Russian President Vladimir Putin to GRU Special Forces Reserve Colonel Vladimir Kovtun. He became one of the officers who first succeeded in capturing an American man-portable anti-aircraft gun in Afghanistan. missile system(MANPADS) "Stinger". Thus, the USSR provided the world with irrefutable evidence of US participation in sponsoring Afghan militants with weapons. Life figured out the history of the unique operation of the Soviet special forces.

The Soviet Union has been at war in Afghanistan since 1979. There were various reasons for this, the essence of which in this story does not make sense to go into. One way or another, throughout the war, Soviet troops acted quite successfully and could have achieved all their goals if the US and other NATO allies had not come to the aid of the Afghan Mujahideen opposing them. They provided the militants not only with weapons, but also with means of communication, money, food, and also provided instructor assistance. Long time The USSR failed to obtain irrefutable evidence of US intervention in the conflict in Afghanistan. The turning point came only in 1987.

Throughout the war, one of the main advantages of the Soviet troops was aviation. For obvious reasons, the Mujahideen could not oppose anything to it in the air, and there were few means to fight from the ground. However, since the autumn of 1986, the Americans began to supply the militants with their own - modern at that time - Stinger MANPADS. This weapon was quite light and easy to operate, but at the same time extremely dangerous for Soviet pilots. "Stinger" confidently hit air targets at an altitude of 180 to 3800 meters. As a result of the supply of these weapons in 1986, Soviet troops lost 23 aircraft and helicopters.

The situation reached the point that helicopter pilots had to drastically change tactics and fly at extremely low altitudes, constantly using terrain folds as cover. Soviet intelligence, of course, received data on the supply of American MANPADS to the Mujahideen, but there was no 100% evidence of this. The command issued a statement that the first soldier or officer who captured the Stinger from the militants would be presented with the title of Hero of the USSR. However, the wait was not long.

The Meltanai Gorge in the Afghan province of Kandahar was at the junction of two Soviet units, and therefore the Mujahideen felt quite at ease there. The Soviet special forces knew this and periodically ambushed the militants. January 5, 1987 a group of scouts of the 186th separate detachment special purpose The GRU of the General Staff, under the command of the deputy commander of the detachment, Major Yevgeny Sergeev, decided to make another raid in the gorge. Under the command of Sergeyev was Vladimir Kovtun (then still in the rank of senior lieutenant).

The scouts arrived in the gorge on two Mi-8 helicopters. Flying up to the proposed landing site, they saw three motorcyclists on the road. At that time, only militants used this type of transport. However, the Mujahideen betrayed themselves: dismounting, they opened fire on the helicopters with automatic weapons and fired two shots from the same Stingers. As it turns out later, the militants fired offhand from MANPADS, and therefore did not hit the helicopters. And the special forces themselves at first decided that they were being fired from hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers (RPGs).

Photo: © RIA Novosti / Alexander Grashchenkov

"Spirits"-motorcyclists are partially eliminated from the onboard machine gun, in addition, the commander of one of the helicopters, Captain Sobol, worked on militants with unguided rockets. The commander of the detachment Sergeyev orders to land the car, and the second helicopter asks to stay in the air to cover the special forces group. Already on the ground, the fighters divided into two detachments and began a battle with the Mujahideen almost point-blank. Our fighters had to storm the hill, on which the "spirits" were fortified. The dynamics of the battle was so high that it lasted no more than 10 minutes, the scouts literally flew up the hill.

In that battle, we failed sixteen "spirits". Apparently, a group of Mujahideen, who had come earlier from the village, was sitting on a high-rise. Couldn't they all have come on three motorcycles? Perhaps they were trying to organize an air defense ambush with ground cover and at the same time test the recently received Stingers. One of the "spirits", who had some kind of pipe and a case like a diplomat in his hands, was chased by me and two fighters. "Spirit" interested me primarily because of the "diplomat". Still not assuming that the pipe is an empty container from the Stinger, I immediately felt that there might be interesting documents in the case, - Vladimir Kovtun told Brother after many years.

Photo: © RIA Novosti / Andrey Solomonov

The senior lieutenant rushed in pursuit of the Mujahideen, but the militant pulled away. Then Vladimir Kovtun, being a master of sports in shooting, decided to liquidate him. From a distance of more than 200 meters, a bullet from the AKS hit exactly in the head. Kovtun took the case and the American MANPADS. The scouts began to retreat to the helicopters, carrying valuable combat trophies. They also took one wounded Mujahideen with them, providing him with medical assistance.

They gave the order to leave. The fighters brought two more pipes: one empty, the other unused. The spinner took off and took the opposite course. In the cabin, I opened the "diplomat", and there is complete documentation on the "Stinger", starting from the addresses of suppliers in the USA and ending with detailed instructions for using the complex. At this point, we were overjoyed. Everyone knew what a stir our command created around the purchase of Stingers by the Mujahideen. They also knew that the one who was the first to take at least one sample would be awarded the Star of the Hero, ”Kovtun shared his memories in an interview.

Thanks to the feat of intelligence officers, the USSR presented at an urgent press conference at the Afghan Foreign Ministry irrefutable evidence of US interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

However, none of the participants in this operation received the promised Star of the Hero of the USSR. The scouts themselves attribute this to the fact that they had a conflict with the higher leadership. However, they noted that the main thing was the result, during the capture of the Stingers, no one thought about any titles.

Photo: © Page" Afghan wind "Scorpio"/OK

There was a lot of noise around this case. The commander of the brigade, Colonel Gerasimov, arrived. They decided to introduce Sergeev, me, Sobol, the commander of the board on which we flew, and one sergeant from the inspection group (Colonel Vasily Cheboksarov. - Note. Life). For registration of the submission to the Hero, it is necessary to photograph the candidate. The four of us were photographed and ... they did not give anything. In my opinion, the Order of the Red Banner was given to Sgt. Zhenya Sergeev had an unresolved party penalty, and my relationship with the command was also not cloudless. Why they didn’t give the Hero to the helicopter pilot, I still don’t know. Probably, he, too, was in disgrace with his superiors. Although, in my opinion, we didn’t do anything particularly heroic then. But the fact remains: we took the first "Stinger"!

It took more than 20 years to get a well-deserved award. Thanks to the efforts of relatives and colleagues, the first title of Hero, but already of Russia, was received by the commander of the detachment, Lieutenant Colonel Evgeny Sergeev in 2012. Unfortunately, posthumously. Sergeev did not live to receive the well-deserved award for only a couple of years, he died of a serious illness, which was the result of numerous injuries during the years of service.

Now, on the day of the 30th anniversary of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, justice has triumphed in relation to Colonel Vladimir Kovtun.

People who wrote invisibly recent history country.

Lieutenant Colonel Evgeny Georgievich Sergeev

In memory of a special forces officer.

On April 25, 2008, in the ancient Russian city of Ryazan, Lieutenant Colonel Evgeny Georgievich Sergeev, a man of amazing fate, who lived a bright and very eventful life, died of a fourth heart attack. They called him a legend domestic special forces even during his lifetime, which he devoted to the main cause, in which the mission of a man was originally laid down - the protection of his homeland.

