began to change. Scientific and production associations (NGOs) appeared. Their goal was to merge science and industry, which actually did not happen. But during these years, the official economy was rapidly and successfully merging with the shadow economy - all sorts of semi-legal and illegal production and trade activities, in which entire enterprises were involved. The incomes of the shadow economy amounted to many billions. By the beginning of the 80s. the ineffectiveness of attempts at limited reform became apparent Soviet system. The country entered a period of deep crisis.

Due to these and many other reasons, by the mid-80s. the possibility of a gradual, painless transition to new system public relations in Russia was hopelessly missed. The spontaneous degeneration of the system changed the entire order of life of Soviet society: the rights of managers and enterprises were redistributed, departmentalism and social inequality intensified. The nature of industrial relations within enterprises has changed, labor discipline has begun to fall, apathy and indifference, theft, disrespect for honest work, envy of those who earn more have become widespread. At the same time, non-economic coercion to work persisted in the country. The Soviet man, alienated from the distribution of the produced product, has turned into a performer who works not according to conscience, but under compulsion. The ideological motivation of labor developed in the post-revolutionary years weakened along with the belief in the imminent triumph of communist ideals, in parallel with this, the flow of petrodollars was reduced and the external and internal debt of the state grew.

In the early 80s. without exception, all sections of Soviet society suffered from lack of freedom, experienced psychological discomfort. The intelligentsia wanted genuine democracy and individual freedom.

Most workers and employees associated the need for change with better organization and wages, a more equitable distribution of social wealth. Part of the peasantry hoped to become the true owners of their land and their labor.

However, in the end, completely different forces determined the direction and nature of the reform of the Soviet system. These forces were the Soviet nomenklatura, which depended on communist conventions and personal well-being from their official position.

By mid-1991, a very turbulent situation had developed in the Soviet Union. Back in the late 1980s, the government “launched the money machine”, the financial and credit mechanism turned out to be unbalanced, economic indicators continued to decline, the budget deficit increased, inflation increased, and there was a shortage of consumer goods. All this led to mass unrest and dissatisfaction of people, open criticism of the existing political system.

In 1991, there was a decline in production, a decrease in the gross national product, oil and coal production, inflation turned into hyperinflation. It became clear that a deep economic crisis broke out in the country. Its resolution also required cardinal political changes.

However, inconsistent domestic policy, primarily chaotic economic reforms, led to a deepening crisis in all spheres of society and, as a result, to a sharp decline in living standards.

Thus, by the beginning of the 80s. the Soviet totalitarian system actually lost support in society and ceased to be legitimate. Its collapse becomes a matter of time.

1.2 Political state

The first concrete step towards political reform was the decisions of the extraordinary twelfth session of the Supreme Council (SC) of the USSR (eleventh convocation), held on November 29 - December 1, 1988. deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR elected by him with real power functions, as well as a change in the electoral system, primarily the introduction of elections on an alternative basis.

the year was a year of radical change, especially in the political structure of society. The elections of people's deputies of the USSR (March-May) held in 1989 were preceded by an election campaign unprecedented in our country, which began at the end of 1988. The possibility of nominating several alternative candidates (9505 candidates were nominated for 2,250 deputy seats) finally gave Soviet citizens the opportunity to really choose one of several.

A third of the people's deputies were elected from public organizations, which allowed the Communists, as the most massive "public organization" at the Congress, to have a majority. This was announced as an achievement: the share of communists among people's deputies turned out to be 87% against 71.5% of the previous convocation, on the basis of which it was concluded that in the conditions of freedom of choice the authority of the party was confirmed.

In the elections held on March 26, 1989 in 1500 territorial and national-territorial districts, 89.8% of those included in the voter lists participated. These elections were a noticeable shift in society towards democracy, at least as it seemed at the time. The entire country followed the work of the Congress - a decrease in labor productivity was recorded everywhere.

The First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (May 25 - June 9, 1989) became a very major political event. Never before has there been such a thing in the history of this country.

There were few practical results of the Congress, in particular, a new USSR Supreme Council was elected. Several general decrees were adopted, for example, the Decree on the main directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR.

The discussions at the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (December 12-24, 1989) were more businesslike than at the first Congress. The Second Congress adopted 36 normative acts, incl. 5 laws and 26 regulations. One of the central issues on the agenda of the Second Congress of People's Deputies was the discussion of measures to improve the economy. The issue of combating organized crime was discussed. The congress considered the reports of the commission, devoted both to foreign policy problems (assessment of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany of August 23, 1939, political assessment of the introduction Soviet troops to Afghanistan in 1979) and internal political (about Gdlyan's investigative group, about the events in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989, about privileges).

When the first Congress of People's Deputies opened, many pinned their hopes for a better life on it. But, like many hopes of our people, they were not destined to come true. The First Congress is now called "the game of democracy." By the second Congress, people's interest had noticeably subsided. It has already become clear to the people that you can’t just take it and make life better. The reform of the electoral system was a necessary thing, but it gave the people little concrete, vital.

In the summer-autumn of 1989, reformers in the CPSU gave the democrats the opportunity to gain political strength and influence. The situation in the country required a decisive development of a course towards a mixed economy, towards the creation of a state of law and the conclusion of a new union treaty. All this objectively worked for the Democrats.

By the winter of 1989/90, the political situation had changed significantly. Gorbachev, fearing, not without reason, that the spring elections in the republics would lead to the victory of radical forces (Democratic Russia, the RUH and others), who immediately - following the example of the Baltic States - would try to take an independent position in relation to the Supreme Soviet of the Union headed by him, took a step , against which he and his like-minded people opposed a few months ago. Using his authority in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR headed by him, he managed - with the resistance of the Interregional Deputy Group - to pass a decision on the establishment of the post of President of the USSR. Having become President, Gorbachev received broad political powers and thereby greatly strengthened his power in the country.

Then political struggle moved to the state level. There was an actual multi-authority, in which the union and republican structures could neither act without regard to each other, nor come to an agreement among themselves. The "war of laws" between the Union and the republics was conducted with varying success, and by the winter of 1990/91 reached its peak due to the tragic events in the Baltic states, the struggle over the Union Treaty and the Union budget. All this happened against the background of the rapid collapse of the economy, interethnic confrontation between the republics and within them.

As a result, there has been another shift in the mindset of society. After the democrats came to power in the large industrial centers of Russia and Ukraine, a lot of time passed, but the situation continued to worsen. Moreover, democracy was clearly degenerating into anarchy. Similar sentiments also seized the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: in December, fearing an unpredictable development of events, it delegated additional powers to the President, and at the same time additional responsibility. Gorbachev, in January of this year, formed a new Cabinet of Ministers, in which representatives of the "enlightened" bureaucracy and the military-industrial complex took key posts.

