Since August 1918, the post of People's Commissar of Finance of the RSFSR was held by Krestinsky (until the end of 1922). His appointment marked the beginning of the VK policy. The leadership of Krestinsky fell on the Civil War. The VC period was characterized by almost complete ignorance of the eq. laws of the development of society and the role of money, devalued as a result of inflation millions of times (monetary terms appear - a piece (a thousand rubles), lemon, lemonard. VC were "extraordinary taxes" on the exploiting classes.

A one-time, ten-billion-dollar emergency tax was imposed on the bourgeois classes. the total collection in May 1919 did not reach even a billion rubles.

Other taxes (income and trade) also did not produce results. The excise form of taxation (nationalization, centralization) lost its significance and was abolished. In 1920, the People's Bank was liquidated, so there was no credit and banks in Russia for 2 years.

The most important material source at that time was the surplus appropriation system. Significant masses of commodities circulated on semi-legal markets, and the state sought to extract these resources for its own purposes. Through emission. The entire amount of seizures by issue amounted to 1,163 million pre-war rubles, and withdrawals by means of food appropriation amounted to 931 million pre-war rubles. The Soviet government wanted to destroy money and replace it with a labor unit.

Thus, emission, surplus appropriation and monetary taxes provided material resources of the state. transformations during the Civil War.

Despite the extreme unpopularity among the population, the VK policy allowed the communists to stay in power. However, by the beginning of 1921 the VK had exhausted itself, and in February 1921 all monetary taxes were abolished, emission was stopped, and the surplus appropriation system was replaced by a tax in kind. fundamental transformations and restoration of financial mechanisms began.

27. Financial transformations during the NEP period

By the early 1920s. Russia found itself in a state of polit., Ek., Financial crisis, to overcome which the NEP was adopted, the reanimation of the market began, commodity-money relations began to develop. The task was to recreate credit institutions... In the fall of 1921, the State Bank was established, and soon after a monetary reform was carried out, which stabilized the country's financial system. 1922 was headed by Sokolnikov. The main merit of the People's Commissar Kerensky is ( 1922-1924) monetary reform, the result of which was the withdrawal from circulation of 886.5 quadrillion old rubles and the creation of a hard national currency - a gold chervonets. Transformations followed: the introduction of an extensive system of taxes, loans and credit operations. As a result, in 1924, after the famine of 1921, thanks to the NEP, the country not only fed its population, but also sold 180 million poods of grain abroad. Established State. bank. So the foundation was laid for the monetary economy of Soviet Russia. The nationalized industry began to reorganize to new self-supporting principles. Lending to industrial and trade enterprises on a commercial basis began. Until the stabilization of the ruble, State. the bank issued loans at high%: from 8 to 12% per month, but gradually the interest rate decreased.In 1922, the Yugo-Vostochny, the first commercial one in Soviet Russia, emerged. At the end of 1922, a number of banks appeared: Prombank to finance industry, Electrobank for electrification, Vneshtorgbank for foreign trade, savings banks were established to mobilize the population's money savings. A decree was issued on the establishment of state. labor savings banks. In the summer of 1922, a subscription to the first state was opened. a grain loan for a total of 10 million poods of rye grain. In 1922, stock exchanges were organized to carry out transactions with the Central Bank. There was a "black exchange" or "American". She was unofficially recognized by the authorities. They sold any currency, gold, valuable furs. The purchase of canceled Central Banks took place there as well. As a result, stocks and bonds, which in 1919-1920. met as a wrapper, disappeared and ended up abroad. Simultaneously with the monetary reform, a tax reform was carried out. Transition from natural taxation to monetary taxation. taxes were imposed on tobacco, alcoholic beverages, beer, matches, honey. Already at the end of 1923 the main source of income for the state. the budget was deductions from the profits of enterprises, and not taxes from the population. The main result of the tax reform was the overcoming of the budget deficit in 1924.

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1. Measures of the state, referred to as the policy of "war communism"

2. Money circulation in years civil war

3. Activities of the People's Bank

List of used literature

1. Measures of the state, referred to as the policy of "war communism"

The internal policy of the Soviet state during the civil war was called the "policy of war communism."

The policy of "war communism" included a set of measures that affected the economic and socio-political sphere. The basis of "war communism" was extraordinary measures in supplying cities and the army with food, the curtailment of commodity-money relations, the nationalization of the entire industry, including small-scale, surplus appropriation, the supply of food and industrial goods to the population on the basis of ration cards, universal labor service and the maximum centralization of management of the national economy and the country. generally.

Chronologically, "War Communism" falls on the period of the Civil War, but certain elements of politics began to emerge as early as late 1917 - early 1918.

This applies primarily to the nationalization of industry, banks and transport. The "Red Guard attack on capital", which began after the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the introduction of workers' control (November 14, 1917), was temporarily suspended in the spring of 1918. In June 1918, its rates accelerated and all large and medium-sized enterprises were transferred to state ownership. In November 1920, the confiscation of small businesses took place. Thus, the destruction of private property took place. Characteristic feature"War communism" is the extreme centralization of the management of the national economy. At first, the management system was built on the principles of collegiality and self-government, but over time, the inconsistency of these principles becomes obvious. The factory committees lacked the competence and experience to manage. The leaders of Bolshevism realized that they had previously exaggerated the degree of revolutionary consciousness of the working class, which was not ready to rule. The stake is placed on state management of economic life. On December 2, 1917, the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) was created.

The tasks of the Supreme Council of the National Economy included the nationalization of large industry, the management of transport, finance, the establishment of commodity exchange, etc. By the summer of 1918, local (provincial, district) economic councils, subordinate to the Supreme Council of the National Economy, emerged. The Council of People's Commissars, and then the Council of Defense, determined the main directions of work of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, its central administrations and centers, with each representing a kind of state monopoly in the corresponding branch of production. By the summer of 1920, almost 50 central administrations had been created to manage large nationalized enterprises.

The centralized management system dictated the need for a commanding style of leadership. One of the features of the policy of "War Communism" was the system of emergency organs, whose tasks were to subordinate the entire economy to the needs of the front.

One of the main features of the policy of "War Communism" is the curtailment of commodity-money relations. This was manifested primarily in the introduction of nonequivalent natural exchange between town and country.

On January 11, 1919, in order to streamline the exchange between the city and the countryside, by the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, a food appropriation system was introduced. It was prescribed to withdraw the surplus from the peasants, which were initially determined by "the needs of the peasant family, limited by the established norm." However, the surplus soon began to be determined by the needs of the state and the army. The state announced in advance the figures of its needs for bread, and then they were divided by provinces, counties and volosts.

The curtailment of commodity-money relations was also facilitated by the prohibition of wholesale and private trade in the autumn of 1918 in most of the provinces of Russia. However, the Bolsheviks still did not succeed in destroying the market to the end. And although they were supposed to destroy money, the latter were still in use. The single monetary system collapsed. Only in Central Russia, 21 banknotes were in circulation, money was printed in many regions. In 1919, the ruble fell 3136 times. Under these conditions, the state was forced to switch to wages in kind.

The existing economic system did not stimulate productive labor, the productivity of which was steadily declining.

Under the conditions of "war communism", there was universal labor service for persons from 16 to 50 years old.

The system of military-communist measures included the abolition of payments for city and rail transport, for fuel, fodder, food, consumer goods, medical services, housing, etc. (December 1920). The class-equalizing principle of distribution is approved. From June 1918, card supply was introduced in 4 categories.

The consequences of "War Communism" cannot be separated from the consequences of the civil war. At the cost of tremendous efforts, the Bolsheviks managed to turn the republic into a "military camp" and win by means of agitation, rigid centralization, coercion and terror. But the policy of "war communism" did not and could not lead to socialism. By the end of the war, the inadmissibility of running ahead became obvious, the danger of forcing socio-economic transformations and escalation of violence. Instead of creating a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a dictatorship of one party arose in the country, for the maintenance of which revolutionary terror and violence were widely used.

2. Currency circulation during the civil war

In the summer of 1918, a new type of paper banknotes began to be issued under the name “Settlement Notes of the RSFSR”. However, to carry out a monetary reform, i.e. it was not possible to exchange old money for new ones. Bank notes of the RSFSR began to circulate since 1919 on a par with old banknotes. It should be noted that in 1917 and 1918 there were banknotes issued by the tsarist and Provisional governments in circulation. In 1918, Loan of Freedom bonds with a denomination of not more than 100 rubles, a series of bonds and short-term obligations of the State Treasury for a period up to November 1, 1919 were legalized as a means of payment. the appeal was issued "State credit notes of 1918".

In mid-1918, the Civil War and foreign military intervention began. The most important source of coverage for government spending was the issue of paper money. In 1918 it amounted to 33.6 billion rubles, in 1919 - 163.6 billion rubles, and in 1920 - 943.5 billion rubles, i.e. increased against 1918 by 28 times. Atlas ZV Monetary circulation and credit of the USSR. - M., 1957 .-- p. 32..

The growth of the money supply in circulation was accompanied by an even more rapid depreciation of money. From July 1, 1918 to January 1, 1921, the purchasing power of the ruble fell 188 times Dyachenko V.P. The history of finance of the USSR. - M .: Politizdat, 1978 .-- p. 54.. The resulting hyperinflation was associated with a decrease in the needs of economic turnover in money: production and commodity assets were reduced, and the process of naturalization of economic relations was under way. During certain periods of the Civil War, the territory in which banknotes were circulated also decreased. Thus, the purchasing power of money fell by leaps and bounds. Money has lost its ability to perform its functions.

Under the conditions of war communism, the government was forced to take the path of naturalizing economic relations. The means of production and consumer goods produced at the nationalized enterprises were not sold for money, but were distributed in a centralized manner using orders and cards. By the beginning of 1921, 93% of all wages were paid in kind. The measures taken somehow normalized the work of the nationalized enterprises and protected the material interests of the working people. The displacement of commodity-money relations and their replacement by direct product exchange, the introduction of a system of in-kind accounting changed the attitude towards money as an economic category. In 1920 - 1921 in economic theory, several projects have been discussed for measuring social costs on a cash-free basis. (The concept of "energy intensity", "purely material accounting", "labor hours", "threads as a form of working money".)

The consequence of the depreciation of money was that the urban and rural bourgeoisie lost their money savings. However, the Soviet state could not completely abandon the use of money. Z.V. Atlas in his book "The Socialist Monetary System" writes that the production of money during the years of War Communism was the only flourishing industry. At the same time, the paradox of the monetary system of the war communism period was that the more the sphere of application of money narrowed down, the more acutely their deficit was felt. Therefore, both central and local bodies of Soviet power were forced to constantly deal with monetary problems. The issue of rapidly depreciating paper money remained almost the only source of monetary revenues for the state budget. The money issued was circulated on the private market, the basis of which was small-scale peasant farming. Along with money, goods of high demand, such as salt and flour, also played the role of a universal equivalent in the private market. This impeded economic ties between individual regions of the country, gave rise to baggage, speculation, undermined the financial base of the state, which could not control and regulate the development of small-scale commodity economy. Thus, even under the conditions of War Communism, money retained its role, but performed it in a peculiar form.

After the end of the Civil War, all efforts of the state were aimed at restoring commodity-money relations in the country, strengthening monetary circulation. By regulating commodity-money relations, the government expected to use money as a tool for national accounting, control and planning. In March 1921, at the X Congress of the RCP, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was discussed and adopted. Proving the need for the development of commodity-money relations in the interests of restoring the national economy and strengthening the elements of the socialist economy, V.I. Lenin emphasized: "... money turnover is such a thing that perfectly verifies the satisfactory turnover of the country, and when this turnover is wrong, unnecessary pieces of paper are obtained from money." In the process of implementing NEP, the monetary reform of 1922-1924 played an important role in the formation and development of the first monetary system of the USSR. In the course of it, all the elements that form the concept of the monetary system were determined by law.

3. Activities of the People's Bank

After the October Revolution of 1917, the banking system underwent significant transformations. Their content and direction were determined by the ideology of the class struggle and the economic theory of socialism, one of the elements of which was the postulate of the inevitability of the withering away of commodity-money relations during the transition to socialism. At the same time, it was assumed that the principle of distribution according to work would retain its significance. Therefore, the requirement was formulated to establish the strictest accounting and control over the measure of labor and consumption during the period of transition to moneyless relations. As a weapon of such control, V.I. Lenin considered a bank - a single, largest of the largest, state, with branches in each volost, at each factory, believing that such a bank means nationwide bookkeeping, nationwide accounting of production and distribution of products.

