Federal Agency for Education of the Russian Federation

State municipal institution of professional higher education

Vladimir State University

Department of History and Museology

Completed

Student gr. ISG-106

Surnichenko K.A.

Checked

Assoc. Pogorelaya S.V.

Mongol-Tatra invasion, the essence of the Horde yoke and its influence on the fate of Russia

Vladimir 2006

Plan.

1. Formation of the Mongol Empire. Etymology of the concept of "Tatars" ... .1

2. Battle on Kalka. Russia after the Battle of Kalka ………………………… 3

3. Batu's invasion of Russia. Reasons for the success of the Mongols. Consequences of the invasion of Batu ……………………………………………………… ... 5

4. Establishment of the Horde yoke, its consequences and influence on the fate of Russia ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 12

5. Discussion about the degree of influence of the Mongolian (Horde) yoke on the development, the fate of Russia. ……………………………………………. …….15

6. List of used literature …………………………………… .21

7. List of used literature (footnotes) ……. ………………… ... 32

I. Formation of the Mongol Empire. Etymology of the concept of "Tatars".

Mongolian tribes have long roamed the vastness of Central Asia. In the steppe regions, they were engaged in cattle breeding, and in the north, in the taiga regions, and hunting. In the 12th century, the territory occupied by them stretched from Baikal, the upper reaches of the Yenisei and Irtysh in the north to the Gobi desert in the south. Since the end of the 12th century, among the Mongol tribes who roamed here, there was a process of disintegration of tribal relations and the beginning of feudalization. From among the ordinary community members-cattle breeders, the tribal noyons (princes), who owned large pastures and herds, began to stand out. To capture them from the communities of cattle breeders, the noyons set up their squads of nukers (warriors), led by bagaturs (heroes). From the very beginning, the state of the Mongols turned out to be militarized. Nomadic pastoralism led to the depletion of pastures, the depletion of pastures led to the struggle for new pastures. Hence, the seizure of the lands of neighboring tribes, the rapid movement over great distances.

In the second half of the 12th century, a struggle for leadership began between the Mongol tribes. During the bloody civil strife at the end of the 12th century, or rather in 1190, the khan of the tribe who roamed in the basin of the Onon and Korulen rivers (the mountainous outskirts of the Gobi steppe) won. At birth in 1154, he was named Temujin (according to other sources, Temujin). He had to go through many vicissitudes of fate and difficult trials. Temuchin was 13 years old when his father, Esukai-Bagatur, died. The father's tributes, and these were 30-40 thousand families, refused to pay tribute to the young heir, and began to attack his nomadic camps. Temuchin suffered setbacks in wars, betrayals, insults, more than once fell into the hands of enemies. He is three years old as a youth

spent in slavery and with a wooden block around his neck, performing the most difficult work in the forge of a hostile tribe. He managed to kill the watchman with his own chain and escape from captivity 1.

Before becoming a great khan, Temuchin had to wage a fierce struggle with his opponents for over 20 years, and neither his native people nor his neighbors knew mercy from him. Temuchin was already over 50 when he emerged victorious from mortal combat for the sole authority. In 1206, at the Khural-congress of all Mongol princes, on the banks of the Onon, he proclaimed himself their supreme ruler, Genghis Khan (the great khan, "sent from heaven").

Genghis Khan created a first-class army for his time. His entire army was divided into tens, hundreds and thousands. Ten thousand soldiers made up the tumen (in Russian sources "darkness") - a kind of independent army. The high fighting efficiency of the Mongolian army was recognized by such a military authority as Napoleon. In particular, he noted: “... it is in vain to think that the Mongol invasion was a senseless invasion of the Asian horde. It was a deeply thought-out offensive by an army in which military organization was much higher than in the troops of her enemy ”2.

The Mongols fought on short, with a shaggy mane, fast and very hardy horses. Before entering the main mass in a foreign land, they sent forward detachments in order to destroy as many people as possible and, sowing panic, to put them to flight. Then the main army followed, destroying everything in its path. In the center were detachments of warriors of the conquered peoples, and the Mongols suddenly and swiftly attacked from the flanks.

But the main distinguishing feature of Genghis Khan's army, which significantly increased its combat capability, was, along with a clear organization, iron military discipline. Circular, collective responsibility for

cowardice, failure to comply with an order, even for inexperience or for some other reason did not help a neighbor - death.

Genghis Khan promoted courageous, decisive and capable people, regardless of their tribal and social origin, to the first places in his army, such as Subedey-bagatur, Jebe-noyon, Tohuchar-noyon and others.

Well-placed intelligence worked continuously for the Mongol army. On the eve of the invasion of foreign lands, the military leaders had information about the military-political and economic potential of the enemy - they were delivered by merchants, ambassadors and numerous prisoners.

In other words, the army of Genghis Khan in all respects surpassed the armies of today and in vain N.M. Karamzin writes: people to none of the then European peoples "3. They were not inferior to the European peoples, but they could not resist the Asian onslaught, and there were absolutely no chances. In the years 1211-1212. collapsed under the onslaught of hordes of Mongols

China is a single powerful state, so it is hardly worth referring to the feudal fragmentation of Russia.

In the summer of 1219, Genghis Khan began the conquest of Central Asia. In two years, an advanced civilization was turned into pastures. After that, Genghis Khan withdrew the main forces to Mongolia, and two Tumen Jebe Noyon and Subedeya Bagatur devastated Iran and Transcaucasia, and in the spring of 1223 struck the Crimea, plundering Sudak.

The question of who nevertheless attacked Russia is very confused in Russian history: Mongols, Tatars or Mongol-Tatars? And what does the modern Tatars (Kazan Tatars) have to do with those Central Asian Tatars? And in general, where did this concept come from?

VO Klyuchevsky in his course on Russian history used mainly the concept of "Tatars" 4. A. Nechvolodov equally uses the concepts of "Mongols" and "Tatars" 5. To one degree or another, pages and lines are devoted to this problem in almost all serious publications considering the history of the Mongol Empire, Genghis Khan and their relationship with Russia in the 13th-15th centuries. S.F. Platonov in the "Complete course of lectures on Russian history", "Crystal", St. Petersburg, 1997 ", using the concept of" Tatars ", etc. In modern historiography, an important role is played by the double journal "Rodina" (No. 3-4 for 1997), dedicated to the Mongol invasion and the problem of the relationship between the Forest and the Steppe in the 9th-16th centuries. Modern answers to the above questions are roughly as follows.

All the Mongols, the peoples neighboring with them, including the Russian, were also called Tatars. The concept of "Tatars" is ambiguous in its semantic expression. The ethnonym "ta-ta" or "ta-tan" dates back to the 5th century and means the name of the largest Mongol tribe that lived in the northeastern part of Mongolia, as well as in Manchuria. In the 12th century, a tribal union in the steppes of Eastern and North-Eastern Mongolia and Transbaikalia was known under the name "Dada". Then the name "Tatars", as well as the name "Mongols", spread to the multilingual Mongolian, Turkic, Manchu peoples of the Mongol Empire of the 13th-15th centuries, although the Tatars themselves almost completely exterminated Genghis Khan during the struggle for power 6. The Russian language "Tatars" came from the Chinese language, for which all Mongolian tribes were "Tatars", ie. "Barbarians". Actually they called the Tatars "White Tatars", while the Mongol tribes to the north of them were called "Black Tatars", which was pejorative in nature, emphasizing their savagery. The Chinese attributed Genghis Khan to the "black Tatars".

At the beginning of the 13th century, in revenge for the poisoning of his father, Genghis Khan ordered the destruction of the Tatars. Tatars as a military and political force ceased to exist. However, the Chinese continued to call the Mongol tribes Tatars, although the Mongols did not call themselves Tatars. Thus, the army of Batu Khan consisted of Mongol warriors 7 and modern Tatars have nothing to do with Central Asian Tatars 8.

The term “Mongolo-Tatars”, widespread in historical literature, is a combination of the self-designation of a people with the term by which this people was designated by its neighbors 9.

II... Battle on Kalka. Russia after the Battle of Kalka.

In the spring of 1223, a 30-thousandth detachment of Mongols led by Jebe and Subedei, passing along the southern coast of the Caspian Sea, invaded Transcaucasia. Having defeated the Armenian-Georgian army and devastated Georgia and Azerbaijan, the invaders broke through the Derbent passage to North Caucasus and faced the Alans (ancestors of the Ossetians) and the Polovtsians. Acting by cunning, they first defeated the Alans, and then began to push the Polovtsians.

The latter, led by Khan Kotyan, asked for help from the Russian princes, with whom they were related (the Galician prince Mstislav Udaloy was married to the daughter of Khan Kotyan). On the initiative of Mstislav Mstislavovich the Bold, at the congress of the southern Russian princes in Kiev, it was decided to come to the aid of the Polovtsy 10.

A large Russian army led by the three strongest princes of southern Russia: Mstislav Romanovich of Kiev, Mstislav Svyatoslavovich of Chernigov and Mstislav Mstislavovich Galitsky. In the lower reaches of the Dnieper, it united with the Polovtsian army. This was the last joint major military action on the eve of the invasion of Batu.

The Kiev prince Mstislav Romanovich, entrenched with his army on the hill, did not take part in the battle. The regiments of Russian soldiers and Polovtsians, crossing the Kalka, struck at the advanced Mongol detachments, which retreated. The Russian and Polovtsian regiments were carried away by the pursuit. The approaching main forces of the Mongols took the pursuing Russian and Polovtsian soldiers in ticks and destroyed.

Then the Mongols laid siege to the hill, where the Kiev prince fortified. On the third day of the siege, Mstislav Romanovich believed the enemy's promise with honor to release the Russians in the event of a voluntary surrender and laid down his arms. The Russian princes and warriors did not know that the murder of ambassadors among the Mongols was the greatest crime, and no oaths were counted in comparison with this evil! And the Russians killed the Mongol ambassadors on the eve of the Battle of Kalka and the Mongol revenge was terrible. And Prince Mstislav Romanovich and all his soldiers were brutally killed. A tenth of the army returned to Russia from the Azov steppes. In honor of their victory, the Mongols held a "feast on the bones." The captured princes were crushed with planks on which the victors sat and feasted. The Russian chronicler wrote after the Battle of Kalka:

“It was for our sins that God put

bewilderment in us, and perished without number

many people. And there was a cry and a sigh,

and in all cities and townships.

we do not know about these evil Tatars,

where did they come from

and where again God knows ... "11

After the defeat at Kalka, the Russian lands were still engulfed in inter-princely strife. Relative calm remained only on the Vladimir land, where the Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich managed to maintain peaceful relations with the southern Russian princes.

However, Novgorod remained a bone of contention, from where Yuri's brother Yaroslav was expelled in the same sad year 1223. Then, in 1224, Yuri Vladimirsky appeared at the head of a numerous army and by force forced the Novgorodians to accept their brother-in-law Mikhail Vsevolodovich of Chernigov for reign. Soon between Yaroslav and Mikhail of Chernigov, a stubborn struggle ensued for the Novgorod reign, crowned with the victory of Yaroslav in 1229. Then Daniil Galitsky joined this struggle, who was eager not to conquer Novgorod, but to unite the whole of Southern and South-Western Russia under his command. Russian princes and people fought furiously among themselves, forgetting or not attaching importance to the wise words of the chronicler. "... We don't know about these same evil Tatars, where they came from and where God knows again." Well, the Russians did not have intelligence at that time, and even Kalka did not teach us anything!

Meanwhile, Mongolian history did not develop in our favor!

Returning to their steppes, the Mongols made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the Volga Bulgaria. Reconnaissance in force showed that it is possible to conduct aggressive campaigns against Russia and its neighbors only by organizing a general Mongol campaign and not just anywhere, but against the countries of Europe. In addition, Genghis Khan died in 1227, and the Mongol Empire was divided into regions (uluses) ruled by his sons and grandsons. Genghis Khan's grandson Baty (1227-1255), who inherited all the lands in the "West" from his grandfather, "where the Mongolian horse will step." His main military adviser was Subedei, who knew well the theater of future military operations.

In 1235, at the kurultai - the congress of the Mongol princes in the capital of Mongolia, Karakorum, a decision was made on a general Mongol campaign to the West. In 1236 they captured the Volga Bulgaria, and in 1237 they subdued the nomadic peoples of the steppe. In the fall of 1237, the main Mongol forces, having crossed the Volga, concentrated on the Voronezh River, aiming at the Russian lands. Getting down to a difficult story about the terrible Russian defeats with the highest spirit of the Russian people, their courage, staunchness and heroism, it is natural to ask "What are the reasons for the successes of the Mongols?" We will try to answer it in more detail, but for now the mournful pages of Russian history ...

III... Batu's invasion of Russia. Reasons for the success of the Mongols. Consequences of Batu's invasion.

The Ryazan land became the first principality to be mercilessly ruined. In the winter of 1237, Batu's hordes invaded its borders, ravaging and destroying everything in its path. The Vladimir and Chernigov princes refused to help Ryazan. The Mongols laid siege to Ryazan and sent ambassadors who demanded obedience and one-tenth "part in everything." Karamzin points out other details: “Yuri Ryazansky, abandoned by the Grand Duke, sent his son Theodore with gifts to Batu, who, having learned about the beauty of Theodorova’s wife Eupraxia, wanted to see her, but this young prince answered him that Christians did not show their wives evil pagans. Batu ordered to kill him; and unfortunate Eupraxia, having learned about the death of her beloved husband, together with her baby, John, threw herself from the high mansion to the ground and lost her life ”12. The bottom line is that Batu began to demand from the Ryazan princes and nobles "daughters and sisters on his bed" 13.

Everything was followed by a courageous answer from Ryazantsev: "If all of us are not there, then everything will be yours." On the sixth day of the siege on December 21, 1237, the city was taken, the prince's family and the surviving residents were killed. In the old place, Ryazan was no longer revived (modern Ryazan is a new city located 60 km from the old Ryazan; it was previously called Pereyaslavl Ryazan).