Naturally, Gorbachev needed to consolidate his grip on power. And in order to ideologically justify his struggle with the old party system, he was forced to proclaim a course towards the renewal of socialism with its leading and guiding force - the CPSU. At first, in April, they began personnel changes. One after another, the party leaders of the regions and republics went on a well-deserved rest. Egor Kuzmich Ligachev led the cleaning of the apparatus, and in two years he coped with his task - he seated devoted people in all key posts.

On this, all party “perestroikas” before Gorbachev, as a rule, ended, but Ligachev’s influence in the party increased so much that the Secretary General felt the competitor’s breath in the back of his head. And no sooner had the new nomenklatura arrived than Gorbachev announced that perestroika was continuing.

However, it was not so easy to “topple” Ligachev in the party arena, and Gorbachev, in the end, had to create alternative structures in the form of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies in order to keep the apparatchiks in constant tension. In sitting on two chairs at once, Gorbachev found undoubted benefits for himself: the partycrats could always be intimidated by the democrats, and the democrats by the glory of the CPSU.

The fight was mainly around two points. The first is the general scenario for the development of perestroika. Will it be a gradual ingrowth of the established management structures into a market economy and the introduction of state-bureaucratic capitalism "from above"? Or, on the contrary, the liquidation of these structures and the spontaneous formation of capitalism "from below"?

The second key point is that since reforms require deliberately unpopular measures, the responsibility for their adoption and all the costs associated with them are, as a rule, assigned to political opponents. Most often, the Center acted as a "scapegoat". This manifested itself, for example, in the course of a political scandal that erupted in the Supreme Soviet of Russia, when the Union government announced the decision to introduce negotiated prices for a number of goods (in November 1990). Meanwhile, this decision was agreed with B.N. Yeltsin, and with I.S. Silaev. The opposite cases are also known, when the Center itself found a “scapegoat”: the five percent sales tax introduced by presidential decree, which took a little less than a billion (931.5 million) rubles from the pocket of the population in January-February 1991 alone, was “blabbed” on the Council of Ministers RSFSR.

By the end of 1990, a hopeless situation was established: neither the communist reformers nor the liberals could, individually, achieve positive changes in the economy, politics, and the social sphere. The main thing is that they could not stand alone against the threat of general anarchy. The first - because they have largely lost the support of the people, the second - because after their first victories they managed to lose many of their adherents.

The understanding of the need for a political compromise was observed both in one and in the other camp. The communist reformers in their documents of the second half of 1990 called for civil accord, expressed their readiness to create not just a bloc of forces of "socialist orientation", but to enter into an alliance with all democratic parties and movements. Their opponents, whom they faced when they came to power at the local, and in some places at the republican level, also seemed to be internally ready for cooperation. The idea of a compromise with part of the apparatus and the center and the creation of a strong executive power. The idea of civil accord by suspending the idea of a complete dissolution of all political parties became popular by the end of 1990 and flashed on different flanks of the liberal democratic movement. Both A. A. Sobchak and the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia V.V. Zhirinovsky. The liberals, apparently, realized that their time was running out before it had even begun.

An acute crisis broke out in the existing political system. Having proclaimed the slogan “All power to the Soviets!”, the reformers did not even think about the fact that the Soviets, which had ceased to be the driving belts of the CPSU, were not able to organize a normal process political development. The CPSU press sharply criticized the "incompetent democrats" who did not know how to organize the work of those Soviets in which they had the majority. "Incompetent Democrats" pointed to "sabotage" by the executive branch, mafia structures. However, the essence of the matter goes deeper. The political crisis of the end of 1990 is the result not so much of incompetence or sabotage as of an obsolete type of statehood.

Each political force sought to find its own way out of this crisis. The "state classes" reacted most painfully to it - those strata whose very existence was now at stake. They increasingly pushed the President and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to establish an authoritarian presidential regime under nominal Soviet power. Gorbachev, although not without hesitation, was forced to go for it. He needed support, but there was nowhere to get it: the CPSU lost its mobilization abilities, and cooperation with the liberals did not work out - the inertia of confrontation affected.

However, even if it had taken shape, the authoritarian transformation of the regime could hardly have been avoided. Because liberals - in any case, considered the strengthening of executive power, authoritarian methods of transition to a market economy as something long-term, and not as a temporary tactical measure, therefore, strictly speaking, they were not only democrats, but also liberals, except in quotation marks. It was enough to read the draft Constitution of Russia to see that the totalitarian regime is supposed to be replaced not by universal democracy, but by authoritarian power. At the same time, however, unlike the communist reformers, the liberals aimed at changing the foundation of the political system, at transforming Soviet power into a parliamentary republic.

.3 Relations between the USSR, the RSFSR and other union republics

The year 1990 was marked by the unilateral decision of some union republics (primarily the Baltic ones) to self-determine and create independent nation-states.

Attempts by the allied center to influence these decisions by economic measures were ultimately unsuccessful. A wave of declaring the sovereignties of the union republics, electing their own presidents, and introducing new names swept across the country. The republics sought to get rid of the dictates of the center by declaring their independence.

The real danger of the uncontrolled collapse of the USSR, threatening with unpredictable consequences, forced the center and the republics to look for a way to compromises and agreements. The idea of concluding a new union treaty was put forward popular fronts The Baltic states back in 1988. But until mid-1989, she did not find support. At that time, it seemed to many that the contract was not the main thing. The center finally “ripened” to realize the importance of the Union Treaty only after the “parade of sovereignties” changed the Union beyond recognition, when the centrifugal tendencies gained strength.

political soviet state of emergency

.1 Prerequisites for the creation of the State Emergency Committee, its composition

There are different opinions about the reasons for the creation of the State Emergency Committee, the main ones are:

) fear of persons who are members of the State Emergency Committee to lose power;

) saving the USSR from collapse.

According to the first version, scheduled for August 20, 1991. the signing of the new Union Treaty pushed the conservatives to take decisive action, since the agreement deprived the top of the CPSU of real power, posts and privileges. According to the secret agreement between M. Gorbachev, B. Yeltsin and the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev, which became known to the chairman of the KGB V. Kryuchkov, after the signing of the agreement, it was supposed to replace the Prime Minister of the USSR V. Pavlov N. Nazarbayev. The same fate awaited the Minister of Defense, Kryuchkov himself, and a number of other high-ranking officials.

I would like to believe that the organizers of the GKChP were driven not by selfish intentions, but by patriotism, the desire to preserve the Soviet Union. Let's take a closer look at this version.

