The T-90 tank is the latest modification of the vehicles of the legendary family of T-72 tanks - Soviet tanks of the second post-war generation. Without undergoing significant layout changes, he embodied almost all the best that was created in the domestic tank building by the mid-90s of the ending century.
The T-72 tank itself was developed by the Uralvagonzavod design bureau and was created as one of the options for improving the T-64A tank produced by the Kharkov plant named after. Malyshev. The T-72 tank differed from the T-64A mainly in minor hull changes associated with the installation of a four-stroke diesel engine of the V-2 family (the one that originated for the legendary T-34 tank and developed for the T-54, T-55 and T-62 tanks ) instead of the 5TDF boxer two-stroke diesel engine and a new undercarriage, using a simpler and more reliable electromechanical automatic loader (A3) of a tank gun instead of an electro-hydraulic loading mechanism (MZ).
The creation of the T-64 and T-72 tanks in the late 60s and early 70s was a big step forward. At that time, there were no vehicles in the world that were equal to them in terms of basic combat characteristics, and the possibility of excluding the fourth crew member (loader) by installing the MZ (A3) on a tank with a classic layout on foreign tanks was realized only at the end of the 80s ( on the French tank of the third generation "Leclerc").
From the time it was put into service (1973) to the present, the T-72 tank has been repeatedly modernized and improved in all major areas ( firepower, security, mobility). The improvements were aimed at ensuring, to the necessary extent, the ability of the T-72 tank to withstand the tanks adopted by the armies of the strongest foreign states later than the T-72, development, as well as the new anti-tank weapons (PTS) being created.
So, for example, the improvement of tank protection was carried out in 5 stages, and if we compare the security of the frontal projection of the T-72 tank, produced in 1973, when its mass production began, and the T-90 tank, the last of the tanks of this family, put into service 20 years later , then it tripled. To the constantly improved multi-layer combined armor protection, first mounted, and then built-in dynamic protection (in the Western press - “reactive armor”) and the Shtora-1 optoelectronic suppression complex, which provides the tank with individual protection against the most armies of the world in service, were added anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) with command semi-automatic guidance systems such as "TOW", "Hot", "Milan", "Dragon" and laser homing heads such as "Maverick", "Hellfiree", "Copper head" by creating active jamming of their guidance. The use of unconventional protection methods provided a slight increase in the mass of the T-90 tank, which, in combination with an increase in engine power from 740 to 840 hp. allowed to maintain an acceptable level of mobility.
During its existence, tanks of the T-72 family were purchased for the armies of many countries, and also began to be licensed produced abroad (for example, in Yugoslavia). The tank has proven itself with positive side when operating in various climatic conditions- from the harsh Arctic to the Asian deserts and subtropics. The vast majority of domestic tankers who served on other domestic tanks (T-64 and T-80 families), as well as foreign specialists and tankers who had a chance to fight on these vehicles, speak positively about the car. As for the complaints about the tanks of the T-72 family, which appeared at the suggestion of the media during the US-Iraq conflict and during military conflicts in the Transcaucasus, the analysis of the reasons for such complaints reveals mainly the shortcomings of the tank operation system in the troops. Indeed, an analysis of the nature of combat damage to tanks reveals an insufficient level of support for their combat use, and in some cases the wrong tactics for using tanks (for example, most tank damage during urban battles occurred as a result of PTS hits when firing from above into the insufficiently protected upper hemisphere of the tank), and analyzing the claims to tanks coming from the troops, we can conclude that the overwhelming number of failures and malfunctions occurs due to insufficient knowledge of the material part and a poor level of maintenance.
Without a doubt, we can say that the tanks of the T-72 family have a solid level of survivability in combat conditions. So, during the demonstration shelling of the T-90 tank, which took place during the period of euphoria “based on the results of the combat use” of our tanks in Chechnya, 6 shots were fired from another tank from a distance of 200 m, reproducing the conditions of real shelling in combat conditions. After that, the tank being fired under its own power arrived at the show ground and outside looked like a pile of twisted metal. Naturally, there were damages to the material part, but their analysis shows that with the correct organization of the combat use of tanks, with the appropriate provision of their actions, a significant proportion of losses in personnel and equipment in Chechnya could be prevented.
To a large extent, the reasons for such survivability and reliability lie in the painstaking accounting in the Design Bureau of Uralvagonzavod, the General Designer of which for a long time was a talented engineer and leader V. Potkin, the experience of domestic and foreign tank building, the system for monitoring and collecting information on the operation of tanks correctly installed in the Design Bureau in the troops, as well as ongoing tests, especially at the stage of accepting the tank into service with the army. After the death of the General Designer, the T-90 tank received the name "Vladimir". Here is our story about some episodes of state tests of the T-90 tank, which one of the authors had to participate in bringing.
"COARCOAT RUN" - LIFE MAKES BETTING
Conditionally, the position of the test participants can be characterized as follows. When conducting tests of various levels and types (from research to state acceptance tests), those military specialists who represent the interests of the customer of the test sample and who will have to operate the vehicle in the future, and maybe even fight on it, try to identify all its shortcomings in order to eliminate them before adoption and check how the machine meets the requirements that were presented during its design. Representatives of design bureaus try to profitably demonstrate all the advantages of the sample, and if any inconsistencies are identified, they try to justify them with the capabilities of existing technologies, violation of the test program, rules for operating the prototype, etc. In general, this is a normal situation of a struggle for a customer’s car and its developer, in which compromise solutions are sought for the design and characteristics of a wide variety of constituent parts sample. Sometimes quite funny things happen. So, during the most difficult tests of the tank for patency on a section of the road swollen from bad weather, consisting of a mixture of clay, sand and crushed stone, there was a partial destruction of the crushed stone mixed in clay, rubber bandages of road wheels, which naturally irritated the representatives of the Design Bureau, who were indignant on this occasion, they said that such conditions as at this test site are no longer on the entire continent. Or another case, when a metal fragment accidentally captured by the caterpillar lugs broke through the fuel tank on the fender and a dispute arose whether this should be considered a design defect.
The test program for the T-90 was built in such a way that from the very beginning, the cars that arrived from the factory faced almost the most difficult tests - running along a highway with a hard asphalt concrete surface until the fuel was completely depleted (in the common people - "cockroach races"). On a concrete track, the cruising range at one gas station was determined. The tank was refueled "to the eyeballs", including two barrels at the stern of the car, which are included in the engine fuel supply system (total 1700 liters). In the early morning, the tank went out onto the track, stopping once at 4 o'clock, for a crew change, for 1.5-2 minutes, without turning off the engine. When it was already the second hour of the night, all the participants in the tests were just waiting for it to stop. And finally, the booming rumbling stops. On the gas station we look for a tank on the highway, look at the speedometer - 728 km (600 km were declared). Of course, in addition to the skill of the drivers, this is the merit of the designers and prototype manufacturers, who have achieved the optimal combination of parameters and adjustments of the engine-transmission unit and the tank's motion control system. Similar results in foreign tank building are unknown.
The resource of the tank before overhaul is 14 thousand km, and the T-90 tanks had to “run” along the concrete road for 3500 km, and how to run: the average speed was 48-50 km / h. It should be noted that tests on concrete are the most difficult for a tank out of all the tests, because hard coating in combination with high speeds has the highest destructive effect on the components and assemblies of the tank.
In general, the task of the tester in any conditions is to “squeeze” everything that it is capable of out of the car, test it in extreme conditions, try to put it in extreme conditions, of course, observing all the rules and regulations of operation. Sometimes we, the testers, felt sorry for the car. But the realization that if it survives in such difficult conditions, it will certainly not let you down in battle, nevertheless prompted further “rape” of the machine.
Somehow, during a 250-kilometer night run, the operating conditions of a tank were simulated with partial damage to the power plant (coolant leak). This situation is quite real both in everyday operation and in a combat situation, where it is especially important to have a tank reliability margin (for helicopters, for example, there is a certain requirement for the duration of “dry”, i.e. without oil, engine operation to enable the crew to choose a place and land the car in case of damage to the engine lubrication system). Testing was entrusted to the driver, experienced tester A. Shopov. 35 liters of antifreeze was poured into the tank engine cooling system instead of the 90 liters prescribed. During the tests, the main parameters of the operation of the power plant were carefully controlled during the task. And it should be noted that the engine of the T-90 tank successfully passed this difficult test for it, having worked out the resource specified by the program at the temperature limit.
This fact made us take a slightly different look at the car, we were even more deeply imbued with respect for its developers, who created this reliable and extremely unpretentious car.
What is an eight-hour non-stop run with the fire control system on? Be sure to choose a difficult route with endless pits and potholes, on which the stabilized gun of the tank from overloads now and then gets on the hydrostop, a loaded squeal of the hydraulics of the gun stabilizer is heard, the mass of which reaches several tons. In addition, the gunner is obliged to make a horizontal turn of the tank turret every 2-3 minutes in the “transfer speed” mode by 360.