In 1917, as a result of nationalization, the share capital of private banks was confiscated and passed into state ownership. A state monopoly on banking was proclaimed, former private banks were merged with the State Bank of Russia into a single national bank of the RSFSR, mortgage banks and credit institutions serving the small and middle urban bourgeoisie were liquidated, and transactions with securities were prohibited.

On December 14, 1917, a Decree was signed on the nationalization of the credit system and the formation of the Unified People's Bank of the Russian Republic, uniting all state, joint-stock and private banks that existed at that time. Later, the capital of the banks was confiscated, and the banking business was declared a state monopoly. Such actions were explained by the need to free workers from the exploitation of bank capital. The credit system was practically eliminated.

In 1918 the State Bank was renamed the United People's Bank of the Russian Republic. The country received a kind of "single" bank, which was supposed to focus on organizational issues, such as the adoption of assets on the balance sheet. islands and liabilities of nationalized banks. As for the performance of purely banking operations, this bank did not manage to expand its activities in this direction. High and intensifying every day inflation undermined commodity-money relations, provoked their curtailment in the state sector of the national economy, which led to a sharp narrowing of the sphere of crediting and settlements. The erroneous interpretation of the "flight from money" characteristic of the period of hyperinflation as the rejection of commodity-money relations as such became the theoretical basis for the introduction of the policy of War Communism. During the period of this policy, the United People's Bank of the Russian Republic actually ceased its operations. By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 19, 1920, the United People's Bank of the Russian republics was liquidated.

The economic system of this period was virtually penniless and strictly centralized. Over the course of several years (from 1917 to 1920), the Soviet government took a number of measures to eliminate money circulation. The establishment of the procedure for settlements between the state and enterprises without the use of banknotes led to the simplification of banking operations. Since January 1920, there have been no banks in the country.

However, quite soon, already in the course of the civil war, the inconsistency of the policy of war communism was revealed, and at the beginning of 1921 the transition to a new economic policy (NEP) was announced, including the replacement of the surplus tax with a tax in kind, after which the peasant could freely dispose of his products. In practice, this meant a course towards restoring commodity-money relations, creating a market, strengthening the ruble and, accordingly, re-creating the banking system. One of the first practical steps in the implementation of the new economic policy was the decree on the establishment of the State Bank of the RSFSR, which began its operations on November 16, 1921. With its establishment, the foundation was laid for the restoration of the monetary economy. Nationalized industry, which until that time consisted of budgetary supply of the state, went over to an independent existence, to cost accounting. The new economic policy allowed the existence of a free market, and also provided the right to lease nationalized enterprises to private individuals.

All these activities have prepared the basis for the development of credit relations.

On October 15, 1921, the State Bank of the RSFSR was founded with capital allocated from public funds in the amount of 2 trillion. rubles, which were approximately equal to 50 million rubles. pre-war. The main goals of the State Bank's activities were to restore money circulation and control its implementation, as well as to promote the development of industry, Agriculture and turnover. The State Bank had the right to issue banknotes, which served as a powerful resource for active operations. All of them were carried out on the basis of the principle of national economic expediency, in contrast to the previously existing United People's Bank, the state bank performed lending functions - issuing loans, opening on-call loans with collateral with goods and trade documents, accounting bills. In addition, he carried out the purchase and sale of securities, deposit, foreign exchange, transfer and other operations. Significant rates of inflation determined a high interest rate on loans, which was set at 8% for state-owned and 12% for private enterprises per month.

With the establishment of the State Bank, the foundation was laid for the restoration of the monetary economy.

List of used literature

1. Aleksandrov A. M. Financial system of the USSR. - M .: Gosfinizdat, 1956.

2. Atlas ZV Monetary circulation and credit of the USSR. - M., 1957.

3. Belousov RA Economic history of Russia. XX century. - M .: IzdAT, 1999.

4. Belsky KS Financial law: science, history, bibliography. - M .: Jurist, 1995.

5. Money. Credit. Banks / Ed. E.F. Zhukova. - M .: UNITI, 2000.

6. Money, credit, banks / Ed. G. N. Beloglazova. - M .: Yurayt-Izdat, 2004.

7. Dyachenko VP History of finance of the USSR. - M .: Politizdat, 1978.

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New financial system was built on the principle of incompatibility between Soviet power and commodity-money relations, so money must be liquidated. The socialist economy must have a natural and monetary nature with a centralized distribution of resources and finished goods.

The exclusive right of the state to carry out banking operations, to reorganize, liquidate old and create new credit institutions (state monopoly) was approved by a decree on the nationalization of banking in the country. First, the State Bank was nationalized, and then the Russian-Asian, Commercial and Industrial, Siberian and other joint-stock and private banks. In January 1918, bank shares belonging to large private entrepreneurs were canceled.

The State Bank was renamed to National Bank, and during 1919 all banks were liquidated and valuables confiscated.

N. Bukharin, E. Preobrazhensky, Yu. Larin and others in 1918-1920. they constantly emphasized that “the communist society will not know money,” that money is doomed to disappear. They wanted to immediately devalue the money, and in their place to put a mandatory system of distribution of benefits by cards. But, as these politicians noted, the presence of small producers (peasants) did not allow this to be done quickly, because the peasants were still outside the sphere of state control and they still had to pay for food.

Proceeding from the idea of the need to abolish money as soon as possible, the government was more and more inclined towards a complete depreciation of money by means of their unlimited emission. So many of them were printed that they depreciated tens of thousands of times and almost completely lost their purchasing power, which meant hyperinflation, which was carried out deliberately.

The emission of money in the first post-revolutionary years turned out to be the most important source of replenishment of the state budget. In February 1919 were issued the first Soviet money, which were called “settlement notes of the RSFSR”. They were in circulation together with "Nikolaevka" and "Kerenk", but their rate was much lower than that of the previous money.

In May 1919, the People's Bank was ordered to issue as much money as needed for the country's economy. As a result of the rampant emission, the price level has reached unprecedented proportions. If the price level of 1913 is taken as 1, then in 1918 it was 102, in 1920 - 9 620, 1922 - 7 343 000, and in 1923 - 648 230 000. As a result, Soviet money was completely discounted. High value retained only the golden royal ruble, but there was almost no circulation of it.

Devastation, lack of roads, civil war have turned the country into closed, isolated economic islands with internal monetary equivalents. According to the former Russian Empire there were many varieties of money in circulation. They printed their own money in Turkestan, Transcaucasia, in many Russian cities: Armavir, Izhevsk, Irkutsk, Yekaterinodar, Kazan, Kaluga, Kashira, Orenburg and many others. In Arkhangelsk, for example, local banknotes with the image of a walrus were called “walruses”. Credit bills, checks, exchange signs, coupons were issued: “turkbon”, “zakbon”, “grubon”, etc. By the way, it was in Central Asia and Transcaucasia had the largest emission, since the printing press was in the hands of local governments, virtually independent of the center.

After October, the tax system practically collapsed, which finally undermined the state budget, for the replenishment of which even coupons of the “Free Loan” of the Provisional Government were put into circulation. In the first six months after the revolution, government expenditures ranged from 20 to 25 billion rubles, and revenues - no more than 5 billion rubles.

To replenish the budget, local Soviets resorted to discriminatory taxation of “class enemies” in the form of “indemnities”. Thus, in October 1918, a special contribution of 10 billion rubles was imposed on wealthy peasants.

As a result, the financial system of Russia was destroyed, the economy switched to natural exchange. A system of moneyless relations and settlements was introduced in the industry. Glavkas and local authorities issued orders according to which enterprises had to release their products to other enterprises and organizations free of charge. Taxes were abolished, debts were canceled. The supply of raw materials, fuel, equipment was carried out free of charge, in a centralized way through the Glavka. To carry out production accounting at enterprises, the Council of People's Commissars recommended switching to natural measuring instruments - “threads” (labor units), which meant a certain amount of labor expended.

The credit and banking system actually ceased to exist. The People's Bank was merged with the treasury and subordinated to the Supreme Council of the National Economy, and in fact turned into a central clearinghouse. The bank accounts of enterprises recorded the movement of not only cash, but also material assets within the state sector of the economy. Instead of bank lending, centralized government financing and procurement were introduced.

In accordance with the surplus appropriation system, the private trade in bread and other products was prohibited in the country. All foodstuffs were distributed by state institutions strictly according to the cards. Industrial goods of daily demand were also distributed centrally by cards. Everywhere, 70-90% of wages were paid to workers and employees in the form of food and manufactured goods rations or manufactured products. Cash taxes from the population, as well as payments for housing, transport, utilities, etc. were abolished.

Of all its links in the financial system during the period of war communism, there was only the State budget, but it also consisted of monetary and material parts. The main revenue items of the budget were money issue and indemnity. The formed financial system fully met the tasks of centralizing economic development.

Soviet power inherited from bourgeois Russia a completely disorganized monetary system. By the time of the October Revolution of 1917, the purchasing power of the ruble was no more than 10 pre-war kopecks (2, p. 55). Having mastered the commanding economic heights, the Soviet government, using the levers of a market economy, immediately faced the need to create a new monetary system and strengthen the ruble. With significant reserves of old money, the bourgeoisie still had economic strength.

Creation of a new monetary system... The creation of a new monetary system began with the seizure of the State Bank of Russia and the nationalization of private commercial banks.

The State Bank was the issuing apparatus of the country and the bank of banks. It is worth noting that he provided large loans to commercial and other banks, kept their cash reserves and carried out cash services. On the eve of the October Revolution, the credit debt of commercial banks to the State Bank was more than 2 billion rubles. (2, p. 59).

Thanks to the nationalization of private commercial banks and their merger with the State Bank into the United People's Bank of the Republic, the government succeeded in:

to use emission resources for urgent expenses of the Soviet state;
to sharply cut the sources of funds for financing the counter-revolution;
to strengthen control over the spending of funds of both private individuals and nationalized enterprises in the bank;
to develop non-cash payments, which reduced the bank's need for emission resources.

The reduction in emissions in the first half of 1918 and a decrease in the rate of growth in prices allowed the government to announce the implementation of a monetary reform. It is worth noting that it involved the exchange of old banknotes for new ones. It was decided that the bearers of small amounts within the established limit exchange for one ruble for one ruble, not change the money in excess of the norm, but credit it to a current bank account. The monetary reform would reduce the amount of cash in circulation, increase the credit resources of the United People's Bank, reduce the emission of banknotes and strengthen state control over cash flows. Based on the foregoing, we come to the conclusion that the project for the monetary reform of 1918, on the one hand, was aimed at strengthening the system of monetary circulation in the country, and on the other, had a pronounced class orientation. The monetary reform undermined the economic power of the bourgeoisie.

In the summer of 1918, a new type of paper banknotes began to be issued under the name “Settlement Notes of the RSFSR”. At the same time, it was not possible to carry out a monetary reform, that is, to exchange old money for new ones. Bank notes of the RSFSR began to circulate since 1919 on a par with old banknotes. Do not forget that it will be important to say that in 1917 and 1918 there were banknotes issued by the tsarist and Provisional governments in circulation. In 1918, the bonds "Loan of Boda" were legalized as a means of payment with a denomination of not more than 100 rubles, a series of bonds and short-term obligations of the State Treasury for a period up to November 1, 1919. money surrogates in circulation were issued "State credit notes of 1918".

In mid-1918, the Civil War and foreign military intervention began. It should not be forgotten that the emission of paper money turned out to be the most important source of coverage of government expenditures. In 1918 it amounted to 33.6 billion rubles, in 1919 - 163.6 billion rubles, and in 1920 - 943.5 billion rubles, that is, it increased against 1918 by 28 times (1, p. 32).

The growth of the money supply in circulation was accompanied by an even more rapid depreciation of money. From July 1, 1918 to January 1, 1921, the purchasing power of the ruble fell 188 times (5, p. 54). The resulting hyperinflation was associated with a decrease in the needs of economic turnover in money: production and commodity assets were reduced, and the process of naturalization of economic relations was under way. In certain periods of the Civil War, the territory on which the banknotes were circulated also decreased. Based on the foregoing, we come to the conclusion that the purchasing power of money fell by leaps and bounds. Money lost the ability to perform ϲʙᴏand functions.