Since December 1990, the chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov analyzed the situation in the country and tried to introduce a state of emergency in the ways provided for by the Constitution. The introduction of a state of emergency was necessary in order to restore the rule of law in the USSR and stop the collapse of the Union. By the beginning of August 1991, it became clear that it would not be possible to do this by legal means: they began to prepare a coup. August 7-15, 1991 V.A. Kryuchkov repeatedly met with future members of the State Emergency Committee. On August 18, surveillance was established for the President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev, who at that moment was on vacation in the Crimea, and the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin.

August Vice-President of the USSR G.I. Yanaev issued a decree on his assumption of the post of President of the USSR. On the same night, the State Committee for the State of Emergency was created. It included:

V.S. Pavlov - Prime Minister of the USSR;

D.T. Yazov - Minister of Defense of the USSR;

V.A. Kryuchkov - Chairman of the KGB of the USSR;

O.D. Baklanov - Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council;

B.K. Pugo - Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

V.A. Starodubtsev - Chairman of the Peasant Union of the USSR;

A.I. Tizyakov - President of the Association of State Enterprises of the USSR.

The main goal of the putschists was to "prevent the collapse of the Union", which, in their opinion, was to begin on August 20 during the first stage of the signing of a new union treaty, turning the USSR into a confederation of independent states. It was on August 20 that the representatives of the RSFSR and Kazakhstan were to sign the agreement.

The putschists chose the moment when the President was away and announced his temporary removal from power for health reasons.

The GKChP relied on the forces of the KGB (Alpha), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Division named after Dzerzhinsky) and the Moscow Region (Tula Airborne Division, Taman Division, Kantemirovskaya Division). In total, about 4 thousand military personnel, 362 tanks, 427 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were brought into Moscow. Additional units of the Airborne Forces were deployed in the vicinity of Leningrad, Tallinn, Tbilisi, and Riga. The Airborne Forces were commanded by Generals Pavel Grachev and his deputy Alexander Lebed. However, the putschists did not have complete control over their forces; so, on the very first day, parts of the Taman division went over to the side of the defenders of the White House. From the tank of this division, Yeltsin delivered his famous message to the assembled supporters.

Informational support for the putschists was provided by the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (for three days, news releases invariably included exposure of various acts of corruption and violations of the law committed as part of the "reformist course"). The GKChP also enlisted the support of the Central Committee of the CPSU, however, these institutions could not have a noticeable impact on the situation in the country, and for some reason the committee could not or did not want to mobilize that part of society that shared the views of the members of the GKChP.

GKChP resistance led by political leadership Russian Federation. By call Russian authorities masses of Muscovites gathered at the House of Soviets of the Russian Federation ("White House"), among whom were representatives of various social groups- from the democratic community, student youth, intellectuals and veterans Afghan war to members of criminal structures and the "petty bourgeoisie".

On the night of August 19, 1991, the President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev was forcibly removed from power. A group of high-ranking officials formed the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (GKChP).

At 6 o'clock in the morning, the USSR mass media announce the introduction of a state of emergency in the country and the inability of the President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev to perform his functions "for health reasons" and the transfer of all power into the hands of the State Emergency Committee. Simultaneously to Moscow and others big cities troops were brought in.

It was announced that “in order to overcome the deep and comprehensive crisis, political, interethnic and civil confrontation, chaos and anarchy that threaten life and our society ... meeting the demands of the general population for the need to take the most decisive measures to overcome the slide of society to national catastrophe, ensuring law and order, introduce a state of emergency in certain areas of the USSR for a period of 6 months from 4 o'clock Moscow time on August 19, 1991 ... To govern the country and effectively implement the state of emergency, form the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (GKChP THE USSR)..."

By decrees of the State Emergency Committee in a number of regions of the country, mainly in the RSFSR, a state of emergency was introduced, rallies, demonstrations, and strikes were prohibited. The activities of democratic parties and organizations, newspapers were suspended, and control over the mass media was established. In addition, it was prescribed to establish law and order in the country, fight corruption, freeze and lower prices, “struggle for the harvest”, accelerate housing construction and other populist actions.

At night, Alpha moved to Yeltsin's dacha in Arkhangelskoye, but did not block it and was not instructed to take any action against him. Meanwhile, Yeltsin urgently mobilized all his supporters in the upper echelon of power; the most prominent of these were Ruslan Khasbulatov, Anatoly Sobchak, Gennady Burbulis, Mikhail Poltoranin, Sergei Shakhrai, Viktor Yaroshenko. The coalition drafted and faxed out an appeal "To the Citizens of Russia." The mouthpiece of the opponents of the putsch was "Echo of Moscow"

Yeltsin's condemnation of the GKChP during a speech from a tank of the Taman division at the White House. With the connivance of Alpha, Russian President B.N. Yeltsin arrives at the "White House" (Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR) at 9 o'clock and organizes a center of resistance to the actions of the State Emergency Committee. Resistance takes the form of rallies that gather in Moscow near the White House on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment and in Leningrad on Mariinskaya Square. The White House defenders are supported by rock bands ("Time Machine", "Kruiz", "Shah", "Metal Corrosion"), which organize the "Rock on the Barricades" concert. Barricades are erected in Moscow, leaflets are distributed. Directly at the White House is the armored vehicles of the Ryazan regiment of the Tula airborne division under the command of Major General Alexander Lebed and the Taman division. At 12 o'clock from the tank, Yeltsin addressed the audience at the rally, where he called the incident a coup d'état. From among the protesters, armed detachments of militias are created under the command of deputy Konstantin Kobets. Afghan veterans and employees of the private security company "Alex" take an active part in the militia. Yeltsin prepares space for retreat by sending his emissaries to Paris and Sverdlovsk with the right to organize a government in exile.

On the evening of August 19, a press conference was held by the State Emergency Committee. The members of the GKChP were visibly nervous; the whole world went around the footage of G. Yanaev's shaking hands. Journalist T. Malkina openly called what was happening a "coup", and the words of the members of the State Emergency Committee were more like excuses.

By order of the State Emergency Committee, preparations were made for the previously unplanned seizure of the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR by special forces of the KGB of the USSR. However, the generals responsible for preparing the assault began to have doubts about the expediency. Alexander Lebed goes over to the side of the White House defenders. The commanders of "Alfa" and "Vympel" Karpukhin and Beskov ask the Deputy Chairman of the KGB Ageev to cancel the operation. The assault was cancelled.

In connection with the hospitalization of V. Pavlov, the temporary leadership of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was entrusted to V.Kh. Doguzhiev, who made no public statements during the coup.

On the night of August 21, tank units controlled by the State Emergency Committee carry out maneuvers near the White House (the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR). There is a skirmish on the Novoarbatsky bridge.