In desert Central Asia there was such a case. The tank driver, a conscript soldier, one day suddenly and unexpectedly “carefully” began to drive the tank along a well-known route. He did not respond to repeated requests to increase speed. I had to stop, turn off the engine and carry out explanatory work about the need to test the tank in extreme conditions. As it turned out, industry representatives sympathized with the soldier in his “ordeals” over the uneven Turkmen road and convinced him that a possible repair of the tank due to overload was useless to the soldier. What is surprising, after the words that now we are quietly rolling back without checking anything, and in two years the “good” tank put into service, but already in the hands of a younger soldier brother, will fail somewhere in a combat situation, he was under the impression that we did not return to this issue with this soldier until the end of the tests. And the speed performance of this driver was one of the best, even among more experienced testers.
A comprehensive check of the numerous properties of the tank, of course, required a lot of time and even had to replace the driver dismissed from the ranks of the army - a conscript soldier. To replace the troops, they sent an average, not having sufficient experience, driver. It was in Siberia, in the midst of a severe winter. The new driver was eager to start testing and quickly demonstrate his knowledge and skills. After two days of exploring the forty-kilometer route as a passenger in the tank turret, we finally entrusted him with a place behind the levers of the vehicle. The route was quite difficult, combining high-speed sections with bumpy, almost bare, snow-free sections covered with a meter layer of snow. But, nevertheless, the testers always fit into the average speed of 35-41 km / h. Imagine our surprise when the beginner overcame the test route in almost 2 hours at an average speed of 23 km/h. And this despite the fact that before the movement, he asked if it was possible to drive the car "to the full." Mastery is a acquired business, and if you wish, of course, you can achieve everything. Within a week, the newcomer almost completely adapted to the harsh winter conditions, the features of a difficult test track.
When testing for cross-country ability in snow, we were extremely surprised when the T-90 confidently overcame long snow sections with a snow depth of 1.1 to 1.3 m.
IN THE DESERT IT IS NOT EASY EVEN FOR A CAMEL
All stages of testing were difficult for the tank, but what awaited him in the desert of Central Asia cannot be compared with the rest.
The ambient temperature is 45-50°C in the shade. Throughout the hundred-kilometer running track, a layer of forest dust of 10-20 cm. During the movement, the column of dust behind the tank rose several hundred meters, and from the tank itself only a cannon and mud guards were visible. But the trail from him in the desert was visible for tens of kilometers. By the dust tail, we determined where the tank was located, and it was visible for 40 km. However, as we joked, it was certainly visible to American satellites from space, there's no getting around here.
Dust was almost everywhere. When cleaning the internal volume of the tank with a vacuum cleaner from dust that entered through open hatches during marches, 5-6 buckets of it were collected, and this is for every 4-5 marches. We remembered about it even a few months later in the winter in Siberia, when on one of the tracks after the tank flew into a huge hole so that the Turkmen dust that had long settled in the hull rose.
Trying to somehow get rid of the dust, the testers moved away from the field road to the side where it was smaller, but, a couple of times at high speed, they fell into pits with steep walls washed out by spring floods, which are not visible among the faded yellow and dried vegetation , returned to the "channel". So we called this monstrous road because when you cross it on foot, it seems that you are walking on water. Moreover, it is possible to cross such a "channel" only in boots, which, of course, no one wore in the heat, in sneakers - it is impossible.
During the day, the tanks covered from 350 to 480 km, they also worked out, like on a concrete road, on all types of fuel. Moreover, in the military district where the tests were carried out, there was no kerosene for the engine of the T-90 tank. There was only RT kerosene (jet fuel), the use of which was not allowed by the tank operating instructions. After discussion together with representatives of the Design Bureau, we made a decision on runs on kerosene of the Republic of Tatarstan at our own peril and risk. We were fulfilling a point in the test program, but the representatives of the design bureau were clearly taking risks, but, obviously, they were confident in their offspring. There was also a risk that very large loads were placed on the tank engine in dusty and high temperature ambient air, even when operating on "native", diesel, fuel, and here aviation kerosene.
At that time, everything went extremely well and calmly. By the way, for the entire time of testing T-90 tanks in the desert, the average speed ranged from 35 km / h on gasoline to 43 km / h on kerosene and diesel fuel. And in order to put all the dots on this issue, let's add that the average speed of operation of tanks (an indicator obtained by dividing the readings of the mileage meter by the readings of the hour meter under load) in combat units is 8-11 km / h, and in our country for all state tests it was 28 km/h.
And yet, it was not without incident. Somehow, at the end of the working week, we were completing tank runs along the ring route. They told the test leader on the radio that we were going out for the last lap, then we were going to the park on our own, after which we got out of communication. Passing at high speed a checkpoint on the track, we saw one of the testers of the backup group, who was waving his hand at us. We took this gesture for a greeting and, having answered the same, continued to move. After many kilometers of grueling run, we were looking forward to the events of the weekend and were in a wonderful mood.
The section of the road from the ring road to the park was a hilly road with steep ascents and descents, 6 km long. One climb with a steepness of about 300 and a length of 80-100 m was especially impressive. When the car climbed this climb, and we sympathized with it very much, the speed dropped sharply, the dust at the stern dissipated a little and a rather tricky situation was discovered. The tank was burning, burning very strongly, and outside. After all, in the event of a fire from the inside, the PPO system would work and the crew would know about it immediately. We, the commander and gunner on the turret, tried to convince the driver to stop immediately by intercom, without bothering to tell the reason for such a stop in a fever. Naturally, the driver did not understand why he had to stop in such an inconvenient place and continued to climb to the top of the hill.
Only after the tank stopped did the source of the fire become clear. It was a tank with a supply of oil for the engine, mounted on the exhaust manifold of the power plant (so that in winter this oil was heated and always ready for use). Obviously, during a long drive over rough terrain, the tank was loosened, it was destroyed and oil spilled onto the exhaust manifold, where it instantly ignited. During our movement, almost 40 liters of oil spilled onto the port side and the undercarriage, as a result of which the rubber bulwarks and rubber tires of the rear road wheels caught fire. That's what they tried to tell us at the checkpoint. It took a long time to put out the fire. The OU-2 fire extinguisher available in the ZIP was not enough, the forest dust that was in abundance at hand also did not help much. The fire was dealt with only when, burning, it was possible to rip off the tank itself from the bulwark mounts, ready to explode.
Naturally, we arrived at the park in an "unsightly" form and with a great delay, which made the head of the test and our colleagues worry. But we must give them their due - they showed restraint and loyalty to us, considering what happened was not an emergency, but one of the equipment failures, in order to eliminate which it is necessary to make adjustments to the tank operating instructions.
SHOOTING GOOD IS NOT JUST SHOOTING GOOD
When conducting firing tests at one of the training grounds in Siberia, we had such a case. During the execution of firing from two T-90 tanks, a lunch break was announced, and after it the firing director set the task for the crews for the next race. The tanks were already ready for the task, the leader was ready to give the command "forward", as at that moment a moving object appeared in front of the target area. As it turned out, the watchman from the other end of the range, considering the shooting over, rode a horse in a sleigh to get groceries in the village and decided to shorten his path through the range. After all, he watched the firing from the tanks, already from the side of the command tower, with horror imagining himself and his horse there, at the level of real targets.
It should be added that learning how to shoot well from this tank is much easier, in our opinion, than how to drive it well. In principle, those simple operations that a gunner performs can be mastered in a few training sessions, and almost everything that is classified as a gunner’s art was taken over by the fire control system (FCS) installed on the tank, which automatically takes into account all the necessary data for firing, including including corrections caused by deviations from normal firing conditions (such as wind direction and speed, barometric pressure, and air temperature, temperature of the charge, wear of the cannon bore, side roll of the tank, etc.) The whole task of the gunner is to use the guidance console (jokingly called the “joystick” by the soldiers) to bring the aiming point to the target, and press the electric trigger button to fire a shot .
During tests to determine the fire capabilities of a tank, sometimes the SLA makes you treat yourself very, very correctly. During the firing, one of the T-90 tanks began to make unjustified misses. Checking the serviceability of the SLA did not reveal any defects, everything functioned normally. Everyone was perplexed. Only a casual glance of the tank commander at the new capacitive wind sensor allowed to explain the unsatisfactory performance of the SLA. It turned out that everything is very simple - the crew made an inattention and a small case was not removed from the wind sensor, and he, naturally, being "in calm", did not work out the required correction for the SLA.
This episode is not given by chance, because the technique, no matter how “smart” it is, still requires a professional, qualified attitude, which allows much wider use of its capabilities.
The firing capabilities of the T-90 have been significantly expanded with the installation of a guided weapon system to ensure a confident superiority over all existing foreign tanks in terms of target engagement range. Heavily armored targets at ranges up to 5 km are hit by the T-90 on the move (up to 30 km/h) with a high probability of being hit by the first shot. During the state tests, 24 missile launches were made at ranges of 4-5 km, and all of them hit the target. Again, I must say thanks to the designers who created this "long arm". It is one thing when, at an exhibition in Abu Dhabi, from a T-80U tank (which has the same guided weapon system), an experienced gunner made 52 launches of a guided missile at a distance of 5 km and all the missiles hit the target, and another thing when the state tests of the tank T-90, all missile launches were carried out by young guys who had undergone preliminary training and had absolutely no practice of firing a guided missile before.