The operation to capture MANPADS is perhaps the brightest page military biography Evgenia Sergeeva. During his service in Afghanistan, under his direct supervision and with his direct participation, many different operations were carried out, thanks to which E. Sergeev was considered one of the most effective commanders. It was very difficult to achieve this: twice the commando officer was on fire in the helicopter, and once he collapsed with him.

The result of Yevgeny Sergeev's stay in the DRA was two Orders of the Red Star and the most honorable medal - "For Courage". At the same time, he arrived in Afghanistan in the position of deputy battalion commander, and was replaced in the same position after 2 years - the most ill-fated party penalty again affected. Others, without fighting, managed to make a career during this period ...

Sergeev Evgeny Georgievich - at the time of submission to the title of Hero Soviet Union‒ Deputy for Combat Training, Commander of the 186th Separate Special Forces Detachment of the 22nd Separate Special Forces Brigade of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (as part of a limited contingent of the grouping of Soviet troops in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan), major.

Lieutenant colonel. He was awarded 2 orders of the Red Star, the Order of Courage, medals, including the medal "For Courage".

Decree of the President Russian Federation dated May 6, 2012, for the courage and heroism shown in the performance of military duty in the Republic of Afghanistan, Lieutenant Colonel Sergeev Evgeny Georgievich was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation (posthumously).

In the summer of 2012 at a solemn ceremony at the Cultural Center Armed Forces RF Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Major General I.D. Sergun, on behalf of the President of the Russian Federation, handed over the insignia of the Hero of the Russian Federation - the Gold Star medal - to the widow of E.G. Sergeeva ‒ Natalia Vladimirovna Sergeeva.

Eugene was born on February 17, 1956 in Belarus, in the city of Polotsk, in the family of a paratrooper officer, and therefore Sergeyev had no questions about who to become and where to go. After graduation high school in 1973, he became a cadet of the 1st year of the 9th company of the faculty of special intelligence of the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command twice Red Banner School named after Lenin Komsomol (390031, Russia, Ryazan, Army General V.F. Margelov square, 1) .

From 1971, when the first graduation of the 9th company took place, until 1994 inclusive, until the transfer of the 5th battalion to the Novosibirsk VOKU, 1068 officers were trained. More than 30 graduates graduated from the school with a gold medal, more than 100 graduated with honors, six became generals, five became Heroes of the Russian Federation, more than 15 commanded special forces. Graduates of the 9th company and the 5th battalion have always been proud of belonging to the Ryazan Airborne School.

The cadet Sergeev studied quite well, he had a phenomenal memory of a scout. According to the recollections of his fellow students, Eugene could read any text in English from two or three typewritten pages a couple of times and retell, if not by heart, then very close to the text. Being the smallest in the company, he did not lag behind other cadets in sports either. He was a school boxing champion. True, in his weight category, as a rule, there were no rivals, and the victory was awarded automatically. But there was a case when a lightweight boxer was prepared and put up in one of the companies, Sergeev was not slow to confirm his champion title, thus proving that he had not worn it in vain.

In fairness, it should be noted that Yevgeny Sergeev was not a model of military discipline, rather, on the contrary, he was often listed as a prisoner in the Ryazan garrison guardhouse. There was even a case when the future legendary commando was going to be expelled from a military university altogether, but then the intervention of his father, at that time the head of the airborne training department of the school, saved him.

A cocky character, a sharp mind and an equally sharp tongue did not allow Sergeyev to walk in the favorites of his superiors. But that didn't bother him much. But the questions of friendship, officer honor and human dignity were in the first place for Yevgeny. His friends respected him immensely for this. Despite his short stature, he had an iron will and rare courage, and therefore was not afraid of people above himself, neither in position and rank, nor in height.

After graduating from college in 1977, Sergeev was assigned to serve in Transbaikalia, and a few years later he already commanded a separate special-purpose company deployed in Mongolia.

At the end of 1984, it was decided to strengthen the special forces grouping in Afghanistan with three separate detachments. Captain Sergeev became the deputy commander of one of them. Here, too, he almost immediately showed his cocky disposition, when, during the deployment of the detachment, the deputy for equipment and weapons somehow inadvertently spoke out against Sergeyev, deciding to laugh at his short stature, for which he was immediately knocked down by Evgeny.

Then he himself, despite the fact that he was essentially the instigator of the conflict, complained about Sergeyev to the district command. But Yevgeny Georgievich cared little for the fact that he was making enemies for himself in high offices, and the broken nose of the deputy technical officer, as well as some other facts, were later recalled to him.

But it wasn't until then. An accelerated coordination of the detachment began and a long and difficult march through the snow-covered Salang Pass at an altitude of 4000 m, to the south of Afghanistan, to Sharjoy.

When crossing it, very serious incidents and tragedies repeatedly occurred: for example, on February 23, 1980, in the middle of the tunnel of the pass, when oncoming columns were moving, a collision occurred, resulting in a traffic jam in which 16 Soviet servicemen suffocated, and on November 3, 1982, here there was an explosion of a fuel truck, killing at least 176 soldiers and officers Soviet army. But the detachment under the command of Sergeyev made the most difficult march through the whole of Afghanistan, in difficult and unusual weather conditions without loss of personnel and equipment. It is also important that Evgeny Georgievich himself did not have any combat experience by that time ...

E. Sergeev always and everywhere tried to delve into everything himself, calculate and think through everything to the smallest detail, and only then get to work. As a true commander, he was everywhere at the head of his subordinates, almost all the time he walked in the head patrol.

The head watch is two or three people who ensure the safety of the group. They go forward several hundred meters and in the event of a sudden collision with the enemy, they can only rely on themselves. If there are large enemy forces in front of them, then the head patrol takes the blow and thereby gives the group the opportunity to either retreat or take an advantageous position to repel the enemy attack. Of course, it's not the job of the deputy commander to go on the rampage, but this is only when it comes to daily work. And in the period when this work is just getting better, the commander, in order to better understand the features of the upcoming activity, should try everything himself. Another thing is that not everyone will go for it.

A few months after arriving in Afghanistan, an event will occur in the life of Yevgeny Sergeev, which will subsequently play an important role in his military career, and, perhaps, in life.

For a clearer organization of the activities of the detachment, E. Sergeev decided to establish contact with our military advisers in order to receive intelligence information from them. He invited them to visit, but it so happened that they arrived when Yevgeny was not there, no one in the detachment knew about their arrival, and therefore they were not admitted. As soon as E. Sergeev arrived, he was immediately informed about what had happened, and in order to correct the situation, he rushed to catch up with them in his UAZ. Naturally, he took a bottle of vodka with him in order to smooth out the embarrassment. Caught up with. Everything was resolved. The bottle was sold to several healthy men, purely symbolically. And when he returned back, the head of the political department of the brigade, which included the detachment, was already waiting for him.

Probably, those who found themselves in Soviet times do not need to explain who the political officer was in those years in the army. Other commanders of regiments and divisions were afraid to conflict with their deputies on the political side, not without reason fearing possible unpleasant consequences - both in their careers and in later life. But Yevgeny Sergeev was not a shy one. Attempts to explain to the political worker why he smelled of alcohol were not successful, and Yevgeny Georgievich left in his hearts, slamming the door. And after some time, for his demarche, he received a penalty along the party line, which meant - fight, do not fight, and you will not receive any awards or positions. Still - 1985. The height of the "new thinking" and the fight against drunkenness. But in fairness, it should be noted that E. Sergeev served not for this ...

In 1986, many Soviet reconnaissance vehicles abroad received an order: to get a sample of the latest American Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile system (MANPADS). The Mujahideen began to actively use this effective weapon against our helicopters and aircraft. Aviation of the 40th Army suffered serious losses. If in 1981 only one car was shot down with the help of the Stinger MANPADS, then in 1986 there were already 23 of them. It was necessary to find an “antidote”. Alas, no matter how hard our residencies fought, the task turned out to be impossible. Then she was assigned to special forces, for which, as you know, there are no impossible tasks.

The command of the Soviet troops received information that the CIA plans to supply about 500 Stinger MANPADS to the territory of Afghanistan. Of course, the complete dominance of Soviet aviation in the air in the event that such a number of missiles hit the combat zone would be highly doubtful.

Therefore, at the beginning of 1986, a telegram signed by the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov, was circularly sent to all units of the special forces operating on the territory of the DRA. The telegram announced the upcoming delivery, as well as the fact that the one who captured the first "Stinger" was waiting for a high award - the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

On January 5, 1987, an inspection team under the command of Major E. Sergeev flew out along the route he had planned in order to reconnoiter the area for the upcoming ambush operations. Entering at an extremely low altitude by two helicopters into the Meltanai Gorge, where the spooks felt at home, because. soviet soldiers showed up there extremely rarely, they suddenly collided with three motorcyclists who began to flee into the green. Sergeev, who was sitting in the place of the onboard gunner, opened fire, and the helicopter commander launched rockets and went to land.

Broken motorcycles and corpses were found on the ground, one of which was tied to a strange pipe wrapped in a blanket. One of the Mujahideen ran away from the special forces, but was destroyed by machine gun fire. Next to the dead dushman lay the same strange incomprehensible pipe and a diplomat, in which, as it turned out later in the helicopter, there were instructions for using the Stinger.

Thus, the American Stinger MANPADS, which were hunted by Soviet intelligence officers of various departments, were the first to take the Soviet GRU special forces and personally Major Evgeny Georgievich Sergeev with his subordinates.

From the memories of the participants in the operation

Vladimir Kovtun, for 1987, deputy commander of the 2nd company of the 7th special forces detachment of the GRU:

In January 1987, I was going to go out again to the junction of the zones of responsibility with the Kandahar detachment (the 173rd GRU special forces detachment was located in Kandahar). On the way to Kandahar, not far from Kalat, in the area of the village of Jilavur, there is a solid greenery. Almost perpendicular to the road, the Meltanai Gorge ran to the southeast. It was too far for us and the Kandaharites to fly there. Taking advantage of this, the spirits felt quite at ease in this area. Sergeev conceived another adventure - to work there. The plan was this. Choose a place for an ambush, work out and for several weeks no longer appear in the area at all, so that the spirits calm down. Then work again and again for a while the abyss. So pinch slowly.

Under the guise of search operations, we flew to reconnoiter the area. The inspection group was commanded by Vasya Cheboksarov. Sergeyev and I flew to choose a place for an ambush, landing and day camp.

Evgeny Sergeev, in 1987, deputy commander of the 7th special forces detachment, who planned the operation:

That is exactly what happened. Kovtun and I flew in the lead helicopter. There were two or three other fighters with us. I was sitting behind a machine gun in the place of the gunner. Lieutenant V. Cheboksarov and his fighters were flying in a slave helicopter.

Vladimir Kovtun:

First, they flew southwest along the concrete road. Then we turned left and entered the gorge. Suddenly, three motorcyclists were found on the road. Seeing our turntables, they quickly dismounted and opened fire from small arms, and also made two runaway launches from MANPADS. But at first we mistook these launches for RPG shots.

This was a period when the coherence of the actions of the helicopter crews and special forces groups was close to ideal. The pilots immediately made a sharp turn and sat down. Already when they left the board, the commander managed to shout to us: “They are shooting from a grenade launcher.” Twenty-fours (MI-24 helicopters) covered us from the air, and we, having landed, started a fight on the ground.

Evgeny Sergeev:

As soon as they saw the motorcyclists, they immediately opened fire. Motorcyclists in Afghanistan are definitely spirits. I press the trigger of the machine gun. The commander of the helicopter detachment was Sobol. He manages to work out with NURSs and immediately leaves for landing. And then it feels like a shot from an RPG was fired at us. I managed to “fill up” the shooter. They sat only on the leading side. While still in the air, I noticed a strange pipe from one of the motorcyclists. On the ground, I heard on the radio that one of the “twenty-fours” was also fired from a grenade launcher. On the radio, I give the command to the led "eight" to remain in the air. The dynamics of the battle is high, and there are not so many spirits. I decided that while the follower sits down, time will pass and everything will be over. In the air, his fire was more necessary for us. In the event that the situation somehow becomes more complicated, I will be able to land troops in the place where I will need them at that moment. On earth we are divided. I ran along the road with one fighter. Volodya with two scouts ran to the right. The spirits were beaten almost point-blank. There are motorcycles on the ground. A pipe wrapped in a blanket is attached to one of them. An inner voice calmly says: “This is a MANPADS.” Here I look, V. Kovtun is riding a motorcycle back.

Is there a result!

Vladimir Kovtun:

In that battle, we “filled up” sixteen people. Apparently, a group of Mujahideen, who had come earlier from the village, was sitting on a high-rise. They couldn't all come on three motorcycles. Perhaps they were trying to organize an air defense ambush with ground cover and at the same time try out the recently received Stingers.

One of the spirits, who had some kind of pipe and a “diplomat” type case in his hands, was chased by me and two fighters. He interested me, first of all, because of the “diplomat”. Still not assuming that the pipe is an empty container from the Stinger, I immediately felt that there might be interesting documents there. The spirit was from us meters in a hundred - a hundred and fifty. "Twenty-fours" took him "in a circle", firing from quadruple machine guns, and did not let him leave.

On the run, I shout into “Daisy”: “Men! Just don't miss it!" The spirit, apparently realized that they did not want to kill him, and began to run away firing back. When he was already two hundred meters away, I remembered that I was a master of sports in shooting. No, I don't think I'll miss you. He took a full breath-exhalation, sat down on his knee and “caught up” with him in the back of the head.

When I ran up, a strange pipe caught my eye. Obviously not a grenade launcher. MANPADS, even ours, even the enemy, have many similarities. And, despite the fact that the antenna was not deployed, a hunch flashed: “Maybe “Stinger?” By the way, they did not hit us, although they shot twice, precisely because they did not have time to prepare the complex and the antenna was never deployed. In fact, they hit like a grenade launcher, offhand.

But there was no time to especially consider the trophies. Bullets whistled. He grabbed a machine gun, a pipe, a “diplomat” and to the turntables. I run up to Sergeyev. He asks: "What?"

I answer: "MANPADS". He, despite the fact that we recently had a great fight, broke into a smile and climbed up to shake hands. Shouts: "Volodya!" The rest of the emotions without words.

Evgeny Sergeev:

The joy, of course, was great. And not because we practically earned ourselves hero stars. Nobody thought about it then. The main thing is that there is a result, and it seems not bad. Despite my emotions, I saw three spirits depart. He gave the command to the wingman to sit down and take them prisoner. The inspection team landed, but could not take the spirits. Destroyed.

The entire fight lasted no more than ten minutes. The wounded spirit was injected with promedol and loaded into a helicopter. The place was dangerous, so there was no reason to linger there.

Vladimir Kovtun:

The fight took no more than twenty minutes. They gave the order to leave. The soldiers brought two more pipes. One empty and one unused. The spinner took off and took the opposite course. In the cabin, I opened a diplomat, and there is complete documentation on the Stinger. Starting from the addresses of suppliers in the States and ending with detailed instructions for using the complex. At this point, we were overjoyed. Everyone knew what a stir the Army command created around the purchase of Stingers by the Mujahideen. They also knew that the one who takes the first, at least one sample, will be awarded the star of the Hero.

Evgeny Sergeev:

We have enough experience so far. I knew that after the battle, the spirits would definitely come to pick up theirs. Bury something before sunset. Therefore, in an hour and a half or two, you can safely visit the same place and have a second result.

Taki did. Only this time they flew into the gorge from the south. I raised two eights and four twenty-fours. He took more people. True, no one else was found at the battlefield. The gorge was combed again. They searched for an identification station “friend or foe”, but to no avail.

Then they delivered all the captured and wounded spirit to Kandahar. That spirit lay in the hospital, first in Kandahar, then in Kabul. As they said, he suddenly died there, although he practically recovered in Kandahar.

After this operation, Major Yevgeny Sergeev was sent to Kabul, where he personally reported to the commander of the 40th Army, General Boris Gromov, on the progress of the combat mission and the capture of MANPADS.

After listening carefully to the major, B. Gromov warmly thanked him and other servicemen for the successful operation and gave the command to prepare submissions for the award, even despite the presence of a party penalty. The submission to the Golden Star was sent to four people, but ... none of them received it. All for different reasons. E. Sergeev - precisely because he had that very unremoved party penalty. In addition, when in Kabul Yevgeny Georgievich talked about how the Stingers were captured, some high officials in surprise began to object to him that everything was painfully simple.

After “processing” Major E. Sergeev’s story, the version of the capture of American MANPADS began to look different: our agents detected the loading of a batch of Stingers in the United States, tracked its unloading in Pakistan, and then led it all the way to Afghanistan. As soon as the MANPADS hit the DRA, the special forces were alerted - and this is the result.

Evgeny Georgievich himself, during his lifetime, recalling this incident, called it "a fairy tale of the Vienna Woods." Although, I must say, it was for her that a lot of people were awarded - and orders and medals are by no means fabulous. And those who really risked their lives and achieved the result did not receive anything.

Major E. Sergeev also delivered the Stingers to Moscow. At the Chkalovsky airfield, he was met by "people in civilian clothes", took away the trophies, documentation and, having loaded everything into the car, drove away. And the special forces hero remained standing on the field of the airfield in a burnt-out field uniform, without a penny of money in his pocket ...

They didn't become heroes.

Vladimir Kovtun:

There was a lot of noise around this. The commander of the brigade, Colonel Gerasimov, arrived. They decided to introduce me, Sergeyev, Sobol, the commander of the board on which we flew, and one sergeant from the inspection group to the Hero. For registration of the submission to the Hero, it is necessary to photograph the candidate. The four of us were photographed and...

In the end, they didn't give anything. In my opinion, the “Banner” was given to Sgt. Zhenya had a party penalty that had not been lifted, and a criminal case was opened against me. Why they didn’t give the Hero the helicopter pilot, I still don’t know. Probably, he, too, was in disgrace with his command.

Although, in my opinion, we didn’t do anything particularly heroic then, but the fact remains. We took the first Stinger.

Evgeny Sergeev:

As it turned out later from the documents captured by V. Kovtun, these Stingers were the first of a batch of 3,000 pieces that the Mujahideen bought in the States. Of course, one of the main reasons that served as such a stir around the Stingers was the need to obtain material evidence of the active support of the Dushmans by the Americans. The captured documents clearly testified to this.

When in Kabul I told how it really turned out, the high officials objected to me in surprise that everything was too simple. After that, they began to process and complicate me. As a result, it turned out that our agents detected the loading of a batch of MANPADS in the States, tracked its unloading in Pakistan, and so on “herded” it all the way to Afghanistan. As soon as the "Stingers" got into Afghanistan, the Kandahar and our detachments were alerted. They were waiting for the spirits with the Stingers to be within reach. And as soon as they got there, we quickly took off and worked. But these are all “tales of the Vienna Woods”. Although a lot of people were awarded for fairy tales to “the very top”.

True, it is always tougher and simpler. It all happened at about nine - half past ten in the morning. At this time, there is usually no movement of the spirits. We are just lucky, but the spirits are not.

Although it must be admitted that at that time our special services tried in various ways to get a sample of the Stinger. As far as I know, the KGB, which at that time was a very powerful organization, also tried to get them through its agents. However, the SOVIET SPETSNAZ did it.

And after returning to the USSR, after some time, Sergeev was summoned to the prosecutor's office in Tashkent to give explanations about the slander that some ensign had scribbled. In Afghanistan, he was convicted of stealing by Sergeyev, dismissed from the army, and by the time of the trial he had drunk himself. But as in the notorious thirty-seventh year, Evgeny Georgievich was offered to justify himself. The case was under control in the Central Committee, ended in nothing, but while it dragged on, the military officer was not given permission to enter the academy.

But be that as it may, after serving in Afghanistan, Major E. Sergeev was sent to further serve in the Transcaucasian Military District, where separatist sentiments were already brewing. Political leaders shied away from taking on any responsibility, and often shifted it to the military and employees law enforcement, after with the ease of the latter and substituting.

Somehow, a crowd of excited people, numbering about six hundred people, skillfully instigated by separatists from the party committee (!) stormed the checkpoint of the unit commanded by E. Sergeev and rushed to the camp site where this unit was based. Evgeny Georgievich did not lose his head when he saw an angry crowd and several armed people in it, one of whom had already fired a shot, fired a burst over their heads and opened fire to kill. This was enough for the crowd to immediately disperse, and two corpses remained on the pavement. Thanks to the decisive actions of E. Sergeev and his subordinates, who showed by deed that it was not worth joking with them, no more such incidents arose in the city, major interethnic conflicts were avoided.

But, of course, these events could not pass without a trace. A criminal case was initiated against Yevgeny Georgievich, which was soon sorted out and closed. The separatists announced for the head of an officer a great amount in Soviet times - 50,000 rubles. Miraculously, he managed to avoid an assassination attempt, and therefore soon E. Sergeev was transferred to serve in Belarus. But even there he did not have a chance to stay long - the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and Evgeny Georgievich ended up in the famous 16th GRU special forces brigade stationed in the village of Chuchkovo, Ryazan Region.

It would seem that the time has come to calmly engage in combat training, but there it was. Soon a military conflict broke out in Chechen Republic. The command of the brigade determined that a battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel E. Sergeev was sent to the rebellious republic. According to the memoirs of Yevgeny Georgievich, no one really even knew what to prepare for, what tasks would be set and what exactly should be worked out. As usually happens in such cases, everyone worked out - even what military intelligence and shouldn't be doing it at all. They gave him a month to prepare, and after that, a unit under the command of a special forces officer flew to Mozdok.

As it happened before, Lieutenant Colonel E. Sergeev also showed his talent as an organizer of the highest class in Chechnya. The detachment soon began to perform tasks, where the battalion commander was again ahead. Groups of the detachment, together with a group of the 45th reconnaissance regiment of the Airborne Forces, were the first to reach Dudayev's palace, however, as often happens, someone else got the high award. Nevertheless, Sergeev's unit continued to successfully carry out the tasks assigned to him. However, the tragic event cut short the glorious combat path of the detachment and the military career of its commander.

On one of the January days of 1995, after completing the assigned task, the fighters returned to their base in Grozny - it was located in the building of the former vocational school. Here it became clear that one of the officers who was part of the group, under the guise of calling for reinforcements, shamefully fled. Sergeev gathered the officers for a meeting in order to decide what to do with this man next. There was a proposal to send him back to Chuchkovo, and deal with him already there. To give the rest of the officers an opportunity to discuss this issue, Lieutenant Colonel Sergeev went out into the street and then felt a strong push of the ground under his feet, fell, and a brick wall collapsed on him. Evgeny Georgievich lost consciousness, and when he woke up and the surviving subordinates pulled him out from under the ruins, he organized the analysis of the rubble and the search for those who remained under the rubble. It turned out that part of the three-story building was destroyed by the explosion. After the main activities for the search and extraction of the injured and the dead from the rubble were completed, Evgeny Georgievich again lost consciousness.

This time he came to his senses already in the hospital, where he learned that as a result of the explosion and the collapse of the building, 47 soldiers and officers of the detachment were killed and another 28 were injured and shell-shocked. It was another very serious blow for the courageous officer of the special forces, much stronger than his own fractures and wounds.

And then accusations of unprofessionalism and almost criminal negligence rained down on E. Sergeev. Allegedly, the commandos did not check the building, but it was mined. Rumors persisted that wires had been found that led from the ruins of the house to the fence. But one must think that such an experienced commander with rich combat experience could not help but understand that there could be surprises in the buildings in the captured city. In addition, only one corner of the building collapsed, and not all of it completely, which indicates the possibility of hitting the building with its own artillery shell. Later, this is exactly what happened with one of the units of the Marine Corps.

But the version of "shooting at friendly people" was immediately rejected by high officials. Finding out whose projectile it was is rather difficult, and the trial will testify to the mess that is happening in Grozny. In the press, both in ours and in foreign ones, a wild noise will immediately rise, that if artillery indiscriminately hits its own, then what is happening with the population is even scary to imagine. And here and so problems through the roof. A small victorious operation to overthrow the Dudayev regime, which, according to high army ranks, could have been completed in just 2 hours by the forces of one parachute regiment, turned, in fact, if not into a war, then at least into a major armed conflict of a regional scale.

... A monument to fallen soldiers was opened in the Chuchkovskaya brigade.

Lieutenant Colonel Evgeny Georgievich Sergeev retired for health reasons, received a second disability group. And immediately became of no use to anyone. Previously, when organizational talent and the will of the commander were required, Sergeyev was sent ahead and even insisted on his candidacy. When a person suffered while performing his military duty, they forgot about him. His health was deteriorating, but no one except his relatives and close friends cared about this. Evgeny Georgievich did not even manage to come to the meeting dedicated to the thirtieth anniversary of graduation from the school - he felt bad before, he lived on injections and pills, practically without getting out of hospitals. There was hope that this strong and courageous person would get out, cope with the disease, because 52 years old - is this the age for a man?

But the disease was not defeated. On April 25, 2008, Lieutenant Colonel Evgeny Georgievich Sergeev died. At the funeral of a real Hero, for inexplicable reasons, there was no guard of honor, which is due to any senior officer, and the GRU was unable to provide its representative to participate in farewell to a man who devoted his whole life to serving in this department.

The organization of the funeral, which was attended by many colleagues, was taken over by the "Afghan" officers. Lieutenant Colonel Evgeny Georgievich Sergeev was buried in the 4th section of the New Cemetery of the city of Ryazan, not far from the Alley of Glory of servicemen who died in the line of their military duty, next to his father, Georgy Ivanovich Sergeev, a colonel, one of the best teachers of the Ryazan airborne school. Their grave is the eighth from the central alley in the last row of 4 sections.

Shortly before his death, special forces veterans supported the initiative of reserve lieutenant colonel Alexander Khudyakov to achieve the title of Hero of Russia for Yevgeny Sergeev. But they didn't.

And concluding the story about this, without exaggeration, a great man, I would like to say the following. If Lieutenant Colonel Sergeev lived in the United States and served in the American army, then Hollywood would make a blockbuster about his life and exploits, with a multimillion-dollar budget and the involvement of its best movie stars, which would then be rolled with stunning success in cinemas around the world, and book publishers would gladly would shell out millions of dollars just for the opportunity to publish his memoirs.

If Lieutenant Colonel Sergeev had accomplished his feat during the Second World War, then, probably, he would have received his Hero of the Star - it happened that even “penalty boxers” were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Perhaps some school, a pioneer squad, or something like that would be named after him.

But Lieutenant Colonel E. Sergeev died in Russia, where not those who defend the country are held in high esteem, but those who sell it wholesale and retail. And for its defenders, the state saved at that time even on the last salute ...

P.S. When writing this article, the materials presented in the articles by Sergei Kozlov “Who took the Stinger” were used? and “Passed through the fire”, published in the journal “Brother”, respectively, in the issues of February 2002 and June 2008, also memoirs of reserve lieutenant colonel Alexander Khudyakov.

MOSCOW, November 5 - RIA Novosti, Andrey Kots. Elite fighters leave no traces and are ready to be thrown into any theater of operations every minute - today, November 5, military intelligence officers celebrate their centenary. Over these 100 years, they have carried out thousands of the most difficult sorties behind enemy lines and decided the outcome of more than one major battle. Many special operations are still classified. One of the most striking is the capture by the GRU special forces of American portable anti-aircraft systems"Stinger" during the Afghan war. About this raid - in the material RIA Novosti.

Operation Cyclone

The first "stingers" appeared among the Afghan dushmans in September 1986, after a special operation by the CIA, which received the designation "Cyclone". The army aviation of the joint contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) by that time had long been a headache for bandit formations. Helicopters unexpectedly attacked the caches of militants, covered the columns of dushmans on the march with fire, landed tactical troops in troubled villages and, most importantly, smashed caravans with weapons and ammunition coming from Pakistan. Due to the actions of Soviet pilots, many gangs in Afghanistan were on starvation rations, and military supplies intended for them were burned in the desert and on mountain passes. The White House considered that the supply of modern MANPADS to militants would force OKSV to curtail flights and the USSR would lose air superiority.

At first, the Stingers really came as an extremely unpleasant surprise for Soviet helicopter pilots. Only in the first month of using MANPADS, militants shot down three Mi-24 strikes, and by the end of 1986, the USSR lost 23 aircraft and a helicopter from fire from the ground. The new weapon forced the Soviet command to completely reconsider the tactics of using army aviation. Helicopter crews have since flown at extremely low altitudes to avoid being caught by the missile's homing head. But this made them vulnerable to heavy machine guns. It was clear that the new tactic was only a half-measure.

Ambush at the airfield

In order to effectively counter the emerging threat, it was necessary to carefully study the samples of MANPADS. Firstly, it is necessary to understand the principle of their operation, and secondly, to prove the direct support of the spooks from the CIA. The GRU special forces of the General Staff announced a full-scale hunt for the Stinger. The first one to get the launch tube was promised to be awarded the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union immediately and without further ado. But long months of reconnaissance activities did not give any result - the "spirits" took care of MANPADS as the apple of their eye and developed complex tactics for them combat use. This is how the head of the Afghan Intelligence Center of Pakistan (1983-1987), General Mohammad Yusuf, described the successful attack in his book "The Bear Trap".

"About 35 Mujahideen secretly made their way to the foot of a small high-rise overgrown with bushes, one and a half kilometers northeast of the runway of the Jalalabad airfield. Fire crews were at a shouting distance from each other, located in a triangle in the bushes, since no one direction, a target may appear.We organized each team in such a way that three people fired, and the other two held containers with missiles for quick reloading.Each of the Mujahideen selected a helicopter through an open sight on the launcher, the system "friend or foe" signaled with intermittent signal, that an enemy target appeared in the coverage area, and the "Stinger" captured the thermal radiation from the helicopter engines with its guidance head. When the lead helicopter was only 200 meters above the ground, Gafar commanded: "Fire." One of the three missiles did not work and fell without exploding , just a few meters from the shooter.Two others crashed into their targets.Two more The helicopters went into the air, one hit the target as successfully as the previous two, and the second passed very close, since the helicopter had already landed.

ATS military source: Syrian MiG-21 shot down by American StingerThe MiG-21 aircraft of the Syrian Air Force was flying to control the airspace and was shot down from MANPADS near the village of Kafer-Nbuda in the province of Hama, a military source told RIA Novosti.

Dushmans used the tactics of mobile sabotage reconnaissance anti-aircraft groups (DRZG) - small detachments that secretly operated near Soviet airfields. Weapons and ammunition were delivered to the launch site in advance, often with the help of local residents. Such attacks were difficult to counter without knowing technical features used anti-aircraft missiles. Surprisingly, the special forces managed to capture the operating MANPADS by pure chance.

forehead to forehead

On January 5, 1987, the reconnaissance group of the 186th separate special forces detachment under the command of Major Evgeny Sergeyev and Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun went on a free hunt in two Mi-8 helicopters. The special forces planned to comb through the suspicious "greenery" near Kalat on the road to Kandahar and, if necessary, destroy the detected enemy targets. "Turntables" were at extremely low altitude and literally nose to nose collided with three militants on motorcycles.

Dangerous skies in Afghanistan [Experience in the combat use of Soviet aviation in a local war, 1979–1989] Zhirokhov Mikhail Alexandrovich

MANPADS

The war in Afghanistan was the first conflict in which MANPADS were massively used, both against helicopters and against aircraft. It was here that Soviet specialists worked out measures and methods to combat MANPADS and increase the survivability of helicopters, and the Americans finalized the methodology for using missile systems.

Note that, according to the experience of the war in Afghanistan, Soviet military experts arranged MANPADS in descending order according to the degree of danger as follows: Jevelin, Strela-2M, Stinger, Bluepipe, Red Eye.

Let's try to figure out the effectiveness of the use of each complex, using the statistics of losses of helicopters of only one type - the Mi-24.

As evidenced by impartial statistics, the most deadly MANPADS in Afghanistan were the British Bluepipe and Jevelin.

Unlike the USSR and the USA, where the main emphasis in the development of MANPADS was placed on missiles with a thermal seeker, in the UK the main emphasis was placed on MANPADS aimed at the target using radio command systems. The Blowpipe complex began to be developed back in 1964 by Short Brothers and in 1972, after passing military tests, it was recommended for adoption.

Unlike MANPADS with IR guidance, which implement the “fire and forget” principle, the operator of such a MANPADS, before launching a missile at a target, must point the crosshairs at it and hold it on the target at the time of launch. After launch, the missile was automatically kept on the target line. After the missile was automatically brought to the guidance trajectory, the MANPADS operator switched to the manual guidance mode. At the same time, observing the target and the missile through the sight, he had to combine their images, continuing to keep the target on the crosshairs.

One of the main advantages of this guidance method is that such systems practically do not react to standard countermeasure systems used by aircraft and helicopters, which are designed primarily to divert missiles with IR-GOS.

However, with all the pluses of Blowpipe, there were many minuses. Thus, the operation of the radio link and tracers on the rocket unmasks the guidance process and the location of the firing position, the use of manual control leads to a strong dependence of the effectiveness of the complex on the degree of training and fitness of the shooter, his psychophysical state. You should not discount the fact that, after launch, it was very problematic for many Mujahideen (among whom there were rarely heroes) to keep an eight-kilogram block with a transport-launch container on their shoulders while aiming. For these reasons, the shelling of helicopters was carried out, as a rule, not from a maximum range of 3.5 km, but from a range of 1.5-2 km, which approximately corresponded to the capture range of the Stinger seeker. At the same time, the high visibility of the operator, together with the low - up to 500 m / s - the maximum speed of the rocket, allowed Soviet helicopter pilots to cover it with a Shturm or a pair of NARs, disrupting guidance, or simply get away from the rocket.

As a result, according to Soviet data, for the period from 1982 to 1989, only two Mi-24s were shot down by Blowpipe hits, moreover, one of them, leaving for the base, was finished off by Strela-2M. Su-25 attack aircraft were also shot down by the same complexes, however, as with helicopters, the percentage of hits on the number of launches was too small - the missile was only suitable for the slow, low-maneuverable and poorly armed Mi-8.

A completely different weapon was the Blowpipe modification - the Jevelin complex. The rocket of this complex had a maximum speed of 600 m / s, for guidance, the operator only needed to combine the mark of the sight with the target, the commands were generated automatically, and the rocket did not unmask itself as a tracer. Unlike its predecessor, Jevelin no longer had a manual, but a semi-automatic radio command system, but warhead, located in front, broke through any armor. In addition, the mass of the warhead "Jevelina" was 3 kg, but, unlike the "Stinger", it was more compact in length and had a much greater high-explosive action. Although the Blowpipe and Jevelin warheads were almost identical: the latter's two-module warhead was partially moved forward in such a way that the front 0.8-kilogram cumulative high-explosive charge created a hole for the main 2.4-kilogram charge to penetrate into the internal volumes of any target , including heavily armored ones. However, the main thing is that neither the LTC nor the Lipa impulses acted on these missiles, although, in the end, they learned to jam the radio command channel.

It is interesting that the pilots unmistakably recognized the type of rocket “by behavior”. The weak side of both British missiles was the need to track the target to hit or miss. This was widely used by helicopter crews in paired sorties. In this case, the following tactics were used: the attacked helicopter maneuvered within 60–70 degrees, forcing the rocket to loop, after which the partner hit the operator of the Shturmom MANPADS.

According to impartial statistics, the Jevelin proved to be the most effective MANPADS in Afghanistan. Of the 27 complexes, four were captured, two were destroyed before launch. Of the remaining twenty-one, four missiles were fired at the Su-25 - one was shot down by a single hit, the other was heavily damaged. Of the two launches on supersonic aircraft, one turned out to be the loss of the Su-17 for us. In addition, six missiles were fired at the Mi-8, while only one missed, while the other passed the Mi-8 right through without exploding. Four Mi-8s were destroyed by one hit, with the death of the crew and troops.

Of the nine missiles fired at the Mi-24, five hit, three missed, one lost its guidance due to the destruction of the operator. As a result, four helicopters were shot down - three with one hit, one was finished off by the Strela-2M MANPADS, one was seriously damaged and returned to the base. Despite the small number and episodic use, Jevelin missiles left a serious mark on the history of the Afghan war, shooting down ten aircraft.

The next in terms of effectiveness against Soviet aircraft were the Soviet MANPADS "Strela-2M" and "Strela-2M2". Modification "Strela-2M2" (factory designation 9M32M2) in the USSR was released in a small series of 700 pieces. The release was discontinued due to the appearance of the Strela-3 MANPADS, so the Strela-2M2 was sent to "friendly countries", including Afghanistan. The rocket was distinguished by cooling the sensor to minus 30 degrees with carbon dioxide. These missiles, brought in China and Iran almost to the level of Strela-3, combining an uncooled (for Strela-2M2 - cooled) IR sensor with a photocontrast one, had less protection from the LTC. But on the other hand, they did not react at all to the Lipa's impulses. In addition, it turned out that these missiles could capture the Mi-24 with EVA not from 1.5, but from 2-2.5 km. In addition, the 1.5-kilogram Strela-2M/2M2 warhead had a cumulative funnel, a planned crushing steel case (unlike the Stinger's aluminum warhead case) and carried 200 ten-gram spherical tungsten submunitions.

It is also worth mentioning that the Strela-2M could hit the vital parts of the structure covered with armor with a cumulative jet of the Mi-24, as well as damage armored units with heavy fragments at close range. When hit and close to burst, Soviet-made missiles were an order of magnitude more effective against any heavily armored aircraft - helicopters and attack aircraft.

In general, according to most experts, the Strela-2M inflicted more damage on our Mi-24s in Afghanistan than the Stingers. The advantage of the Strela over the Stinger was that, with a perfect hit, the Stingers hit the engine, and the Arrows hit the gearbox and stern, which were not protected by armor, besides breaking through the armor of the gearbox with a scattered cumulative jet.

It is rather difficult to give complete statistics on Strel launches, since after 1986 all the defeats of helicopters and aircraft were traditionally recorded at the expense of the American Stinger. Today, one can only use statistics from the pre-Stinger period, when at least four Mi-8s, two Mi-24s and two An-12s were shot down by these missiles.

And before moving on to an analysis of the use of Stingers in Afghanistan, it is worth saying a few words about the FIM-43A Red Eye. This complex was supplied to the Mujahideen in the initial period of hostilities and performed poorly in combat conditions. The complex was created for a direct hit on the target. Its main task was to hit the target with a high-explosive factor, then introducing heavy fragments into the airframe, which practically did not happen in real combat conditions.

Purely theoretically, a direct hit from the FIM-43A did more damage than a direct hit from the Stinger, but the power of the warhead was clearly not enough to disable the car, seriously damaging it, and even more so to shoot it down. The Red Eye combat unit had certain advantages over the Stinger-A when attacking the Mi-24, which, however, was absolutely offset by the obsolescence of the Red Eye. The shooting of the LTC reduced the probability of hitting by 80%, the low (500 m / s) initial speed of the rocket and poor controllability on the trajectory allowed the helicopter to easily escape with a couple of energetic maneuvers.

The capture of a helicopter with an EED could be carried out from a distance of no more than 1 km. For helicopters without EED, launches were made almost exclusively on board from 1–1.5 km. But the limited angles and attack distance, which exposed the anti-aircraft gunners under the attack of a helicopter, as well as low accuracy, together with the “addiction” to the LTC, were not the main trouble. The unreliability of both a contactless and a contact fuse meant that the missile could fly a few centimeters from the hull without exploding.

Note that with the help of FIM-43A missiles for 1982-1986. Mujahideen shot down only two Mi-24s and one Su-25. After the massive installation of LBB-166 Lipa pulsed IR interference stations on helicopters, the enemy himself refused to use the remaining FIM-43A, since the probability of their hit was rapidly approaching zero.

The first to enter Afghanistan in 1985 were the Stingers of the first modification - FIM-92A. With similar characteristics to the Red Eye, the Stingers' GGEs broke the skin, in particular, in the projection of the fuel tanks, causing a serious leak, and sometimes a fire, excised the main and tail rotor blades, could interrupt the tail rotor control rods, pierce the hydraulic hoses, in case of luck, without causing harm to the main units of the Mi-24, protected by armor. However, it was almost impossible to shoot down the Mi-24 even with a single FIM-92A hit. Therefore, the Mujahideen practiced paired launches, launches of four MANPADS (in part, given the greater likelihood of a miss on a helicopter equipped with Lipa), as well as entire anti-helicopter ambushes with six to ten Stinger complexes, spare TPKs and a pair of Strela-2M complexes ”, often backed up by ZPU or even light MZA.

The appearance in less than a year of the next, more accurate and noise-immune modification of the Stinger-POST (FIM-92B) with a warhead mass of 2.3 kg, as well as improved FIM-92A, with increased power from 0.93 to 1.5 kg The warhead increased the explosive factor by 1.6 times for the 2.3-kilogram warhead and only by 1.3 times for the improved 1.5-kilogram FIM-92A warhead.

From mid-1986, these advanced missiles, along with the remaining 800 Stinger-A, were used for the first time by the Mujahideen against the Mi-24. However, the very first hits confirmed the worst fears of the developers - it was almost impossible to shoot down the Mi-24 with a single hit of the Stinger if the missile did not hit the ammunition, tail boom or tail rotor of the helicopter, or did not cause a fire in the fuel tanks. That is, the relative miss of the Stinger was much more effective than a direct hit on the armor plate of a gearbox, a shielded EVA, or an armored engine. Although the 2.3-kilogram warhead, due to the high-explosive factor and the density of the fragments field, often tore off the armor plate and damaged the engine, which was inaccessible to the Stingers with 0.93 and even 1.5-kilogram warheads. In addition, the Stinger-POST (FIM-92B) simply cut the main rotor blade of the GGE, due to which its efficiency dropped by 30–50%. But the vital, armored units were too tough even for the new FIM-92B modification.

Note that in the latest modification of the FIM-92C Stinger-RPM, the same 2.3-kilogram warhead was used without changes, but when attacking a helicopter, the seeker was reprogrammed to the appropriate algorithm. However, even against the Mi-24, not to mention the Mi-28, such a warhead, without cumulative and armor-piercing elements, a rod scheme or equipped with heavy submunitions, was simply powerless.

As for the statistics of the Afghan war, only 18 helicopters were shot down by 89 Stinger hits on the Mi-24. Some of them were shot down with two or three rockets, as well as a combination with ZPU. Sometimes, after hitting the Stinger, the Mi-24 achieved the Strela. For 18 downed helicopters, there were 31 hits (out of 89). Interestingly, 58 hits caused non-critical damage.

However, after the Jevelin, which was not used on a large scale, the Stinger's hit statistics were the highest: out of 563 launches on the Mi-24, 89 missiles reached the target - about 16%. The strength of the Stinger was that the shooting of the LTC gave only 27% of the “leaving” of the rocket against 54% of the Strela.

Against the Mi-8, the Stingers were very effective - only three Mi-8s survived after a single hit by the Stingers and five after being hit by the Strela-2M. This was largely due to the fact that the LBB-166 Lipa station on the Mi-8 had a dead zone, and besides, the helicopter had significantly larger linear dimensions than the Mi-24 in all angles, relatively low speed and maneuverability.

In addition, the capabilities of the Mi-24 allowed the helicopter pilots to perform an anti-missile maneuver, called the Fatalist or Nahalka. In 65% of cases, when performing this maneuver, it was possible to avoid a seemingly inevitable hit, and on the Mi-8 such a maneuver was simply impossible.

MANPADS "Stinger" was also very effective against jet aircraft. The vast majority of Su-22s, Su-17s and MiG-21s were shot down by missiles of this type. Compared to the Mi-24, the percentage of launches to downed vehicles was significantly higher: 7.2% against jet combat aircraft in total; 4.7% against the Su-25 and 3.2% against the Mi-24. But 18% - in case of use against the Mi-8.

For the first time in Afghanistan (the combat debut of MANPADS took place in 1982 in the Falklands), "Stingers" were used on September 25, 1986 in the Jalalabad region by a detachment of a certain "engineer Gaffar" from the Islamic Party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. On that day, a group of 35 people set up an ambush in the area of the local airfield, firing at eight combat and transport helicopters of the 335th helicopter regiment returning from a routine task of reconnaissance and destruction of caravans.

The rebels damaged the Mi-24V of Lieutenant E.A. with two missiles. Pogorely. The pilot ordered the rest of the crew to leave the helicopter, and he himself tried to force him to land. The attempt was partially successful: they managed to land the car, while Pogorely received serious injuries and died in the hospital. In addition, the Mi-8 exploded in the air. Only the right pilot survived, who was thrown out of the cockpit by an explosion. His parachute opened automatically.

Here is how Colonel K.A. recalls these events. Shipachev, then the commander of the 335th regiment, who was on the ground: “Suddenly we heard a rather strong explosion, then another and another. Trying to understand what was the matter, we jumped out into the street and saw the following picture: six helicopters were descending directly above us in a spiral, and on the ground, at a distance of 100–300 m from the runway, a downed Mi-8 was burning. In the air, jumped out pilots hung on parachutes.

As it later turned out during the analysis, according to the group that was landing, spooks from an ambush made eight launches of the Stinger MANPADS from a distance of 3800 m from the runway. After the first launch, the flight director gave the command to the crews to turn on the protective equipment and open fire on the attackers, but there was nothing to shoot with: all the ammunition had already been completely used up, and combat helicopters they couldn't even strike back. Everyone who promptly turned on the shooting of heat traps defended themselves from missiles, and two helicopters were shot down.

... Immediately realizing that the pilots could not give an adequate response to the enemy, the command post immediately transmitted the coordinates of the target to the position of rocket artillery, and a retaliatory strike was fired at the bandits. A day later, we escorted the bodies of the dead comrades to their homeland, and already on September 28 we again began to carry out the next tasks.

A rare case for the Afghan war, when there is a description of this remarkable event from the other side. Says Pakistani Brigadier General Mohammad Yusuf, who was responsible until August 1987 for preparing the Stinger crews from the rebels: “The long wait for a suitable target was rewarded at three in the afternoon. Everyone peered into the sky to see the magnificent sight - no less than eight helicopters, belonging to the most hated enemies - Mi-24 fire support helicopters, were approaching the landing strip. Ghaffar's group had three Stingers, the operators of which lifted the now loaded launchers on their shoulders and stood in position for firing. The firing crews were within shouting distance of each other, arranged in a triangle in the bushes, since no one knew from which direction the target might appear. We organized each squad so that three people fired, and the other two held rocket tubes for quick reloading ...

When the lead helicopter was only 200 m above the ground, Ghaffar commanded: "Fire!", And the cries of the Mujahideen "Allah Akbar!" went up with the rockets. One of the three rockets did not fire and fell without exploding, just a few meters from the shooter. The other two crashed into their targets. Both helicopters hit the runway like a stone, shattering on impact. There was a wild scuffle between the fire crews during the reloading of rockets, as each of the team wanted to fire again. Two more rockets went into the air, one hit the target as successfully as the previous two, and the second passed very close, since the helicopter had already landed. I believe that one or two other helicopters were also damaged due to the fact that their pilots had to land abruptly ... Five missiles, three hit targets - the Mujahideen triumphed ...

After the ceasefire, Ghaffar's men quickly collected the empty tubes and destroyed the unexploded rocket by smashing it with rocks... Their return to the base was uneventful, although about an hour after their departure they heard the rumble of a jet aircraft in the distance and the sound of exploding bombs.

On that day, there was no immediate reaction to the downed helicopters in Jalalabad, the Russians were simply stunned. Then the airfield was closed for a month…”

As you can see, the testimonies of the parties are somewhat similar, but in some ways they diverge from each other.

Finishing the story, it is worth noting that the Soviet units were hunting for MANPADS systems. What is worth, for example, the story of the capture of the first Stinger complex, which is claimed by two dozen people in different time and under different circumstances (I think over the years their number will only grow).

Most truthfully, in my opinion, the story of the first captured Stinger is described in an article by reserve colonel Alexander Musienko: “The first Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile system was captured Soviet troops in Afghanistan on January 5, 1987. During aerial reconnaissance of the area by the reconnaissance group of senior lieutenant Vladimir Kovtun and lieutenant Vasily Cheboksarov of the 186th separate special forces detachment under the general command of the deputy commander of the detachment, Major Evgeny Sergeyev, in the vicinity of the village of Seyyid Kalai, three motorcyclists were noticed in the Meltakai Gorge " . Vladimir Kovtun described further actions as follows: “When they saw our turntables, they quickly dismounted and opened fire from small arms, and also made two quick launches from MANPADS, but at first we mistook these launches for RPG shots. The pilots immediately made a sharp turn and sat down. Already when they left the board, the commander managed to shout to us: “They are shooting from grenade launchers!” Twenty-fours covered us from the air, and we, having landed, started a battle on the ground. Helicopters and special forces opened fire on the rebels to kill, destroying them with NURS and small arms fire. Only the leading board landed on the ground, and the leading Mi-8 with the Cheboksarov group insured from the air. During the inspection of the destroyed enemy, Senior Lieutenant V. Kovtun seized the launch container, the Stinger MANPADS instrumentation unit and a complete set of technical documentation from the rebel he had destroyed. One combat-ready complex, strapped to a motorcycle, was captured by Captain E. Sergeev, and another empty container and a rocket were captured by the reconnaissance group, who landed from a slave helicopter.

Until the autumn of 1979, the Soviet side tried not to advertise its participation in the war. So, the border guards used the Mi-8 in the color of "Aeroflot" with fake numbers

At the first stage of the war, the Mi-8T made up the majority

Mi-6 helicopters played a very important role in supplying remote garrisons. But in the conditions of mountain warfare, their crews suffered heavy losses.

Due to the high mountain conditions, the Mi-8 was made as light as possible. Pay attention to shy; mania for the lack of trusses for hanging weapons