The Alpha group refuses to storm the White House. At 5 o'clock in the morning, Yazov gives the order to withdraw troops from Moscow. On the afternoon of August 21, the session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR begins under the chairmanship of Khasbulatov, which almost immediately accepts statements condemning the GKChP. Vice-President of the RSFSR Alexander Rutskoi and Prime Minister Ivan Silaev fly to Foros to see Gorbachev. On another plane, some members of the State Committee for the State of Emergency take off to Crimea, trying to beg for forgiveness. Gorbachev refuses to accept them. The politically active people, who had gathered in the capital to defend the President of the USSR, actually found themselves under the direct command of President Yeltsin. By the end of the coup, in his speeches, Yeltsin shifts the focus from defending Gorbachev's legitimate authority to defending "free Russia."

Mikhail Gorbachev returns from Foros to Moscow with Rutskoi and Silaev on a Tu-134 plane. Members of the GKChP were arrested. Live, Yeltsin, in the presence of Gorbachev, signs a decree on the suspension of the CPSU on the territory of the RSFSR, in his own way, fulfilling the claims of the putschists - depriving Gorbachev's power provided by the party.

Mourning for the dead has been declared in Moscow. A mass rally was held on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment in Moscow, during which the demonstrators carried out a huge panel of the Russian tricolor; At the rally, the President of the RSFSR announced that a decision had been made to make the white-azure-red banner the new state flag of Russia.

2.3 Consequences of the August Putsch

The events of August 19-21, 1991 changed the country. Perestroika is a thing of the past as a "revolution from above" within the framework of the old system, with its focus on the socialist choice made once and for all.

The events of August 1991 accelerated the collapse Soviet Union. In August 1991, Ukraine and Moldova declared their independence, in September - Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Chechen Republic, then the independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was recognized, in October Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan separated, in December - the RSFSR and Kazakhstan.

All attempts by M.S. Gorbachev to resume work on the signing of a new Union Treaty were unsuccessful. Ukraine and Belarus voted for the independence of their republics and refused to sign the Union Treaty. In this situation, unification with other republics lost its meaning.

In December 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus met in Minsk to negotiate the termination of the 1922 Union Treaty and the possibility of creating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). December 25 M.S. Gorbachev resigned, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the flag of the USSR was replaced by the flag of the Russian Federation, and the formation of a new state political system in the likeness of Western Europe began.

The collapse of the USSR led to the rupture of most of the traditional ties between economic entities in the former republics, significantly reduced both in Russia and in other CIS states the opportunities for economic maneuver with financial, industrial, natural and other resources, due to the isolation of the economic systems of states and the widespread crisis, associated with the disintegration of the Soviet economy.

In the political sphere, the collapse of the USSR marked the beginning of a long-term process of changing the world and regional balances of power: economic, political, military. The whole system of international relations has become less stable and less predictable. The global threat has moved away, including nuclear war However, the likelihood of local wars and armed conflicts has increased. The political potential and influence of Russia in comparison with the USSR, its ability to defend its interests has sharply decreased.

Internationally, the collapse of the USSR was accompanied by some positive changes. The outside world has become less afraid of Russia compared to the USSR. The potential for creating a hostile environment towards her has decreased.

The problem of minorities living outside their national homelands has arisen. Protecting their interests through traditional diplomacy in the long term requires complex strategies.

There is a problem of new borders, which can cause aggravation in relations between the states that were created on the territory of the former Soviet Union, where such a problem did not exist.

The collapse of the USSR did not become a completed act, but initiated a long process of building new independent states. This process is characterized by significant instability.

2.4 Evaluation of the GKChP

In order to evaluate the events of August 1991, we have reviewed and will now evaluate three events.

The first event is the creation of the State Emergency Committee and the intentions that were proclaimed.

The State Emergency Committee, by its creation and its declarations, declared:

1)the previous course pursued by Gorbachev had reached a dead end.

This was well understood by those who opposed the GKChP, but they hoped that by defeating the GKChP, they would be able to seize power themselves.

2)Gorbachev is incapable of running the country.

On August 18, Gorbachev refused to return to Moscow with other leaders and personally take part in restoring order; he referred specifically to health - either to sciatica, or to rheumatism. Thus, formally, the GKChP told the truth, and Yanaev was obliged to take up the duties of the President, since Gorbachev evaded this.

3)The country is on the brink of an abyss and emergency measures are needed to pull it out of there.

Indeed, emergency and decisive measures were needed to overcome the crisis in the country. It might scare someone. It was clear to most that without them - still can not do. Yes, and Yeltsin, having taken power in the country, it was through emergency measures that he tried to solve the problem. And how could a country be stopped on the brink of disaster without emergency measures?

The second event - the actions of the State Emergency Committee

There are many questions when we want to assess the actions of the State Emergency Committee. It is not clear why, if the organizers of the GKChP decided to isolate Gorbachev, they left him in his own residence, if he was arrested by the GKChP, how did Rutskoi and other representatives of the White House get to him first on August 21? If the State Emergency Committee introduced a state of emergency in the country (or a number of localities), why were not those leaders who could lead the fight against it arrested on the night of 18 to 19? Why, on the morning of August 19, was Yeltsin unhindered, on Yanayev's instructions, released from his dacha, which is believed to have been blocked by Alpha forces? Why, when the astonished generals called Yazov and asked what they should do next, did he give a strange order: “Get drawn into the city, find places of deployment and not interfere with the life of Moscow”? Why did none of the introduced parts get practically any intelligible task? Why were the units sent to the White House ordered to “Take protection of the leadership of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR? Why, on the very first evening, did the Vremya program broadcast Yeltsin's calls to oppose the Allied leadership, given that all the TV buildings were already filled with KGB officers? Why, when "Echo of Moscow" called supporters to the White House and was closed down by the Moscow KGB, representatives of the Union Government came to resume its broadcast? Why was not a single attempt made to blockade or occupy the White House, while the troops colorfully rolled through the streets of Moscow? If the State Emergency Committee sent troops into the city, why did he withdraw them?

Giving an assessment, we can say that the actions were strange, indecisive, weak-willed and, as a result, led to what such actions can lead to - to defeat.

The third is the consequences of the defeat of the State Emergency Committee.

The events of August 1991 are a tragedy, the consequences of which have not yet been fully realized. And not all of them we have already fully felt on ourselves. For example, the geopolitical losses of the collapse of the USSR in the future may resonate more than once with our descendants.

Conclusion

In this work, I turned to the events of 20 years ago, which took place on August 18-21, 1991. Until now, these events and their consequences are assessed differently.

In this work, I gave an assessment of the economic and political state of the Soviet Union, examined the chronicle of the events of the "August coup" and gave them an assessment.

In March 1991, a nationwide referendum was held, the vast majority of participants in which spoke in favor of preserving the USSR. The GKChP was the last, desperate, doomed attempt to stop the collapse of the Soviet Union.