Well, what a professional can do was demonstrated at the demonstration of the T-90 tank by one of the foreign delegations. A rather experienced gunner, performing a firing exercise, first hit the target with a guided missile at a distance of 4 km from a place, and then, in 54 seconds at a speed of 25 km / h, hit 7 real armored targets located at ranges of 1500-2500 m, and returning to the initial position, handed over fire control to the tank commander, who, in a duplicate mode, fired "from the stern" of the tank, shot 4 more targets.
Shooting from a tank always impresses with its power, it is especially spectacular and visual in mountainous conditions, where the targets seem to be very close at a glance, and the rocks located literally behind them are probably 3 km, no more. However, when measuring the range with a laser rangefinder, it turns out that these rocks are at least 6-7 km away, and at least 2.5 km from the targets. Under such conditions, the trajectory of the projectiles is very clearly visible.
A TANK IS NOT A SUBMARINE AND NOT A HANG Glider, BUT STILL...
It also happened that, in addition to the harsh frosts of Siberia, the unbearable (for humans) heat and dust of Central Asia, the tank had to pass through water barriers 5 m deep and climb 2 times to a height of 8000 m aboard transport aircraft IL-76MD and AN-124 Ruslan.
Difficult were tests under water. The tank entered the reservoir to a depth of 5 m, the engine was turned off and for 1 hour the crew listened in complete silence through the air supply pipe to what was happening above the water column. Such a long time spent under water was necessary to check the quality of the sealing of the elements of the Shtora-1 optoelectronic suppression complex, which are located on the tank's armor. Although, in principle, there is nothing to be afraid of under water (in case of an emergency abandonment of the tank, the crew was equipped with IP-5 insulating gas masks), we were looking forward to the time to start the engine and return the tank to the surface of the water.
A SWAN SONG...
One of the most important stages of testing prototypes of T-90 tanks - testing for resistance to anti-tank weapons, is usually carried out at the end of the entire test program, since after this stage the sample, as a rule, is not subject to further use.
To test the security characteristics of the program, tests were provided for shelling and mine detonation of one of the prototypes. The beginning was terrible for the car. Under one of the tracks, a landmine was laid, the TNT equivalent of which corresponded to the most powerful mines of foreign states. The machine passed this test, i.е. was brought into working condition by the crew within the time specified by the requirements. Then the tank was subjected to brutal shell fire, with the "enemy" hitting the "weak" places. With each new hit, it became more and more gloomy, and after a fairly decent number of hits, systems and components began to fail, the last, like a person, was the "heart" of the tank, its engine.
We were humanly sorry for the tank, which had become our friend in combat over the past year and a half. But his "suffering" will not be in vain, as they have given new food for designers and specialists.
The second T-90 tank had a completely different fate. He traveled 14,000 km, fired a mountain of ammunition, changing two barrels to a tank cannon during the tests, and was sent to his birthplace - the city of Nizhny Tagil, where new components and assemblies were installed on him for further research and testing.
During the fighting, infantry fighting vehicles were hit by anti-tank weapons. When cumulative grenades hit the sides, combat vehicles were often pierced through. Near one of these machines, representatives of the manufacturer lingered for a long time. They could not, did not have the right not to study all the circumstances of the destruction of the BMP. Moreover, next to the through hole above the right caterpillar, apparently, one of the colleagues of the dead motorized riflemen inscribed bitter and fair words with white paint: “Remember, here are the souls of our guys.”
Losses from mine explosions for the same period in 1980 amounted to 59% of the total. Of the total number of tanks blown up, 17% were irretrievably lost or required major repairs. An explosion under one of the tracks tore not only it, but, depending on the power of the charge, one or more road wheels and suspension units were torn off. The impact of the explosion on the bottom led to its deflection, concussion or death of the driver.
IF tanks have always been and will be for a long time to come, but their appearance is always associated with the tasks of the coming war or wars. "Whom are we friends against?" - Diplomats ask themselves a question, and the military and designers must answer it in their own way. Naturally, the lessons of recent campaigns should be used with maximum efficiency.
“Let's remember 1994–1996, especially the New Year's assault on Grozny,” colonel-journalist Vladimir Matyash addressed the readers of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper in 2004.
“The streets of the city were literally crammed with tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled howitzers, Nons, Tunguskas, which became targets in a limited space without reliable cover for motorized riflemen. In the current campaign (this was during the “Second Chechen War”, which received the official name of the “counter-terrorist operation”), tanks and artillery did not go ahead of the infantry, but, suppressing knots of resistance with fire, ensured its advance. In turn, the competent actions of motorized rifle units ruled out the possibility of effective use of anti-tank weapons by bandits to destroy armored vehicles. They were simply not allowed to get within range of a valid shot. Yes, and armored vehicles have significantly strengthened their protective shell. Hence the minimum loss. So, during the assault on Grozny, only one tank was destroyed, which covered the evacuation of the wounded with its side.
“We have learned serious lessons from the past campaign,” says Major Tsimbalyuk, a former commander of a tank platoon and now chief of staff of a tank battalion of a motorized rifle brigade, holder of two Orders of Courage.
After the New Year's assault on Grozny in 1995, only 5 tanks remained of this battalion. Now there are no losses in the unit, largely due to the high combat characteristics of the T-72. And yet, the officer, as they say, pointedly raised the question of the unreliability of the PPO (fire-fighting equipment) T-72, the problem of detecting the enemy in difficult conditions with regular surveillance devices, and the need to install classified communications equipment on the tank. Combat operations also strongly dictate the need to equip all crew members with machine guns. Of course, designers need to modernize modern tanks, taking into account the experience of local conflicts of recent decades.
In the mountains, the engine heats up, there is not enough power, because you had to climb 1200 meters. Caterpillars, especially in ice, do not provide reliable grip on rocky soil. And it's cold in the tank. If some heat is stored in the fighting compartment, then it is not in the control compartment.
Apparently the mechanic is right. So, comrade scientists, take care to provide the soldier under armor with more or less living conditions. And Sergeant Major Protsenko said about one more thing. Installing or removing batteries (batteries) on the T-72, even under normal conditions, is not an easy task. And they “sit down” quite quickly, especially in winter conditions. So, to replace the battery, you need to remove the driver's seat, which weighs about 70 kg, and then lift the battery itself vertically through the hatch, which is no less heavy. On the T-62, everything is much simpler, you don’t need to lift anything - the battery is freely lowered into the landing hatch by one person ...
The commander of the T-72 tank, contract service sergeant Petelnik, who also participated in the hostilities, took out his vision of the problems from them:
“The militants tried to hit the left side of the tower and under the turret space, trying first of all to disable the aiming devices, which sometimes succeeded.
The bandits also used another weakness of our car: after a shot, the gun becomes on a hydraulic stop for the next loading. Not much time passes, but it is this moment of forced inaction that the enemy uses. In addition, in the conditions of mountains, low temperatures, dampness, it happened that the control unit of the loading mechanism failed. We took it out and warmed it up on a fire, after which everything went fine. Another problem: after the ammunition is completely used up, you have to retreat from positions in order to load the container. Firstly, precious time is running out, secondly, the position has to be left, unmasking itself, and thirdly, the crew is forced to leave the combat vehicle, while being exposed to small arms. It would be nice to have an armored transport-charging vehicle, like the missilemen have.”
Certain shortcomings of the armored vehicles used in the counter-terrorist operation are also characteristic of other vehicles. The imperfection of the tracks, for example, fully applies to both self-propelled howitzers and infantry fighting vehicles, since they glide over the mountains. Therefore, already in military conditions, the Main Armored Directorate adjusted their refinement - lugs were fixed on the tracks.
The commanders considered and continue to consider saving the lives of soldiers one of the most important tasks in the course of the counter-terrorist operation. Indeed, the losses in the current operation are much less than in 1995-1996. Scientists, designers, industrialists were shown the T-72 tank, which received nine direct hits from anti-tank weapons in battle. The combat vehicle lost mobility, but retained the ability to fire. The crew members, largely due to dynamic protection, were not injured or shell-shocked. For four hours the “seventy-two” fought. And if the Arena system was also installed on the tank, it would not be possible to take it with either ATGMs or grenade launchers. Almost 19% of the damage to armored vehicles was from mines and land mines. Is it from the time afghan war scientists and designers have not developed a countermeasure against them - a reasonable question arises. Developed and very effective. This is electromagnetic protection, both for tanks and for infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers. Alas, all the same financial difficulties do not allow it to be widely introduced in the troops.