The story of the heroic deeds of the Ryazan hero Evpatiy Kolovrat, who entered into an unequal battle with the invaders and who deserved the respect of Batu himself for his valor and courage, has been preserved in the grateful national memory.

Having devastated the Ryazan land in January 1238, the Mongol invaders defeated the Grand Ducal guard regiment of the Vladimir-Suzdal land near Kolomna, led by the son of the Grand Duke Vsevolod Yurievich. Actually it was all the Vladimir army. This defeat predetermined the fate of North-Eastern Russia. During the battle for Kolomna, the last son of Genghis Khan, Kulkan, was killed. The Chingizids, as usual, did not take direct part in the battle. Therefore, the death of Kulkan near Kolomna suggests that the Russians; it was probably possible to inflict a strong blow on the Mongol rear in some place.

Moving then along the frozen rivers (Oka and others), the Mongols captured Moscow, where the entire population under the leadership of the governor Philip Nyanka put up strong resistance for 5 days. Moscow was completely burned down, and all its inhabitants were killed.

On February 4, 1238, Batu was besieged by Vladimir. Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich left Vladimir in advance to organize a rebuff to unwelcome guests in the northern forests on the Sit River. He took two nephews with him, and left the Grand Duchess and two sons in the city.

The Mongols prepared for the storming of Vladimir in accordance with all the rules of military science, which they had mastered back in China. They built siege towers near the walls of the city in order to be on the same level with the besieged and at the right time to throw over the walls over the walls, installed "vices" - battering and throwing machines. At night, a "tyn" was erected around the city - an external fortification to protect them from attacks by the besieged and in order to cut off all their escape routes.

Before the storming of the city at the Golden Gate in front of the besieged Vladimirtsy, the Mongols killed the younger prince Vladimir Yuryevich, who had recently defended Moscow. Mstislav Yuryevich soon died on the defensive line. The last son of the Grand Duke, Vsevolod, who fought with the horde in Kolomna, during the assault on Vladimir, decided to enter into negotiations with Batu. With a small retinue and large gifts, he left the besieged city, but the khan did not want to talk to the prince and “like a fierce beast, do not spare his youth, led him to slaughter before him” 15.

After that, the horde rushed to the final assault. The Grand Duchess, Bishop Mitrofan, other princely wives, boyars and some of the common people, the last defenders of Vladimir, took refuge in the Assumption Cathedral. On February 7, 1238, the invaders broke into the city through the gaps in the fortress wall and set it on fire. Many people died from fire and suffocation, not excluding those who took refuge in the cathedral. The most valuable monuments of literature, art and architecture perished in the fire and ruins.

After the capture and devastation of Vladimir, the horde spread throughout the Vladimir-Suzdal principality, ravaging and burning cities, villages and villages. During February, 14 cities were plundered between the Klyazma and Volga rivers: Rostov, Suzdal, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Galich, Dmitrov, Tver, Pereyaslavl-Zalessky, Yuryev and others.

On March 4, 1238, beyond the Volga on the City River, a battle took place between the main forces of North-Eastern Russia, led by the Grand Duke of Vladimir Yuri Vsevolodovich and the Mongol invaders. 49-year-old Yuri Vsevolodovich was a brave fighter and a fairly experienced military leader. Behind him were victories over the Germans, Lithuanians, Mordovians, Kama Bulgarians and those Russian princes who claimed his grand-princely throne. However, in organizing and preparing the Russian troops for the battle on the City River, he made a number of serious miscalculations: he showed carelessness in the defense of his military camp, did not pay enough attention to intelligence, allowed his governors to disperse the army over several villages and did not establish reliable communication between the scattered detachments. And when a large Mongol unit under the command of Barendey unexpectedly appeared in the Russian camp, the result of the battle was obvious. The chronicles and excavations of archaeologists in the City testify that the Russians were defeated in parts, fled, and the horde whipped people like grass. Yuri Vsevolodovich himself also died in this unequal battle. The circumstances of his death remained unknown. Only the following testimony about the prince of Novgorod's contemporary of that sad event has come down to us: "God knows how he died, others talk a lot about him" 16.

From that time on, the Mongol yoke began in Russia: Russia became obliged to pay tribute to the Mongols, and the princes were to receive the title of Grand Duke from the hands of the Khan 17. The very term "yoke" in the meaning of oppression was first used in 1275 by Metropolitan Kirill 18.

Mongol hordes moved to the north-west of Russia. Everywhere they met stubborn resistance from the Russians. For two weeks, for example, the suburb of Novgorod, Torzhok, defended itself. However, the approaching spring thaw and significant human losses forced the Mongols, before reaching Veliky Novgorod about 100 miles, from the stone Ignach-cross to turn south, to the Polovtsian steppes. The retreat was in the nature of a "round-up". Having divided into separate detachments, the invaders "combed" the Russian cities from north to south. Smolensk managed to fight back. Kursk was defeated, like other centers. The greatest resistance to the Mongols was put up by the small town of Kozelsk, which held out for seven (!) Weeks. The town stood on a steep edge, washed by two rivers - Zhizdra and Druchusnaya. In addition to these natural barriers, it was reliably covered by wooden fortress walls with towers and a moat about 25 meters deep. Before the horde arrived, the goats managed to freeze a layer of ice on the floor wall and the entrance gate, which made it much more difficult for the enemy to storm the city. The inhabitants of the town have written a heroic page in Russian history with their blood. It is not for nothing that the Mongols called it "an evil city". The Mongols stormed Ryazan for six days, Moscow for five days, Vladimir for a little longer, Torzhok for fourteen days, and little Kozelsk fell on the 50th day, probably only because the Mongols - for the umpteenth time! - used their favorite trick- after another unsuccessful assault, they imitated a stampede. The besieged goats, in order to complete their victory, made a general sortie, but were surrounded by superior enemy forces and all were killed. The Horde finally broke into the city and drowned in blood the residents who remained there, including the 4-year-old Prince Kozelsk 19.

Having devastated North-Eastern Russia, Khan Batu and Subedey-Bagatur led their troops to the Don steppes to rest. Here the horde spent the entire summer of 1238. In the fall, Batu's detachments repeated their raids on Ryazan and other Russian cities and villages that had so far escaped ruin. Murom, Gorokhovets, Yaropolch (modern Vyazniki), Nizhny Novgorod were defeated.

And in 1239, Batu's hordes invaded South Russia. They took and burned Pereyaslavl, Chernigov and other settlements.

On September 5, 1240, the troops of Batu, Subedey and Barendey crossed the Dnieper and surrounded Kiev from all sides. At that time, Kiev was compared with Constantinople (Constantinople) in terms of wealth and population size. The population of the city was approaching 50 thousand people. Shortly before the arrival of the horde, the Kiev throne was seized by the Galician prince Daniil Romanovich. When it appeared, he went west to defend his ancestral possessions, and entrusted the defense of Kiev to the tysyatsky Dmitry.

The city was defended by artisans, suburban peasants, merchants. There were few professional soldiers. Therefore, the defense of Kiev, like that of Kozelsk, can rightfully be considered a people's defense.

Kiev was well fortified. The thickness of its earthen ramparts reached 20 meters at the base. The walls were oak, filled with earth. Within the walls were stone defensive towers with gates. A moat filled with water, 18 meters wide, stretched along the ramparts.

Subedei, of course, was well aware of the difficulties of the upcoming assault. Therefore, he first sent his ambassadors to Kiev demanding his immediate and complete surrender. But the Kievites did not agree to negotiations and killed the ambassadors, and we know what this meant for the Mongols. Then a systematic siege began. ancient city in Russia.

The Russian medieval chronicler described it as follows: “... Tsar Batu came to the city of Kiev with many soldiers and surrounded the city ... and it was impossible for anyone to leave the city or enter the city. And it was impossible to hear each other in the city from the creak of carts, the roar of camels, from the sounds of trumpets ... from the neighing of horse herds and from the screams and screams of countless people ... fought, and there were many dead ... the Tatars broke through the city walls and entered the city, and the townspeople rushed towards them. And one could see and hear the terrible crackle of spears and the clatter of shields; arrows darkened the light, so that the sky behind the arrows was not visible, but there was darkness from the multitude of Tatar arrows, and everywhere the dead lay, and everywhere blood flowed like water ... and the townspeople were defeated, and the Tatars climbed the walls, but from strong exhaustion they sat down the walls of the city. And the night came. The townspeople that night created another city, near the Church of the Holy Mother of God. The next morning the Tatars came against them, and there was an evil slaughter. And people began to faint, and ran with their belongings into the church vaults and the walls of the church fell down from the weight, and the Tatars took the city of Kiev in the month of December, the 6th day ... "20

In the works of the pre-revolutionary years, such a fact is given 21 that the Mongols seized the courageous organizer of the defense of Kiev Dimitar and brought him to Batu.

“This formidable conqueror, having no idea of ​​the virtues of philanthropy, knew how to appreciate extraordinary courage and, with an air of proud pleasure, said to the Russian governor:“ I give you life! ” Demetrius accepted the gift, because he could still be useful for the fatherland and was left with Batu. "

Thus ended the heroic defense of Kiev, which lasted 93 days. The invaders plundered the church of St. Sofia, all the other monasteries, and the surviving Kievites were killed every last one, regardless of age.

In the next 1241, the Galicia-Volyn principality was destroyed. On the territory of Russia, the Mongol yoke was established, which existed for 240 years (1240-1480) 22. This is the point of view of historians of the Faculty of History of Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov.

In the spring of 1241, the horde rushed to the West in order to conquer all the "evening countries" and extend their power to all of Europe, down to the last sea, as Genghis Khan bequeathed.

Western Europe, like Russia, was going through a period of feudal fragmentation at that time. Torn apart by internal strife and rivalry between small and large rulers, it could not unite to stop the invasion of the steppe people by common efforts. Alone, at that time, no European state was able to withstand the military onslaught of the horde, especially its fast and hardy cavalry, which played a decisive role in hostilities. Therefore, despite the courageous resistance of the European peoples, in 1241 the hordes of Batu and Subedey invaded Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Moldavia, and in 1242 they reached Croatia and the Dalmatia-Balkan countries. A critical moment has come for Western Europe. However, at the end of 1242, Batu turned his troops east. What's the matter? The Mongols had to reckon with incessant resistance in the rear of their troops. Then they were comprehended by a number of small but failures in the Czech Republic and Hungary. But most importantly, their army was exhausted by the battles with the Russians. And so from the distant Karakorum, the capital of Mongolia, the news came about the death of the great khan. In the subsequent division of the empire, Batu has to be himself. It was a very convenient excuse to end the difficult hike.

A.S. Pushkin wrote about the world-historical significance of the struggle of Russia against the Horde conquerors:

“Russia was assigned a high mission ... its boundless plains absorbed the power of the Mongols and stopped their invasion at the very edge of Europe; the barbarians did not dare to leave enslaved Russia in their rear and returned to the steppes of their east. The resulting enlightenment was saved by a torn apart and dying Russia ... "23.

Reasons for the success of the Mongols.

The question of why the nomads, who were significantly inferior to the conquered peoples of Asia and Europe in economic and cultural terms, subordinated them to their power for almost three centuries, has always been in the center of attention of both domestic and foreign historians. No tutorial study guide; a historical monograph, to one degree or another, considering the problems of the formation of the Mongol empire and its conquests, which would not reflect this problem. To represent this in such a way that if Russia were united, it would have shown the Mongols, is not a historically justified idea, although it is understandable that the level of resistance would be an order of magnitude higher. But the example of a united China, as indicated earlier, destroys this scheme, although it is present in the historical literature. The quantity and quality of military force on each side and other military factors can be considered more justified. In other words, the Mongols outnumbered their opponents in military power. As already noted, the Steppe in military terms always surpassed the Forest in ancient times. After this little introduction to the "problem", let us list the factors of victory of the steppe dwellers, cited in the historical literature.

The feudal fragmentation of Russia, Europe and the weak interstate relations between the countries of Asia and Europe, which did not allow, by uniting their forces, to repulse the conquerors.

The numerical superiority of the conquerors. There was a lot of controversy among historians about how much Batu brought to Russia. N.M. Karamzin indicated the figure of 300 thousand soldiers 24. However, serious analysis does not allow even getting close to this figure. Each Mongolian horseman (and they were all horsemen) had at least 2, and most likely 3 horses. Where in forest Russia in winter to feed 1 million horses? Not a single chronicle even raises this topic. Therefore, modern historians call the figure a maximum of 150 thousand Mughals who came to Russia, the more cautious stop at the figure 120-130 thousand. And all of Russia, even if united, could put up 50 thousand, although there are numbers up to 100 thousand 25. So, in reality, the Russians could put 10-15 thousand soldiers into battle. Here the following circumstance should be taken into account. The striking force of the Russian squads, the princely armies, were in no way inferior to the Moguls, but the bulk of the Russian squads were militiamen, not professional soldiers, but ordinary people who took up arms, not like professional Mongol soldiers. The belligerents' tactics were also different. The Russians were forced to adhere to defensive tactics designed to starve the enemy. Why? The fact is that in a direct military clash in the field, the Mongolian cavalry had clear advantages. Therefore, the Russians tried to sit out behind the walls of their cities. However, the wooden fortresses could not withstand the pressure of the Mongol troops. In addition, the conquerors used the tactics of continuous assault, successfully used siege weapons and equipment that were perfect for their time, borrowed from the peoples of China, Central Asia and the Caucasus that they conquered.

The Mongols did a good job of reconnaissance before the outbreak of hostilities. They had informants even among the Russians. In addition, the Mongol commanders did not personally take part in the battles, but led the battle from their headquarters, which was, as a rule, in a high place. Russian princes up to Vasily II the Dark (1425-1462) themselves directly participated in the battles. Therefore, very often, in the event of even the heroic death of the prince, his soldiers, deprived of professional leadership, found themselves in a very difficult situation.

It is important to note that Batu's attack on Russia in 1237 came as a complete surprise to the Russians. The Mongol hordes undertook it in the winter, attacking the Ryazan principality. The Ryazan people are accustomed only to the summer and autumn raids of enemies, mainly Polovtsians. Therefore, no one expected a winter strike. What were the steppe people pursuing with their winter attack? The fact is that the rivers, which were a natural barrier to the enemy cavalry in the summer, were covered with ice in winter and lost their protective functions.

In addition, in Russia, stocks of food and feed for livestock were prepared for the winter. Thus, the conquerors already before the attack were provided with fodder for their cavalry.

These, in the opinion of most historians, were the main and tactical reasons for the Mongol victories.

Consequences of Batu's invasion.

The results of the Mongol conquest for the Russian lands were extremely difficult. In terms of the scale of destruction and casualties incurred as a result of the invasion, they could not be compared with the damage caused by the raids of nomads and the princely strife. First of all, the invasion caused enormous damage to all lands at the same time. According to archaeologists, of the 74 cities that existed in Russia in the pre-Mongol period, 49 were completely destroyed by the hordes of Batu. At the same time, a third of them became depopulated forever and were no longer restored, and 15 former cities became villages. Only Veliky Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Polotsk and the Turovo-Pinsk principality did not suffer, primarily due to the fact that the Mongol hordes bypassed them. The population of the Russian lands also sharply decreased. Most of the townspeople either died in the battles, or were taken away by the conquerors to "polon" (slavery). Handicraft production suffered especially. After the invasion of Russia, some handicraft industries and specialties disappeared, stone construction stopped, the secrets of making glassware, cloisonné enamel, multicolored ceramics, etc. were lost.Huge losses were suffered by professional Russian warriors, princely warriors, and many princes who died in battles with the enemy .. Only half a century later, the service class begins to recover in Russia, and, accordingly, the structure of the patrimonial and only nascent landlord economy is being recreated.

However, the main consequence of the Mongol invasion of Russia and the establishment of Horde rule from the middle of the 13th century was a sharp increase in the isolation of Russian lands, the disappearance of the old political and legal system and the organization of the power structure that was once characteristic of the Old Russian state. For Russia in the 9th-13th centuries, located between Europe and Asia, it was extremely important in which direction it turned - to the East or to the West. Kievan Rus managed to maintain a neutral position between them, it was open to both the West and the East.

But the new political situation of the 13th century, the invasion of the Mongols and the crusade of the European Catholic knights, who questioned the continued existence of Russia and its Orthodox culture, forced the political elite of Russia to make a certain choice. The fate of the country for many centuries, including the present, depended on this choice.

The collapse of political unity Ancient Rus also marked the beginning of the disappearance of the ancient Russian nationality, which became the progenitor of the three currently existing East Slavic peoples. Since the 14th century, in the northeast and northwest of Russia, the Russian (Great Russian) nationality has been formed; on the lands that became part of Lithuania and Poland-Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples 27.

IV... The establishment of the Horde yoke, its consequences and influence on the fate of Russia.

After Batu's invasion of Russia, the so-called Mongol-Tatar yoke was established, a complex of economic and political methods that ensured the domination of the Golden Horde 28 over that part of the territory of Russia that was under its control. A new term “Golden Horde” also appears, which denotes the state formed in 1242-1243. The Mongols who returned from the western campaigns to the Lower Volga region, with the capital Saray (Saray-berke), whose first khan was the same Batu 29.

The main among these methods were the collection of various tributes and duties - "popluzhnoye", a trade duty "tamga", fodder for Mongolian ambassadors - "honor", etc. The hardest of them was the Horde "exit" - a tribute in silver, which began to 40s XIII century, and since 1257 on the orders of Khan Berke, the Mongols made a census (I census in the history of the country) of the population of North-Eastern Russia ("record in the number"), establishing a fixed amount of fees. Only the clergy were exempted from paying the "exit" (before the adoption of Islam by the Horde at the beginning of the 14th century, the pagan Mongols, like all pagans, were distinguished by their religious tolerance).

Representatives of the Baskaki Khan were sent to Russia to control the collection of tribute. The tribute was collected by the tax-farmers - "besermen" (Central Asian merchants). By the end of the XIII-beginning of the XIV century, the institution of Basque people was abolished due to the active opposition of the population. From that time on, the Russian princes themselves began to collect the Horde tribute. In case of disobedience, punitive campaigns followed. As the rule of the Golden Horde was consolidated, punitive expeditions were replaced by repressions against individual princes.

Having become dependent on the Horde, the Russian principalities lost their sovereignty. Their receipt of the princely table depended on the will of the khan, who gave them labels (certificates for reign). The measure that consolidated the domination of the Golden Horde over Russia was the issuance of labels for the great reign of Vladimir.

Those who received such a label added the Vladimir principality to their possessions and became the strongest among the Russian princes in order to maintain order, stop strife and ensure an uninterrupted flow of tribute. The Horde khans did not allow any significant strengthening of any of the princes and a long stay on the grand princely throne. In addition, having taken away the label from the next Grand Duke, they gave it to the rival prince, which caused princely strife and a struggle to obtain the Vladimir reign at the khan's court.

A well-thought-out system of measures provided the Golden Horde with solid control over the Russian lands.

Political and cultural consequences of the Mongol yoke.

The consequences of the Mongol yoke for Russian culture and history were very difficult. The Mongols inflicted particular damage on the cities, which at that time in Europe were getting rich and freed from the power of the feudal lords.

In Russian cities, as noted earlier, stone construction ceased for a century, the number of urban population, and especially the number of skilled artisans, decreased. A number of handicraft specialties have disappeared, especially in jewelry: the production of cloisonné enamel, glass beads, grain, niello, filigree. The veche, the stronghold of urban democracy, was destroyed, trade relations with Western Europe were disrupted, and Russian trade turned its face to the east.

Development slowed down Agriculture... Uncertainty about the future and the increased demand for fur contributed to the increased role of hunting to the detriment of agriculture. There was a conservation of servitude, which was disappearing in Europe. Serf slaves remained the main force in the private farms of the princes and boyars until the beginning of the 16th century. The state of agriculture and forms of ownership was stagnant. Everything in Western Europe big role private property plays. It is protected by legislation and guaranteed by power. In Russia, state power-property is preserved and becomes traditional, limiting the sphere of development of private property. The term "state power-property" means that land is not, as a rule, an object of free sale and purchase, is not in someone's full private ownership, land ownership is inextricably linked with the implementation of state functions (military, administrative, legislative, judicial) and state power cannot be someone's private business 30.

The intermediate position of Ancient Russia between the West and the East is gradually being replaced by an orientation toward the East. Through the Mongols, Russians are assimilating the values ​​of the political culture of China and the Arab world. If the ruling elite of the West in the X-XIII centuries. As a result of the Crusades, she got acquainted with the culture of the East as victors, then Russia, having a sad experience of defeat, experienced a strong influence of the East in conditions of demoralization and a crisis of traditional values.

In the Golden Horde, Russian princes adopted new forms of political communication, unknown in Russia (“beat with the forehead,” that is, with the forehead). The concept of absolute, despotic power, with which the Russians were familiar only theoretically, on the example of Byzantium, entered the political culture of Russia on the example of the power of the Horde Khan. The weakening of the cities created an opportunity for the princes themselves to claim the same power and a similar expression of the feelings of their subjects.

Under the influence of specifically Asian legal norms and methods of punishment, the Russians eroded the traditional, still tribal idea of ​​the punishing power of society ("flow and plunder", "blood feud") and the limited princely right to punish people (preference for "vira", fines). The punishing force was not society, but the state in the form of an executioner. It was at this time that Russia recognized the "Chinese executions" - the whip ("commercial execution"), cutting off parts of the face (nose, ears), torture during the inquiry and investigation. This was a completely new attitude towards man in comparison with the 10th century, the time of Vladimir Svyatoslavovich.

In the conditions of the yoke, the idea of ​​the need to balance rights and obligations has disappeared. The duties of the sweat towards the Mongols were fulfilled regardless of whether this gave any rights. This was fundamentally at odds with the class morality of the West, assimilated by Kievan Rus, where duties were a consequence of certain rights granted to a person. In Russia, the value of power has become higher than the value of law (we still see this!). Power subordinated to itself the concepts of law, property, honor, dignity.

At the same time, there is a restriction of the rights of women, characteristic of the eastern patriarchal society. If the medieval cult of women flourished in the West, the knightly custom of worshiping a certain Beautiful Lady, then in Russia the girls were locked up in tall chambers, protected from communication with men, married women had to dress in a certain way (be sure to wear a scarf), were limited in property rights, at home.

At the same time, the Russian people acutely felt the injustice of everything that was happening. Aggression from the East and West forced foreigners to blame the "infidels" for everything. Under the conditions of the Horde yoke and the hostile attitude of the Catholic West, Russians developed national narrow-mindedness, a feeling of only being a true Christian, Orthodox people. The Church remained the only nationwide public institution. Therefore, the unity of the nation was based on the awareness of belonging to a single faith, the idea of ​​God's chosenness of the Russian people. Subsequently, this will manifest itself in the theory "Moscow-the third Rome".

Dependence on the Mongols, extensive trade and political ties with the Golden Horde and other eastern courts led to marriages of Russian princes with "Tatar princesses", the desire to imitate the customs of the khan's court. All this gave rise to the borrowing of Eastern customs, spreading from the top of society to the bottom.

Gradually, the Russian lands, not only politically, but to a certain extent and culturally, became part of the Great Steppe. At least the Europeans, who again got acquainted with the life of Russia in the 15th-17th centuries, had many reasons to call this land "Tataria". Due to the difference in the pace and direction of social development in the life of Russia and Western Europe, which had similar forms in the X-XII centuries, qualitative differences arose by the XIV-XV centuries.

The choice of the East as an object of interaction for Russia turned out to be quite stable. It manifested itself not only in the adaptation to the eastern forms of state, society, culture in the 13th-15th centuries, but also in the direction of the expansion of the centralized Russian state in the 16th-17th centuries. Even in the 18th century, when interaction between Russia and the West and Europe became the main thing, the Europeans noted Russia's tendency to give eastern “answers” ​​to the “questions” of the West, which resulted in the strengthening of autocracy and serfdom as the basis for the Europeanization of the country 31.

V... Discussion about the degree of influence of the Mongolian (Horde) yoke on the development and fate of Russia.

In science, controversy is common. Actually, without them, there would be no science. In historical science, disputes are often endless. Such is the discussion about the degree of influence of the Mongol (Horde) yoke on the development of Russia for more than two centuries. At one time, in the nineteenth century, it was customary not to even notice this impact.

On the contrary, in historical science, as well as in journalism of recent decades, it is believed that the yoke has become a turning point in all spheres of public life, most of all in political life, since the movement towards a single state modeled on Western European countries was stopped, as well as in the public consciousness, which formed, as a result of yoke, the soul of the Russian man, like the soul of a slave 32.

Supporters of the traditional point of view, and these are historians of pre-revolutionary Russia, historians of the Soviet period and many modern historians, writers and publicists, i.e. in fact, the vast majority are extremely negative about the impact of the yoke on the most diverse aspects of life in Russia. There was a massive displacement of the population, and with it the agricultural culture, to the west and northwest, to less convenient territories with a less favorable climate. The political and social role of cities has sharply decreased. The power of the princes over the population increased. There was also a certain reorientation of the policy of the Russian princes to the east. Today it is not fashionable, and often considered inappropriate, to quote the classics of Marxism, but, in my opinion, sometimes it is worth it. According to Karl Marx, “the Mongol yoke not only suppressed, but insulted and drained the very soul of the people who became its victim” 33.

In fact, I also adhere to the traditional point of view in my work. But there is another, directly opposite point of view on the problem under consideration. She considers the Mongol invasion not as a conquest, but as a "great cavalry raid" (only those cities that stood in the way of the troops were destroyed; the Mongols did not leave garrisons; they did not establish permanent power; with the end of the campaign, Batu went to the Volga).

At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, a new cultural-historiosophical (historiosophy-philosophy of history) and geopolitical theory-Eurasianism appeared in Russia. Among many other provisions, completely new, extremely unusual, and often shocking was the interpretation by the theorists of Eurasianism (G.V. Vernadsky, P.N.Savitsky, N.S. Trubetskoy) of Old Russian history and the so-called "Tatar" period of Russian history. To understand the essence of their statements, you need to grasp the essence of the idea of ​​Eurasianism.

The “Eurasian idea” is based on the principle of the unity of the “soil” (territory) and asserts the originality and self-sufficiency of the Slavic-Turkic civilization, which developed within the framework of the first Golden Horde, then the Russian Empire, and later the USSR. And today, the current leadership of Russia, experiencing enormous difficulties in governing a country in which there are Orthodox and Muslims nearby, and with their own state formations (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia, finally, Chechnya (Ichkeria)), is objectively interested in spreading the idea of ​​Eurasianism.

According to the theorists of Eurasianism, contrary to the tradition of domestic historical science to see in the Mongol yoke only "the oppression of the Russian people by the Baskaks of the filthy", the Eurasians saw in this fact Russian history a largely positive outcome.

"Without" Tatar "there would be no Russia" - wrote PN Savitsky in his work "The Steppe and Settlement." could. It is great happiness for Russia that it went to the Tatars ... The Tatars did not change the spiritual being of Russia, but in their excellent quality for them in this era as creators of states, a militar-organizing force, they undoubtedly influenced Russia. "

Another Eurasianist S.G. Pushkaryov wrote: “The Tatars not only did not reveal systematic aspirations to destroy the Russian faith and nationality, but on the contrary, showing complete religious tolerance, the Mongol khans issued labels to the Russian metropolitans to protect the rights and advantages of the Russian Church” 34.

Developing this thought of his, S.G. Pushkarev contrasted the "Tatar neutral environment" with the Romano-Germanic "Drang nach Osten", as a result of which "the Baltic and Polabian Slavs disappeared from the face of the earth" 35.

This advantage of the East over the West was appreciated by many Russian statesmen of that time. GV Vernadsky cited Alexander Nevsky (who, by the way, was numbered among the saints by the Russian Orthodox Church) as a vivid example of an "Old Russian Eurasian". In contrast to Daniil Galitsky, who connected himself with the West, Alexander Nevsky, “with much less historical data, achieved much more lasting political results. Prince Alexander Yaroslavovich singled out in the Mongols a culturally friendly force that could help him preserve and establish Russian identity from the Latin West "36 - this is how GV Vernadsky estimated the" Eastern "orientation of Alexander Nevsky and his stake on the Horde.

The thought of G.V. Vernadsky was deepened by another Eurasian historian, Boris Shiryaev. In one of his articles, he comes to the conclusion that "the Mongol yoke caused the Russian people from the provincialism of the historical existence of small scattered tribal and urban principalities of the so-called appanage period onto the broad road of statehood." “In this intermediate epoch lies the genesis of Russian statehood,” 37 he stated.

The famous emigre historian and ethnographer of Kalmyk origin E.D. Khara-Davan believed that it was during these years that the foundations of Russian political culture were laid, that the Mongols gave the conquered Russian lands "the main elements of the future Moscow statehood: autocracy (khanat), centralism, serfdom" 38. In addition, the "influence Mongol rule Russian principalities and tribes were merged together, forming first the Muscovy, and later Russian empire"39.

The personification of the supreme power, traditional for Russia, also goes away in this era.

Mongol rule made the Moscow sovereign an absolute autocrat, and his subjects serfs. And if Genghis Khan and his successors ruled in the name of the Eternal Blue Sky, then the Russian autocrat ruled his subjects as the Anointed of God. As a result, the Mongol conquest contributed to the transformation of urban and veche Russia into rural and princely Russia / from the author: from a modern point of view, it all looks sad, but ... \

Thus, according to the Eurasians, “the Mongols gave Russia the ability to organize itself militarily, to create a state-compulsory center, to achieve stability ... to become a powerful“ horde ”40.

In addition, in the period of the XIII-XV centuries, Eurasian authors noted on the territory of Russia due to the introduction of the Turkic element into the Russian (Slavic) culture as a whole, a definitely new ethnotype was formed, which laid the foundations of the psychology of the Russian person 41. Thus, Prince N.S. Trubetskoy believed that “the Turkic loves symmetry. Clarity and stable balance; but he loves that all this has already been given, and not given, so that it determines by the inertia of his thoughts, actions and way of thinking ”42.

Such a psyche imparts to the nation "cultural stability and strength, asserts cultural and historical continuity and creates conditions for the economy of national forces that are conducive to any construction." Having merged into the Slavic element during the Mongol yoke, these Turkic features of the Russian folk psyche determined both the strength of the Moscow state ("not well tailored, but tightly sewn"), and that "everyday confession, that saturation of culture and everyday life with religion, which were a consequence of the special properties of the ancient Russian piety ". True, according to the Eurasian theorist, the flip side of these features was "excessive sluggishness and inactivity of theoretical thinking."

According to the Eurasianists, the Russian religious consciousness received a significant "recharge" from the East. So, E.D. Khara-Davan wrote that "the Russian seeking of God"; "Sectarianism", a pilgrimage to holy places with a willingness to sacrifice and torment for the sake of spiritual burning could only be from the East, because in the West, religion does not affect the life and does not touch the hearts and souls of its followers, for they are completely and completely absorbed only by their own material culture "44.

But not only in strengthening the spirit did the Eurasians see the merit of the Mongols. In their opinion, Russia also borrowed features of the military valor of the Mongol conquerors from the East: "courage, endurance in overcoming obstacles in war, love of discipline." All this "gave the Russians the opportunity to create the Great Russian Empire after the Mongol school" 45.

The further development of Russian history was seen by the Eurasians as follows.

The gradual decay, and then the fall of the Golden Horde, leads to the fact that its traditions are taken up by the strengthened Russian lands, and the empire of Genghis Khan is reviving in a new guise of the Muscovy. After the relatively easy conquest of Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberia, the empire is practically restored within its former borders.

At the same time, there is a peaceful penetration of the Russian element into the eastern environment and the eastern into the Russian, thus cementing the integration processes. As B. Shiryaev noted: “The Russian state, without compromising its basic principle of Orthodox everyday religiosity, begins to apply to the conquered by the Tatar khanates the Genghis Khan's method of religious tolerance, which he tested on himself. This technique connected both peoples ”46.

Thus, the period of the XVI-XVII centuries. is considered by the Eurasians as the era of the best expression of the Eurasian statehood.

The Eurasian theory of the relationship between Russians and Mongols (Turks) caused a stormy controversy among Russian émigré historians. Most of them, brought up on the classical works of the Russian historical school, did not accept this interpretation and, above all, the concept of Mongolian influence on Russian history. And there was no unity among the Eurasians either. So, for example, the prominent Eurasian YD Sadovsky in his letter to PN Savitsky sharply criticized the book “The Legacy of Genghis Khan in the Russian Empire”, published in 1925 for “praising the most vile and vile slavery among the Tatars” 47. Another prominent Eurasian theorist, M, adhered to a similar position. Chess.

"What can we say about opponents of Eurasianism in general." So PN Milyukov contrasted the argumentation of the Eurasians with his theses about “the absence of a Eurasian culture, common to Russians and the Mongols” and “the absence of any significant kinship of the eastern steppe life with a sedentary Russian” 48. The "apotheosis of the Tatar region" was seen in the Eurasian theory by the prominent liberal historian A.A. Kizevetter. "Dmitry Donskoy and Sergiy Radonezhsky, from the point of view of a devout Eurasian, should be recognized as traitors to the national vocation of Russia," 49 he sneered.

One way or another, but despite a certain radicalism and subjectivism, Eurasianism is valuable in that it provides a new, in fact, interpretation of Russia's relations with both the West and the East. And this, in turn, enriched the theoretical basis of historical science.

The ideas of the Eurasianists in the second half of the twentieth century were developed by the famous scientist Lev Nikolaevich Gumilyov and his other followers. Here is how L.N. Gumilev wrote on this issue:

“... Moreover, the purpose of this raid was not the conquest of Russia, but the war with the Polovtsians. Since the Polovtsians firmly held the line between the Don and the Volga, the Mongols used a well-known tactical method of long-distance detour: they made a "cavalry raid" through the Ryazan and Vladimir principality. And later Grand Duke Vladimirsky (1252-1263) Alexander Nevsky concluded a mutually beneficial alliance with Batu: Alexander found an ally to resist the German aggression, and Baty - in order to emerge victorious in the fight against the great Khan Guyuk (Alexander Nevsky provided Batu with an army consisting of Russians and Alans).

The union existed as long as it was beneficial and necessary for both sides (L.N. Gumilyov) 50. A. Golovatenko writes about this: “... Russian princes themselves often turned to the Horde for help and did not even see anything shameful in using the Mongol-Tatar detachments in the fight against competitors. So ... Alexander Nevsky, with the support of the Horde cavalry, expelled his brother Andrei from the Vladimir-Suzdal principality (1252). Eight years later, Alexander again used the help of the Tatars, rendering them a reciprocal service. The authoritative prince contributed to the census in Novgorod (similar censuses in all Horde possessions served as the basis for taxation); The Horde also helped Alexander Nevsky to make his son (Dmitry Alexandrovich) a prince of Novgorod.

Cooperation with the Mongols seemed to the princes of North-Eastern Russia to be as natural a means of achieving or consolidating power as allied relations with the Polovtsy-southern Russian princes of the 12th century ”51. I think it is worth listening in this discussion to the calm and balanced opinion of the famous Soviet historian N.Ya. Eidelman:

“It is impossible, of course, to agree with the paradoxical opinion of L.N. Gumilev (and other Eurasians!) That the Mongol yoke was the best destiny for Russia, because, firstly, it saved it from the German yoke, and secondly, it could not painfully to affect the identity of the people, as it would have happened under the more cultured German invaders. I don’t believe that such an erudite as Gumilev does not know facts that can easily dispute him; carried away by his theory, he goes to extremes and does not notice, for example, that the forces of the "knight-dogs" were incomparably weaker than the Mongol forces; Alexander Nevsky stopped them with an army of one principality. Far from praising any foreign domination in general, let me remind you that the Mongol yoke was terrible; that, first of all and most of all, it hit the ancient Russian cities, magnificent centers of crafts, culture ...

But it was the cities that were the bearers of the trading principle, commodity, future bourgeoisness - the example of Europe is obvious!

There is no need, we suppose, to look for positive sides such a yoke in comparison with the abstract, non-existent and unrealizable then German yoke. First of all, because the result of Batu's arrival is simple and terrible; the population has decreased several times; ruin, oppression, humiliation; the decline of both princely power and the sprouts of freedom ...

List of used literature.

1. N.M. Karamzin "History of the Russian State". Kaluga, "Golden Alley" v. 3.4.1993

2.Klyuchevsky V.O. Collected works vol.2. Moscow "Mysl" .1988

3. Nechvolodov "The Legend of the Russian Land", a reprint edition of the Ural branch of the All-Union Cultural Center "Russian Encyclopedia" book 2.1991.

4. Orlov A.S., Georgiev V.A., Polunov A.Yu., Tereshchenko Yu.Ya. "The basis of the course of the history of Russia" Moscow State University. MV Lomonosov, and the Faculty of History. Moscow, "Prostor". 2002

5. Pushkin A.S. Complete works, vol. 3, Moscow, 1958.

6. Sandulov Yu.A. and others. “History of Russia. People and Power ”. St. Petersburg, "Lan". 1997

7. Zuev M.N. "History of Russia since ancient times." Moscow, "Bustard". 1999

8.Gumilyov L.N. “From Russia to Russia. Essays on Ethnic History ". Moscow, "Economic Russia". 1992

9.Ionov I.N. "Russian civilization" 9th-early10th centuries ". Moscow," Enlightenment ".

10. "History of Russia 9-10th centuries." edited by M.M. Shumilov, Ryabikin S.P., 5th edition revised and enlarged. St. Petersburg, "Niva". 1997

11. Golovatenko A. "History of Russia: controversial problems." Moscow, "School-press".

12. Zaikin I.A., Pochkaev I.N., "Russian history". Moscow, "Mysl". 1992

13.Valkova V.G., Valkova O.A., "The Rulers of Russia". Moscow, "Rolf", "Iris-press". 1999

14. Savitsky P.N. "Steppe and Settlement". Moscow-Berlin, 1925

15. Khara-Davan E. "Genghis Khan as a commander and his legacy." Elista, 1991

16.Eidelman N. Ya. “Revolution from above” in Russia ”. "Book", 1989

17. Vernadsky G.V. “Two exploits of St. Alexander Nevsky ". Eurasian time book, book 4. Berlin, 1925

18. Shiryaev B. "Supranational state on the territory of Eurasia", "Eurasian Chronicle", issue 7. Paris, 1927.

19. Pushkarev S.G. "Russia and Europe in their historical past", "Eurasian Chronicle", book 2. Prague, 1925

20.Magazine "Rodina" No. 3-4 1997.

21. Quote by S.I. Gessen. "Eurasianism". Modern records, v. 23.1925.

List of used literature, (footnotes).

1. IA Zaichkin, IN Pochkaev "Russian history", Moscow, "Mysl" 1992; page 104.

2. Quotation after Jan V. "Selected Works" v.1, Moscow, 1979; page 436.

3.Karamzin N.M. "History of the Russian State" v.4, Kaluga, "Golden Alley" 1993; page 419.

4.Klyuchevsky V.O. "Collected Works" v.2, Moscow, "Mysl" 1988; p. 20,21,41,45, etc.

5. Nechvolodov A. "The Legend of the Russian Land", reprinted edition of the Ural branch of the All-Union Cultural Center "Russian Encyclopedia", 1991; pp. 262-269, etc.

6. IA Zaichkin, IN Pochkaev "Russian history", Moscow, "Mysl" 1992; page 103.

7. "History of Russia IX-XX centuries." edited by M.M. Shumilov, S.P. Ryabikina, 5th edition, revised and supplemented, St. Petersburg, "Neva" 1997; page 34.

8. Magazine "Rodina" No. 3-4 for 1997, article by Mirkasim Usmanov, Doctor of History Kazan University “The neighbors called them Tatars” pp. 40-44.

9.Zuev M.N. "History of Russia from ancient times to the end of the twentieth century", Moscow, "Bustard" 1999; page 48.

10. N.M. Karamzin "History of the Russian State" v.3, Kaluga, "Golden Rainbow"; pp. 380-381.

11.Magazine "Rodina" No. 3-4 for 1997; page 39.

12. N.M. Karamzin, ibid., P. 397.

13. Ibid., P. 410.

14. Magazine "Rodina" No. 3-4 for 1997, article by A. Amelkin "When; Evpatiy Kolovrat was “born”, pp. 48-52.

15. IA Zaichkin, IN Pochkaev "Russian history", Moscow, "Mysl" 1992; page 115.

16. Ibid., P. 116.

17.Valkova V.G., Valkova O.A. "Rulers of Russia", Moscow, "Rolf, Iris Press" 1999; page 69.

18. "History of Russia IX-XX centuries." edited by M.M. Shumilov, S.P. Ryabikina, 5th edition, revised and supplemented, St. Petersburg, "Neva" 1997; page 35.

19. IA Zaichkin, IN Pochkaev "Russian history", Moscow, "Mysl" 1992; page 119.

20. Ibid, p. 121 and A. Nechvolodov "The Legend of the Russian Land", a reprint edition of the Ural branch of the "Russian Encyclopedia" 1991; page 299.

21. N.M. Karamzin "History of the Russian State", Kaluga, "Golden Alley" v. 4, p. 417 and A. Nechvolodov "The Legend of the Russian Land", reprinted edition of the Ural branch of the "Russian Encyclopedia" 1991, book 2 ; p. 300.

22. Orlov A.S., Georgiev V.A., Polunov A.Yu., Tereshchenko Yu.Ya. Moscow State University MV Lomonosov Faculty of History, Moscow, "Prostor" 2002; p. 70.

23. Pushkin A. S. "Complete Works" v.6, Moscow, 1958; page 306.

24. N.M. Karamzin "History of the Russian State", Kaluga, "Golden Alley" 1993, v.3; page 396.

25. For example, Sandulov Yu.A. and others. “History of Russia. People and Power ", St. Petersburg," Doe "1997; page 171.

26. Ionov I. N. "Russian civilization of the 9th-beginning of the 20th century", Moscow, "Enlightenment" 1994; page 77.

27. Zuev M.N., ibid; page 53.

28. Zuev M.N., ibid; page 53.

29. "History of Russia IX-XX centuries" edited by MM Shumilov, SP Ryabikin, 5th edition, revised and supplemented, St. Petersburg, "Neva" 1997; page 35.

30. Golovatenko A. "History of Russia: controversial problems", Moscow, "School-Press" 1994; page 32.

31. Ionov I.N., ibid., Pp. 82-84.

32. Sandulov Yu.A. and others. “History of Russia. People and Power ", St. Petersburg," Doe "1997; 173.

33. Quote from "History of Russia IX-XX centuries." edited by MM Shumilov, SP Ryabikin, 5th edition, revised and supplemented, St. Petersburg, "Neva" 1997; page 36.

34. Pushkarev S.G. "Russia and Europe in their historical past", "Eurasian Chronicle", book 2, Prague 1925; page 12.

35 Ibid., P. 12.

36 Vernadsky G.V. "Two exploits of St. Alexander Nevsky", "Eurasian Contemporary", book 4, Berlin1925; pp. 325-327.

37. Shiryaev B. " Nation state on the territory of Eurasia "," Eurasian Chronicle "issue 7, Paris, 1927; page 7.

38. Khara-Davan E. "Genghis Khan as a commander and his legacy", Elista, 1991; page 182.

39 Ibid., P. 181.

40 Ibid., P. 202.

41. Magazine "Rodina" No. 3-4, 1997, A. Shatilov "Peresvet and Chelubey-brothers forever"; page 101.

42. Quote by S.I. Gessen. "Eurasianism", "Modern Notes" v.23, 1925; page 502.

45. See Khara-Davan E., the specified composition; p. 195.

46. ​​Ibid; pp. 199-200.

47. Magazine "Rodina" No. 3-4, 1997; p. 55.

48 Ibid; p. 56.

49. Ibid; p. 59.

50. Gumilyov L.N. “From Russia to Russia. Essays on ethnic history ", Moscow," Ecopros "1992, part 2" In alliance with the horde "ch. 1 and 2; pp. 90-136.

51. Golovatenko A. "History of Russia: controversial problems", edition 2, supplemented, Moscow, "School-Press" 1994; pp. 39-40.

52. Eidelman N. Ya. "Revolution from above" in Russia, "Book" 1989; pp. 32-33.

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1. Reasons for the success of the Mongols

The question of why the nomads, who were significantly inferior to the conquered peoples of Asia and Europe in economic and cultural terms, subordinated them to their power for almost three centuries, has always been in the center of attention of both domestic and foreign historians. The Mongols outnumbered their opponents in military power. As already noted, the Steppe in military terms always surpassed the Forest in ancient times. After this little introduction to the "problem", let us list the factors of victory of the steppe dwellers, cited in the historical literature.

The feudal fragmentation of Russia, Europe and the weak interstate relations between the countries of Asia and Europe, which did not allow, by uniting their forces, to repulse the conquerors.

The numerical superiority of the conquerors. There was a lot of controversy among historians about how much Batu brought to Russia. N.M. Karamzin indicated the number of 300 thousand soldiers. However, serious analysis does not allow even getting close to this figure. Each Mongolian horseman (and they were all horsemen) had at least 2, and most likely 3 horses. Where in forest Russia in winter to feed 1 million horses? Not a single chronicle even raises this topic. Therefore, modern historians call the figure a maximum of 150 thousand Mughals who came to Russia, the more cautious stop at the figure 120-130 thousand. And all of Russia, even if united, could put up 50 thousand, although there are numbers up to 100 thousand. So, in reality, the Russians could put 10-15 thousand soldiers into battle. Here the following circumstance should be taken into account. The striking force of the Russian squads, the princely armies, were in no way inferior to the Moguls, but the bulk of the Russian squads were militiamen, not professional soldiers, but ordinary people who took up arms, not like professional Mongol soldiers. The belligerents' tactics were also different. The Russians were forced to adhere to defensive tactics designed to starve the enemy. Why? The fact is that in a direct military clash in the field, the Mongolian cavalry had clear advantages. Therefore, the Russians tried to sit out behind the walls of their cities. However, the wooden fortresses could not withstand the pressure of the Mongol troops. In addition, the conquerors used the tactics of continuous assault, successfully used siege weapons and equipment that were perfect for their time, borrowed from the peoples of China, Central Asia and the Caucasus that they conquered.

The Mongols did a good job of reconnaissance before the outbreak of hostilities. They had informants even among the Russians. In addition, the Mongol commanders did not personally take part in the battles, but led the battle from their headquarters, which was, as a rule, in a high place. Russian princes up to Vasily II the Dark (1425-1462) themselves directly participated in the battles. Therefore, very often, in the event of even the heroic death of the prince, his soldiers, deprived of professional leadership, found themselves in a very difficult situation.

It is important to note that Batu's attack on Russia in 1237 came as a complete surprise to the Russians. The Mongol hordes undertook it in the winter, attacking the Ryazan principality. The Ryazan people are accustomed only to the summer and autumn raids of enemies, mainly Polovtsians. Therefore, no one expected a winter strike. What were the steppe people pursuing with their winter attack? The fact is that the rivers, which were a natural barrier to the enemy cavalry in the summer, were covered with ice in winter and lost their protective functions.

In addition, in Russia, stocks of food and feed for livestock were prepared for the winter. Thus, the conquerors already before the attack were provided with fodder for their cavalry.

These, in the opinion of most historians, were the main and tactical reasons for the Mongol victories.

2 ... The establishment of the Horde yoke, its aftermathtii and influence on the fate of Russia

After Batu's invasion of Russia, the so-called Mongol-Tatar yoke was established, a complex of economic and political methods that ensured the domination of the Golden Horde over that part of the territory of Russia that was under its control. A new term "Golden Horde" also appears, which denotes the state formed in 1242-1243. The Mongols, who returned from the western campaigns to the Lower Volga region, with the capital Saray (Saray-berke), whose first khan was the same Batu.

The main among these methods were the collection of various tributes and duties - "popluzhnoe", the trade duty "tamga", fodder for the Mongol ambassadors - "honor", etc. The most difficult of them was the Horde "exit" - tribute in silver, which began to be levied as early as 40 -th years XIII century, and since 1257 by order of Khan Berke, the Mongols made a census (I census in the history of the country) of the population of North-Eastern Russia ("record in the number"), setting fixed rates. Only the clergy were exempted from paying the "exit" (before the adoption of Islam by the Horde at the beginning of the 14th century, the pagan Mongols, like all pagans, were distinguished by their religious tolerance).

Representatives of the Baskaki Khan were sent to Russia to control the collection of tribute. Tribute was collected by tax farmers - "besermen" (Central Asian merchants). By the end of the XIII-beginning of the XIV century, the institution of Basque people was abolished due to the active opposition of the population. From that time on, the Russian princes themselves began to collect the Horde tribute. In case of disobedience, punitive campaigns followed. As the rule of the Golden Horde was consolidated, punitive expeditions were replaced by repressions against individual princes.

Having become dependent on the Horde, the Russian principalities lost their sovereignty. Their receipt of the princely table depended on the will of the khan, who gave them labels (certificates for reign). The measure that consolidated the domination of the Golden Horde over Russia was the issuance of labels for the great reign of Vladimir.

Those who received such a label added the Vladimir principality to their possessions and became the strongest among the Russian princes in order to maintain order, stop strife and ensure an uninterrupted flow of tribute. The Horde khans did not allow any significant strengthening of any of the princes and a long stay on the grand princely throne. In addition, having taken away the label from the next Grand Duke, they gave it to the rival prince, which caused princely strife and a struggle to obtain the Vladimir reign at the khan's court.

A well-thought-out system of measures provided the Golden Horde with solid control over the Russian lands.

Political and cultural the consequences of the Mongol yoke . The consequences of the Mongol yoke for Russian culture and history were very difficult. The Mongols inflicted particular damage on the cities, which at that time in Europe were getting rich and freed from the power of the feudal lords.

In Russian cities, as noted earlier, stone construction ceased for a century, the number of urban population, and especially the number of skilled artisans, decreased. A number of handicraft specialties have disappeared, especially in jewelry: the production of cloisonné enamel, glass beads, grain, niello, filigree. The veche, the stronghold of urban democracy, was destroyed, trade relations with Western Europe were disrupted, and Russian trade turned its face to the east.

The development of agriculture has slowed down. Uncertainty about the future and the increased demand for fur contributed to the increased role of hunting to the detriment of agriculture. There was a conservation of servitude, which was disappearing in Europe. Serf slaves remained the main force in the private farms of the princes and boyars until the beginning of the 16th century. The state of agriculture and forms of ownership was stagnant. In Western Europe, private property is playing an increasing role. It is protected by legislation and guaranteed by power. In Russia, state power-property is preserved and becomes traditional, limiting the sphere of development of private property. The term "state power-property" means that land is not, as a rule, an object of free sale and purchase, is not in someone's full private ownership, land ownership is inextricably linked with the implementation of state functions (military, administrative, legislative, judicial) , and state power cannot be someone's private business.

The intermediate position of Ancient Russia between the West and the East is gradually being replaced by an orientation toward the East. Through the Mongols, Russians are assimilating the values ​​of the political culture of China and the Arab world. If the ruling elite of the West in the X-XIII centuries. As a result of the Crusades, she got acquainted with the culture of the East as victors, then Russia, having a sad experience of defeat, experienced a strong influence of the East in conditions of demoralization and a crisis of traditional values.

In the Golden Horde, Russian princes adopted new forms of political communication, unknown in Russia (“to beat with the forehead,” that is, with the forehead). The concept of absolute, despotic power, with which the Russians were familiar only theoretically, on the example of Byzantium, entered the political culture of Russia on the example of the power of the Horde Khan. The weakening of the cities created an opportunity for the princes themselves to claim the same power and a similar expression of the feelings of their subjects.

Under the influence of specifically Asian legal norms and methods of punishment, the Russians eroded the traditional, still tribal idea of ​​the punishing power of society ("flow and plunder," "blood feud") and the limited princely right to punish people (preference for "vira", fines). The punishing force was not society, but the state in the form of an executioner. It was at this time that Russia recognized the "Chinese executions" - the whip ("commercial execution"), cutting off parts of the face (nose, ears), torture during the inquiry and investigation. This was a completely new attitude towards man in comparison with the 10th century, the time of Vladimir Svyatoslavovich.

In the conditions of the yoke, the idea of ​​the need to balance rights and obligations has disappeared. The duties of the sweat towards the Mongols were fulfilled regardless of whether this gave any rights. This was fundamentally at odds with the class morality of the West, assimilated by Kievan Rus, where duties were a consequence of certain rights granted to a person. In Russia, the value of power has become higher than the value of law (we still see this!). Power subordinated to itself the concepts of law, property, honor, dignity.

At the same time, there is a restriction of the rights of women, characteristic of the eastern patriarchal society. If the medieval cult of women flourished in the West, the knightly custom of worshiping a certain Beautiful Lady, then in Russia girls were locked in tall chambers, protected from communication with men, married women had to dress in a certain way (be sure to wear a headscarf), were limited in property rights, in everyday life.

Dependence on the Mongols, wide trade and political ties with the Golden Horde and other eastern courts led to marriages of Russian princes with "Tatar princesses", the desire to imitate the customs of the khan's court. All this gave rise to the borrowing of Eastern customs, spreading from the top of society to the bottom.

Gradually, the Russian lands, not only politically, but to a certain extent and culturally, became part of the Great Steppe. At least the Europeans, who again got acquainted with the life of Russia in the 15th-17th centuries, had many reasons to call this land "Tataria". Due to the difference in the pace and direction of social development in the life of Russia and Western Europe, which had similar forms in the X-XII centuries, qualitative differences arose by the XIV-XV centuries.

The choice of the East as an object of interaction for Russia turned out to be quite stable. It manifested itself not only in the adaptation to the eastern forms of state, society, culture in the 13th-15th centuries, but also in the direction of the expansion of the centralized Russian state in the 16th-17th centuries. Even in the 18th century, when the interaction between Russia and the West and Europe became the main thing, the Europeans noted Russia's tendency to give eastern "answers" to the "questions" of the West, which resulted in the strengthening of autocracy and serfdom as the basis for the Europeanization of the country 3 1.

3 ... Discussion about the degree of influence of the Mongolian (Horde)yoke for development, the fate of Russia

In science, arguments are common. Actually, without them, there would be no science. In historical science, disputes are often endless. Such is the discussion about the degree of influence of the Mongol (Horde) yoke on the development of Russia for more than two centuries. At one time in the nineteenth century it was customary not to even notice this impact.

On the contrary, in historical science, as well as in journalism of recent decades, it is believed that the yoke has become a turning point in all spheres of public life, most of all in political life, since the movement towards a single state modeled on Western European countries was stopped, as well as in the public consciousness, which formed, as a result of yoke, the soul of the Russian man, like the soul of a slave.

Supporters of the traditional point of view, and these are historians of pre-revolutionary Russia, historians of the Soviet period and many modern historians, writers and publicists, i.e. in fact, the vast majority are extremely negative about the impact of the yoke on the most diverse aspects of life in Russia. There was a massive displacement of the population, and with it the agricultural culture, to the west and northwest, to less convenient territories with a less favorable climate. The political and social role of cities has sharply decreased. The power of the princes over the population increased. There was also a certain reorientation of the policy of the Russian princes to the east. Today it is not fashionable, and often considered inappropriate, to quote the classics of Marxism, but, in my opinion, sometimes it is worth it. According to Karl Marx, "the Mongol yoke not only suppressed, but insulted and dried up the very soul of the people who became its victim."

But there is another, directly opposite point of view on the problem under consideration. She considers the invasion of the Mongols not as a conquest, but as a "great cavalry raid" (only those cities that stood in the way of the troops were destroyed; the Mongols did not leave garrisons; they did not establish permanent power; with the end of the campaign, Batu went to the Volga).

At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, a new cultural-historiosophical (historiosophy - philosophy of history) and geopolitical theory - Eurasianism - appeared in Russia. Among many other provisions, completely new, extremely unusual, and often shocking was the interpretation by the theorists of Eurasianism (G.V. Vernadsky, P.N.Savitsky, NS Trubetskoy) of Old Russian history and the so-called "Tatar" period of Russian history. To understand the essence of their statements, you need to grasp the essence of the idea of ​​Eurasianism.

The "Eurasian idea" is based on the principle of the unity of the "soil" (territory) and asserts the originality and self-sufficiency of the Slavic-Turkic civilization, which developed first within the Golden Horde, then the Russian Empire, and later the USSR. And today, the current leadership of Russia, experiencing enormous difficulties in governing a country in which there are Orthodox and Muslims nearby, and with their own state formations (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia, finally, Chechnya (Ichkeria)), is objectively interested in spreading the idea of ​​Eurasianism.

According to the theorists of Eurasianism, contrary to the tradition of Russian historical science to see in the Mongol yoke only "the oppression of the Russian people by the Baskaks of the filthy", the Eurasians saw in this fact of Russian history a largely positive result.

"Without" Tatar, "there would be no Russia" - wrote P.N. Savitsky in the work "Steppe and Settlement". In the eleventh and first half of the thirteenth centuries, the cultural and political crushing of Kievan Rus' could not lead to anything other than a foreign yoke. It is great happiness for Russia that it went to the Tatars. The Tatars did not change the spiritual essence of Russia, but in their excellent quality for them in this era, the creators of states, a military-organized force, they undoubtedly influenced Russia. "

Another Eurasian S.G. Pushkarev wrote: "The Tatars not only did not reveal systematic aspirations to the destruction of the Russian faith and nationality, but on the contrary, showing complete religious tolerance, the Mongol khans issued labels to the Russian metropolitans to protect the rights and advantages of the Russian Church."

Developing this idea, S.G. Pushkarev contrasted the "Tatar neutral environment" with the Romano-Germanic "Drang nach Osten", as a result of which "the Baltic and Polabian Slavs disappeared from the face of the earth."

This advantage of the East over the West was appreciated by many Russian statesmen of that time. As a vivid example of the "Old Russian Eurasian" G.V. Vernadsky brought Alexander Nevsky (who, by the way, was canonized by the Russian Orthodox Church). In contrast to Daniil Galitsky, who connected himself with the West, Alexander Nevsky, "with much less historical data, achieved much more lasting political results. Prince Alexander Yaroslavovich singled out in the Mongols a culturally friendly force that could help him preserve and establish Russian identity from the Latin West" - this is how G.V. Vernadsky "oriental" orientation of Alexander Nevsky and his stake on the Horde.

Thought G.V. Vernadsky was deepened by another Eurasian historian, Boris Shiryaev. In one of his articles, he comes to the conclusion that "the Mongol yoke caused the Russian people from the provincialism of the historical existence of small scattered tribal and urban principalities of the so-called appanage period onto the broad road of statehood." "In this intermediate era lies the genesis of Russian statehood," he stated.

The well-known émigré historian and ethnographer of Kalmyk origin E.D. Khara-Davan believed that it was during these years that the foundations of Russian political culture were laid, that the Mongols gave the conquered Russian lands "the basic elements of the future Moscow statehood: autocracy (khanat), centralism, serfdom." In addition, "the influence of Mongol rule, the Russian principalities and tribes were merged into one, forming first the Muscovy, and later the Russian Empire."

The personification of the supreme power, traditional for Russia, also goes away in this era. consequence of the Horde Tatar yoke

Mongol rule made the Moscow sovereign an absolute autocrat, and his subjects serfs. And if Genghis Khan and his successors ruled in the name of the Eternal Blue Sky, then the Russian autocrat ruled his subjects as the Anointed of God. As a result, the Mongol conquest contributed to the transformation of urban and veche Russia into rural and princely Russia / from the author: from a modern point of view, it all looks sad, but ... \

Thus, according to the Eurasianists, "the Mongols gave Russia the ability to organize itself militarily, create a state-compulsory center, achieve stability ... become a powerful" horde. "

According to the Eurasianists, the Russian religious consciousness received a significant "recharge" from the East. So, E.D. Khara-Davan wrote that "the Russian seeking of God"; "sectarianism", a pilgrimage to holy places with a willingness to sacrifice and torment for the sake of spiritual burning could only be from the East, because in the West, religion does not affect the life and does not touch the hearts and souls of its followers, for they are completely and completely absorbed only by their own material culture ".

But not only in strengthening the spirit did the Eurasians see the merit of the Mongols. In their opinion, Russia also borrowed features of the military valor of the Mongol conquerors from the East: "courage, endurance in overcoming obstacles in war, love of discipline." All this "gave the Russians the opportunity to create the Great Russian Empire after the Mongol school."

The further development of Russian history was seen by the Eurasians as follows.

The gradual decay, and then the fall of the Golden Horde, leads to the fact that its traditions are taken up by the strengthened Russian lands, and the empire of Genghis Khan is reviving in a new guise of the Muscovy. After the relatively easy conquest of Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberia, the empire is practically restored within its former borders.

At the same time, there is a peaceful penetration of the Russian element into the eastern environment and the eastern into the Russian, thus cementing the integration processes. As B. Shiryaev noted: "The Russian state, without sacrificing its basic principle of Orthodox everyday religiosity, begins to apply the Genghis Khan's method of religious tolerance, which he had tested on himself, to the conquered by the Tatar khanates. This technique united both peoples."

Thus, the period of the XVI-XVII centuries. is considered by the Eurasians as the era of the best expression of the Eurasian statehood.

The Eurasian theory of the relationship between Russians and Mongols (Turks) caused a stormy controversy among Russian émigré historians. Most of them, brought up on the classical works of the Russian historical school, did not accept this interpretation and, above all, the concept of Mongolian influence on Russian history. And there was no unity among the Eurasians either. So, for example, the prominent Eurasian J.D. Sadovsky in his letter to P.N. Savitsky sharply criticized the book "The Legacy of Genghis Khan in the Russian Empire", published in 1925 for "praising the most vile and vile slavery among the Tatars." Another prominent Eurasian theorist, M, adhered to a similar position. Chess.

"What can we say about opponents of Eurasianism in general." So P.N. Milyukov contrasted the arguments of the Eurasians with his theses about "the absence of a Eurasian culture common to Russians and the Mongols" and "the absence of any significant kinship between the eastern steppe life and the settled Russian." The "apotheosis of the Tatar region" was seen in the Eurasian theory by the prominent liberal historian A.A. Kiesewetter. "Dmitry Donskoy and Sergiy Radonezhsky, from the point of view of an orthodox Eurasianist, should be recognized as traitors to the national vocation of Russia," he sneered.

One way or another, but despite a certain radicalism and subjectivism, Eurasianism is valuable in that it provides a new, in fact, interpretation of Russia's relations with both the West and the East. And this, in turn, enriched the theoretical basis of historical science.

The ideas of the Eurasianists in the second half of the twentieth century were developed by the famous scientist Lev Nikolaevich Gumilyov and his other followers. This is how L.N. Gumilev wrote on this issue:

"... Moreover, the purpose of this raid was not the conquest of Rus, but the war with the Polovtsians. Since the Polovtsians firmly held the line between the Don and the Volga, the Mongols used a well-known tactical method of long-distance detour: they made a" cavalry raid "through the Ryazan, Vladimir principality. Prince Vladimirsky (1252-1263) Alexander Nevsky concluded a mutually beneficial alliance with Batu: Alexander found an ally to resist German aggression, and Baty - to emerge victorious in the fight against the great Khan Guyuk (Alexander Nevsky provided Batu with an army consisting of Russians and Alans) ...

The union existed as long as it was beneficial and necessary for both parties (L.N. Gumilyov). A. Golovatenko writes about this: “... Russian princes themselves often turned to the Horde for help and did not even see anything shameful in using the Mongol-Tatar troops in the fight against competitors. So ... Alexander Nevsky, with the support of the Horde cavalry, expelled his brother Andrei from the Vladimir-Suzdal principality (1252). Eight years later, Alexander again used the help of the Tatars, rendering them a reciprocal service. Alexander Nevsky to make his son (Dmitry Alexandrovich) the prince of Novgorod.

Cooperation with the Mongols seemed to the princes of North-Eastern Russia to be just as natural a means of achieving or strengthening power as allied relations with the Polovtsy-South Russian princes of the 12th century. ”I think it is worth listening to the calm and balanced opinion of the famous Soviet historian N. . Eidelman:

"It is impossible, of course, to agree with the paradoxical opinion of L.N. Gumilyov (and other Eurasians!) That the Mongol yoke was the best lot for Russia, because, firstly, it saved it from the German yoke, and secondly, it could not painfully touch the identity of the people, as it would have happened under more cultured German invaders.I don’t believe that such an erudite person like Gumilev does not know facts that can easily challenge him; carried away by his theory, he goes to the extreme and does not notice, for example, that the strength The "knight-dogs" were incomparably weaker than the Mongol ones; Alexander Nevsky stopped them with an army of one principality. Without praising any foreign dominion in general, let me remind you that the Mongol yoke was terrible; that, above all and most of all, it struck the ancient Russian cities, magnificent centers of craft, culture ...

But it was the cities that were the bearers of the trade principle, commodity, future bourgeoisness - the example of Europe is obvious!

There is no need, we believe, to look for the positive aspects of such a yoke, first of all, because the result of Batu's arrival is simple and terrible; the population has decreased several times; ruin, oppression, humiliation; the decline of both princely power and the sprouts of freedom.

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Kievan Rus at the beginning of the XII century, negative and positive aspects of fragmentation. The formation of the Mongolian state, which united numerous tribes of nomadic pastoralists and hunters. The establishment of the Horde yoke, its influence on Russia.

The problems of the Tatar-Mongol yoke in Russian historical literature have caused and continue to cause different assessments and points of view.
Even N.M. Karamzin noted that the Tatar-Mongol domination in Russia had one important positive consequence - it accelerated the unification of the Russian lands and the revival of the united Russian state. This gave rise to some later historians to talk about the positive meaning of the yoke.
Another point of view was that the Mongol-Tatar domination had extremely serious consequences for Russia, since it threw it away in the development of 250 years. This approach provided an explanation for all subsequent problems in the development of Russia.
The third point of view is presented in the works of some modern historians, who say that there was no Tatar-Mongol yoke at all. They believe that the relations of the Russian principalities with the Golden Horde were more reminiscent of allied relations: Russia paid tribute (and its size was not so great), and the Horde, in return, ensured the security of the borders of the weakened and scattered Russian principalities.
It seems that each of these points of view covers only part
Problems.
It is necessary to separate the concepts of "invasion" and "yoke": in the first case, we are talking about the Batu invasion, which ruined Russia, and about those acts of intimidation that the khans took from time to time against the rebellious princes; in the second - about the very system of relations between the Russian and Horde authorities and territories.
The Russian lands were considered by the Horde as part of their own territory, which had a certain degree of independence.
Russia turned out to be deprived of its former independence: the princes could rule only by receiving a "label" for reigning; the khans encouraged numerous conflicts and strife between the princes; striving to get these "labels", the princes were ready to take any steps, which gradually changed the very atmosphere in the power structures of the Russian lands (which was preserved even after the fall of the yoke); the principalities were obliged to pay quite a significant tribute to the Horde (even those lands that were not captured by the Horde paid it); many cities were devastated and no longer rebuilt; when preparing for new campaigns, the khans demanded from the Russian princes not only new money, but also soldiers; finally, the "live commodity" from the Russian lands was a valuable commodity in the slave markets of the Horde.
At the same time, the khans did not encroach on the position of the church - they, unlike the German order knights, did not prevent the subordinate population from believing in those gods to which they were accustomed. This made it possible to preserve, despite the most difficult conditions of foreign domination, national customs, traditions, mentality.

The economic development of the Russian lands after a period of complete defeat in the middle of the century recovered quite quickly, and from the beginning XIV v. began to develop rapidly. From the same time, stone construction in cities was revived, the restoration of temples and fortresses destroyed during the invasion began. An established and fixed tribute was soon no longer a heavy burden on the manufacturer. And since the time of Ivan Kalita, a significant part of the collected funds began to be left for the internal needs of the Russian lands themselves.
After the first persecutions associated with resistance to the invaders, the Russian Orthodox Church was forced to act in new conditions. Its pastors strove to preserve among the people those traditional features, without which it would have lost its appearance. With the accumulation of strength by the state, the voice of the church sounded more weighty. The transfer of the center of Russian Orthodoxy to Moscow in many ways made it the spiritual capital of all Russian lands.

Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation

Khabarovsk State Pedagogical University

Examination work number 1

According to Patriotic history

theme: Russia and the Golden Horde in the 13-15th centuries. Discussions about the influence of the Mongol-Tatar yoke on the development of the Russian lands.

Performed by a 1st year student of OZO Fine Art

Semenikhina Yulia Alexandrovna

Checked by: V.V. Romanova

Khabarovsk

Introduction.

At turning points in history, which has not yet become the past, but represents a turbulent present, references to ancient times are quite common - perhaps even traditional. At the same time, not only are parallels drawn, the events of different eras are compared, but attempts are made to see in the ancient deeds of ancestors the crops that are sprouting today. This is exactly the case with the sudden keen interest in the history of Russia in the 13th-15th centuries, that is, the period well known as the "Tatar yoke", "Tatar-Mongol yoke", "Mongol yoke". A return to a closer examination, and sometimes a revision of the past, is usually dictated not by one, but by several reasons. Why did the question about the yoke arise today, and why is it being discussed in a very large audience? First, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the initiators of its discussion were publicists, writers and the broadest layers of the intelligentsia. Professional historians looked at the discussion that unfolded since the end of the 80s of the last century calmly, silently and with some surprise. In their view, the controversial points on the problem remained only in the clarification of some subtleties and minor details, for the solution of which there are clearly not enough sources. But it suddenly turned out that all the interest is not so much in the yoke itself, as its influence on the entire course of development of our country, even specifically - today, as well as on the formation of the Russian national character, psychological makeup, adherence to certain ideals and the absence of different ( mostly positive) qualities in people. The Russian state, formed on the border of Europe with Asia, which reached its heyday in the 10th - early 11th century, at the beginning of the 12th century disintegrated into many principalities. This disintegration took place under the influence of the feudal mode of production. The external defense of the Russian land was especially weakened. The princes of individual principalities pursued their own separate policy, reckoning primarily with the interests of the local feudal nobility and entered into endless internecine wars. This led to the loss of centralized control and to a strong weakening of the state as a whole.

II ... Russia and Golden Horde at 13-15.

1. Battle of Kalka.

In the spring of 1223, one of the largest armies ever deployed in Eastern Europe gathered at the crossings on the Dnieper. It included regiments from the Galicia-Volyn, Chernigov and Kiev principalities, Smolensk squads, "the whole land of Polovtsia." The main forces of the Mongol army remained in Asia with Genghis Khan. The auxiliary army of Jebe and Subedei was far inferior in number to the Russian-Polovtsian army. Moreover, it was thoroughly shabby during the long hike. The Mongols tried to split the allied army opposing them. They offered the Russian princes to attack the Polovtsians together and take possession of their herds and property. Without entering into negotiations, the Russians killed the ambassadors. The Mongols managed to win over to their side only the "brodniks", the Orthodox population of the Don, who were mortally at odds with the Polovtsians.

The weakness of the allied army was the lack of a unified command. Neither of the older princes was willing to obey the other. The true leader of the campaign was Mstislav Udaloy. But he could only dispose of the Galician and Volyn regiments.

When the Mongol guard detachment appeared on the left bank of the Dnieper, Mstislav Udaloy crossed the river and defeated the enemy. The leader of the detachment was captured and executed. Following the Galician prince, the entire army crossed to the left bank of the Dnieper. After the transition, which lasted 8 or 9 days, the allies reached the Kalka (Kalmius) river in the Azov region, where they met the Mongols.

Mstislav Udaloy acted as bravely on the Kalka River as on the Dnieper. He crossed over Kalka and began the battle, but at the same time he did not warn of his decision either the Kiev or the Chernigov princes. The numerical superiority of the allies was so great that Mstislav decided to defeat the Mongols on his own, not sharing the honor of victory with other princes. By his order, princes Daniil Volynsky, Oleg Kursky, Mstislav Nemoy moved into battle. The attack was supported by the Polovtsian patrol regiment with the commander Yarun at the head. At the beginning of the battle, the Russians pushed the Mongols back, but then came under attack from the main enemy forces and fled. The princes and commanders who led the attack, almost all survived, while the greatest losses were suffered by the regiments that remained on Kalka and fled after the unexpected blow of the Mongols. During the retreat, the light Polovtsian cavalry far outstripped the retreating Russian regiments. On the way, the Polovtsians robbed and beat the Russian warriors who had abandoned their weapons.

2. The beginning of the invasion.

Southern Russia suffered irreparable losses on Kalka and did not recover from the defeat. These circumstances determined the military plans of the Tatar-Mongols.

After the disaster on Kalka, the Russian princes did not think of a major offensive that would save Russia from the devastating raid of the Asian horde. In Russia, few could assess the extent of the danger hanging over the country. The nomads, in the eyes of the Russians, were "non-homogenous". The Battle of Kolomna was one of the largest in the entire time of Batu's invasion. The Mongols operated in unusual conditions for them - in the forests covered with snow. Their army slowly moved into the depths of Russia on the ice of frozen rivers. The cavalry lost mobility, which threatened the Mongols with disaster. Each warrior had three horses. A herd of hundreds of thousands of horses gathered in one place could not be fed in the absence of pasture. The Tatars had to unwillingly disperse their forces. The chances of success for the resistance increased. But Russia was seized with panic.

The Vladimir regiments thinned considerably after the Kolomna battle, and the Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich did not dare to defend the capital. Dividing the remaining forces, he fortunately retreated troops to the north, and left his wife and son Vsevolod with the voivode boyar Peter Oslyadjukovich in Vladimir.

The Tatars began the siege of Vladimir on February 3, 1238. He hoped to lure the Russians out of the fortress, the Mongols brought the youngest son of Prince Yuri, who was captured by them, to the Golden Gate. In view of the small number of the garrison, the voivode rejected the offer of a sortie. On February 6, the Mongols "more often decorate the forests and stave vices until the evening." On the next day of dinner, they broke into the New City and set it on fire. Vsevolod's family locked themselves in the stone Assumption Cathedral, while the prince himself tried to enter into an agreement with the Tatars. According to the South Russian chronicle, Vsevolod left the city with a small squad, carrying with him "gifts of many," the gifts did not soften Mevgu Khan. His soldiers broke into Detinets and set fire to the Cathedral of the Dormition. The people who were there died in the fire. The survivors were robbed and taken prisoner. Prince Vsevolod was taken to Batu, who ordered to kill him "in front of him."

Prince Yuri fled to the north, sending messengers to different parts of the Suzdal region for help. Brother Svyatoslav and three nephews from Rostov brought their squads. Only Yaroslav did not heed his brother's call.

The Vladimir prince reliably took refuge from the Tatars, setting up a camp in a wooded area on the Sit River north of the Volga.

Batu sent the governor of Burundai in pursuit of Yuri. On March 4, 1238, the Mongols attacked the Russian camp. According to the Novgorod chronicle, the Vladimir prince managed to equip the voivode with a guard regiment, but he did it too late, when nothing could be corrected. The voivode set out from the camp, but immediately ran back with the news that the headquarters was surrounded. However, the South Russian and Novgorod chronicles emphasize that Yuri did not offer resistance to the Tatars. Mongolian sources confirm that there was actually no battle on the City River. The prince of that country, George the Elder, fled and hid in the forest, he was also taken and killed. The chronicles paint a picture of the total extermination of prisoners in the captured cities. In fact, the Mongols spared those who agreed to serve under their banners, and formed auxiliary detachments from them. So, with the help of terror, they replenished their army.

During February, the Mongols defeated 14 Suzdal cities, many settlements and graveyards.

3. Hike to southern Russia.

In 1239 the Mongols defeated the Mordovian land and burned Murom and Gorokhovets. At the beginning of 1239 they captured Pereyaslavl, a few months later - fell on Chernigov.

The feuds of the princes made Southern Russia an easy prey for the Mongols. After the flight of Mikhail of Chernigov, the Kiev table was occupied by one of the Smolensk princes, but he was immediately expelled by Daniel Galitsky. Daniel was not going to defend Kiev, but "rested the city to the thousand boyar Dmitr." The Tatars began the siege of Vladimir on February 3, 1238. He hoped to lure the Russians out of the fortress, the Mongols brought the youngest son of Prince Yuri, who was captured by them, to the Golden Gate. In view of the small number of the garrison, the voivode rejected the offer of a sortie. On February 6, the Mongols "more often decorate the forests and stave vices until the evening." On the next day of dinner, they broke into the New City and set it on fire. The courage of the defenders of Vladimir was attested by Mongol sources. They fought fiercely, and Meng-Kaan personally performed heroic deeds until he defeated them. Prince Vsevolod had the opportunity to defend himself in a stone detachment. But he saw the impossibility of confronting the main forces of the Mongols alone and, like other princes, tried to get out of the war as soon as possible. Vsevolod's family locked themselves in the stone Assumption Cathedral, while the prince himself tried to enter into an agreement with the Tatars. According to the South Russian chronicle, Vsevolod left the city with a small squad, carrying with him "gifts of many," the gifts did not soften Mevgu Khan. His soldiers broke into Detinets and set fire to the Cathedral of the Dormition. The people who were there died in the fire. The survivors were robbed and taken prisoner. Prince Vsevolod was taken to Batu, who ordered to kill him "in front of him."

In 1240 Batu and Kadan, the son of the Mongol emperor, laid siege to Kiev. In December 1240 Kiev fell. Boyar Dmitr, who was in charge of the defense, was wounded and taken prisoner. Batu spared his life "courage for his sake."

The war changed the face of the old boyars. The princely squads suffered catastrophic losses. The nobility of Varangian origin has disappeared almost entirely.

The princes who tried to defend Russia, for the most part, laid down their heads. Vladimir Prince Yuri died along with all his sons. His brother Yaroslav with six sons survived the invasion. One young son of Yaroslav, who was in Tver, died. The prince did not participate in the defense of the Russian land and did not defend his capital. As soon as Vatu's troops left the land, Yaroslav immediately occupied the grand-princely table in Vladimir. Following this, he attacked the Kiev principality.

The defeat of Russia by the Mongol-Tatars led to the fact that the onslaught of the German crusaders on the Novgorod and Pskov possessions intensified.

When Batu returned from the western campaign, Yaroslav in 1240 went to bow to him in Sarai. The establishment of Mongol rule allowed the prince to achieve a long-standing goal. Batu recognized Yaroslav as the oldest prince of Russia. In fact, the Horde recognized the legitimate claims of the Vladimir prince to the Kiev table. However, the southern Russian princes did not want to submit to the will of the Tatars. For three years, they stubbornly refused to bow to Bat in the Horde.

The forces of South Russia were undermined by the Tatar-Mongol pogrom and internal strife. The Horde imposed a tribute on Russia. In addition to monetary payments, the Mongols demanded that the Russian princes constantly send military detachments to serve the khan.

entered the Novgorod land. On February 20, they began the siege of Torzhok. For two weeks the Tatars tried to destroy the walls of the city with the help of sedimentation machines. The city was taken. The population was massacred.

Pereyaslavl was the last city that the Mongol princes took together.

4.Rus and the Horde. The reign of Alexander Nevsky .

If on the western borders the Russian people managed to defend their land from the encroachments of their neighbors, then the situation was different in relations with the conquerors from the East. Mongol conquerors ruled from the Pacific Ocean to the Danube. And in the lower reaches of the Volga, Khan Baty ordered to build the city of Sarai, which became the capital of the new state - Golden 0rdy. The Russian princes were subordinate to the Tatar khans, although Russia was not included in the actual Golden Horde territory. It was considered the "ulus" (possession) of the Sarai rulers. The headquarters of the main Mongol khan was located many thousands of miles away - in Karakorum. But over time, Sarai's dependence on Karakorum diminished. The local khans ruled their country quite independently. In the Horde, such an order was introduced when the Russian princes, in order to obtain the right to power in the principalities, had to receive a special khan's letter. It was called a shortcut. Trips for "labels" were accompanied by the presentation of rich gifts not only to the khan, but also to his wives, close officials. At the same time, the princes were demanded to fulfill conditions alien to their religion, sometimes humiliating. On this basis, dramatic scenes were played out in the Horde. Some Russian rulers refused to follow the prescribed order. For such a refusal, Prince Mikhail of Chernigovsky paid with his life. For the accepted torment in the name Orthodox faith he is canonized by the Russian Church. The stories of the legend about the courageous behavior of Michael in the Horde spread widely throughout Russia as evidence of the prince's loyalty to a high moral duty. Ryazan prince Roman Olegovich was subjected to brutal reprisals. His reluctance to change his faith caused the Khan's fury and his whirling. The prince's tongue was cut off, his fingers and toes were cut off, he was cut at the joints, the skin was flayed from his head, and she herself was planted on a spear. In Karakorum, Prince Yaroslav Vsevolodich, the father of Alexander Nevsky, was poisoned.

In 1252 Alexander Nevsky became the Grand Duke of Russia. He chose Vladimir as the capital, not Kiev. He saw the main danger in the Horde, and therefore tried not to aggravate relations with it. The prince understood that Russia was not in a position to resist both aggression from the West and a constant threat from the East. There is a legend that Prince Alexander rejected the Pope's proposals to accept Catholicism and the title of king. He remained faithful to Orthodoxy. At one time he said: "God is not in power, but in righteousness." This did not prevent him from responding to the strikes of neighboring Lithuania and the Baltic Germans. The Russian commander did not know defeats. The situation dictated its own laws. The proud Russian ruler also had to go to bow to the Horde rulers. But Alexander was in no hurry. Only after a notification from Batu, in which the conqueror of many lands celebrated the exploits of Alexander Nevsky, the Grand Duke of Russia went to the Horde. He was the only Russian ruler who had not yet been to the Horde. Baty made it clear that otherwise the Russian land would face new ruin from the Tatars. "Will you alone not submit to my dominion?" - the Khan of Alexander Nevsky asked menacingly. There was no choice. In the Horde, Alexander Nevsky was given a worthy welcome. Later, the Grand Duke was forced to visit the distant Karakorum. Otherwise, Prince Alexander would not have been able to keep his land intact. The Horde khans imposed a heavy tribute on Russia, which had to be paid in silver every year. Tatar tribute collectors (Baskaks) with military detachments settled in Russian cities. The population groaned from extortion and violence. The Sarai authorities conducted a population census to keep track of taxpayers (this was called “number, and those included in the census were called“ number people ”). Benefits were provided only to clergy. But to win over the Russian Orthodox Church the rulers of the Horde did not succeed. The khans of the Horde drove away many thousands of Russian people. They were forced to build cities, palaces and fortifications to do other work. Archaeologists have discovered several Russian settlements on the territory of the Golden Horde. The things found testified that these involuntary inhabitants kept the memory of their abandoned homeland, continued to be Christians, and built churches. The Horde authorities established a special Saraisko-Podonsk diocese for the Orthodox population. Despite the frightening events, the Russian people did not always come to terms with their position. Discontent in the country grew and resulted in open protests against the Horde. The Khans sent Punitive troops to Russia, which found it difficult to resist the scattered centers of resistance. All this was seen and understood by Alexander Nevsky. The time has not yet come when I could stand up for myself. Therefore, the Grand Duke tried to keep his fellow tribesmen from military action against the Horde. Saving Novgorod, as an Islet of the not ruined Russian land, he forced the Novgorodians to let the Tatar scribes of the population into the city.

The threat of the invasion of the Vladimir "Tumen" and the Tatars had the effect of Novgorod agreed to accept the Tatar "census" for the census (the Tatar officials were called the census officials who conducted the population census and determined the size of the Horde exit-tribute. It is believed that the Horde tried to streamline the collection of tribute in Russia. However, there is reasons to believe that the rulers of Sarai tried to extend the Mongolian military system to Russia). But as soon as the Tatar scribes arrived in the city and started the census, the lesser people - the "rabble" - again worried. Having gathered on the Sofia side, the veche decided that it was better to lay down their heads than to recognize the power of the conquerors of the Gentiles. Alexander and the Tatar ambassadors who fled under his protection immediately left the prince's residence on the Gorodishche and headed for the border. The departure of the prince was tantamount to breaking the world. In the end, supporters of Alexander Nevsky from among the Novgorod boyars persuaded the veche to accept his terms in order to save the Novgorod land from invasion and ruin.

In the end, supporters of Alexander Nevsky from among the Novgorod boyars persuaded the veche to accept his terms in order to save the Novgorod land from invasion and ruin.

The Horde failed to extend the order to Russia military service, in the Mongolian uluses. But the measures implemented by the Horde laid the foundation of the Basque system, more adapted to Russian conditions. Instead of Temniks and Thousands, specially appointed officials - Baskaks, who had military power at their disposal - began to rule Russia. The main Baskak kept his headquarters in Vladimir. He supervised the activities of the Grand Duke, ensured the collection of tribute and recruited soldiers into the Mongol army. In the middle of the XIII century. signs of the collapse of the Mongol empire were outlined and increasingly isolated from each other. The influx of military detachments from Mongolia to the Batu ulus stopped. The rulers of the Horde tried to compensate for the losses with additional sets of warriors in the conquered countries.

Prince Alexander Nevsky managed to achieve success in the Horde and limit the forced recruitment of troops only because of special circumstances. Many Russian lands and principalities escaped, Batu's invasion was not going to recognize the power of the Mongols. The rich and vast Novgorod land was one of them. During the defense of Torzhok, the Novgorodians put up fierce resistance to the Tatars. They later repulsed the invasion of the Livonian knights. It was impossible to bring Novgorod to its knees without war, and Prince Alexander suggested that the rulers of the Horde use the Vladimir "Tumens" against the Novgorodians.

The unwillingness of the weakened Russia to fight the Horde was revealed quite clearly when the speech of Andrei Yaroslavich, brother of A. Nevsky, against the horde ended in complete failure. His army was defeated, and the prince himself fled to Sweden. The invasion of foreigners inflicted heavy damage on the economy of Russia. Some important industries (metalworking, construction, jewelry, etc.) were frozen for a long time. The news of Batu's death caused an exhalation of relief in the Russian Lands. Moreover, in 1262 there were uprisings in all the Russian Grads, during which Tatar tribute collectors were beaten and driven out. Alexander Nevsky, foreseeing the dire consequences of these events, decided to visit the Horde in order to prevent the coming bloody retribution.

In 1258, the Mongols defeated the Lithuanians. The appearance of the Tatars in Lithuania worsened the position of Novgorod. In the winter of 1259, the Novgorod ambassadors, who traveled to Vladimir, brought the news that there were regiments on the Suzdal border, ready to start a war. The threat of the invasion of the Vladimir "Tumen" and the Tatars had the effect of Novgorod agreed to accept the Tatar "census" for the census (the Tatar officials were called the census officials who conducted the population census and determined the size of the Horde exit-tribute. It is believed that the Horde tried to streamline the collection of tribute in Russia. However, there is reasons to believe that the rulers of Sarai tried to extend the Mongolian military system to Russia). The Horde did not succeed in extending the orders of military service to Russia, in the Mongol uluses. But the measures implemented by the Horde laid the foundation of the Basque system, more adapted to Russian conditions. Instead of Temniks and Thousands, specially appointed officials - Baskaks, who had military power at their disposal - began to rule Russia. The main Baskak kept his headquarters in Vladimir. He supervised the activities of the Grand Duke, ensured the collection of tribute and recruited soldiers into the Mongol army.

By the beginning of the 1260s, the Golden Horde not only stood out in and entered into a protracted and bloody war with the Mongol state of Hulagu, formed after the conquest of Persia and the final defeat of the Arab Caliphate. The collapse of the Mongol Empire and the war between the uluses tied the forces of the Horde and limited its interference in the internal affairs of Russia.

II ... The influence of the Mongol-Tatar yoke on the development of the Russian lands.

Frequent forays into Russia contributed to the creation of a unified state, as Karamzin said: "Moscow owes its greatness to the khans!" Kostomarov emphasized the role of the khan's labels in strengthening the power of the grand duke. At the same time, they did not deny the influence of the ruinous campaigns of the Tatar-Mongols on the Russian lands, the collection of heavy tribute, etc. Gumilev, however, painted in his research a picture of good-neighborly and allied relations between Russia and the Horde. Soloviev (Klyuchevsky, Platonov) assessed the impact of the conquerors on the internal life of ancient Russian society as insignificant, with the exception of raids and wars. He believed that the processes of the second half of the 13-15th century either followed from the tendencies of the previous period, or arose independently of the Horde. Briefly mentioning the dependence of the Russian princes on the khan's labels and tax collection, Soloviev noted that there is no reason to recognize the significant influence of the Mongols on the Russian internal administration, since we do not see any traces of it. For many historians, an intermediate position - the influence of the conquerors is regarded as a noticeable, but not decisive, development and unification of Russia. The creation of a single state, according to Grekov, Nasonov and others, was not due to, but in spite of the Horde, from the point of view of the Mongol yoke in modern historical science: Traditional history considers it as a disaster for the Russian lands. Another, interprets the invasion of Batu as an ordinary raid of nomads. Supporters of the traditional point of view extremely negatively assess the impact of the yoke on the most diverse aspects of life in Russia: there was a massive displacement of the population, and with it the agricultural culture to the west and northwest, to less convenient territories with a less favorable climate; the political and social role of cities is sharply reduced; increased power of the princes over the population. The invasion of nomads was accompanied by massive destruction of Russian cities, the inhabitants were ruthlessly destroyed or taken prisoner. This led to a noticeable decline in Russian cities - the population decreased, the life of the townspeople became poorer, and many crafts fell into decay. The Mongol-Tatar invasion dealt a heavy blow to the basis of urban culture - handicraft production. Since the destruction of cities was accompanied by massive withdrawals of artisans to Mongolia and the Golden Horde. Together with the artisan population of the Russian city, they lost their centuries-old production experience: the craftsmen took their professional secrets with them. Complex crafts disappear for a long time, their revival began only 15 years later. The ancient craftsmanship of enamel has disappeared forever. Became poorer appearance Russian cities. The quality of construction has also dropped significantly since then. The conquerors inflicted no less heavy damage on the Russian countryside and the rural monasteries of Russia where the majority of the country's population lived. The peasants were robbed by all Horde officials, and numerous khan's ambassadors, and simply robber bands. The damage caused by the Monolo-Tatars to the peasant economy was terrible. Dwellings perished in the war and outbuildings... Working cattle were captured and driven into the Horde. The damage inflicted on the national economy of Russia by the mono-Tatar and conquerors was not limited to devastating robberies during the raids. After the establishment of the yoke, huge values ​​left the country in the form of "tribute" and "requests". The constant leakage of silver and other metals had dire consequences for the economy. There was not enough silver for trade, there was even a "silver hunger". The Mongol-Tatar conquests led to a significant deterioration in the international position of the Russian principalities. Ancient trade and cultural ties with neighboring states were forcibly severed. Trade fell into decay. The invasion dealt a strong destructive blow to the culture of the Russian principalities. The conquests led to a long decline in Russian chronicle writing, which reached its dawn by the beginning of the Batu invasion. The Mongol-Tatar conquests artificially delayed the spread of commodity-money relations, the subsistence economy did not develop.

Conclusion

Thus, the origin and development of the Golden Horde had a strong influence on the development of the Russian state, because for many years its history tragically intertwined with the fate of the Russian lands, became an inseparable part of Russian history.

While the Western European states, which were not attacked, gradually passed from feudalism to capitalism, Russia, torn apart by the conquerors, retained the feudal economy. The invasion caused the temporary backwardness of our country. Thus, the Mongol-Tatar invasion can in no way be called a progressive phenomenon in the history of our country. After all, the rule of the nomads lasted almost two and a half centuries, and during this time the yoke managed to put a significant imprint on the fate of the Russian people. This period in the history of our country is very important, as it predetermined the further development of Ancient Rus.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

1. Egorov V.L. "Golden Horde Myths or Reality" ed. knowledge Moscow 1990

2. Grekov B.I. The world of history: Russian lands in the 13-15th centuries M., 1986

3. Kuchkin V.A. Alexander Nevsky - statesman and commander of medieval Russia - National history... 1996

4. Ryazanovsky V.A. Questions of history 1993 # 7

5. Skrynnikov RG Russian history 9-17 centuries M .; published by the whole world 1997

Scientists have long disagreed on the interpretation of the influence of the Tatar-Mongol yoke on the history of Ancient Russia. Some scholars sincerely believe that there was actually no invasion, and the Russian princes simply turned to the nomads for protection. In those days, the country was weak and not ready for serious wars with Lithuania or Sweden. The Tatar-Mongol yoke carried out the protection and patronage of the Russian lands, preventing the invasions of other nomads and the development of wars.

One way or another, but in 1480 the Tatar-Mongol rule in Russia came to an end. It is necessary to characterize in the most detailed way the role of the yoke in the history of the state, paying attention to both positive and negative aspects.

Positive and negative influence of the Tatar-Mongol yoke

Sphere of life of society and state	Positive influence of the yoke	Negative aspects of the influence of the Mongol yoke
Cultural sphere of life	the vocabulary expanded, because Russian people began to use foreign words from the Tatar language in constant everyday life. The Mongols also changed the perception of culture itself, introducing aspects that were traditional for themselves. during the domination of the Tatar-Mongol yoke in Ancient Russia, the number of monasteries and Orthodox churches increased.	culture developed much more slowly than before, and literacy completely fell to the lowest rates in the history of Ancient Rus. the architectural and urban development of the state was inhibited. more and more problems with literacy were encountered, the annals were unstable.
The political sphere of the life of the state.	The Mongol yoke defended the territory of Ancient Rus, preventing wars with other states. Despite the system of labels used, the Mongols allowed the Russian princes to preserve the hereditary nature of the transfer of power.	Veche traditions that existed in Novgorod and testify to the development of democracy were destroyed. The country preferred to be equal to the Mongolian way of organizing power, leaning towards its centralization. during the control of the Tatar-Mongol yoke over the territory of Ancient Russia, it was not possible to achieve the separation of a single ruling dynasty. the Mongols artificially supported fragmentation, and Ancient Rus stalled in political development, lagging behind other states for several decades.
Economic sphere of life of the state	There are no positive aspects of the influence of the yoke on the economy.	The most painful thing for the country's economy was the need to pay a regular tribute. after the invasion and establishment of the power of the Tatar-Mongol yoke, 49 cities were ruined, and 14 of them were never able to rebuild. stalled the development of many crafts, in fact, as well as the development of international trade.
Impact on public consciousness	Scientists fall into two camps on this issue. Klyuchevsky and Soloviev believe that the Mongols did not have a significant impact on public consciousness. All economic and political processes, in their opinion, followed from the trends of previous periods.	On the contrary, Karamzin believed that the Mongol yoke had a huge impact on Ancient Russia, having achieved a complete economic and social inhibition in the development of the state.

Conclusions on the topic

Of course, it was impossible to deny the impact of the Tatar-Mongol yoke. The people of the Mongols were feared and hated, largely due to the fact that representatives of the Tatar-Mongol yoke tried to change the state according to their own model. At that time, the Mongols even dreamed of implanting their religious system on the inhabitants of Ancient Russia, but they actively resisted this, giving preference only to Orthodoxy.

In addition, the influence of the Tatar-Mongol yoke affected the establishment of the future system of power. Gradually, the power in the country became centralized, and the rudiments of democracy were completely destroyed. Thus, the oppressive, eastern model of government flourished on the territory of Russia.

After liberation from the yoke in 1480, the country found itself in a deep economic crisis, from which it got out only decades later. Ahead of the state were the Troubles, imposture, the change of the ruling dynasty and the flourishing of autocracy.