After August 22, the Union was torn to pieces in a matter of weeks and plundered by local (or rather, small-town) elites who entrenched themselves in the "new independent" states.

But just remembering history is not enough. You have to be able to draw analogies. In the 80s of the last century, a “course of restructuring”, “acceleration” was announced, but all this collapsed without bringing concrete results, although the country had huge potential. We must not allow the words “modernization” and “national projects” to become empty words. The elections held in December 2011 and March 2012 showed that people's political consciousness and political activity are growing. Changes are needed in the political and socio-economic sphere, in the sphere of international relations. The citizens of Russia are waiting for changes and are ready to change themselves.

Bibliography

1."World History: A Textbook for Universities". Leaders of the team of authors: Markova A.N., Polyak G.B. UNITY 1997

2."Voice of Birobidzhan" newspaper. Article: "GKChP: Rehabilitation of Intentions" Regional branch Jewish Autonomous Region. Chernyakhovsky S. 24.08.2006

."Results of the week" newspaper. Article: "Twenty years after the coup". 08/21/2011

.Internet. "Statement of the Soviet leadership". 08/18/1991

.Internet. Article: "Passion for the State Emergency Committee: 20 years later", a review of the press "Literaturnaya Gazeta", "Today", "Economic News". 08/19/2011

."Nash Vek" newspaper. Article: "20 years later" Startsev Petr. 08/17/2011

."New Russia" newspaper. Interview with Sergey Kurginyan.01.04.2009

."Development of the Russian economy for 100 years" book. Simchera Vasily. Economy 2007

Attachment 1

Interview with Alexander Tsipko

Alexander Tsipko, philosopher, publicist: “The GKChP, in my opinion, is generally a dramatic moment in Russian history. Then, as in 1917 during the attempted coup by General Kornilov, the people who took responsibility for the fate of the country did not have enough will, determination, or consistency. Indeed, in order to solve their problems, the members of the GKChP had to arrest Yeltsin and his entire team, dissolve the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. There were plenty of grounds for accusing this congress of trying to dismember the country and carry out a coup d'état. Instead, the members of the GKChP behaved inconsistently towards Gorbachev, tried to flirt with Yeltsin, and were afraid of unpopular decisions. Which ruined their belated attempt to save historical Russia.

The paradox is that the members of the GKChP showed even greater moral weakness than Gorbachev, whom they tried to remove for these very qualities. Their hands were shaking.

It should also be noted that the leaders of the infamous committee tried to save the country, and not the socialist system. I knew the late Soviet premier Valentin Pavlov well. He did not believe in any advantages of the socialist system, he was a marketer and a reformer"

Annex 2

On August 19, 1991, representatives of the top leadership of the USSR, who opposed the actual liquidation of the Soviet Union as a federal state and its replacement by a confederate "Union of Sovereign States", attempted to interfere with this process by introducing a state of emergency in the country.

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who actively promoted the SSG project, was isolated at the state dacha in the Crimean Foros (according to other sources, having taken a neutral position, Gorbachev withdrew from the events, waiting for their outcome).

The State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP) assumed full responsibility for the fate of the country. By the decision of the State Emergency Committee, from 4 am on August 19, 1991, a state of emergency was introduced throughout the USSR for a period of six months.

From the appeal of the State Emergency Committee to the Soviet people:

“…The policy of reforms initiated by M. S. Gorbachev, conceived as a means of ensuring the country's dynamic development and democratization of public life, has reached a dead end for a number of reasons. The initial enthusiasm and hopes were replaced by disbelief, apathy and despair. The authorities at all levels have lost the trust of the population. Politicism has ousted concern for the fate of the Fatherland and the citizen from public life. An evil mockery is being imposed on all the institutions of the state. The country has essentially become ungovernable…”

The loud statements of the State Emergency Committee, however, did not lead to equally decisive actions. The introduction of troops into Moscow was not followed by attempts to disperse rallies of political opponents and stop the actions of the leadership of the RSFSR, headed by Boris Yeltsin, who declared the actions of the State Emergency Committee an attempted coup d'état.

On the evening of August 21, the GKChP was dissolved, and its members were arrested within a few days. The government, which announced its intention to save the country, did not take any real action.

The inhabitants of the USSR remember the events of August 19-21, 1991 most of all by the broadcast on television of the ballet "Swan Lake". The ballet, which was repeated several times, was replaced by other programs that, for political reasons, could not be aired.

The detained members of the State Emergency Committee were in the Matrosskaya Tishina pre-trial detention center, and from June 1992 to January 1993 they were released on bail. On February 23, 1994, the defendants in the “GKChP case” were amnestied by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

The State Committee for the State of Emergency included 8 people:

- First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council;
- Chairman of the KGB of the USSR;
- Prime Minister of the USSR;
- Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR;
- Chairman of the Peasants' Union of the USSR;
- President of the Association of State Enterprises and Objects of Industry, Construction, Transport and Communications of the USSR;
- Minister of Defense of the USSR.

The vice-president of the USSR, who became the formal head of the GKChP, was poorly suited to the role of leader. The trembling of the hands of Yanaev, who was very worried at the press conference of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, for his political opponents was evidence of the uncertainty of the "junta leader" in his actions. On August 21, Yanaev meekly signed documents on the dissolution of the State Emergency Committee and the cancellation of all its decisions.

Gennady Yanaev. Photo: RIA Novosti

Journalist Mikhail Leontiev cited Yanaev’s phrase from his conversation during the days of the “putsch” with the head of the KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov: “Understand my character, if at least one dies, I won’t be able to live.”

Arrested on August 22, Yanaev gave candid interview journalist Andrey Karaulov, in which he said that the documents of the State Emergency Committee were developed with the knowledge of the President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev, who back in April 1991 ordered the security forces to begin preparing measures in case a state of emergency was introduced in the country. The interview with Yanaev did not come out on the personal orders of the then head of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company Oleg Poptsov.

In January 1993, Yanaev was released from custody on bail, and in February 1994, the ex-head of the State Emergency Committee was amnestied.

In the future, Gennady Yanaev did not take an active part in political life, working as a consultant to the committee of veterans and disabled people of the state service, and also heading the Fund for Helping Disabled Children since childhood.

In recent years, Yanaev served as head of the department national history and international relations of the Russian international academy tourism.

Gennady Yanaev died on September 24, 2010 from cancer. Buried at Troekurovsky cemetery capital Cities.

Baklanov, who represented the military-industrial complex in the State Emergency Committee, did not play an active role in the events of August 1991, however, he was arrested along with the rest of the "members of the junta." Like most other members of the State Emergency Committee, until January 1993 he was in the Matrosskaya Tishina pre-trial detention center, after which he was released on bail. In February 1994, Baklanov was amnestied. His arrest affected the career of his son - Baklanov Jr., who worked in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was forced to resign.