During the fighting, infantry fighting vehicles were hit by anti-tank weapons. When cumulative grenades hit the sides, they were often stitched through. Near one of these machines, representatives of the manufacturer lingered for a long time. They could not, did not have the right not to study all the circumstances of the destruction of the BMP. Moreover, next to the through hole above the right caterpillar, apparently, one of the colleagues of the dead motorized riflemen wrote bitter and fair words in white paint:
“Remember, here are the souls of our guys.”
Motorized riflemen managed to strengthen the sides of the armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles with boxes of sand, cartridges, spare wheels, using ropes and even waist belts. Hearing about this, the representative of the manufacturer immediately expressed his readiness to install special mounting brackets on armored personnel carriers. It is difficult to say how much such an improvement will increase the safety of equipment and people. And why should it, when special protective screens have been developed and tested. The whole question is how soon infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers will be equipped with them. However, even less costly work to improve technology, alas, is becoming a stumbling block for us today.
It is known, for example, that the personnel of units are often placed on the hull of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. Well, what is it worth equipping combat vehicles with handrails, holding on to which one could avoid falling in the event of an explosion or an unexpected collision with an obstacle? Their absence sometimes causes injuries, even mutilations, death of military personnel.
BTR-80 of the period of the Chechen campaign 1995–1996 with blocks of "reactive armor" installed on it and impromptu booking of the undercarriage
And here is another example “from the same opera”: in the course of hostilities, especially in the mountains, for example, in Nagorno-Karabakh, on the T-55 and T-72 tanks, the crews turned off the stabilizers of the guns in order to protect themselves from the breech of the gun swinging too much , and fired only from short stops.
Another very important lesson learned during the battles with Chechen fighters was related to the special vulnerability of Russian tanks associated with the presence of an automatic loader on them.
Foreign tanks "Abrams", "Leopard-2" use unitary shots with manual loading carried out by the fourth crew member. In domestic T-72, T-80, T-90 tanks, separate loading shots with a burning cartridge case are used, and loading is carried out by an automatic loader, which made it possible to reduce the tank crew to three people (commander, gunner, driver) and at the same time significantly increase the rate of fire. The autoloader includes a rotating annular conveyor with a vertical axis located on the floor of the tank and containing radially arranged cassettes with shells and powder charges, an elevator that raises the cassettes to the loading line, and a chain rammer located in the turret chase, as well as a device for ejecting a burning pallet from the tank. shells! The location of the conveyor on the floor of the tank behind relatively weak armor and the presence in the conveyor of a large mass of flammable combustible shells in Chechnya led to numerous cases of tank deaths in Chechnya when cumulative grenades from hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers hit the space between the rear rollers, where it is very convenient to shoot, leaning out of sewer hatch or from the cellar.
However, the most important thing was that, as before, even new domestic vehicles could not fight in urban conditions. As Lester V. Grau, an American specialist in the field of armored vehicles, reported in his article “First Round: Russians in Chechnya” in the March issue of the Journal of Military Ordnance magazine, the loss of our armored vehicles in Chechnya only in the first month of the conflict that broke out in 1995, amounted to 225 cars - 10.23% of their total!
Already on February 20, 1995, Lieutenant General A. Galkin, who then headed the Main Armored Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, held a conference at which all these sad facts were discussed, but it was still impossible to expect a quick result, because of which, as he reports Grau, referring to Russian sources known to him, our troops lost 846 combat vehicles of various types in Chechnya out of 2221 units of armored vehicles involved there (38%).
According to our domestic data, by the time the major battles in Chechnya were over in May 1996, Russian troops had irretrievably lost 331 armored vehicles (tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles), for the most part destroyed by RPG rocket-propelled grenades - perhaps the most popular weapon among Chechen fighters after the Kalashnikov assault rifle.
Under these conditions, the fighters again tried to turn to "front-line ingenuity" and armor their cars not only with boxes of sand, but also with blocks of dynamo-reactive armor, but such "modernizations" did not always help out either. In fact, we again repeated the situation of the end of 1945, when protection from the fire of German faustpatrons had to be found using a wide variety of improvised means, which by no means always helped to escape.
Scheme of destruction of T-72 tanks in Chechnya in 1994-1996. (according to Steven Pledges)
Scheme of the defeat of the BMP-1 in Chechnya in 1994-1996. (according to Steven Pledges)
Scheme of the defeat of the BTR-70 in Chechnya in 1994–1996. (according to Steven Pledges)
Scheme of destruction of T-80 tanks in Chechnya in 1994-1996. (according to Steven Pledges)
Scheme of the defeat of the BMD-1 in Chechnya in 1994–1996. (according to Steven Pledges)
In the diagrams shown here domestic tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers belonging to the famous American expert Steven Zaloga, the zones vulnerable to RPG-7 and RPG-18 hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers are clearly visible not only on lightly armored BMD-1 and BMP-2, but also on vehicles such as T -72 and T-80! And there is nothing surprising in the fact that, up to the present day, our motorized riflemen prefer to ride on the armor of the BTR-70, and not under it. With 100% damage zones available on it, driving inside such a car under RPG fire is just suicide!
However, the most surprising thing about this story with the “lessons of the mountains” is that by this time our army had already managed to fight enough in the mountains, and even drew certain conclusions from the combat experience gained!
We are talking about the actions of our tanks on the territory of Afghanistan, which appeared there in December 1979. And it happened that our troops that entered the territory of this country included not only three tank divisions, but also tank regiments of divisions, and tank battalions of motorized rifle regiments. The first were soon taken back to the Union, since they had no one to fight in the conditions of the Afghan war, but the tank battalions were left to guard the roads, accompany the columns and, where possible, support motorized riflemen with fire and caterpillars.
The divisions of the Turkestan Military District that entered Afghanistan were armed with T-55 tanks. But in anticipation of military operations in 1980, the troops began to receive T-62 and T-64 tanks. The latter, however, did not pass the tests in the highlands - a two-stroke diesel let them down, and they did not stay in the DRA for a long time. But the T-55, T-62 and partially T-72 fought in the mountains for a long time.
The specificity of the terrain and combat use, as well as the tactics of the Mujahideen, quickly revealed the main drawback of Soviet tanks: poor protection against mines and cumulative ammunition. Actually, this was not a discovery for designers and the military - even during the Arab-Israeli wars in 1968 and 1973. tanks of the T-54/55 and T-62 types were easily hit by ATGMs and RPGs. However, in a "correct" field war, tanks almost always had freedom of maneuver, the possibility of using all the firepower of their own and attached units against identified anti-tank weapons. In the end, the very variety of combat situations rarely led to a tank-RPG or tank-ATGM duel. In this regard, the shortcomings in the protection of Soviet vehicles in the Middle East were compensated by a number of advantages: a low silhouette, good sand mobility and sufficient firepower.
Another thing is Afghanistan. Here, the tanks had no other enemy, except for a single Mujahideen with a grenade launcher and mines that littered the roads. There was practically no freedom of maneuver: either movement along the roads, or fire from a place at roadblocks. Even where the terrain allowed getting off the road, this was in most cases impossible - the roadsides were heavily mined by the enemy. Finally, the attack itself was carried out by the Mujahideen where the visibility of the crew was reduced to a minimum - in the mountain defile, in the green zone or among the deaf duvals of the villages.
All this led to the fact that the crew at the combat exit could at any moment expect a cumulative grenade on board or a landmine explosion under the caterpillar. In such an environment, one had to hope only for armor protection, but it just let her down.
The relatively thin armor of the sides, roof and stern was easily penetrated by the RPG-7 grenade. Having armor penetration of the order of 400–500 mm, the grenade launcher could hit a T-54/55 tank in the forehead. Despite the relatively weak armor action, a cumulative grenade, when it hit the turret, as a rule, killed one or more crew members, could disable weapons, and undermine the ammunition load. Hitting the engine compartment made the car a stationary target, and if fuel lines were encountered in the path of the cumulative jet, ignition occurred.
It should also be borne in mind that the enemy was usually not limited to one hit, but fired until the vehicle was completely out of order. Of course, there were happy exceptions, for example, when 7 RPG grenades hit the T-55 turret, they all pierced the armor, but the crew remained alive, and the tank was combat-ready. Unfortunately, not everyone was so lucky. For 11 months in 1980, 16% of tank losses occurred from RPG fire.
Even more dangerous were anti-tank mines and land mines. Losses from mine explosions for the same period in 1980 amounted to 59% of the total. Of the total number of tanks blown up, 17% were irretrievably lost or required major repairs. An explosion under one of the tracks tore not only it, but, depending on the power of the charge, one or more road wheels and suspension units were torn off. The impact of the explosion on the bottom led to its deflection, concussion or death of the driver. The use of mine trawls did not always ensure safety. Knife trawls on stony soil were useless, and various tricks were used against the Katkovs: radio control, the frequency of the fuse (a landmine exploded not under the trawl, but sometimes in the middle of the column) and many other methods of mining.
Thus, already the first operations gave tangible losses in military equipment. Increased protection was required, and the troops began their own improvisations: hanging boxes of ammunition, sand and gravel, spare road wheels, track tracks, tanks with water, oil and fuel on the armor.