War communism... Under these conditions, the government was forced to take the path of naturalization of economic relations. The means of production and consumer goods produced at the nationalized enterprises were not sold for money, but were distributed in a centralized manner using orders and cards. By the beginning of 1921, 93% of all wages were paid in kind. The measures taken somehow normalized the work of the nationalized enterprises and protected the material interests of the working people. The displacement of commodity-money relations and their replacement by direct product exchange, the introduction of a system of in-kind accounting changed the attitude towards money as an economic category. In 1920 - 1921 in economic theory, several projects have been discussed for measuring social costs on a cash-free basis. (The concept of "energy intensity", "purely material accounting", "labor hours", "threads as a form of working money".)

The consequence of the depreciation of money was that the urban and rural bourgeoisie lost their money savings. At the same time, the Soviet state could not completely abandon the use of money. ZV Atlas, in his first book "The Socialist Monetary System" (2), writes that the production of money during the years of War Communism was the only prosperous branch of industry. At the same time, the paradox of the monetary system of the war communism period was that the more the sphere of application of money was narrowed, the more acutely their deficit was felt. Therefore, both central and local bodies of Soviet power were forced to constantly deal with monetary problems. The issue of rapidly depreciating paper money remained almost the only source of monetary revenues for the state budget. The money issued was circulated on the private market, the basis of which was small-scale peasant farming. Along with money, goods of high demand, such as salt and flour, also played the role of a universal equivalent in the private market. This impeded economic ties between individual regions of the country, gave rise to baggage, speculation, undermined the financial base of the state, which could not control and regulate the development of small-scale commodity economy. Based on all of the above, we come to the conclusion that under the conditions of war communism, money retained its role, but performed it in an uneven form.

Monetary reform 1922-1924 After the end of the Civil War, all efforts of the state were aimed at restoring commodity-money relations in the country, strengthening monetary circulation. By regulating commodity-money relations, the government expected to use money as a tool for national accounting, control and planning. In March 1921, at the X Congress of the RCP, a new economic policy (NEP) was discussed and adopted. ᴛᴏ - such a thing, which perfectly verifies the satisfactoryness of the turnover of the country, and when this turnover is wrong, then unnecessary pieces of paper are obtained from the money ”[Lenin V.I. It is worth saying - poly. collection op. T. 43. S. 66.]. In the process of implementing NEP, the monetary reform of 1922-1924 played an important role in the formation and development of the first monetary system of the USSR. In the course of it, all the elements that form the concept of the monetary system were determined by law.

The monetary unit of the USSR was declared ducat, or 10 rubles. Its gold content was established - 1 spool or 78.24 shares of pure gold, which was the gold content of the pre-revolutionary ten-ruble gold coin.

At the first stage of the monetary reform, chervonets were issued. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the chervonets was issued not to cover the budget deficit, but to service the economic turnover. The monopoly right to issue chervontsy was presented to the State Bank of the USSR. As bank notes, they were issued by the bank into circulation in the process of short-term lending to the national economy. Moreover, loans were provided only for easily marketable inventory.

Bank loans in chervontsy replaced the traditional bills of exchange. It is worth saying that in order to withdraw the chervonets from circulation, it was decided to repay the loans of the State Bank, provided in chervontsy, with them. Therefore, the amount of chervonets in circulation was limited by the need for economic circulation in means of payment. It is worth noting that they were credit money not only in form, but also in essence. Their emission was limited both by the needs of the economic turnover and by the values on the balance sheet of the State Bank. So, according to the law, the chervontsy issued into circulation were provided by at least 25% with precious metals, stable foreign currency at the exchange rate for gold, and 75% with easily marketable goods, short-term bills of exchange and other short-term obligations. It should be said that in order to maintain the stability of the chervonets in relation to gold, the state allowed, within certain limits, its exchange for gold (in coins and ingots) and stable foreign currency. Except for the above, the state accepted chervontsy at face value in payment of state debts and payments levied in gold according to the law. Based on all of the above, we come to the conclusion that all the necessary conditions have been created to maintain the stability of the gold piece. It is worth noting that it has established itself in circulation as a hard currency.

It was not easy to solve the problem of maintaining the stability of the national currency. First of all, there was a large budget deficit in the country, which was covered by the emission of a constantly depreciating new currency - sovznak. In connection with this, there was a parallel circulation of two currencies - the chervonets and the sovznak. Secondly, with the transition to NEP, gold and foreign currency took strong positions in circulation as stable currencies. That is why, until March 1923, from 30 to 50% of the gold coins allowed for issue remained in the cash desk of the Board of the State Bank, that is, they were not put into circulation. In the course of strengthening the position of the chervonets in 1923, there is a gradual transition from the gold calculation of all monetary transactions to the red one. The revenues and expenditures of the state budget, the volume of economic transactions, tax payments, wages, etc. began to be calculated in chervontsy. The need to use royal gold coins and foreign currency as a means of circulation and payment disappeared. The right to issue chervontsy granted to the State Bank expanded its possibilities for lending to the national economy. The consumption of their own circulating assets by enterprises associated with the depreciation of money has ceased, and normal conditions have been created for the development of commercial and bank loans. All ϶ᴛᴏ made it possible to strengthen the principles of cost accounting in the national economy, increase the budget revenue base and reduce the budget deficit.

At the same time, the emission of Sovznots to cover the budget deficit continued until the middle of 1924. It should be said that in order to reduce the nominal volume of the money supply and facilitate settlements in the country, two denominations of Sovznots were carried out signs to new ones.]: the first at the end of 1921, and the second at the end of 1922. At the first denomination 10,000 rubles. all previous issues were equal to 1 ruble. banknotes of the 1922 sample. When carrying out the second denomination, 100 rubles. sample 1922 exchanged for 1 ruble. sample of 1923. On March 1, 1924, the number of Soviet signs in circulation, excluding two denominations, was fantastic - 809.6 quadrillion rubles. Even with a small turnover, one had to operate in millions of rubles.

With the devaluation of the sovznak, the sphere of circulation of the chervontsi continued to expand. If initially they served the commercial turnover between enterprises, enterprises and the financial and credit system, then later they began to apply to the retail trade. Based on the above, we come to the conclusion that for some time in the country there was a system of parallel circulation of two currencies.

The system of parallel circulation of currencies was a step towards the restoration of commodity-money relations in the country and the strengthening of money circulation. At the same time, it contained serious contradictions. The chervonets as a banknote of large denomination was the currency of the city. Prices for agricultural products were low; therefore, the peasant market was served mainly by Soviet signs. From the depreciation of the latter, the peasants suffered great material losses. There was a threat of a reduction in agricultural production, naturalization of the peasant economy.

The urban population also suffered from the depreciation of the sovznak. The loss of family budgets for workers and employees ranged from 20 to 30%. All ϶ᴛᴏ required the completion of the started monetary reform. Necessary economic prerequisites for him, as well as the formation of a new monetary system, were created by the beginning of 1924. The second stage of the monetary reform was marked by the issuance of treasury bills and the withdrawal from circulation of depreciated Soviet notes. In February-March 1924, the Soviet government issued decrees on the issuance of state treasury notes in denomination 1; 3; 5 rubles, the termination of the issue of Soviet signs into circulation, the minting and issuance of silver and copper coins into circulation, the withdrawal of Soviet signs from circulation.

The latter was carried out by buying them out at the following rate: 1 rub. Treasury bills were exchanged for 50 thousand rubles. banknotes of the sample of 1923, except for the two denominations carried out in 1921 and 1922, the exchange rate was 50 billion rubles. all old banknotes after the October Revolution for 1 ruble. new.

Treasury Notes differed from the chervonets not only in the value of the banknotes, but also in their economic nature. Until mid-1924, the issue of treasury notes was used by the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR to cover the budget deficit. It should be said that for their release into circulation, no bank security was required with gold, goods or credit obligations. As legal tender, treasury notes were provided with all the property of the state. It should be said that in order to maintain the stability of monetary circulation in the country, the issue of treasury notes was limited. In 1924, the limit of the emission right of the USSR People's Commissariat of Finance to issue treasury notes was no more than 50% of banknotes issued into circulation, in 1928 - no more than 75%, and in 1930 - no more than 100%. In 1925, in connection with the liquidation of the budget deficit, the issue of treasury notes was completely transferred to the State Bank. Along with the issue of bank notes, the issue of treasury notes has become one of the bank's credit resources. The treasury nature of the issue remained for the metal coin, the income from which went to the budget.

Based on all of the above, we come to the conclusion that as a result of the reform of 1922 - 1924. a new monetary system was formed in the USSR. The types of banknotes, the name of the monetary unit, its gold content, the procedure for issuing banknotes, their security, economic instruments for regulating the money supply in circulation were determined. The development of non-cash payments, provided for by the law, was of essential importance for the organization of the latter. Formed as a result of the reform of 1922 - 1924. the new monetary system existed with minor changes of a non-fundamental nature until the beginning of 1990.

This reform was carried out in a difficult economic and political environment: a ruined economy, a financial blockade, a sharp decline in the gold reserve. On the eve of its implementation, the country's gold reserves amounted to 8.7% of the gold reserves of tsarist Russia before the First World War and 13% of the gold reserves on the eve of the monetary reform of S.Yu. Witte. The Soviet government was able to quickly create a new monetary system, strengthen the purchasing power of the ruble and increase the role of money in the management of social production. It should be said that to maintain the established parity (1 ducat was equal to 10 rubles in treasury notes), the Soviet government widely used the methods available to it - state regulation of commodity prices and commodity intervention. In 1922 - 1924. The Soviet state already owned the overwhelming part of industrial production, the resources of the credit system, all railway transport, foreign trade, a significant part wholesale trade country. By regulating wholesale and retail prices, maneuvering commodity stocks and monetary resources, the state actively influenced the purchasing power of money and its circulation in the national economy.

Money during the industrialization period. The socialist reconstruction of the national economy was a serious test for the country's monetary circulation system. The planned centralized system of economic management fundamentally changed the nature of commodity-money relations and the operation of the law of value in the national economy. The planned increase in the cost of capital investments (primarily in heavy industry) has caused serious disparities between the effective demand of the population and its supply of goods. As a result, prices in the private retail sector began to rise rapidly. In state and cooperative trade, the prices of goods were set by the state. It is worth noting that they were much lower than the prices for private goods. At the same time, the population could not actually buy products at low prices due to the commodity deficit. Based on all of the above, we come to the conclusion that the government's attempts to influence the purchasing power of the ruble were not crowned with success. There was both "latent" and "visible" inflation in the country, which undermined the stability of monetary circulation.

To improve the supply of the urban population with industrial and food products, to reduce its material losses associated with the constant rise in prices in the unorganized market, the government introduced a rationing supply system. In 1930, the normalized supply system covered 29 million people, and in 1934 - 40.3 million. According to modern researchers, about 80% of the country's population did not receive cards (peasants, "disenfranchised") It is worth noting that it, of course, used the services of the "black" market. The urban population also took part in the activities of the latter, since the norms for its supply by cards were very meager. The distribution of goods by cards was carried out at commodity prices. This reduced the losses of the population from the depreciation of money, but did not satisfy its demand for consumer goods. It should be said that in order to increase consumption, commercial trade was allowed, which was carried out only in cities. Various goods were sold in commercial stores at prices higher than the rationed supply and lower than the collective farm market. In 1934, the turnover of commercial trade amounted to 13 billion rubles. or 21% (3, p. 115) of the total retail (state and cooperative) turnover. If we talk about the sale of goods at high prices, and, consequently, about their influence on the purchasing power of the monetary unit, it should be emphasized that in 1934 the share of commercial and market trade accounted for 35.6% (3, p. 115) general turnover. This had a significant effect on reducing the purchasing power of money and led to inflation.

Based on the foregoing, we come to the conclusion that the change in the distribution of national income associated with an increase in the costs of socialist reconstruction of the national economy was accompanied by an increase in the volume of money turnover, an increase in the money supply in circulation and inflation. As a result of credit expansion to cover these costs, the money supply in circulation increased in 1930 by 45% (2, p. 254), and in 1931 - by 32.5%. The growing "imbalance" between money and commodity circulation was accompanied by a rise in prices in both the public and private sectors. In the first half of 1932, the purchasing power of the ruble was 60% lower than in 1927-1928. (2, p. 256) (calculated according to the general trade index)

In 1933, the Soviet government took measures to normalize the sphere of monetary circulation and strengthen the monetary system. It is worth saying that for him a large amount of money was withdrawn from circulation. The money supply for the year decreased by more than 1.5 billion rubles, or 20%. Along with this, the volume of capital investments was reduced by 10.7%; launched commercial trade in bread and other food products (2, p. 259).