Oleg Baklanov. Photo: RIA Novosti

After the amnesty, Baklanov returned to work related to the enterprises of the military-industrial complex. IN Lately Baklanov served as Chairman of the Board of Directors of OAO Rosobshchemash.

The head of the KGB of the USSR was one of the "ideological inspirers" and informal leaders of the State Emergency Committee. However, Kryuchkov never ordered the KGB units to take active steps against Boris Yeltsin and other political opponents. In particular, on August 19, the Alpha unit had the possibility of arresting Yeltsin before he arrived in Moscow, but Kryuchkov did not go for it, fearing "unpredictable consequences." Arrested on August 22, Kryuchkov remained in custody until January 1993, after which he was released, and in February 1994 he was amnestied.

Vladimir Kryuchkov. Photo: RIA Novosti

In subsequent years, Kryuchkov served as the Board of Directors of Region JSC, and was also an adviser head of the FSB of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin. The ex-head of the KGB was a member of the organizing committee of the Movement in Support of the Army, participated in the work of the council of veterans of state security workers, and wrote several memoirs.

He died on November 23, 2007 from a heart attack, was buried with military honors at the Troekurovsky cemetery of the capital.

The Prime Minister of the USSR was an active supporter of the creation of the State Emergency Committee, but in the August days of 1991 he became one of its most passive participants. Unlike his colleagues, he did not fly to Foros for negotiations with Gorbachev, but was removed from his post and arrested while in the hospital.

Valentin Pavlov. Photo: RIA Novosti

After an amnesty in 1994, Pavlov returned to financial activities, heading Chasprombank. Later, the ex-premier of the Soviet Union worked as an adviser at Promstroybank, was an employee of a number of economic institutions, Deputy Chairman of the Free Economic Society.

As one of the most active members of the State Emergency Committee, Interior Minister Boris Karlovich Pugo was planned to be arrested first. On August 22, an extremely motley group of comrades, consisting of the chairman of the KGB of the RSFSR, left for Pugo's apartment, ahead of the capture group. Viktor Ivanenko, 1st Deputy Interior Minister and future active participant in the execution of the White House Victor Erin, Deputy Prosecutor General of the RSFSR Evgeny Lisina and deputy Grigory Yavlinsky.

Boris Pugo. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org / Eugene M

What happened at the apartment of the head of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs is still unclear. According to Yavlinsky, Pugo and his wife were still alive, but were near death. According to the main version, the Pugo couple tried to commit suicide, and the minister first shot his wife, and then himself. Pugo died a few minutes later, and his wife died in the hospital a day later, without regaining consciousness.

Boris and Valentina Pugo are buried at the Troekurovsky cemetery in Moscow.

In the August days of 1991, Starodubtsev, who was in charge of the agrarian complex, was preparing a draft Decree "On saving the harvest." Arrested on August 22, Starodubtsev was the first of the members of the State Emergency Committee to be free - he was released from the pre-trial detention center for health reasons in June 1992.

Starodubtsev returned to work in the Agrarian Union, and in 1993 became a member of the Federation Council.

Vasily Starodubtsev. Photo: RIA Novosti

After the amnesty in 1994, the business executive Starodubtsev made the most successful among his colleagues in the State Emergency Committee political career in the new Russia, from 1997 to 2005, holding the post of governor of the Tula region.

In 2007 and 2011, Starodubtsev was elected to the State Duma of Russia on the lists of the Communist Party. He died on December 30, 2011 from a heart attack. He was buried in the rural cemetery of the village of Spasskoye, Novomoskovsk district, Tula region, next to the graves of his wife and son.

The industrialist Alexander Tizyakov was not an accidental member of the State Emergency Committee. In July 1991, he signed the Word to the People, published in the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya, in which politicians and cultural figures spoke out against the actions of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin and for the preservation of the Soviet Union.

However, Tizyakov did not have time to switch to active work to save Soviet industry in the three days of the existence of the State Emergency Committee.

Alexander Tizyakov. Photo: RIA Novosti

Like other members of the GKChP, Tizyakov left the pre-trial detention center in January 1993 and was granted amnesty in February 1994.

Subsequently, Tizyakov was a co-founder of AOZT Antal (engineering) and the insurance company Severnaya Kazna, the founder of Vidikon LLC (production of chipboard) and the company Fidelity (production of consumer goods), headed the board of directors of the investment trust company New Technologies ". In addition, Tizyakov was the president of the Russian-Kyrgyz enterprise Tekhnologiya, as well as the scientific director of Nauka-93 LLC.

The Minister of Defense of the USSR was an extremely unpopular figure among supporters of democratic reforms and paid them in the same coin. It was Yazov who gave the order to send army units to Moscow. Nevertheless, the Minister of Defense did not give a command to use force against the opponents of the State Emergency Committee.

After his arrest on August 22, Yazov recorded a repentant video message addressed to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Yazov himself claimed that the initiator of "tele-repentance" was journalist Vladimir Molchanov, and the ex-minister himself, depressed by the events and not sleeping at night, succumbed to the pressure.

Dmitry Yazov. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org / Barvenkovsky

While under investigation, Yazov continued to be registered with military service, from which he was fired on February 2, 1994, three weeks before his amnesty.

Dmitry Yazov was the last military man to be awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. He is currently the only living Marshal of the USSR.

After the amnesty, Dmitry Yazov held the positions of chief military adviser to the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation of the Russian Ministry of Defense, chief adviser-consultant to the head of the Academy of the General Staff.

Currently, the 89-year-old retired Marshal of the USSR is the leading analyst (general inspector) of the service of general inspectors of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

USSR Vice President Gennady Yanaev, USSR Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo, USSR Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov, USSR KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, USSR Defense Council First Deputy Chairman Oleg Baklanov, USSR Peasant Union Chairman Vasily Starodubtsev, President of the Association of State enterprises and objects of industry, construction, transport and communications of the USSR Alexander Tizyakov.

They were actively supported by the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Valentin Varennikov; Valery Boldin, Chief of Staff of the President of the USSR; Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Oleg Shenin; Vyacheslav Generalov, head of the security of the President of the USSR; Yury Plekhanov, head of the Security Department of the KGB of the USSR, Anatoly Lukyanov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and some others.

The GKChP relied on the forces of the KGB (Alpha), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Division named after Dzerzhinsky) and the Moscow Region (Tula Airborne Division, Tamanskaya motorized rifle division, Kantemirovskaya division).

The State Radio and Television provided informational support to the putschists.

The nominal head of the conspirators was the vice-president of the USSR Gennady Yanaev.