Then the case was put on a production basis, and most of the tanks were equipped with additional protection. Rubber-fabric screens were hung on the sides of the hull; an additional ceramic-metal block was installed on the frontal part in the form of a box-shaped structure made of armor plates 30 mm thick, inside which were placed 5 mm steel sheets with 30 mm gaps filled with foamed polyurethane. Similar in design "eyebrows" were hung on the frontal part of the tower to the right and left of the gun.
However, the measures taken did not significantly reduce the dynamics of losses, so in the early 1980s. carried out a lot of research work on the deep modernization of the T-55 and T-62. In May 1982, a large group of designers and plant directors, led by the head of the GBTU, Colonel-General Potapov, visited the DRA. And in March 1983, the upgraded T-55M, T-55AM and T-62M were adopted. Reinforced mine protection was introduced on them: a cellular frame on the bottom of the hull under the inhabited compartments made of a steel channel or corner 80 mm wide, closed from below with six armor plates 20 mm thick; spacer rack-pilers in the control compartment behind the back of the driver to prevent deflection of the bottom during an explosion; special fastening of the mechanic's seat on a poly-ke, welded to the side and having a gap with the bottom of the hull of 30 mm, so that the explosion energy does not directly affect the seat; a casing over the first pair of torsion bars with a 20 mm rubber mat to protect the mechanic's feet; emergency hatch cover reinforced with 20 mm armor plate. In addition to the already introduced anti-cumulative protection measures, steel lattice screens were installed on the sides and stern of the hull and turret, which destroyed RPG grenades without detonation.
Tanks T-55M (1983; top) and T-55MV (1985) - T-55 upgrades based on Afghan experience
Upgraded T-62M tank (1983)
The protection against incendiary weapons was also improved. To this end, protective grids with a small mesh and protective steel tubes for external electrical wiring were installed on the roof of the transmission. On modernized tanks used new system fire control "Volna" with a complex of guided weapons and a system for launching smoke grenades 902B "Cloud". The mass of the modernized machines exceeded the 40-ton milestone, so they needed to install a boosted up to 620 hp. from. engine.
The chassis has also been improved. Reinforced rubber-metal hinges and track lugs, new torsion shafts, hydraulic shock absorbers for the second pair of road wheels of T-62 tanks were introduced.
Modernization during the Afghan war gave impetus to the search for ways to further strengthen the T-54/55 and T-62 tanks, which in 1988 accounted for 36.5 and 25.7% of the USSR tank fleet, respectively. It was aimed mainly at improving security by installing dynamic or active protection and increasing firepower. These measures were, of course, forced, due to the lack of more modern machines. With the adoption of the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Arms in Europe, work on the further improvement of obsolete tanks was curtailed. A sharp reduction in the tank fleet was carried out primarily due to the T-55 and T-62, which were in service for more than 30 years.
Thus, neither in Afghanistan nor subsequently in Chechnya did anything fundamentally new to improve our tanks. But for some reason, the experience of the Afghan mountains in Chechnya “did not work” from the very beginning, and our military, according to an already sad tradition, were again forced to learn from their own mistakes, and pay for it with the lives of innocent people!
As already noted, most tanks immediately flared up after hitting the ammunition storage area, meanwhile, our military was well aware of at least one tank, which, even when knocked out, practically did not burn. We are talking about the famous Israeli tank "Merkava" (Chariot), which since 1982 also had to fight in cities and in mountainous, desert areas. Major General Israel Tall, who designed it, was a member of all the Arab-Israeli troops, so before sitting down to the drawings, his group of tank officers carefully studied the statistics of the distribution of shells hitting tanks. This analysis showed that the largest number of them falls on the frontal part of the turret, therefore, the frontal projection of the turret of a promising tank had to be minimized by "drown" it in the hull. The tank had to have the highest possible level of protection, even at the expense of mobility. The limited human resources of the country dictated, first of all, the need for maximum protection of the crew members: let the tank be completely disabled, but its crew must survive. Statistics showed that in the event of a detonation of ammunition, the crew, as a rule, dies completely. This means that crew members and ammunition should be covered to the maximum extent with armor. Additional protection can be provided by placing the engine compartment in front of the hull, in addition, with this arrangement, the crew gets the opportunity to leave the damaged vehicle through the hatch in the aft hull - the least vulnerable to frontal shelling.
Much attention was paid to the convenience of the tankers. The designers proceeded from the postulate "a tank is the crew's home in war time". Tall proposed a very controversial concept of round-the-clock use of the tank, for which it was envisaged to place two crews in one car - one is resting, the other is fighting. If necessary, the places of the reserve crew can be used to evacuate the wounded from the battlefield. Without a doubt, such a concept led to an increase in the booked volume of the hull and the size of the tank itself, unprecedented in modern tank building, and the possibility of additional transportation of people inside the tank baffled many experts who at one time even tried to distinguish the Israeli vehicle into a special subspecies of BMP tanks.
Israeli tank "Merkava" Mk.2
Interestingly, the volume of the turret of the Merkava tank turned out to be much smaller than that of other main battle tanks; due to the low landing of the crew members, it was possible to reduce the height of the tower and reduce the area of its frontal projection to about 1 m2. The wedge-shaped shape of the tower contributes to the ricochet of shells when fired from the front hemisphere. A large basket is attached to the aft niche of the tower, along the perimeter of the lower part of which chains are hung with steel balls at the ends. The chains provoke the detonation of the warhead of the grenades of wearable anti-tank weapons, such as RPG-7, before they come into contact with the armor.
The trunnions of the gun are located closer to the breech than is usually customary, thanks to which it was possible to keep the angle of descent of the barrel equal to -8.5 ° without increasing the height of the turret itself.
Unitary shots for the gun are stored in fiberglass containers with an internal rubber heat-insulating coating, four rounds each. Most of the ammunition is located in the aft part of the tank hull, there are only eight shells ready for firing in the turret. Additional protection of ammunition is provided: from the detonation of mines - by a fuel tank located under the location of containers with shots, from above - by a tank with fresh water, installed directly under the upper armor plate and a significant overhang of the turret niche with a "basket" attached to it. Containers are loaded through a double hatch located in the aft armor plate. The standard ammunition load of 62 rounds can be increased to 84. The loading time of the ammunition load is 15-20 minutes - three times less than that of the German Leopard-1 tanks or the French AMX-30.
During the 1982 battles with Syrian tanks, Israeli vehicles demonstrated high survivability, and this despite the fact that Soviet T-72 shells, as it turned out, pierced their frontal armor, not only on the hull, but also on the turret! At the same time, fighting Soviet tanks fully confirmed the correctness of the concept chosen by General Tall: the protection of the crew is above all!
There is a well-known example when a battalion of Syrian T-72s, making a night march, unexpectedly stumbled upon a unit of Merkava tanks, which were waiting for the arrival of tankers. A fierce night battle ensued, in which the Syrian tanks demonstrated their advantage over the Israelis due to the higher rate of fire of their automated guns and better night vision devices. However, having quickly shot their ammunition racks, the Syrians never saw the results of their shooting, because the Israeli tanks did not catch fire or explode. Having practically suffered no losses, the Syrians withdrew, but after a while they sent intelligence, which discovered a truly amazing picture: on the battlefield there were enemy tanks abandoned by crews with numerous holes in the hulls and towers. But at the same time, none of the Merkava tanks caught fire or exploded, but all thanks to their layout and excellent fire extinguishing system!
Another time, the Merkava Mk.3 tank received 20 hits from RPGs and ATGMs, but despite this, its crew was still not injured.
Today there are three modifications of this tank: Mk.1, Mk.2 and Mk. Z, and the last of them has the same gun as on the M1A1 Abrams and Lsopard-2 tanks. The plans for the future include arming the next modification of the Merkava, now with a 140-mm smooth-bore gun.
The tank came out more than modern and at the time of its creation was considered the best among the tanks of the Western world in terms of protection from anti-tank fire! Even the chains with balls at the ends, hung around the perimeter of the "basket" at the rear of the tower, helped the last one - a solution that was generally affordable and simple, but turned out to be very effective. This is perhaps the main achievement of Israeli engineers.
The main battle tank "Sabra" (1999) - a deep modernization of the American M60AZ made in Israel
Aft hatch "Merkava". Chains under the turret are designed to protect against HEAT projectiles
However, for all the unusualness of its layout, which sharply distinguishes the Merkava from all modern main battle tanks, there are very few technical innovations in its design, and this, first of all, speaks of its price, and also that there are various kinds of new items. not always justified.
The main indicator of the success of this machine is that although during the Lebanese war Israel lost about 50 Merkava Mk.1 tanks, none of them caught fire, and the irretrievable losses amounted to only seven vehicles! Only nine crew members of the wrecked tanks died, while the losses among the crews of the American M60A1 tanks turned out to be much harder.
The 77-67 tank, which is in service with the Israeli army, is a “hybrid” of the T-54 hull, T-62 turret and English 1.7 gun (the turret is turned back with the barrel)
Here is a very impressive example of using someone else's experience in local military conflicts and ... in the mountains!
The main purpose of the active protection complex (KAZ) "Arena" is the destruction of enemy projectiles and missiles flying up to tanks.
The radar station, which is part of the KAZ, detects attacking projectiles at a distance of 50 m from the tank in a sector equal to approximately 270 °, both launched from the ground and from the air. After the detection of an anti-tank weapon, the primary selection of the target is carried out, the trajectory of its movement is determined regardless of whether it is a guided projectile or not. If the target poses a threat to the tank, a protective element is fired at the calculated time, during the flight of which the tracking of the target continues. Then follows the command to engage the ammunition. When undermined, it does not pose a threat to either the tank or the attacking infantry, but it destroys the incoming ammunition. A localized stream hits a target at a distance of 3 to 6 meters from the tank - depending on the conditions of its approach. The time from detection to destruction of the target is 70 milliseconds. After 0.4 seconds, the complex, which works automatically, is ready to reflect the next cone. The commander's console displays information about the operation of the complexes and the amount of remaining ammunition.
After the battle, the used ammunition is easily removed from the mines, and new ones are installed in their place. Full reloading of the complex by the entire crew is about 15 minutes.
Russian modernized tank T-80UM1 "Bars", equipped with the "Arena" complex (1998)
KAZ "Arena" successfully fights with any type of anti-tank guided weapons, including promising ones. Equipping tanks with active protection systems increases their combat effectiveness - depending on the conditions, type of hostilities - from 2 to 3-4 times.
Many are interested in the question of the combat effectiveness of the latest Russian tanks in comparison with foreign counterparts. In particular, what are the capabilities of the tank T-90 vs American?
It should be understood that the situation when two tanks converge on the battlefield, like two knights clad in armor, in a fair duel, is becoming less and less common in modern hostilities. Today, in order to survive, a tank must be ready to fight a variety of opponents - from infantry armed with anti-tank missiles to combat aircraft and helicopters. However, some tanks are constantly compared with others.
Some experts believe that a general theoretical comparison of tanks is impossible, and even real fighting do not provide a definitive answer. It is necessary to take into account the tactics of use, crew training, maintenance of equipment, the interaction of units - all this is often more important than the technical properties of the tank itself.
As for, there is no reliable data on their participation in hostilities. Despite the statements of some authors, most likely there were no T-90s during both the First and Second Chechen campaigns on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan. It is believed that in August 2008, T-90 tanks took part in the fighting in South Ossetia as part of the 58th Army during the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. In particular, T-90s were seen during the withdrawal of Russian troops from Gori (Georgia). But in the absence of documentary evidence, this cannot be categorically asserted, because. outwardly, the T-90 is very similar to the T-72B with dynamic protection "Contact", which can cause an error in their "identification".
Not so long ago, the NTV television company aired a program comparing the T-90S and the main tank of the US armed forces, the M1 Abrams. After analyzing the main characteristics of the two combat vehicles, the authors of the program came to the conclusion that the T-90S is clearly superior to the Abrams. Naturally, Western analysts have a completely opposite opinion. For example, Dean Lockwood, weapons systems analyst at Forecast International, notes: “Speaking of the T-90 family, we are actually talking about the chassis from the T-72 and the updated turret and artillery system from the T-80. The T-72 tank was produced in large numbers, the results of its combat use are not particularly impressive, and the T-80 has very limited combat experience. To call the T-90S the best tank in the world is a clear exaggeration. The T-72 was used by Iraqi forces in 1991 and 2003, when it was also considered one of the best examples of armored vehicles. But the war showed that it could not stand comparison with the American M1 Abrams and the British Challenger. "Abrams" and "Challenger" could destroy the T-72, remaining out of reach for him. The T-90 has a number of improvements, but it is definitely not a technological breakthrough.”
Let's also try to make some generalizations based on the known characteristics of the Russian T-90 and the American Abrams.
T-90 VS ABRAMS: COMPARISON OF DESIGN AND PROTECTION
First of all, it should be taken into account that the T-90 tank, developed by UKBTM more than 20 years ago and essentially being a deep modernization of the T-72, itself has many modifications: T-90 (model 1992) T-90 Bhishma, T-90CA , T-90A (sample 2004), T-90AM, T-90SM, which differ significantly from each other both constructively and in terms of combat effectiveness.
The same applies to the American "Abrams", which entered service in 1980. There were its modifications: M1 (with a 105-mm cannon), M1A1, M1A1NE (with "heavy armor"), M1A2, M1A2 SEP (System Enhancement Program), M1A1 / A2 TUSK (Tank Urban Survival Kit). Moreover, for example, the innovations introduced on the modification of the M1A2 tank increased its combat effectiveness compared to the M1A1 modification in the offensive by 54%, in defense - by 100%.
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M1A2 "Abrams" SEP TUSKII |
For this reason, meticulously comparing millimeters and kilograms makes at least some sense only for very specific modifications released in the same period of time. Therefore, we immediately “bracket” the frankly weaker M1 with a 105-mm cannon and so far exists only in prototypes of the T-90AM / SM.
First of all, it should be noted that the US and the USSR, and later Russia, took two different approaches to the design of their tanks. It can be seen with the naked eye that the T-90 is significantly smaller than the M1. This was achieved thanks to the refusal of the T-90 from the loader, which requires about 1.7 m of the height of the fighting compartment to work. As a result, restrictions on reducing the height of the tank were removed, and the use of a dense layout made it possible to create a highly protected vehicle with a low silhouette and a small area of \u200b\u200bthe longitudinal and cross section with a relatively low mass. As a result, the booked volume of the T-90 is only 12 cubic meters, and the Abrams is 21. True, you have to pay for everything - and the back side of the dense layout was the crampedness of the crew members, as well as the difficulty of replacing each other's crew members if necessary.
Many will say that since the Abrams is heavier, then it is better protected. But not everything is so clear. The reduction in the internal armored volume on the T-90 called for a reduction in the mass of armor to provide the required level of protection. Due to the smaller dimensions, the frontal projection, which is most likely to be hit, is only 5 sq.m for the T-90, and 6 sq.m for the Abrams. This alone makes the T-90 potentially less vulnerable.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the real security of the T-90 and Abrams due to high level the secrecy of this matter. However, it is known that the armor of the front of the towers was made according to a similar principle - packages of "reflective sheets" were installed in the pockets of the frontal armor. They provide an increase in anti-cumulative resistance, while resistance against kinetic ammunition deteriorates due to a decrease in the density of the barrier (air gaps between packages).
For the T-90, the "reflective sheets" are made of steel, while for the Abrams, starting with the M1A1HA modification, they were made of depleted uranium. Due to the high density of uranium (19.03 g/cm3), these plates, with an extremely small thickness, ensured the “explosive” nature of the destruction of the cumulative jet.
On the T-90, in addition to the usual armor, a built-in dynamic protection complex was also used, which most of the Abrams modifications do not have, with the exception of the M1 TUSK (Tank Urban Survival Kit) with increased security, designed for operations in urban environments.
The dynamic protection "Kontakt-5", installed on the T-90, works both against cumulative weapons and against armor-piercing feathered sub-caliber projectiles. The complex provides a powerful lateral impulse that allows you to destabilize or destroy the BPO core before it begins to interact with the main armor.
Now, according to the manufacturer, the frontal armor of the T-90A tanks can withstand hits by the most massive Western BOPS-M829A1, MS29A2, DM-33, DM-43. In 1995, as part of a special display in Kubinka, the T-90 was fired upon by 6 shells from another tank from a distance of 150-200 m. They fired modern Russian HEAT shells. The frontal armor was not pierced, moreover, after the shelling, the car was able to return to the observation deck under its own power.
On the other hand, according to US officials, the frontal armor of the M1A1 also withstood shelling from the 125-mm cannons of Iraqi T-72 tanks, however, they fired outdated ZBM9 and ZBM12 BOPS, decommissioned in the USSR back in 1973.
WEAPONS COMPARISONAND AMMUNITION
As for the main armament - a tank gun, the Russian T-90 is armed with a 125 mm 2A46M / 2A46M5 smoothbore tank gun, and the American Abrams is armed with a 120 mm (NATO standard) M256 smoothbore tank gun. Despite the difference in caliber, they are close in their characteristics, and the effectiveness of their fire depends significantly on the ammunition used. The T-90 is capable of firing four types of ammunition - armor-piercing sub-caliber, cumulative, high-explosive fragmentation shells, as well as guided missiles. The standard ammunition load of the Abrams includes only two types of ammunition - armor-piercing sub-caliber and cumulative.
BOPS is mainly used to combat tanks. Since the 1990s, Russian tanks have been armed with obsolete Soviet BOPS ZBM-32 and ZBM-44 with a core of uranium and tungsten alloy, respectively. True, in Lately more powerful Russian BOPS have been developed that have better characteristics and can fight the frontal armor of almost any Western tanks. These include ZBM-44M and ZBM-48 "Lead". However, for their use on the T-90, it is necessary to replace the automatic loader, since the existing conveyor trays of the rotating conveyor are not designed for the use of projectiles with a length of 740 mm.
The main ammunition of the "Abrams" is a 120-mm M829A3 round with a sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile, which was put into service in early 2003 and has high performance.
It is very significant that the T-90 has a "long arm" - the 9K199 "Reflex-M" guided weapon system with an effective firing range of up to 5000 m. This is 2-2.5 times higher than the return fire range of the BPS of any modern tanks, to In addition, unlike BOPS, guided missiles retain unchanged armor penetration at any distance. As a result, the T-90 gets fundamentally new combat capabilities - to win the battle before entering the zone of effective fire of enemy tanks. Oncoming combat simulation tank companies(10 T-90 tanks against 10 M1A1 tanks) showed that, starting firing guided missiles from a range of 5000 m, T-90s manage to hit up to 50-60% of enemy tanks by a range of 2000-2500 m. True, opponents note that this advantage can not be realized on any terrain - for example, in the European theater, the average probable detection range of a tank-type target is only 2.5 km.
In some publications, there is a statement that the T-90 guided weapon system can at the same time perform the functions of an air defense tank. However, this is an exaggeration. Only declared by the developer technical possibility destruction of non-maneuvering low-speed (up to 70 km / h) air targets. Agree, it would be strange to expect an enemy combat helicopter to helpfully hover in one place, waiting for the T-90 to hit it with a guided missile.
"Abrams" does not have a guided weapon system at all.
The disadvantages of the Abrams also include the fact that its standard ammunition load does not contain a high-explosive fragmentation projectile (and this reduces its ability to destroy area targets), while the T-90 ammunition load has an HE shell with the Ainet remote detonation system. But if necessary, Abrams can use the M83DA1 shotgun projectile or its M908 concrete-piercing version. Also, to combat helicopters, an M830A1 shot with an air blast is provided.
The gun on the T-90 works with an automatic loader. This allows you to shoot at a constant high rate of 6-8 shots. per minute (the minimum loading cycle is 6.5-7 s) under any driving conditions, while on the Abrams a high rate of fire with a loading cycle of up to 7 seconds (8 rounds / min) is provided only from a standstill or when driving on level ground and largely depends on the physical condition of the loader.
The disadvantages of the A3 scheme include the fact that the ammunition is located directly in the fighting compartment next to the crew, which is not separated from it by anything. On the T-90, the ammunition load of 42 rounds is placed partially in a rotating conveyor A3 under the floor of the fighting compartment - 22 shots, and the remaining 20 are located almost throughout the entire habitable volume of the tank, including the turret. Therefore, when the ammunition detonates, the crew dies, and the tank fails and cannot be restored.
Ammunition tank "Abrame" is also 42 shots, but in accordance with modern Western fashion, it is placed in a fundamentally different way - in separate compartments, equipped with special ejection panels, which are knocked out in the event of a detonation of shells, and the energy of the explosion goes up. In the aft niche of the tower, separated from the fighting compartments by an armored partition, there are 36 shots. Another six shots are in the armored enclosure, between the fighting compartment and the MTO. In the event of a defeat of the ammunition rack, the Abrams remains mobile and, according to the instructions, must immediately leave the danger zone, and then move to the rear for repairs.
POWER PLANTS COMPARISON
T-90 and Abrams are equipped with fundamentally different power plants. T-90A, T-90CA - a 1000-horsepower diesel engine, and "Abrams" - a 1500-horsepower gas turbine, made in one block with an automatic hydromechanical transmission. The engines provide the T-90 and Abrams with a specific power of 21 hp / t and 24 hp / t, respectively. Due to the higher efficiency of a diesel engine compared to a voracious gas turbine, the T-90 has a significantly larger cruising range - 550 km, compared to 350 km for the Abrams.
On the serial T-90, a mechanical transmission with an outdated scheme of the turning mechanism is installed (the role of which is performed by onboard stepped gearboxes). The Abrams has a hydrostatic transmission and turning mechanisms with digital automatic control systems. Accordingly, the maneuverability of the Russian T-90 is lower than that of the Abrams. The disadvantages of the transmission of the T-90 tank include low speed reversing- 4.8 km / h, while on the Abrams, due to the hydrostatic transmission, reverse movement is provided up to 30 km / h.
The undoubted advantage of the T-90 power plant is its unpretentiousness and high reliability. In any case, during tests in the Indian Thar Desert, no failure of the T-90 engines was noted, while, for example, a brigade of M1A1 tanks (58 units) lost 16 tanks in three days of movement on the sands during Operation Desert Drill. due to engine failure.
When replacing the engine, the T-90 is characterized by a high labor intensity of work, a team of qualified technicians takes 6 hours to do this, and on the American Abrams it takes only 2 hours.
T-90 VS. ABRAMS - OVERALL ASSESSMENT
So, we can conclude that the undoubted advantages of the T-90 compared to the Abrams include: the ability to fire guided missiles at a distance of up to 5 km; a wide range of ammunition, including HE shells (including those with remote detonation and ready-made submunitions); excellent protection, including dynamic protection "Contact-5" and KOEP "Shtora-1"; high rate of fire throughout the battle due to the use of A3; good mobility, high power reserve, great depth of overcome water obstacles; small dimensions; exceptional unpretentiousness and reliability in operation; good combination of "price-quality".
The Abrams also has its own merits: it organizes full-fledged isolation of the crew from the ammunition load; there is an automated combat control system that provides real-time information; reliable protection; high specific power; good maneuverability (including reverse speed up to 30 km/h).
In conclusion, we present these articles of the General Director of JSC "VNIItransmash", Doctor of Technical Sciences, Corresponding Member Russian Academy rocket and artillery sciences V. Stepanov, which was published in 2012 and is devoted to the analysis of methods for the comparative evaluation of tanks. It estimates the WTU (military-technical level) indicator of the best modern tanks, including the T-90A, T-90MS, M1A2 and M1A2 SEP. The calculation of the WTU is carried out in terms of firepower, security, mobility and operational capabilities and is a comparative assessment of the effectiveness of a given tank relative to some reference tank. The T-90A was chosen as the standard (i.e. its WTU = 1.0). The WTU indicators of the American M1A2 and M1A2 SEP tanks were 1.0 and 1.32, respectively. For the new T-90MS, the WTU indicator was determined as 1.42. Thus, according to the author, the comparative assessment, taking into account a possible calculation error of 10%, indicates the closeness of the levels of the best modern foreign tanks and the T-90A.
Representatives of the Russian defense industry insist on the need to purchase the T-90 tank, the generals have doubts. The escalation of mutual accusations reached the terms "enemies of the state" and "saboteurs".
The scandalous statement by the commander of the ground forces about the qualities of the T-90 tank raised a wave of disputes about the future of both the Russian defense industry and the army. The negative assessment of the T-90 tank by the commander of the ground forces, Colonel General Alexei Postnikov, caused sharp comments from manufacturers of domestic equipment. Colonel Viktor Murakhovsky, a former tanker who ended his service in the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, believes that such statements are made, if not from malicious intent, then from incompetence. But the track record of Alexei Postnikov, behind whom, for example, served as chief of staff of the famous Taman division, makes one pay close attention to the words of the general. Why is the Russian military criticizing the latest Russian tank?
Pedigree T-90
Three Leopards for T-90 The commander of the ground forces, Alexei Postnikov, speaking at the Federation Council on March 15, said: “Those types of weapons and military equipment, which we receive according to the nomenclature of the Ground Forces, including armored vehicles, rocket and artillery weapons, does not yet fully correspond to Western models. He cited the T-90S main battle tank as an example. “The vaunted T-90S is the seventeenth modification of the T-72 tank at a price of 118 million. For this money, you can buy three Leopards.
Domestic tank building reached its peak in the mid-60s of the twentieth century. It was then that the T-64 was adopted, which became the basis for numerous modifications and changed the ideas that had developed in military science about the use of armored vehicles. The T-64A, which received a 125-mm cannon, sent the division into heavy, medium and light tanks into the past and became the world's first main battle tank. This machine combined firepower, mobility and protection and was at one time the most advanced tank in the world.
The T-72 was created at the Uralvagonzavod enterprise by installing a more powerful engine and a perfect automatic loader on the T-64. With later changes to the design of protection, surveillance and fire control systems, the T-72 became the most massive tank of the last quarter of the 20th century - more than 30 thousand vehicles were produced in total.
The modernization of the T-64 to install a gas turbine engine led to the creation of the T-80, which further improvements turned into the Ukrainian T-84 Oplot. And the deep modernization of the T-72 turned it into the T-90, which is now considered the most modern Russian tank(not counting promising developments that have not yet been adopted for service).
The modernized best tank in the world of the 60s is forced to compete with the machines, the development of which began a decade later. Modern equipment installed on the descendants of the T-64 cannot eliminate the layout flaws. Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, believes that Western achievements in tank building should not be rejected, they should be integrated and used. “The Ministry of Defense should solve the problems of protecting the country,” the expert says, “there is no hope for export contracts in the near future, the industry should not quarrel with the Ministry of Defense.”
T-90 against relatives
The T-90 tank is one of the products that domestic enterprises are trying to actively sell on the global arms market. Currently, export modifications of the T-90 are supplied to India and Algeria. India has established a licensed assembly of the T-90; under the terms of the contract, more than 1,000 vehicles will be produced in this country.
Experts doubt the successful fulfillment of contractual obligations by Algeria against the backdrop of political unrest and the resulting economic crisis. In India, the T-90 also had problems, and they are associated with lobbying for a local development - the Arjun tank. The Indian tank is not objectively superior to the T-90, but it is a local development, and the Indian information campaign aimed at discrediting the T-90 is gaining momentum.
The T-90 has even more competitors on the world market. The closest competitors in terms of price / quality ratio are the Ukrainian T-84 Oplot and the Chinese VT1A (which is the result of the refinement of the same T-72). Ukrainians declared themselves on the world tank market back in the mid-90s, supplying Pakistan with 320 T-80UD. Russia then refused to cooperate with its neighbors, who at that time did not produce tank guns. Having mastered the production of barrels on their own, the Ukrainians fulfilled the Pakistani contract, and with the proceeds they developed their own T-84, which, in direct competition with the T-90, won a tender to supply 200 tanks to Thailand.
The Chinese have not yet met with the T-90 in a direct competition, but have already been able to sign a contract with Morocco for the supply of 150 vehicles.
T-90 against strangers - advantages and disadvantages
Most often, the T-90 is compared with the main battle tanks produced technologically. developed countries-- M1 Abrams (USA), Leopard 2 (Germany), Leclerc (France), Challenger 2 (UK) and with a series of Israeli Merkava tanks.
German, British and American vehicles have similar layout and design solutions, so the T-90 can be compared with three tanks at once.
The most striking advantages of the Russian machine are its lower weight and dimensions, which make it possible to easily transport the T-90 on railway platforms along railway tracks general purpose; the ability to overcome deeper water barriers; smaller crew due to the automatic loader used instead of the loader, due to which the amount of armored space is reduced; smaller longitudinal and cross-sectional area, reducing the likelihood of a hit. A well-known advantage of the T-90 is also the ability to launch guided anti-tank missiles with the help of a standard gun, capable of hitting targets at a distance of 5 km (against 2.5 km, from which Western competitors are able to open fire).
The disadvantages of the T-90 are low survivability due to insufficient overlap with dynamic protection elements and the location of fuel tanks and ammunition in the same volume as the crew; an outdated manual transmission, designed for the less powerful engine and lighter weight of the T-64, working at the limit and making the tank uncomfortable to drive; outdated and less effective fire control system.
The Nizhny Tagil designers managed to solve the problem of insufficient overlapping of the frontal armor of the turret with dynamic protection elements on the export T-90S and T-90 SU, where there are no searchlights of the optical-electronic jamming system. The Russian ground forces receive a tank with the elements of dynamic protection removed, the place of which was taken by electronic components. The Russian military is annoyed by such a design decision, especially against the backdrop of the example of the Ukrainian T-84, in which searchlights are installed on top of dynamic protection units, on outriggers.
Separately, it is worth noting the Leclerc and tanks of the Merkava family. The French developers have moved away from the canons of the Western tank building school and took into account the experience of our designers. Leclerc also has an automatic loader, a crew of three, low weight and high mobility. But their own design developments in new directions without a lack of experience, the use of high-tech modern electronic systems made the tank too expensive and not reliable enough, which reduced France's chances of selling tanks to foreign customers.
Merkava is an exception to all the rules and a departure from the norms of world tank building. The development of the tank was headed not by an engineer, but by a tanker who had experience in fighting in urban conditions. The result was a heavy, well-defended fortress, specially designed to fight against urban guerrillas. At the same time, experts question the effectiveness of the Merkava in a battle against a modern army. At the Paris exhibition in 2010, representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense, headed by Deputy Minister Vladimir Popovkin, showed interest in the car, for which they made a separate presentation.
Is the Department of Defense itself to blame?
Experts believe that the reason why the T-90 cannot be brought up to modern requirements is both the position of the Russian military and the attitude of the government towards the purchase of weapons.
“There are no clear and precise tasks for industry from the Ministry of Defense,” Viktor Murakhovsky believes, “the approved armament program, designed for ten years, involves funding in the amount of 20 trillion rubles, which leaves an average of two trillion a year. In 2011, 580 billion were allocated, which is 3.5 times less than those provided for by the program. That is, the program is already breaking down.”
According to the expert, out of the this year 580 billion rubles were signed by the Ministry of Defense for only 300, and not all of this money went into industry. Factories are forced to take out loans in order to pay wages to people and retain specialists.
“Nizhny Tagil is a single-industry town in which Uralvagonzavod is a city-forming enterprise,” says Alexei Bagaryakov, State Duma deputy from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, “how can people survive if the state does not finance such enterprises? The people in the Urals are harsh, they can even lift them on a pitchfork. Serdyukov (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. - website) should have fired the general for such statements.
It is known that the Ministry of Defense insists on financing a deep modernization of old T-72s. The developed set of measures for reworking an old tank turns it into a "Slingshot" product, bringing it almost to the level of modern tanks. Thousands of T-72s in service with the ground forces need to be upgraded, and the Russian military prefers to spend money on upgrades. Representatives of Uralvagonzavod do not deny the need to refine the T-72, but insist on the primary need to finance the purchase of the T-90.
Another reason for the resistance of the military to signing a contract for the purchase of the T-90 is the fact that the new machine does not have the necessary changes. Representatives of the plant say that all the necessary developments have been carried out, and the money from the sale of the tank will be spent on eliminating the shortcomings of the T-90. But the tank that is now being sold to the troops does not have the necessary modifications, such as a hydrostatic transmission, a new fire control system and the removal of ammunition into separate armored capsules that protect the crew in the event of an explosion.
Of course, during the Second Chechen campaign, there were no T-90s on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan. I already wrote about this in my comments on. And of course, the T-90S of the first batch of the "Indian" contract could in no way be used there. Just because the contract was signed on February 15, 2001, the shipment of the first batch of cars under it took place in December of the same year. Yes, taking into account the backlog, to assemble, send to Chechnya, return it back, put it in order and send the car to the customer in 10-11 months then, with completely destroyed cooperation, it was simply impossible. Yes, and as we all remember, the fighting in Dagestan was carried out in August-September 1999, and by the time the contract was signed with India, V.V. Putin had already decided to curtail the operation and reduce the size of the group. Thus, the "Indian" T-90S simply did not have time for that war, with all their desire. However, I vaguely recall a chronicle on TV, where, after a breakthrough from the besieged Grozny, the gang of S. Raduev, BMR-3M cleared the famous minefield. I clearly remember the car hung with DZ "Contact", although representatives of UVZ and UKBTM in private conversations assure me that I was mistaken and it was probably the Ataman BMR-3. Maybe - I do not insist, although I am internally sure that I am right. At the same time, in Chechnya, single copies of the BMP-3 equipped with remote sensing equipment from the Research Institute of Steel and BRM-3 "Lynx" were tested. I am sure of this because in July 2000, after Putin’s famous “wet in the toilet”, these two cars were delivered directly from the combat area to the FSUE NTIIM training ground, in which at that moment I had the pleasure of working, for display at the first exhibition weapons REA-2000. Before the show, these machines were strenuously pointed marafet. Perhaps in Chechnya there was also a BMP-3 with KAZ "Arena", also on an experimental run. However, the only instance of this car arrived at the exhibition already in the "ceremonial" color. This is about the Second Campaign. But for the tragic First Chechen War, and the participation of the T-90 in it, albeit in a single copy, I will not so categorically assert the impossibility of the event. There are two, albeit very indirect, reasons for this:
1. Under the glass of the showcase of the museum of armored vehicles "Uralvagonzavod" there is an interesting document issued in the name of one of the UVZ test drivers - a certificate of approximately two weeks of participation in hostilities in June 1996 on the territory Chechen Republic.
Unfortunately, the museum staff does not comment on this document.
2. I have at my disposal a photocopy of the document "Proposals for improving the T-90 tank, taking into account the existing backlog and comments identified during the events in the Chechen Republic."
This document was signed by V.I. Potkin, chief designer of FSUE UKBTM, and, later, served as the basis for formulating the TTZ and opening the Slingshot-1 R&D (stage 1) to create an improved version of the T-90 tank - the T-tank 92. For reference, the index "T-92" was spelled out directly and clearly in the TTZ: "... create a T-92 tank" - in the design bureau documentation this vehicle was referred to as "Object 189".
So, based on these two, I repeat, very indirect , documents, you can expect short term stay in the combat zone on the territory of the Chechen Republic during The first company in 1996 a single copy tank T-90, the crew of which is possible partly composed of civilian workers manufacturer, i.e. Uralvagonzavod.
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