To normalize the circulation and strengthen the monetary system, it was extremely important to eliminate the rationing system for the distribution of products, which limited and reduced the role of money in the national economy. It is worth saying that in order to maintain their purchasing power, it was decided to establish a level of retail prices that would balance the income and expenses of the population, demand and supply of goods. In 1935, the rationing supply system for food products was abolished, and in 1936 - for industrial ones. The new uniform prices for goods were set at an average level between the low card prices and the high ones in the informal market. Thus, the restructuring of the price system, which had begun in 1928, was completed. As a result, in 1937 they were 5.4 times higher than those formed as a result of the monetary reform of 1922-1924. (2, p. 270). Only thanks to such a significant increase in prices did the Soviet government manage to balance income and expenditures of the population, demand and supply of goods, that is, to prevent a further decline in the purchasing power of the ruble.

Since 1928, the achievement of the ϲᴏᴏᴛʙᴇᴛϲᴛʙii between the dynamics of the growth of the money supply in circulation and the volume of commodity circulation has become a necessary element of planning and regulation of the monetary circulation of the socialist economy. At the same time, due to the reduction in the production of consumer goods, it was impossible to achieve the necessary ratio between income and expenditures of the population without raising prices for these goods. In 1928, 60.5% of the total volume of the product produced was accounted for by consumer goods, and 39.5% by means of production. In 1940, on the contrary, the share of consumer goods accounted for 39%, and means of production - 61% and ϶ᴛᴏ, provided that the urban population was constantly growing. Only from 1929 to 1932 did it double. It should be said that in order to balance supply and demand, the government went to increase prices, the volume of trade was already calculated in current prices. Inflation made it possible to carry out a "systematic redistribution" of national income in favor of the state. The decline in the purchasing power of the ruble presupposed an official change in its price scale, i.e., gold content and exchange rate. From 1924 to July 1937, the gold content of the ruble was reduced 4.4 times. From 1937 to 1940, the decline in the purchasing power of the ruble continued. The economic situation in the country was aggravated by an increase in state budget spending on the country's defense. In 1940, their share in budget expenditures was 32.6% (10, p. 260).

Monetary reform of 1947 A serious test for monetary circulation was the Great Patriotic War 1941 - 1945 By its end, the money supply in circulation increased by 4 times in comparison with 1941 (7, p. 168). The growth of money supply in circulation with a simultaneous reduction in the physical volume of retail trade led to a significant increase in prices and a decrease in the purchasing power of the ruble. In 1943, prices on urban collective farm markets were almost 17 times higher than pre-war prices (2, p. 291). It is worth saying that in order to eliminate the consequences of the war in the field of monetary circulation, it was decided to carry out a monetary reform and switch to free trade at uniform prices. The economic prerequisites for the implementation of such a reform and the abolition of the rationing system of supplying the population were formed by the end of 1947. It should be noted that it was carried out as follows:

firstly, within a few days the old money in circulation was exchanged for new ones at the rate of 10: 1;
secondly, in the savings banks and the State Bank of the USSR, a revaluation of the balances of deposits and current accounts was carried out. The latter was carried out on more favorable terms than the exchange of cash. So, deposits up to 3000 rubles. (they accounted for up to 80%) were not overestimated, that is, for 1 ruble. the depositor received 1 ruble of old money. new. If the amount of the deposit exceeded this figure, then the first 3000 rubles. revalued the ruble for the ruble, and the amount from 3000 to 10,000 rubles. according to the following ratio: for 3 rubles. old money 2 rubles. new. The amount of the deposit exceeding 10,000 rubles was reduced by half. Such a preferential procedure for revaluation of household deposits gave a positive effect to stimulate the population's savings in savings banks;
thirdly, the funds in the settlement and current accounts of cooperative enterprises and organizations were revalued. The revaluation of funds was carried out from a ratio of 5: 4, that is, for 5 rubles. old money was given 4 rubles. new;
fourth, the government carried out the conversion of all government loans issued before 1947. The bonds of all old loans were exchanged for bonds of the new conversion government 2% loan of 1948 at the rate of 3: 1. The exception was the bonds of the freely circulating State internal winning loan of 1938. They were exchanged at a ratio of 5: 1. The bonds of his loan were readily bought and sold by the state to the population, for whom they were both a store of value and a store of value. The bonds of the 1947 loan were not subject to revaluation.

The bulk of the public debt was formed during the war years, when the purchasing power of the ruble was very low. Therefore, the loan conversion deserved the budget from burdensome debt repayment costs, but it had to be done in full rubles.

Based on the foregoing, we come to the conclusion that the planned, centralized system of management of the national economy in the USSR predetermined the special nature of the monetary reform of 1947 and its socio-economic consequences. In terms of timing and methods of implementation, it was fundamentally different from the monetary reforms carried out in a number of capitalist countries after the Second World War. Forming in a planned manner the constituent elements of commodity-money circulation (the value of the money supply in circulation, the volume of retail turnover, the level of commodity prices), the Soviet government managed after a destructive war in a short time to strengthen the money circulation in the country, reduce by 13.5 times (7, p. 174) a lot of money in circulation and increase the purchasing power of the ruble.

In the first quarter of 1948, it was 41% higher than in the first quarter of 1947 (7, p. 174). It became possible to move to an open retail at uniform prices. The total gain of the population from the reduction in prices amounted to 8.6 billion rubles in 1948. (7, p. 174).

The main burden of the costs associated with the monetary reform was borne by the state. The wages of workers and employees, the cash income of collective farmers and other labor income did not change. After the reform, all incomes were paid to the population with new money in the same amount. The monetary reform of 1947 did not change the foundations of the country's monetary system. Only the name of the monetary unit has changed. Bank notes began to be issued not in chervontsy, but in rubles. Treasury notes were issued in denominations of 1; 3; 5 rubles, and bank notes in denominations of 10; 25; 50 and 100 rubles. The reform did not change the mechanism and organization of emission regulation.

Transfer of the ruble to the gold base. Due to the systematic decline in prices after the monetary reform and the expansion of trade, the purchasing power of the ruble continued to increase. In 1950, the government adopted a decree to transfer the ruble to a gold base. Its gold content was found to be 0.222168 g of pure gold.

Based on it, the rate of foreign currencies in rubles was also determined: 1 dollar. equated to 4 rubles, 1 English. f. Art. to 11 rubles. 20 kopecks etc. The new exchange rate meant an increase in the currency parity of the ruble compared to the previous one by 32.5%. The State Bank of the USSR was entrusted with setting the rate of foreign currency in rubles.

The transfer of the ruble directly to the gold base was associated with the formation of the world socialist economic system, which required a single currency base both for mutual settlements between the countries of the socialist camp and for the latter's settlements with capitalist states. At the same time, the established gold content of the ruble turned out to be overestimated, which hindered the development of primarily non-commodity transactions with foreign states. Therefore, it became necessary to revise the currency parity of the ruble on the basis of the ratio of the purchasing power of money in the USSR and other countries. In April 1957, a special rate of exchange of foreign currency for rubles was established for non-commodity transactions. It should be said that for the currencies of capitalist countries, 150% markups were provided to the official exchange rate. For example, the official exchange rate of the ruble against the dollar is 4 rubles. = 1 dollar, and the premium to it is 6 rubles. (150% of 4 rubles = 6 rubles)

Consequently, the ruble / dollar exchange rate for non-commodity transactions was 10 rubles. for 1 dollar The system of a double rate (official and on non-commodity transactions) created additional difficulties for the state in the international currency turnover. Therefore, already in 1961, in connection with a change in the scale of ruble prices, a single exchange rate for the Soviet currency was restored.

Increasing the scale of prices. In May 1960, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a resolution to increase the price scale by 10 times from January 1, 1961 and exchange all banknotes in circulation for new ones at a ratio of 10: 1. By the way, this measure was taken to simplify accounting, long-term planning, and reduce distribution costs. From January 1 to April 1, 1961, all banknotes were exchanged for new ones without any restrictions (10 rubles of old banknotes for 1 ruble of new ones) .According to this ratio, they were recalculated, i.e., reduced by 10 times, wage rates, pensions, scholarships, benefits, all payment obligations, etc.

The change in the scale of prices also meant a change in the gold content of the monetary unit. The new gold weight of the ruble was set equal to 0.987412 g of pure gold, that is, it was increased not 10, but only 4.4 times. This eliminated the mistake made when establishing the gold content of the ruble in 1950 at the level of 0.222168 g of pure gold.

It was necessary to introduce another exchange rate, reflecting the real ratio of the purchasing power of the ruble and the currencies of different countries.

The monetary system of the USSR, which had developed by 1961, existed without significant changes until the beginning of the restructuring of political and socio-economic relations in the country, which began in the late 1980s.

Turning to the history of the formation and development of the monetary system of the USSR allows us to determine and evaluate the fundamental principles of its organization and the role of money in the reproduction process of the socialist economy. It is worth noting that it does not liquidate commodity-money relations, but subordinates their development to these economic laws.

With the conscious use of commodity-money relations in the organization and management of social production, specific features arise in the creation of a monetary system, which should:

reflect the maturity of commodity-money relations (the nature of banknotes, methods of regulating the value of the money supply, the nature of the emission of money and their security);
take into account the socio-economic situation of the country and the possibility of implementing legal acts of the state regulating the state of monetary circulation;
ensure the stability of the purchasing power of money.

The distinctive principles of the functioning of the socialist monetary system were the planning of trade turnover, planned pricing, and regulation of the population's income. This allowed the state to predetermine the purchasing power of money and maintain it at a given level. V the former USSR϶ᴛᴏ was achieved through a whole system of plans regulating production volumes, the activities of the financial and credit system both in the country as a whole and in the regions (national economic plan, state budget, credit and cash plans of the State Bank of the USSR, balance of cash income and expenses of the population)

At different stages of socialist construction, the Soviet state used different methods of issuing money (now credit, now treasury, then one and the other at the same time), which increased the elasticity of the monetary system and the role of money in solving socio-economic problems. The connection between banknotes and gold was manifested in different ways: either the gold content of the monetary unit was established, or the exchange of banknotes for gold took place, or the ratio between the gold reserve of the State Bank of the USSR and the maximum value of the issue of banknotes was adopted. In each specific case, ϶ᴛᴏ reflected the state's ability to maintain the stability of the monetary system. The state of money circulation in the country will be a barometer of its economic and political life. In the USSR, inflationary processes made themselves felt from the beginning of the first five-year plan. Prices were constantly rising, the purchasing power of the ruble was falling. As already indicated, ϶ᴛᴏ was caused by different reasons, but they led to the same result - violation of the law of monetary circulation. Under the planned pricing system, inflation was often latent, that is, it manifested itself not in an increase in prices in the organized market, but in a shortage of goods. The decline in the purchasing power of the ruble was evidenced by the prices of the unorganized market and the expansion of speculation.

While carrying out economic reforms, the RF Government faced deep and lingering inflation. From March 1990 to March 1996, prices increased on average 4806 times. Measures to strengthen control over the state of monetary circulation in the country, and to reduce inflation rates, the Russian government is forced to take at the present time.

Control questions

What banknotes were circulating on the territory of Russia during the Civil War? What are the reasons for the disorder in monetary circulation during this period?
What were the features of monetary circulation under war communism?
What tasks were solved at the first stage of the monetary reform of 1922-1924?
How did the reform of 1922 - 1924 come to an end? and what are its main results?
How was the 1947 reform carried out and what were its results?
What features did the monetary system of a socialist society have? On what principles was its structure based?

The new financial system was built on the principle of incompatibility between Soviet power and commodity-money relations, so money must be liquidated. The socialist economy must have a natural and monetary nature with a centralized distribution of resources and finished goods.

The State Bank was renamed to National Bank, and during 1919 all banks were liquidated and valuables confiscated.

In May 1919, the People's Bank was ordered to issue as much money as needed for the country's economy. As a result of the rampant emission, the price level has reached unprecedented proportions. If the price level of 1913 is taken as 1, then in 1918 it was 102, in 1920 - 9 620, 1922 - 7 343 000, and in 1923 - 648 230 000. As a result, Soviet money was completely discounted. Only the gold royal ruble retained its high value, but there was almost no circulation of it.

Devastation, lack of roads, civil war have turned the country into closed, isolated economic islands with internal monetary equivalents. Many types of money circulated throughout the former Russian Empire. They printed their own money in Turkestan, Transcaucasia, in many Russian cities: Armavir, Izhevsk, Irkutsk, Yekaterinodar, Kazan, Kaluga, Kashira, Orenburg and many others. In Arkhangelsk, for example, local banknotes with the image of a walrus were called “walruses”. Credit bills, checks, exchange signs, coupons were issued: “turkbon”, “zakbon”, “grubon”, etc. By the way, it was in Central Asia and the Transcaucasia that the largest emission took place, since the printing press was in the hands of local governments, which were virtually independent of the center.

The actual task of the communists, after the revolution in 1917, was the establishment of bread. In connection with the difficult situation with the supply of grain to cities, the Communists declared at the beginning of 1918 a grain monopoly. This meant that any surplus pood of grain should be taken into the hands of the state (surplus appropriation, which A.A. Rittich was the first in tsarist Russia). The compulsory grain appropriation was not free for the peasants, but it was carried out at fixed prices set by the state. The setting of prices for bread was entrusted to the newly created Food Commissariat. At the beginning, the price of bread was set at 3 rubles per pood, and later it was increased by 3 times. The private trade in bread was banned, a food appropriation system was established in order to withdraw all surplus agricultural products to supply the army and the urban population.

Further regulation of prices was expressed in the creation of the Supreme Council of National Economy (VSNKh), the competence of which was also attributed to the establishment of marginal prices. According to the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Economic Council, a Price Committee was created at the Supreme Economic Council to establish firm prices for agricultural and industrial products, as well as for raw materials, semi-finished products and elements of their production. By this time, large industrial enterprises in the most important industries had already been nationalized, this made it possible to sell industrial products for. Special meaning had a decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the organization of supply", which provided for the establishment of factory, wholesale and retail prices by the Committee of Prices of the Supreme Council of National Economy.

One of the first issues discussed by the Price Committee was the question of. It was determined that the price is set on the basis of the cost of goods, works or services and charges in favor of enterprises and the state. Thus, it was determined from the outset that the calculation base of the price is the cost of production.

As for the contributions to the state, the Committee set its size at 10% of the cost of production.

During the very first year of its activity, the Price Committee set the price for 3925 types of products, including for textile goods - 975, metal - 350, chemical - 720, rubber industry - 315, agricultural machines - 77, glass and porcelain products - 435. In general, for three years of activity, the Price Committee has approved the price of more than 5,000 different types of goods. In addition, he published two fixed price guides and carried out three general price revisions.

Unfortunately, the objective conditions were not favorable for the action of firm prices. The civil war and foreign intervention sharply worsened the work of industry and transport. The war distracted a significant number of workers, industrial enterprises worked with a significant load, at the same time, some enterprises did not work at all. Production volumes fell sharply. By 1920, the production of industrial products was halved compared to the pre-war level, the number of workers decreased by 36%, and labor productivity decreased by more than 4 times. The issue of paper money grew annually: so from November 1, 1917 to July 1, 1921, the paper money supply increased 105 times. As a result, there was a rapid depreciation of the ruble (hyperinflation): by the middle of 1921, the value of the ruble had dropped 800 times compared to 1918. The devaluation of money was also facilitated by the free provision of certain services to the population (utilities, postal and telegraph services), as well as the abolition of payments for food for some categories of the population.

Naturalization of relations between enterprises and the state took place. During the years of the Civil War and War Communism, a strictly centralized system of industrial management was established. The relationship between state industrial enterprises and organizations was essentially natural. If in 1918 the proportion of wages in kind was 28%, then in 1920 it was 82-87%, and in the first half of 1921 it rose to 93%.

Since during the civil war in Russia all enterprises of large industry and, to a large extent, enterprises of small industry were nationalized, this procedure was extended to the entire industry of the country. This, of course, does not mean that industrial products had no monetary value. But whether it was estimated in the pre-war currency, in gold rubles or fixed prices, this did not have any practical significance for the enterprise.

As for consumer goods, along with fixed prices set in a centralized way, they were subject to prices that were many times higher than the prices set in the administrative order, and due to the existing inflationary processes in the economy, these prices grew monthly.

The main reasons for hyperinflation in 1918-1921, when the price on the black market soared 130 times, were:

A drop in labor productivity (and hence an increase in the cost of production). The gross industrial output fell from 1,845.0 million pre-war rubles in 18 to 818.0 million rubles by 1920, that is, the drop was 2.2 times; labor productivity decreased 1.4 times. The gross harvest of grain in 1917 amounted to 3.3 billion poods, and in 1920 - 2.1 billion poods, i.e. decreased by 36%.
Naturalization of economic relations and maintenance of low fixed prices in the sphere of state trade. The naturalization of economic relations consisted in the fact that workers and employees are recipients of all most wages in kind. Natural exchange acquired a wide scale, displacing money circulation. In a number of regions of the country, the role of local currencies began to be played by such goods as bread, salt, chintz. The persistence of low fixed prices in the sphere of state trade, the share of which in the total turnover was increasing, reduced the economy's relative need for money.
Development of cashless payments. It is known that non-cash payments have been introduced since the 18th year. Initially, their development was associated with the task of strengthening the ruble. Subsequently, the expansion of non-cash payments continued with the aim of strengthening control over the production and distribution of goods.
The rapid growth of the issue of paper money, which is necessary primarily to cover the urgent needs of the state in a war. The issue of paper money during the period of foreign military intervention and civil war grew at an extremely fast pace. By the first quarter of 1921, the money supply in the country had grown to 518.1 billion rubles, an increase in comparison with 1918 amounted to 2943.8%. Despite the very large size of the issue of paper money, their issue did not keep pace with the rise in prices. This caused a "money hunger", the emergence of surrogates for money, increased naturalization of the economy, the disintegration of the single national market into many isolated local - regional, provincial, county markets. A characteristic feature of the structure of the prices of the "free" market were sharp geographic gaps between them, associated with the closedness of local markets, disruption of transport and difficulties in organizing trade.

Thus, the money and in the period war communism were the only, albeit highly disordered, means of recording and monitoring the overall productivity of the national economy, the movement of material values in it and their distribution. There was an ever greater naturalization of economic relations, but the comparison of all elements of the national economy could only be done in money. In addition, practice during this period stimulated the development, albeit not perfect, of methods for calculating costs, establishing norms for depreciation deductions, and gained some experience.

The entry into the NEP period and the legalization of private trade significantly changed the nature of pricing, since the law of value began to operate in different conditions. In a relatively short time, an acute shortage of consumer goods was eliminated, which was explained by a drop in production much lower than those that would correspond to the historically established standard of living of the urban and rural population. Transport recovered quickly. Consumer cooperation was removed from the state supply and transferred to self-sufficiency. The free distribution of foodstuffs to the population was eliminated, and the free utility services were canceled. The nationalized enterprises received the right to buy and sell goods on the market. The state, using the commanding heights of the national economy, began to actively influence prices through tax, tariff and financial policies.

All this led to a decrease in regional price gaps, to a change in the ratio of prices for industrial and agricultural goods towards the approximation of this ratio to the pre-war level.

For the successful implementation of the NEP, a well-grounded price policy and a stable monetary reform were needed, which was carried out in the country in 1922-1924.

Monetary reform 1922-1924

Instead of the depreciated and actually already rejected by the circulation of Soviet banknotes, in 1922, the release of a new currency was started - chervonets, which had a gold content and a rate in gold (1 ducat = 10 pre-revolutionary gold rubles = 7.74 g of pure gold). In 1924, the Sovznaks, which were quickly ousted by the chervontsy, stopped printing altogether and were withdrawn from circulation; in the same year, the budget was balanced and the use of monetary emission to cover government expenses was prohibited; new treasury notes were issued - rubles (10 rubles was equal to 1 chervonets). In the foreign exchange market, both domestically and abroad, chervonets were freely exchanged for gold and major foreign currencies at the pre-war exchange rate of the tsarist ruble (1 US dollar = 1.94 rubles).

The credit system was revived, in 1921 the State Bank was recreated, which began lending to industry and trade enterprises on a commercial basis.

The entire subsequent period until the end of the NEP, the question of prices continued to be the core of state economic policy. A rise in prices by trusts and syndicates threatened a repetition of the crisis, and a decrease in prices beyond measure, if the private sector existed along with the state, would inevitably lead to the enrichment of private traders at the expense of state enterprises, to the transfer of resources from state-owned enterprises to private ownership and trade.

The private market, where prices were not rationed, but were set as a result of supply and demand, served as a sensitive barometer, the arrow of which, as soon as the state made mistakes in, immediately indicated bad weather.

By the end of 1923, the prices of manufactured goods had risen sharply to the detriment of prices for agricultural goods. There was a heated discussion about the reasons for the disparity in prices. So professor N.D. Kondratyev argued that the fall in grain prices was only a phenomenon of the NEP period, a consequence of the decline in demand for grain. Proceeding from this, he insisted on abolishing the monopoly of foreign trade, speeding up the export of grain by widely attracting private capital for this purpose and importing industrial goods from abroad.

According to Professor S.A. Falkner, the reason for the prevailing price disparity was that the issue of paper money was directed exclusively to industry, which, possessing monetary reserves, could increase the prices of its goods. However, the main reason for the rise in prices for manufactured goods must be sought not in terms of sales, but in terms of production. The main reasons for the rise in prices for manufactured goods by the fall of 1923 were as follows:

Increase in production costs in industry compared with 1913.
The unhealthy practice of individual trusts and syndicates, which, abusing their monopoly position, embarked on the path of unreasonable price increases.
Dominance of a private trader in retail and a significant share in wholesale.
Major shortcomings in the practice of lending to industry.

The main reason for the emerging price disparity was the discrepancy between the development of industry and agriculture, expressed in an increase in the value of industrial products and a decrease, albeit very insignificantly, in the value of agricultural goods. The unhealthy practice of some trusts and syndicates that have embarked on the path of unreasonable price increases, the discrepancy between wholesale and retail prices, which has developed as a result of the domination of the private owner in retail trade, the system of two currencies, and the wrong practice of indiscriminate lending to industry.

By the mid-1920s, measures were taken to reduce costs and limit profits for state-owned enterprises and for freight transportation. Stable prices were established in the branches of heavy industry, wholesale and retail prices for a number of goods were reduced. The circulation was completely transferred to a stable red currency, and the functions of the internal trade commission were transferred to the People's Commissariat of Internal Trade with broad powers in the field of setting prices. The measures taken turned out to be successful: wholesale prices for industrial goods fell, and prices for agricultural products rose noticeably (to the level of 1922), and the price disparity was actually eliminated.

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Lecture 6. FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF RUSSIA before 1941

1. Finances during the period of war communism (1917-1921) 1

2. The economic development of Russia in 1921-1927 as a necessary condition for the restoration of finances. 4

3. The financial system during the NEP period. 5

4. The process of curtailing the NEP and the formation of the command-administrative system 7

5. Development of finance during the formation of the power economy. eight

The construction of the financial system was based on the principle of incompatibility between Soviet power and commodity-money relations, which in practice meant their elimination. Nationalization of banks began with the seizure of the State Bank by armed detachments back in the days of the October coup. But it was only at the end of November 1917 that it began to function normally, since at first its employees did not agree to cooperate with the new government.

The next stage was the nationalization of joint-stock and private banks of commercial credit: Russian-Asian, Commercial and Industrial, Siberian, etc. On December 27, 1917, they were occupied by armed Red Guards in Petrograd, and the next day in Moscow. At the same time The Central Executive Committee approved a decree on the nationalization of banking in the country, which established the exclusive right of the state to carry out banking operations, to reorganize, liquidate old and create new credit institutions (state monopoly).

In January 1918, bank shares belonging to large private entrepreneurs were canceled. The State Bank was renamed to National Bank and put in charge of all others. During 1919, all banks, except for Narodny, were liquidated. By order, all the safes were opened and securities, gold, and cash were confiscated. In Moscow alone, about 300 thousand tsarist rubles were confiscated from bank safes. gold and 150 thousand rubles. silver, and even gold in bars and sand.

N. Bukharin, E. Preobrazhensky, Yu. Larin and others in 1918-1920. they constantly emphasized that “the communist society will not know money,” that money is doomed to disappear.

Proceeding from the idea of the need to abolish money as soon as possible, the government was increasingly inclined towards a complete depreciation of money through their unlimited emission... So many of them were printed that they depreciated tens of thousands of times and almost completely lost their purchasing power.

Monetary emission of the first post-revolutionary years turned out to be the the main source of replenishment of the state budget. In May 1919, the People's Bank was ordered to issue as much money as needed for the country's economy. During 1919, the amount of paper money increased approximately 4 times - up to 225 billion rubles, in 1920 - another 5 times - up to 1.2 trillion rubles, and in 1921 up to 2.3 trillion rubles. As a result of rampant emission price level reached unprecedented proportions. If the price level of 1913 is taken as 1, then in 1923 it is 648,230,000.

Only the golden royal ruble retained its high value, but there was almost no circulation of it, since the population hid it. However, it was impossible to do without full-fledged money, therefore in the country the most bread and salt have become common units of measure for values .

Devastation, lack of roads, civil war turned the country into closed, isolated economic islands with domestic cash equivalents... Many types of money circulated throughout the former Russian Empire. They printed their own money in Turkestan, Transcaucasia, in many Russian cities: Armavir, Izhevsk, Irkutsk, Yekaterinodar, Kazan, Kaluga, Kashira, Orenburg and many others. In Arkhangelsk, for example, local banknotes with the image of a walrus were called “walruses”. Credit bills, checks, exchange signs, coupons were issued: “turkbon”, “zakbon”, “grubon”, etc. By the way, it was in Central Asia and the Transcaucasia that the largest emission took place, since the printing press was in the hands of local governments, which were virtually independent of the center.

After October, practically the tax system collapsed, which finally undermined the state budget, for the replenishment of which even coupons of the "Free Loan" of the Provisional Government were put into circulation. To replenish the budget, local Soviets resorted to discriminatory taxation of “class enemies” in the form of “indemnities”. So, in October 1918, a special contribution of 10 billion rubles was imposed on wealthy peasants, and Moscow and Petrograd, in turn, were to pay 3 and 2 billion rubles, respectively.

As a result Russia's financial system was destroyed, the economy switched to natural exchange. A system of moneyless relations and settlements was introduced in the industry. Glavkas and local authorities issued orders according to which enterprises had to release their products to other enterprises and organizations free of charge. Taxes were abolished, debts were canceled. The supply of raw materials, fuel, equipment was carried out free of charge, in a centralized way through the Glavka. To carry out production accounting at enterprises, the Council of People's Commissars recommended switching to natural measuring instruments - “threads” (labor units), which meant a certain amount of labor expended.

The credit and banking system actually ceased to exist. The People's Bank was merged with the Treasury. The bank accounts of enterprises recorded the movement of not only cash, but also material assets within the state sector of the economy. Instead of bank lending, centralized government financing and procurement were introduced.

In accordance with the surplus appropriation system, the private trade in bread and other products was prohibited in the country. All foodstuffs were distributed by state institutions strictly according to the cards. Industrial goods of daily demand were also distributed centrally by cards. Everywhere, 70-90% of wages were paid to workers and employees in the form of food and manufactured goods rations or manufactured products. Cash taxes from the population were canceled, as well as payments for housing, transport, utilities, etc..

Finance is monetary relations, in this regard, it is difficult to talk about the financial system during the period of war communism. Of all the links in the financial system during this period, there was only the State budget, but it also consisted of monetary and material parts. All taxes on the population and businesses have been abolished. The main income items of the budget were money issue and indemnity.

The financial system of Russia 1917-1921 ("war communism")

The formed financial system fully met the tasks of centralizing economic development.

In the summer of 1918, the policy of War Communism was proclaimed, and the initial impulse of the Bolshevik financial program had already lost its incentive. The main point (nationalization of banks) took the form of a law and was implemented, like the second point (cancellation of the debts of the previous government). However, the nationalization of banks did not live up to the hopes of socialist theorists to create an instrument to control and finance industry. Debt cancellation also did not solve the problem of financing public spending. On the contrary, one of the channels for obtaining funds was closed - through loans. The printing of banknotes remained the only source of funds for government spending and advances to industry. The use of this source led to the depreciation of money and discouraged merchants from accepting banknotes as payment for goods. Thus, money lost its function of stimulating the process of trade and exchange. From a financial point of view, a characteristic feature of War Communism is the withdrawal of money from the economy. However, this was in no way the result of doctrine or deliberate calculation.

In the fall of 1918, all sources of funds were exhausted. On October 30, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee issued two decrees, with the help of which the government tried to use all possible means to get out of this situation. The first decree introduced an "extraordinary revolutionary tax", calculated on the fact that the state would receive an amount of 10 billion rubles from direct taxation. The second decree established a "natural tax" - all farmers had to surrender their surplus products to the state in excess of the established norms for personal and economic needs. The first decree was the latest attempt by the authorities in the early Soviet period to cover government spending through direct monetary taxation, and the second was the first experiment in taxing in kind, which was a natural consequence of the abandonment of money under War Communism.

All the provinces that were in the hands of the Soviets were imposed with an extraordinary revolutionary tax in the appropriate proportions established in the decree. This meant the exclusion of Ukraine and the southeastern regions of Russia, Asian provinces and territories north of Arkhangelsk, i.e. regions under foreign or "white" occupation. At the same time, Moscow, Petrograd and the provinces accounted for half of the 10 billion rubles. Individuals who had no property and earned no more than 1,500 rubles were exempted from the tax. per month, as well as nationalized and municipalized enterprises. In a separate article of the decree, it was stated that the poor urban residents and the poor peasants were not taxed, the "middle strata" were imposed "small rates", and the main burden of the tax fell on the rich townspeople and peasants.

The officially established date for the payment of the tax was December 15, 1918. In winter, a stream of letters and complaints went to the People's Commissariat of Finance, the answers to which were sent to the provincial authorities. Most of the complaints concerned non-compliance with tax exemption provisions. In a lengthy circular dated January 15, 1919, it was noted that the law pursued not only financial, but also class goals.

Combining these two goals and collecting the tax has proven difficult. The April 1919 decree showed concern for the average peasant, stopped all unpaid amounts at the lowest rates and eased at the average ones with the proviso that “higher salaries are not subject to general reduction”.

The apparent setback after the introduction of direct monetary taxation forced the Soviet government to rely on alternative means to achieve its goal.

On the other hand, the first experiment with a tax in kind turned out to be even less effective than with a direct money tax. The October 1918 decree, which established the tax in kind, as well as the document on the extraordinary revolutionary tax, extended about the class and financial aspects of this measure. The introduction of the tax was justified by the "extreme need for agricultural products" experienced by the state during the war. However, an additional goal was to "completely free the poor from bearing the tax burden by shifting the entire tax burden onto the wealthy classes, so that in the countryside the middle peasants were subject to only a moderate tax, and the main part of the state taxes was imposed on the rich kulaks." The centralized distribution of the tax was in charge of the People's Commissariat for Finance, tax collection was entrusted to local executive committees, and in rural areas and villages - to special committees, which consisted mainly of poor peasants. Despite the measures taken and carefully designed tables that determine the amount of the tax depending on the amount of cultivated land, the number of family members, the area where the landowner lives, this tax has become a complete failure.

Lenin later wrote: "It was adopted - this law ... but it did not enter life." The essence of natural

96 tax, as it was understood then, consisted in the fact that they took into account the needs of the "taxpayer" and his family, everything that exceeded this norm was withdrawn. So it was no different from a requisition. This desperate measure was the means by which the Soviet government in 1919 and 1920. received the necessary food for the Red Army and for the urban population. Under these conditions, the state budget during the period of War Communism was nothing more than an empty formality. For the second half of 1918, a budget was developed, as well as for the first half, and was formally approved by the end of the period. The budget for the first half of 1919 was approved by the Council of People's Commissars on April 30, 1919. After that, the People's Commissariat of Finance did not submit any outlines of the budget until the introduction of NEP in 1921, when the budget was formally approved over the past years. The growing devaluation and abandonment of paper money throughout 1919 and 1920 made any budget pointless.

No less acute than the problem of ensuring government spending in the state budget was the problem of financing industry. In the party program of 1919. it was said that since the sources of direct taxation are reduced due to the expropriation of property, "the coverage of government expenditures should be based on the direct conversion of part of the income from various state monopolies to the state revenue", i.e. on profits from nationalized industrial enterprises. However, in the first year after the revolution, this was the ideal of the distant future, and the nationalized industrial enterprises, exhausted by the war, experienced an acute shortage of capital investment, as well as loans for current production. In the winter of 1917/1918, the banks were nationalized, and the Supreme Council of the National Economy began to control the leading industries, both nationalized and non-nationalized. The question arose as to what sources the loans should come from. A decree adopted in February 1918 created the Central Accounting and Loan Committee of the State Bank. At that time, there was no uniform practice, and advances were issued without careful consideration and consideration of the policy of the Supreme Council of the National Economy.

The owners of the property subject to nationalization by the Supreme Council of the National Economy pledged it in one of the branches of the State Bank on the eve of the nationalization act. There is a need to streamline this chaotic process. The first program, which was developed in the spring of 1918 and received support from Gukovsky and in right-wing circles, talked about the creation of special banks to finance the main industries - a grain bank, metal, textile, etc., in which half shares should be owned by the state, and the other half should be owned by individuals with interests in the relevant industries. This program was heavily criticized by the Left Opposition, which described it in its April 4, 1918 memorandum as "disguised denationalization of banks." Subsequently, it was abandoned. However, after the final loss of banks and the depletion of credit sources, except for the treasury, a wide field of activity opened up, and the Supreme Council of the National Economy took over the financing of Russian industry, according to a decree issued on the eve of the I All-Russian Congress of Soviets of National Economy in May 1918, all loans were to be provided to the nationalized industrial enterprises from the treasury by decision of the Supreme Economic Council. Responsibility for monitoring and confirming the grants fell on the central administrations or regional economic councils.

At the same time, the exclusive control over the financing of industry, established by the Supreme Council of the National Economy in the second half of 1918, became the object of criticism. Lenin and his associates advocated for a central bank in the economic system. The State Bank transferred this function to the Supreme Economic Council, which combined two roles: administrative and accounting bodies. This had huge disadvantages. It turned out that in the reports of the Supreme Economic Council, income did not differ from the loans used in production - working capital. Profits were reinvested in industry, and only losses were channeled into the budget. At the beginning of 1919, a discussion took place between the Supreme Economic Council and the People's Commissariat for Finance. The compromise reached was reflected in the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of March 4, 1919 May decree of 1918. which recognized the supreme power of the Supreme Council of the National Economy in the financing of industry, was abolished. In the future, all decisions of the Supreme Council of the National Economy and its bodies on granting loans to state-owned enterprises were to be made "with the participation of representatives of the Commissariat of Finance and the State Audit Office," the issues or disagreements that arose were considered by the Council of People's Commissars.

These measures deprived the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the exclusive authority to finance industry and left the last word behind the People's Commissariat for Finance. There can hardly be any doubt that the separation of finance from technical management was a step forward towards a more efficient organization of industry. However, behind these changes there was another aspect that was not justified in practice. The transfer to the Narkomfin of direct responsibility for financing the industry and the assimilation of individual items in industrial consolidated statements to items in the state budget meant that the financing of industry was carried out on budgetary principles, and not on the principles of commercial credit. In such a system, there was no place for banking as a separate element, and in January 1920 the State Bank was abolished.

Thus, the People's Commissariat of Finance, taking advantage of the tendency towards centralization that took place under war communism, received not only unlimited financial powers, but also a de facto monopoly at the expense of the local administration and the banking system. In both of these areas, the process of concentration was subject to revision under the NEP.

The successes achieved by the People's Commissariat for Finance at the beginning of 1919 in establishing its authority over both state revenues and over the financing of industry became an important step towards achieving order in the system of managing the national economy. However, neither the political nor the economic structure was yet strong enough to withstand the brunt of such control, mainly because the financial weapon that the Narkomfin took possession of was rendered unusable due to the rampant decline in the purchasing power of money. The devaluation of the ruble, beginning in 1919 and later, influenced all aspects of the Soviet financial and economic policy of War Communism. On October 26, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree that authorized an increase in the money supply by at least 33.5 billion rubles, thereby raising its limit from 16.5 billion established by the last decree of the Provisional Government to 50 billion rubles. This decree retrospectively sanctioned what had already taken place: by the time of its promulgation, the new statutory limit had been reached and was on the verge of being exceeded.

From that moment on, the growing needs of the civil war manifested themselves even more - the output of the money supply increased, prices rose rapidly, which indicated a decrease in the purchasing power of the ruble. The turning point came at the beginning of 1919. There was a hope of saving the situation at the expense of monetary reform. Until that time, the Soviet government was content to print old-style banknotes, which were used by the tsarist and Provisional governments. In February 1919, low denomination banknotes of the RSFSR (one, two and three rubles) of the so-called "simplified type" appeared for the first time. Then, on May 15, 1919, a decree was issued that established new Soviet-style banknotes of any denomination and banknotes "in excess of the norm established by the decree of October 26, 1918, within the limits of the actual need of the national economy for banknotes." For a long time, these signs were circulating on the "black market" in Russia and on foreign exchanges at a lower rate than banknotes of the Provisional Government, which were less valuable than tsarist money.

The decree of May 15, 1919 removed the last obstacle on the way to unlimited money supply, and the total amount of money in circulation exceeded 80 billion rubles. In 1918 it doubled, in 1919 - 3 times and in 1919 - 5 times. The catastrophic and irreversible decline could no longer be hidden. The devaluation of the ruble against gold and foreign currencies did not matter much. Foreign trade virtually ceased in 1919, and when it began to slowly revive the following year, the existence of a monopoly on foreign trade ensured that transactions were carried out in hard foreign currency. However, the decline in the purchasing power of the ruble on the domestic market was significant and catastrophic. At the first stage of the inflationary process, prices rise more slowly than the money supply, so that the purchasing power of the total supply of money in circulation increases and the issue of banknotes is an effective, albeit temporary, means of financing government spending. At the second stage, when money depreciates, prices begin to rise much faster than the money supply, their growth cannot be compensated for by the new issue of money, and the purchasing power of the total supply of money in circulation decreases. The second stage began in Russia by the time of the February Revolution. When the Soviet government came to power, prices rose much faster than the money supply.

The practical consequences of the depreciation of the ruble were not slow to show. Since the officially set prices did not rise high enough to keep up with the decline in the purchasing power of money, the gap between fixed prices and free market prices reached fantastic proportions. In those areas of the economy where officially established prices were still in force, various forms of exchange trade or in-kind exchange arose, which supplemented or replaced meaningless money transactions. Thus, the suppliers of raw materials to the nationalized factories, who could set an official price for their raw materials, received payment in kind in the form of the products of these factories. Workers were often paid with the products of the factory in which they worked, so that instead of the devalued currency they received goods for their own use or exchange. The depreciation of the currency contributed to a return to subsistence farming, which was especially consonant with the spirit of socialism. As a result of the growing gap between fixed and market prices, the distribution of ration goods at fixed prices began to correspond to the free distribution, there was only a step to the elimination of payments for basic goods and services. This happened in 1920. From May 1919, food rations for children up to 14 years old were provided free of charge. In January 1920, it was decided to create "free public canteens", primarily to serve workers and employees in Moscow and Petrograd. By the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of October 11, 1920, the finance commissariat was ordered to develop instructions for exempting Soviet workers and employees from paying for such utilities as post, telegraph and telephone, as well as for water supply, sewerage, electricity, and living quarters. On December 4, 1920, payments for food rations were completely abolished, on December 23 - for fuel supplied to state institutions and enterprises and all workers and employees employed there, and on January 27, 1921 - rent "in nationalized or municipalized premises" ... Collecting taxes in monetary terms has lost all meaning. Postal and customs tariffs were abolished in October 1920. On February 3, 1921, the Central Executive Committee was considering a draft decree providing for the abolition of all monetary taxes. Only the timely introduction of NEP prevented the implementation of this completely logical measure.

These were the years of the Civil War, intervention, riots and uprisings. Millions of people died from military operations, from the repressions of the Soviet and anti-Soviet authorities, from hunger and epidemics. The national economy was thrown back by the main indicators for decades. It is all the more surprising that in 1922-1924, in several stages, it was possible to carry out a successful monetary reform, which for some time restored stable monetary circulation.

The era of war communism

It is customary to call War Communism the socio-economic and political system that operated in the RSFSR from about mid-1918 until the spring of 1921, which marked the beginning of the transition to the New Economic Policy (NEP). In fact, the entire period from November 1917 to the end of 1921 was the time of War Communism.

The first World War undermined the economy and finances of Russia more than other warring countries. By the time of the October Revolution, the amount of money in circulation was about 10 times higher than in 1914, the retail price index increased 13 times. Economic devastation worsened the supply of food to cities. The Provisional Government, which ruled the country from March to November 1917 (according to the new style), for the first time in the history of Russia introduced rationing (rationing) of bread and some other products for the urban population. It issued its own paper money, which merged with the tsarist money into one depreciating mass.

Within the framework of the policy of revolutionary violence, the seizure of the State Bank and the nationalization of commercial banks were among the first measures of the Soviet government. The seizure of the State Bank meant directly, firstly, the transfer of that part of Russia's gold reserves that was stored in Petrograd into the hands of the Bolsheviks, and secondly, control over the issue of paper money. As you know, the lack of money was a serious problem in the consolidation of power in the first weeks after the coup.

The State Bank and the commercial banks were soon merged into the People's Bank, which was initially assigned important functions in controlling the remaining private sector in industry. All valuables, both material and paper, stored in banks were confiscated. In particular, everything that was kept in private safes in the premises of banks was subject to confiscation.

This was part of a comprehensive program to confiscate virtually every form of money capital and savings. Everything government loans tsarist and Provisional governments were canceled, with the exception of some bonds of small denomination, which were used as a bargaining chip. The cancellation of external loans had large and complex political consequences that have not yet been fully resolved. All private securities were also canceled: stocks, bonds, mortgages, insurance policies. Although deposits in banks were not formally confiscated or canceled, in reality it became impossible to use this money.

The only form of "savings" available to the population turned out to be paper money. The realities of high inflation did not immediately become apparent to the people, especially the peasantry. The stash of money, most often tsarist issues, continued on a significant scale, although this was now viewed as a counter-revolution and was often severely punished. From the first months after the revolution, local authorities began to impose monetary indemnity on the bourgeoisie. In 1918, the central government announced a one-time emergency tax (also, in essence, an indemnity), which, according to the letter of Marx, was considered the expropriation of the expropriators. The economic significance of these brutal and painful measures was negligible, and they were soon abandoned. Subsequently, all paper money savings were actually eliminated by inflation.

Before the First World War, there were almost 500 million rubles worth of gold coins and more than 100 million high-quality silver coins in circulation. This coin disappeared from circulation in the first months of the war and settled mainly in private hiding places. The population also held a certain amount of foreign currency in banknotes. By decrees of July 25 and October 3, 1918, the possession of precious metals and foreign exchange was prohibited under the threat of severe penalties; these values were subject to delivery to the institutions of the People's Bank.

It is hardly possible to establish how much precious metals were actually seized, how much of them actually fell into the hands of the state, and how much was stolen by local confiscators. When in 1922 these draconian measures were temporarily weakened, the People's Commissar of Finance estimated the amount of gold remaining with the population at 200 million rubles.

The village became a thorn in the eye for the Bolsheviks, which did not fit into the state economy and into a thoroughly bureaucratic distribution system. True, communes and collective farms appeared here and there, but they remained islands in the sea of individual farms. The Soviet government seized from the peasants all products in excess of the physically necessary part (and often this part) by means of food appropriation. She tried to give the peasant industrial goods as a product exchange, but these goods were sorely lacking.

The supply of cards, differentiated by class, was produced at artificially low fixed prices, which had nothing to do with the prices of the free market. It was further revealed that these prices and rations were simply unnecessary, and in many cases the products were given out without payment. Wages became more and more penniless and in kind. In 1920, payments for transport, housing, utilities, and postal and telegraph services were canceled. Outwardly, it all looked like communism according to the recipes of the classics: distribution according to needs. In fact, these needs were determined by the authorities and were met to the smallest extent and in the most miserable way. It was a system of mass poverty and outright coercion.

War communism has reached a dead end. The more officials tried to plan and distribute everything, the less there was left to distribute. State enterprises worked extremely poorly, a significant part of skilled workers dispersed to the villages. The food appropriation system has cut off any incentives to work and production in the bud: they will take it away anyway. A moneyless economy proved to be impossible.

The military-political situation also required a change in course. Full-scale civil war ended by the end of 1920. On the other hand, the peasant uprisings, the Kronstadt uprising in March 1921, the discontent of the workers made it clear to the Kremlin that it was dangerous to postpone reforms. The Bolsheviks responded with a new economic policy, almost immediately called NEP; the revival of money has become her most important part of... However, money was seriously ill with inflation. Little attention was paid to her during the years of war communism, now she was becoming unbearable.

Sovznak

After the October Revolution, it took Soviet power in the center almost two years to start issuing its own paper money. This delay was due to two main reasons: ideological and technical. The first consisted in the fact that in the highest tiers of the party leadership, discussions about a money-free economy were going on with an unclear outcome. The second is lacking technical means and specialists for fabricating new money.

However, in real life, neither the state nor the economy could do without money, so the Soviet government continued to put old banknotes of the tsarist and Provisional governments into circulation. On the territory of the RSFSR, “Nikolaevka” (or “Romanovka”) were circulated in banknotes from 1 to 500 rubles and money of the Provisional Government of two types - “kerenki” in relatively small denominations of 20 and 40 rubles and “Duma money” in banknotes of 250 and 1000 rubles. Cashless payments have decreased to a very insignificant size. Until January 1, 1919, the tsarist, Provisional and Soviet governments issued more than 55 billion rubles (according to other sources, about 61 billion), and 36 billion or a little more was issued by the Soviet government. Not all of them were actually in circulation: some remained in the territories occupied by whites and the interventionists, some were taken out of the country, destroyed or hidden.

Nevertheless, all this money was depreciated en masse, and the money hunger, despite the growth in emissions, remained a constant feature of the economy or what was still left of the economy. The prestige and appreciation of tsarist and “temporary” money differed to a certain extent. The people were more inclined to believe in the restoration of a thousand-year monarchy than in the return of Kerensky. A significant part of the "Nikolaevka" was hidden by the population even before October 1917 or taken out by emigrants. The military failures of the Bolsheviks in 1918-1919 seemed to increase the likelihood of a restoration of power that could recognize tsarist money. For all these reasons, "Nikolaevka" was estimated at 10-15% more expensive than "Kerenok" and "Duma money", and in some places the difference reached 40%. Outside Soviet Russia, tsarist money was also quoted higher.

The Soviet government did not try too hard to limit emissions. There was even the idea that the more money depreciated, the sooner it would be possible to get rid of this "vestige of capitalism." It's funny to read the indifference with which the Bolsheviks were about emission and inflation. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of May 15, 1919 formally authorized the issue "within the limits of the economy's actual need for banknotes." We will print as much as necessary!

Nevertheless, it was at this time that the issue of issuing Soviet Russia’s own money was resolved: in 1919, money was issued in denominations of 1 to 1000 rubles, on which, as in tsarist times, a "credit note" was printed. The issue of new series of sovznakov continued in 1920 and 1921, and their denominations grew and grew. In September 1921, the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) authorized the issue of a banknote of 10 million rubles. All these issues did not replace the old money, but joined them. However, by this time the highest denomination of old money (1000 rubles) had turned into an insignificant value.

Counting money with many zeros became more and more difficult. It must be borne in mind that more than half of the population of Russia was illiterate. In 1922, the sovznak was denominated with a decrease in all monetary values by 10 thousand times, according to Yurovsky, this is not a good idea: people were even more confused about zeros. In 1923, the second denomination took place with a decrease in money by another 100 times, as a result, one million old (before the first denomination) money began to cost one new ruble, which was convenient for the account.

These measures did not change anything, in essence, in the fate of the Sovznak: it continued to fall. By 1921, free prices had lost all connection with fixed ration prices, if the latter were still in force. However, only a part of the urban population was given free supplies, and its rates were extremely low. The "bourgeois" strata, which included not only entrepreneurs, but almost all those who did not engage in physical labor, found themselves in a particularly difficult situation. For a significant mass of the urban population, the free market remained the main source of supply, and its prices determined real life support.

According to the Conjuncture Institute of the People's Commissariat for Finance, at that time the leading scientific center in the field of economics, the free price index in Moscow showed an increase of 27 thousand times in January 1921 compared to 1913. Prices for food products increased 34 thousand times, non-food - 22 thousand. In 1920 alone, prices increased more than 10 times. The range of growth in prices for individual goods was very large. The price of salt increased the most - by 143 thousand times, followed by vegetable oil(71 thousand), sugar (65 thousand), bakery products (42 thousand). Particularly large increases in prices for goods such as sugar and salt were explained by the decline in production, difficulties in transport, and the state monopoly, which did not leave resources for a free market. Of the non-food products, soap (price increase by 50 thousand times) and thread (34 thousand) went up the most. Prices for goods, the purchase of which could be postponed in these extreme conditions, have grown less: for example, the price of dishes "only" increased 12 thousand times.

It is impossible to compare these figures with the monetary incomes of Muscovites in the absence of at least some plausible data. For many categories of the population, it is simply mysterious what means they lived on and where they could get money. Behind all these figures and facts lies the darkness of people's lives in those years. The population of Moscow has decreased in comparison with the pre-war period by about half: people died, emigrated, dispersed to villages and small towns, where it was possible to somehow feed from the land.

The rise in prices far outstripped the issue of money. For three and a half years (from the beginning of 1918 to the middle of 1921), the mass of money increased 100 times, and the prices according to the all-Russian index - 8000 times. Such a huge gap was explained by the extreme narrowness of the market and the small size of the supply of goods. Emission was the main source of government revenues, but the financial efficiency of the issue, that is, the amount of these revenues, steadily declined due to the depreciation of money. In the first half of 1921, the state received from the emission in real terms (at pre-war prices) only 5.6 million rubles a month - an absolutely insignificant amount.

Meanwhile, the costs of making and distributing money were great. About 14 thousand people worked at the factories of the then Goznak in Moscow, Petrograd, Penza, Perm and Rostov-on-Don. To this must be added officials of all levels in charge of emission, money carriers, security guards, cashiers, etc. The impossibility of "emission management", as experts called this system, became more and more obvious. Inflation may not have been a decisive factor in the transition to NEP, but it certainly played a role.

Hyperinflation in Russia in 1921-1922

The practical implementation of NEP (the transition from food appropriation to tax in kind, market acceptance, introduction of self-financing, return to monetary remuneration for labor and its products) coincided in the second half of 1921 with a catastrophic crop failure in the Volga region and some other regions of Russia; famine has engulfed vast territories. One of the consequences of this economic situation was a sharp increase in the issue of Sovznak: the rate of issue of money jumped more than three times in comparison with the previous period. The weak, barely beginning to revive after the spasm of war communism, the national economy responded to this with a new wave of depreciation of money. Since the fall of 1921, money circulation has entered a spiral of hyperinflation.

In the fourth quarter of 1921, the average monthly rate of money issue was 58%, the rate of price growth - 112%. In the first quarter of 1922, these figures were even higher: emission - 67% per month, price growth - 265% per month. There was a complete collapse of the monetary economy.

The situation is comparable to the German hyperinflation of 1922-1923, but with much greater deprivation and suffering. There was no absolute food shortage in Germany; in bloodless Russia, an Asian-type famine with the death of millions of people struck dozens of provinces and the population of large cities. Hyperinflation greatly worsened the situation, made it difficult to move food to hungry areas, increased poverty, exacerbating social stratification.

By the fall of 1922, the situation began to improve, but hyperinflation continued. In the fourth quarter of 1922, the monthly rate of issue was 33%, the growth of prices - 54%. By the end of 1922, the money supply had reached 2 quadrillion (two to ten to the fifteenth power) of non-denominated rubles.

During this period, NEP came to the aid of the Sovznak. With the expansion of monetary relations, the economy's need for money grew, which slightly delayed the depreciation of the sovznak. At the end of 1922, the real value of money in circulation was even greater than at the end of 1921. The agony of the Soviet sign continued throughout 1923 and the first months of 1924. At this time, next to the decrepit Soviet sign, breathing on incense, a vigorous baby - a gold piece had already appeared.

In the first half of 1923, the government was not yet fully confident in the imminent end of the sovznak and considered the possibility of keeping it in circulation, therefore, the emission was to some extent limited and did not go beyond 20-30% growth per month. Since the fall of 1923, the issue and the depreciation of the sovznak have been rampant. But this hyperinflation is already combined with a moderate and careful emission of chervonets - the real money of NEP.

Chervonets and double circulation

By the fall of 1922, the need for financial stabilization had become apparent to the Soviet leadership. For this, objective possibilities were also formed: this year's harvest was not bad, NEP was gaining strength, the international positions of the RSFSR were strengthened. It was impossible, however, to rush and attack finances with Red Army fervor. G.Ya. understood this more than others. Sokolnikov (1888–1939), who from the beginning of 1922 served as People's Commissar of Finance, and in November of the same year was appointed People's Commissar.

There was no state budget in the true sense of the word, taxes were collected very badly, the state needed emission to finance the army, the administrative apparatus, the social sphere, and an unprofitable industry. Under these conditions, the idea of creating a special hard currency without a simultaneous refusal to issue Soviet signs was strengthened in the minds of the more and more. According to some reports, such an idea was submitted at the end of 1921 by the banker V.V. Tarnovsky, recruited as a "bourgeois specialist." In the summer and autumn of the following year, this skeleton was "overgrown with meat" and gave rise to the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of October 11, 1922, which granted the newly created State Bank the right and instructed to start issuing new banknotes in the currency called the chervonets. The idea was that the budget deficit would continue to be covered by the emission of Soviet notes, while the chervonets would be able to maintain its virgin purity as hard bank (and not treasury) money.

The new currency was issued by the State Bank in denominations from 1 to 50 ducats. The gold content of the chervonets was established - 7.74234 grams of pure gold (in the old measures - 1 spool 78.24 shares), which was equal to the parity of 10 royal rubles. Thus, a chervonets meant just 10 gold rubles. As you can see, the denomination of the chervona currency was quite large: the wages of a skilled worker rarely exceeded 6-7 chervonets per month. The role of a bargaining chip with the chervontsy was still assigned to the Sovznaks. The chervonets put into circulation were subject to at least one quarter of the provision of gold reserves and hard foreign currency in the assets of the State Bank. The rest of the collateral could be considered short-term promissory notes (unconditional liabilities of enterprises) and some other assets. This norm basically corresponded to the world practice of that time.

The chervontsy, unlike the banknotes of tsarist times, were not redeemable for gold, and the decree only fixed the government's intention to introduce redeemability in the future without specifying terms and conditions. It can be assumed that the creators of the chervonets did not seriously have such an intention. However, at that time not a single European currency was officially exchangeable for gold, this property was retained only for the American dollar.

The issue of chervonets was carried out in the manner of normal operations of the State Bank through lending to the real sector with proper security. The State Bank combined the functions of a central and a commercial bank. Since there were practically no commercial banks in the country, there was no basis for the practice of refinancing them at the central bank, which is common in other countries. True, one narrow inflationary loophole was left: the State Bank could, as an exception, lend to the state (that is, cover the budget deficit), but at the same time it was required that it contributed gold to the State Bank as collateral for 50% of the amount of such loans.

Basically, these principles ensured the anti-inflationary stability of the chervonets, which was justified in the next 3-4 years. The fact that in the future it became an ordinary paper currency without guarantees against inflation, in any case, was not the fault of its creators.

Chervonets was born on November 22, 1922, when the first banknotes left the State Bank. At the beginning of 1923, 356 thousand ducats were in circulation. A year later, the issue was 23.6 million chervonets (236 million chervoni rubles). This was the year when hard money groped its way through the swamp of inflationary Soviets. This process was successful: by the beginning of 1924, in real value, chervontsy already accounted for 76% of the money supply, and sovznaks accounted for only 24%.

The total money supply was still 8-10 times less than before the war. This fact reflected not only the economical emission of chervonets, but also the decline of the economy and trade, the naturalization of a significant part of this turnover and payments, and the spread of barter. At the same time, the foundations of a healthy monetary circulation were formed - when money becomes a rare commodity and is highly valued.

For about a year and a half, there was a double (parallel) circulation of chervonets and sovznakov. The emission of the latter continued throughout 1923 and the first months of 1924. The Moscow Exchange daily fixed the exchange rate of the chervonets in the sovznaki. This course was considered official and was communicated by telegraph throughout the country. The quotation of the chervonets became the most obvious and simple indicator of the depreciation of the sovznak. On January 1, 1923, a chervonets cost 175 rubles in Soviet signs in 1923 (after a double denomination), on January 1, 1924 - 30 thousand, on April 1, 1924 - 500 thousand. The status of the patrician chervonets was strengthened along with the fall of the role of the plebeian sovznak.

With the recovery of monetary circulation, NEP was gaining strength. For the Russian peasantry, the years from 1923 to about 1928 were perhaps the best in all of its recent history. Although the land was nationalized and owned by the state, the peasant felt his land practically as private property; in the countryside, various forms of voluntary cooperation developed, and private entrepreneurship in small industry and trade revived. Cost accounting began to take root in the public sector; this meant that the budget was exempted from financing enterprises. The budget expenditures for the maintenance of the army and the state apparatus were reduced. Excise taxes (indirect taxes on consumption) and direct taxes generated more and more revenue. The state issued several loans, which were placed at that time on a voluntary basis.

Transactions with gold and currency, for which people were recently threatened with prison, and even the death penalty are now becoming legal. Tsarist gold coins could be freely sold and bought at the exchange rate. A foreign exchange market took shape, in which the exchange rate of the ruble against the dollar gradually increased and soon more or less stabilized at the parity level, that is, in accordance with its gold content. This was, it seems, the only period in the entire Soviet history when our currency entered the world market legally and was valued abroad close to parity. At party-Soviet forums and in the press, they readily quoted the high marks that foreign "bourgeois" gave to the monetary reform and the chervonets.

An interesting innovation was the acceptance by the savings banks of deposits in sovznaki converted into chervontsy at the current exchange rate. This gave the depositor a guarantee against depreciation of the sovznak.

It remained to complete the reform and get rid of the sovnak, which was carried out in February - March 1924: first of all, a full-fledged ruble was restored in rights - now as a tenth of a chervonets, treasury notes were issued in strictly limited sizes in denominations of 1, 3 and 5 rubles ... This structure of monetary circulation was formally retained until 1947. In February 1924, it was decided to issue a bargaining chip from a ruble to a penny. Rubles and fifty kopecks were minted from high-grade silver, coins in denominations of 10, 15 and 20 kopecks - from low-grade silver, smaller coins - from a copper alloy. However, the minting of silver was soon discontinued, and coins began to be minted from alloys of base metals. By the end of the 1920s, the silver coin was tezavrated by the population, that is, it went into hiding places.

Finally, in March 1924, the hour of death came for the Sovznak. Within two months, Soviet notes could be exchanged at the rate of 50 thousand for one new treasury ("chervonny") ruble, or 500 thousand for a chervonets. Excluding the two denominations, the combined ruble has depreciated 50 billion times. It fell slightly short of the devaluation of the German mark: a new mark was exchanged at almost the same time for one trillion old ones. The real value of the combined mass turned out to be negligible: only 17.3 million chervonny rubles were spent on the exchange. Open inflation was over, the next step, after several years of stability, was latent, implicit, suppressed inflation.

V last years it is customary in our country to praise the introduction of the chervonets as a kind of magic wand that made it possible to lead the country out of the financial crisis. As with the Deutsche Mark, it would be a naive mistake to see the secret of success in issuing a new currency as such. If the matter were limited to this, the reform would be reduced to denomination, which, as the experience of many countries, including Russia in 1998, shows, can not give anything by itself. The success of the stabilization reforms in Germany and Russia, despite all the differences in the specific situation, was explained by similar factors: they relied on the forces of recovery in the economy, on the improvement of public finances, on strict credit discipline and emission restrictions. The most important role was played by the confidence of the population and business in the government of the country and in the new money, which it acted as a guarantor. Finally, the success has been facilitated by the improvement in the international environment for countries that have undergone financial stabilization.

Based on the article "Monetary Chaos in Soviet Russia", Portfolio Investor Magazine, No. 12, 2008