On August 19, 1991, the day before the signing of the new Union Treaty, the media broadcast the "Statement of the Soviet leadership", which stated that "due to the impossibility for health reasons of Gorbachev's performance of the duties of the President of the USSR", in accordance with Article 127.7 of the Constitution of the USSR, the powers of the President The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics are transferred to Vice President Gennady Yanaev, a state of emergency is introduced in certain areas of the USSR for a period of 6 months from 04:00 Moscow time on August 19, 1991, and the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (GKChP USSR) is formed to govern the country.

GKChP Resolution No. 1 ordered the suspension of the activities of political parties, public organizations, and prohibited the holding of rallies and street processions. Decree No. 2 prohibited the publication of all newspapers, except for the newspapers Trud, Rabochaya Tribuna, Izvestia, Pravda, Krasnaya Zvezda, Soviet Russia, Moskovskaya Pravda, Leninskoe Znamya, Rural Life ".

Almost all TV programs have stopped broadcasting.

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who at that time was on vacation in the Crimea, was isolated at the government dacha in Foros.

On the morning of August 19, troops and military equipment occupied key points on highways leading to the center of Moscow and surrounded the area adjacent to the Kremlin. Several dozen tanks came close to the House of the Supreme Council and the Government of the RSFSR on Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment (White House).

In total, about 4 thousand military personnel, 362 tanks, 427 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were brought into Moscow. Additional units of the Airborne Forces were deployed in the vicinity of Leningrad, Tallinn, Tbilisi, and Riga.

The response was mass demonstrations and protest rallies in Moscow, Leningrad and a number of other cities in the country.

The resistance to the putschists was led by the President of the RSFSR Boris Yeltsin and the leadership of Russia. Yeltsin signed Decrees No. 59 and No. 61, where the creation of the GKChP was qualified as an attempted coup d'état; Union executive authorities, including law enforcement agencies, were reassigned to the President of the RSFSR.

The House of Soviets of the RSFSR (White House) became the center of resistance to the GKChP. At the call of the Russian authorities, masses of Muscovites gathered at the White House, among whom were representatives of various social groups from the democratically inclined public, student youth, intellectuals to veterans of the war in Afghanistan.

On the very first day, units of the Taman division went over to the side of the White House defenders.

Boris Yeltsin, standing on a tank, read out an "Appeal to the Citizens of Russia", in which he called the actions of the GKChP "a reactionary, anti-constitutional coup" and called on the country's citizens "to give a worthy answer to the putschists and demand that the country be returned to normal constitutional development." The appeal was signed by President of the RSFSR Boris Yeltsin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR Ivan Silaev, Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR Ruslan Khasbulatov.

On the evening of August 19, a press conference of members of the State Emergency Committee was shown on television. Valentin Pavlov, who developed a hypertensive crisis, was absent from it. The members of the GKChP were visibly nervous; the whole world went around the footage of Gennady Yanaev's shaking hands.

Volunteer detachments of defenders gathered around the White House to defend the building from the assault of government troops.

On the night of August 21, in an underground transport tunnel at the intersection of Kalininsky Prospekt (now Novy Arbat Street) and Garden Ring (Tchaikovsky Street), clogged with armored vehicles, three civilians died during maneuvering: Dmitry Komar, Vladimir Usov and Ilya Krichevsky.

Within three days it became clear that the society did not support the performance of the State Emergency Committee.

On the morning of August 21, the withdrawal of troops from Moscow began, at 11:30 an emergency session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR was held.

The session instructed the Prime Minister of the RSFSR Ivan Silaev and the Vice President of the RSFSR Alexander Rutskoi to go to the President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev and free him from isolation. August 22 on Tu-134 Russian leadership Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev returned to Moscow with his family.

All members of the GKChP (with the exception of Boris Pugo, who committed suicide) and the Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the Army Valentin Varennikov, who helped them, as well as a number of other figures (including Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Anatoly Lukyanov). They were charged under Article 64 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (treason).

On February 23, 1994, members of the GKChP were released from prison under an amnesty declared by the State Duma.

The material was prepared on the basis of information from open sources

There are different opinions about the reasons for the creation of the State Emergency Committee, the main ones are:

1) fear of persons who are members of the State Emergency Committee of losing power;

2) saving the USSR from collapse.

I would like to believe that the organizers of the GKChP were driven not by selfish intentions, but by patriotism, the desire to preserve the Soviet Union. Let's take a closer look at this version.

On August 18, Vice-President of the USSR G.I. Yanaev issued a decree on his assumption of the post of President of the USSR. On the same night, the State Committee for the State of Emergency was created. It included the Internet. "Statement of the Soviet leadership". 08/18/1991:

V.S. Pavlov - Prime Minister of the USSR;

D.T. Yazov - Minister of Defense of the USSR;

V.A. Kryuchkov - Chairman of the KGB of the USSR;

O.D. Baklanov - Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council;

B.K. Pugo - Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

V.A. Starodubtsev - Chairman of the Peasant Union of the USSR;

A.I. Tizyakov - President of the Association of State Enterprises of the USSR.

The putschists chose the moment when the President was away and announced his temporary removal from power for health reasons.

The GKChP relied on the forces of the KGB (Alpha), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Division named after Dzerzhinsky) and the Moscow Region (Tula Airborne Division, Taman Division, Kantemirovskaya Division). In total, about 4 thousand military personnel, 362 tanks, 427 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were brought into Moscow. Additional parts of the Airborne Forces were deployed in the vicinity of Leningrad, Tallinn, Tbilisi, Riga. "Itogi Nedeli" newspaper. Article: "Twenty years after the coup". 08/21/2011 Generals Pavel Grachev and his deputy Alexander Lebed commanded the troops of the Airborne Forces. However, the putschists did not have complete control over their forces; so, on the very first day, parts of the Taman division went over to the side of the defenders of the White House. From the tank of this division, Yeltsin delivered his famous message to the assembled supporters.

The resistance to the GKChP was led by the political leadership of the Russian Federation. At the call of the Russian authorities, masses of Muscovites gathered at the House of Soviets of the Russian Federation ("White House"), among whom were representatives of various social groups - from the democratic public, student youth, intellectuals and veterans of the Afghan war to members of criminal structures and the "petty bourgeoisie".

The State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (GKChP) is a self-proclaimed authority in the USSR that existed from August 18 to August 21, 1991. It included a number of high-ranking officials of the Soviet government. The members of the GKChP opposed the perestroika policy pursued by the President of the USSR M. S. Gorbachev, as well as against the signing of a new union treaty and the transformation of the USSR into a confederal Union of Sovereign States, which planned to include only 9 of the 15 union republics. The main opponents of the GKChP were supporters of the President of the RSFSR B. N. Yeltsin, who declared the actions of the members of the Committee unconstitutional. After the defeat and self-dissolution of the GKChP, their actions were condemned by the legislative and executive authorities of the USSR, the RSFSR and a number of other union republics and qualified as a coup d'état. In historiography, the events of August 18-21, 1991 were called the "August Putsch".

From August 22 to August 29, 1991, former members of the dissolved GKChP and those who actively assisted them were arrested, but from June 1992 to January 1993, they were all released on bail. In April 1993, the trial began. On February 23, 1994, the defendants in the GKChP case were amnestied by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, despite Yeltsin's objection. One of the defendants, Valentin Varennikov, refused to accept the amnesty and his trial continued, which he eventually won.

"Themes"

"Faces"

National Flag Day is celebrated in Rossish

date of
holiday is timed to coincide with the events of the August putsch - an attempt
coup d'etat, undertaken by the State Committee for
state of emergency (GKChP). The main goal of the GKChP was to forcibly
prevent the reorganization of the Soviet Union proposed by the President
USSR by Mikhail Gorbachev (he planned to create a "soft",
decentralized federation).
link: http://bsanna-news.ukrinform.ua/newsitem.php?id=20150&lang=ru

Vladimir Kara-Murza Jr.: Non-round date. Forgotten lessons of August-91

Another anniversary of the victory of democratic forces over organized
the top of the CPSU and the KGB by a coup d'état in August 1991
makes you think about the missed chances of the 90s. Eight years after
August, the heirs of the State Emergency Committee came to power in Russia. About the reasons for failure
leaders of the democratic revolution and the importance of historical lessons for
of today's Russian opposition is reflected by the publicist and historian Vladimir
Kara-Murza (Jr.)
link: http://www.rusolidarnost.ru

in parties and movements. Remembering the Soviet Union

rally,
announced and organized by the Labor Voronezh movement with the support of
Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Leninist Komsomol, other left-wing patriotic parties and
social movements, was held in Voronezh on the day of the 21st anniversary
formation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP).
link: http://www.communa.ru/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=63174

Independence: what did it give?

rebellion
State Committee for the State of Emergency, which began on 19
August 1991 and subsequently called "August
putsch", was aimed at removing from power the first and last president
USSR of Mikhail Gorbachev, as well as the return to the "bosom" of the Union of Republics -
Armenia, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine, which are already
adopted declarations of state sovereignty.
link: http://www.nm.md/daily/article/2012/08/24/0900.html

State Committee for the State of Emergency

More
decades distances us from the desperate attempt of the inner circle
Gorbachev to stop the offensive of the nationalists and Yeltsin personally
collapse of the USSR. August 19, 1991 in the morning the media
put the nation on the ears with a message about the introduction of a state of emergency and about
creation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency, headed by
Vice President Yanaev. The whole country is frozen in anticipation of development
events. Only a small part of the population immediately became active.
link: http://www.cprf.info/nikitin/5010.shtml

GKChP member Vasily Starodubtsev: My assessment of the August events of 1991 remains the same

"To me
nothing to add about the State Committee for the State of Emergency and
my participation in it to what I said earlier,” said the deputy
of the State Duma Vasily Starodubtsev to the correspondent of news agency vRossii.ru in
response to a request for comment on the August 1991 events.
link: http://www.og.com.ua/gkchp.php

Moscow celebrates 21st anniversary of August coup

19
August 1991, a group of members of the top leadership of the USSR formed
The State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP) and tried to
take power by isolating Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.
link: http://www.baltinfo.ru

Yesterday's coup and tomorrow's coup

Twenty years ago, in
August 1991, through the efforts of the most conservative part of the highest
of the Soviet bureaucracy, a convulsive and aggressive movement was undertaken
to preserve the political system of the USSR unchanged.
The State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP) undertook
an attempt to seize state power on the eve (a day) before
planned for August 20, the signing of the Novo-Ogaryovsk Union
agreements that were supposed to radically transform the Union
Soviet Socialist Republics. Essentially, these agreements were
the only chance to modernize the Soviet empire in a democratic
direction peacefully.

Forceful political decision undermined the system
finally and predictably accelerated the process of disintegration of the USSR. Essentially,
it was the GKChP putsch that closed the last opportunity for soft reform
The USSR made its rapid disintegration inevitable. The paradox of history
lies in the fact that twenty years later in the state system
Russia, formed on the ruins of the USSR, is precisely the ideology of the putschists of 1991
year is dominant. This poses extremely high risks
territorial and political disintegration of Russia.
link: http://gubernia.pskovregion.org/number_553/03.php

Prerequisites for the collapse of the USSR

But,
on the night of August 19, 1991, the President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev was
forcibly removed from power. A group of senior officials
which included Vice President G. Yanaev, KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov,
Defense Minister D. Yazov, Prime Minister V. Pavlov formed
self-proclaimed, unconstitutional State Committee for Emergency
situation in the USSR (GKChP).
link: http://www.bibliotekar.ru/mihail-gorbachev/71.htm

In 1991, there was an attempted coup in the USSR

19
August 1991 in the USSR there was an attempted coup d'état:
The State Committee for the State of Emergency was created in Moscow
(GKChP), which lasted until August 21, 1991.
link: http://inmsk.ru/thisday_0819/19910819/340635300.html

GKChP - patriots or junta? A sober look after 20 years on the events of August 19, 1991

I specifically raised the appeal of the USSR GKChP (State Committee
by state of emergency). Today everything is already seen soberly and
pragmatically, and I highlighted all the theses that are present in the appeal
in red is the brightest reflection of the state of society, and why
country came.
link: http://www.liveinternet.ru/users/3622599/post185021214/

1991: tragedy or victory?

19
August marks 20 years since the beginning of the events that most
Russians are now considered tragic. It was on this day that the State
State of Emergency Committee (GKChP), consisting of conservative
minded politicians, tried to remove the president of the USSR from power
Mikhail Gorbachev and change the political course in order to prevent the collapse
Soviet Union. Without a doubt, at that moment the whole country was on
facets civil war. But, fortunately, it never happened.
link: http://www.newsinfo.ru/articles/2011-08-18/putch/759999/

The documents of the GKChP were prepared by the KGB

accusatory
conclusion on the GKChP case, fragments of which we bring to your attention
reader, - not just a unique and at the same time quite official
evidence of the turning events of national history,
but also a documentary detective that does not let go from the first to
last minute of reading. The logic and logistics of the conspiracy becomes clear
no doubt about the legitimacy or moral justification
the actions of the conspirators do not remain at all: yes, they certainly
conspirators, yes, their actions cannot be justified by higher interests
country. Strictly speaking, they did not save the country, the collapse of which only
accelerated by the creation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency
(GKChP), and their high positions in the establishment. There was no romance here
for a penny: in front of us are restless, frightened people, not completely sure
in their rightness, morally wounded by their betrayal, weak and
doubters, muffling their doubts with hefty doses of alcohol.
link: