Tracing the origins of modern wars, we can conclude that they are based on two factors: the emergence of unitary states, with their tendency towards centralization; stability in the development of industry and trade, control of all income and ... the invention of the bayonet. The first of these factors made it possible - or even inevitable - to organize regular armies on a permanent basis. The second allowed the use of these armies using strategies and tactics corresponding to the new types of weapons that were put into practice.
In a relatively short period of time, the whole art of war has completely changed. Wars no longer began either with a convention of gentlemen with servants and vassals at a certain place, or with arming and equipping detachments of barely trained militias. Yes, and weapons did not begin to be forged only after the start of the war - it was already at the ready, sharpened and cleaned, next to the hand of its owner. And the military commander no longer looked around the future battlefield with a sharp look, choosing a better place where a mass of pikemen should be placed to cover the ranks of shooters. Now fire and ramming were combined into one. And the officers were no longer worried that their units of shooters could be scattered by the cavalry, if they were without cover for the forest of peaks. Now, figuratively speaking, every musket has grown a steel point for itself and every musketeer has become a pikeman.
When the adoption of the improved flintlock musket in European armies was added to this amazing innovation, firepower on the battlefield became a decisive factor. Gone are the long burning fuses, so dependent on wind and rain. And the temperamental wheel locks with their keys for the factory and clamping springs also went there. Now the musket, pistol and carbine all had the same mechanism, which could be kept in working order with the simplest tools. At the same time, not only did the rate of fire increase, but the elimination of pikemen made it possible to double the number of muskets in combat formations. Steady but constant progress was also made in regard to the design and production technology of artillery pieces, as a result of which this branch of service gradually became more and more mobile.
These were all new tools of warfare that awaited the emergence of great generals and brilliant soldiers of the 18th century. And these great commanders appeared in multitudes: Charles XII, Marlborough, Eugen, Sachs, Clive, Wolf, Washington, Suvorov and a whole galaxy of military leaders who wore the tricolor cockade. Their fate and glory, gained by the soldiers they led, became part of the military traditions of their peoples. But if an impartial judge of military merit were asked to name the general and soldier who deserved the highest reputation in this century, he would not hesitate to choose Frederick II - called the Great - and his incomparable Prussian army.
This choice of his would not mean a dismissive attitude towards the generals and soldiers mentioned above. Frederick was not as successful on the battlefield as the Duke of Marlborough; Nor was he more courageous than Charles XII. His Prussians were no more brave than the red-coated warriors at Fontenoy, no more resilient than the hardy peasants of Count Alexander Suvorov, nor more patriotic than those soldiers of Washington's army who died and froze to death at Valley Forge. But as a war machine trained to march and fire, maneuver and attack faster and better than any soldier past or present, they were unmatched. And the man who led them - statesman, poet, strategist, social reformer, philosopher and organizer - was, beyond comparison, one of the greatest military leaders of all time.
The rise of Prussia is an excellent example of the potential power contained in a small semi-militarist state, ruled by able and hardworking people who think and care only about the security and strengthening of their state. The history of Prussia as a state, in fact, begins only in 1701, when Frederick I, Margrave of Brandenburg, crowned himself as King of Prussia. But long before that, the rulers of Brandenburg, with the help of wars, marriages and treaties, managed to maintain the integrity of their lands, and from time to time even increase them. This policy found its most striking expression during the reign of the previous Margrave Friedrich-Wilhelm, who became famous for his major victory over the Swedes at Fehrbellin and was known as the “Great Elector” (the Margraves of Brandenburg were one of nine princes who had the right to elect the emperor of the Great Roman Empire of the German nation) . Firmly convinced that a strong army was as essential in diplomacy as it was on the battlefield, the margrave wielded his sword as well as his pen. With his reasonable rule and the course towards religious tolerance in the country, he not only earned the love of his people (a rather unusual feeling in Germany of those days), but also attracted thousands of Protestant emigrants from France and Holland (who eventually became the purebred Teutonic ancestors of the master race) to the country) .
Under Frederick, the army continued to increase in numbers, and on the fields of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Prussian troops gained an enviable reputation.
In 1713 he was succeeded by his son, Friedrich Wilhelm. This monarch remained in history as a fanatical despot - rude and cruel, with an unbalanced disposition - but at the same time as a major organizer and extraordinary worker on the throne, fanatically devoted to the idea of the rise of the Hohenzollerns and the expansion of the power of Prussia. The finances he had amassed through the austerity he introduced in every area of public administration - including the costs of the royal court (the queen was forced to make do with only one court lady) - he spent mainly on the army. Its strength was increased from 50,000 to 80,000, recruited mainly through forced recruitment. Rogue recruiters and rogue gangs became as commonplace in all Prussian dominions as they had been in English ports during the war, and any gap between these methods of recruiting new recruits into the army was filled by some form of conscription. All aristocrats were required to serve as officers, which tied the feudal nobility to the crown with close and rigid military ties. Their young sons attended military schools, and this cadet corps of young cadets was a personnel reserve for the officers of the ever-increasing army. His special hobby, which he indulged in with all his passion, was a regiment of giant grenadiers, whom he lured with money or even kidnapped from all the countries of Europe. According to General Fuller, an Italian abbot much taller than average was kidnapped while he was celebrating mass in one of the Italian churches. Tall girls obtained in the same way were to become worthy friends of these monster warriors. These "long guys" beloved by Frederick never made it to the battlefield, and as one of his first decrees, Frederick II disbanded this extremely expensive collection.
As one would expect from such a diligent and hardworking monarch, there were fourteen princes and princesses in the royal family. But death does not see any difference between a prince and a beggar, and only the fourth son of the king, Karl-Friedrich, became the heir to the throne - and, as you can see, this title was more of a burden to him than a joy. Friedrich Wilhelm, who allowed himself to beat even the queen with a cane, not to mention any of the subjects who fell under his hot hand, whether it be the chancellor of the empire or a lackey, did not spare the rod for raising his children. Unfortunately, the sensitive child who was destined by fate to become the heir to the throne was the exact opposite of what, in the opinion of a good king, a future ruler should be. Few children had such a difficult childhood as the young Karl-Friedrich. Severe floggings, a half-starved existence, insults, humiliations and deliberate cruelty accompanied him until the very day of his father's death. Twice the king, in a blind rage, almost killed him - once he tried to strangle him with a curtain cord, and another time, the blade of his father's sword was barely able to be taken away from the boy.
Driven almost to madness by such treatment, the young prince conceived an escape. His plan reached the ears of his father, and the young man was put under arrest, convicted of desertion, and, at the insistence of his father, sentenced to death. Only the intervention of many famous personalities, including the emperor himself, prompted the old tyrant to pardon his son. The prince, however, was forced to attend the execution of his closest friend, a young lieutenant who had assisted him in preparing his escape.
Prussian Mounted Grenadier
It seems like a miracle that, having such a monster as a father, the young prince retained in his character the moderation and common sense that he usually showed in relation to those with whom he associated. His actions as a statesman, on the contrary, were marked by such a stamp of cynicism, ruthlessness, deceit and outright fraud, which was rarely found even among the crowned heads of Europe.
But a thorough understanding of everything related to the Prussian dominions, from the construction of dams to the breeding of pigs - and all this knowledge was hammered into a young man who resisted such knowledge by force or by force - gave the young prince such knowledge of his future kingdom that rarely any monarch could boast. In addition, a strong sense of affection and respect gradually arose between the prince and his people - which will be a very important factor when the kingdom is almost conquered by enemies.
In the last years of the old king's reign, a kind of truce was struck between father and son, who, in fulfillment of his duty as future monarch, married the bride chosen for him, and began to show interest and even zeal in the study of the various imperial aspects of the Prussian state. He was allowed to have his own small court at his Rheinsberg castle. Here he immersed himself in his literary pursuits, playing the flute and indulging in philosophical reflections with his friends, many of whom were French. (It was this Francophilia that sometimes drove his father into an almost uncontrollable rage.) Such a hedonistic existence, which Frederick often said was the happiest period of his life, deceived many of his contemporaries, who envisioned the flowering in Prussia of a great new era of culture and enlightenment. when the young poet and philosopher inherits the throne. How wrong they were!
Only six and a half months after his ascension to the throne, he deliberately dragged the kingdom into war. The conflict that Frederick so cold-bloodedly started did not arise from a misunderstanding or from a fit of anger from the young monarch. On the contrary, it was a deliberate and calculated act of a man who carefully weighed all the chances. And the stimulus that most motivated him to take this step was the very foundations on which the Prussian state was built: a sound and healthy financial system and an army. Thanks to the strict financial measures of his father, the treasury was full of money, and the army was a brilliantly organized force of 80,000 men, drilled as a soldier had never been drilled.
Prussian infantryman
The drill in the army was so severe—with whippings, beatings, and other forms of corporal punishment given for the slightest breach of discipline or delay in carrying out orders—that participation in combat was seen as a blessed relief. No soldier in those days was treated otherwise than a being of a distinctly lower class, but the relationship between the ignorant, rude, narrow-minded nobility and the even more ignorant peasantry, from which the rank and file of the Prussian army was formed, was, as far as one can tell, especially bad ones. For the officers, the Prussian soldier was not a human being, but a piece of clay dressed in a blue uniform, which had to be beaten and drilled into an insensitive robot, incapable of independent thinking. (“If my soldiers start thinking,” Friedrich once remarked, “there will not be a single one left in the ranks.”) His own position on the soldiers and the relationship between officers and privates was as follows: “All that should be given to a soldier is to instill in him a sense of the honor of the uniform, that is, the highest reverence for his regiment, which stands above all other armed forces in the country. Since the officers will have to lead him towards the greatest dangers (and he cannot be driven by a sense of pride), he must feel more fear of his own officer than of the danger to which he is exposed.
The brilliantly trained Prussian soldier, however, was not to be squandered unnecessarily. He was a pawn in a great war game and in power politics, and one that is difficult to replace. Friedrich wrote: "To shed the blood of a soldier when it is not necessary is to lead him to slaughter inhumanly." On the other hand, like any good general, he did not skimp on throwing them into battle when it served his purpose, and then the soldier's blood flowed like a river.
No matter how inhumane the Prussian system of drill and combat training was, it gave great advantages on the battlefield. The tactics of that time did not at all encourage the personal initiative of a soldier or officer - on the contrary, it demanded unconditional obedience to the will of a superior commander and literally automatic execution of an order given. The movements of loading and firing weapons were repeated countless times until the soldier performed them with machine-like precision under any circumstances. Close formation maneuvers, with an emphasis on movement speed and formation maintenance, were practiced until the very day of battle, when complex movements were carried out already in the smoke and confusion of battle, when cannonballs mowed down the ranks of soldiers, and half of the officers and sergeants were killed.
The Prussian cavalry - all large men on strong and hardy horses - was trained in accordance with the views on the tactics of the cavalry, which then dominated Europe, that is, moving in a continuous horse avalanche and advancing at a slow trot, firing from pistols and carbines. This did not suit Frederick's style of fighting, and after his first military campaign, he retrained his horsemen to maneuver at high speed and attack with all available forces with sabers in their hands. The use of firearms by riders in the saddle was prohibited, and weapons and equipment were lightened. All possible measures were taken to ensure that the cavalry could move faster, while maintaining the established formation and alignment in the ranks.
A contemporary, talking about the excellent state in which Frederick brought his cavalry, wrote: “Only in Prussia is there such a situation in which the cavalry and their officers have such confidence, such skill in handling their horses that they literally merge with them and revive in memory myths about centaurs. Only there can one see how sixty or eighty squadrons, each of which has from 130 to 140 cavalry, maneuver so smoothly that the entire cavalry flank can be perfectly controlled on the battlefield. Only here can one see how 8,000 or 10,000 cavalry rush in a general attack at a distance of several hundred yards and, having struck, immediately stop in perfect order and immediately begin the next maneuver against a new line of enemy troops that has just appeared on the field. battle."
In introducing this stunning change in the accepted tactics of the cavalry, Frederick had the full cooperation of two cavalry generals, Seydlitz and Ziethen, who directly led the Prussian cavalry from victory to victory, and completely discredited the old methods. Another military author of the same time wrote: “I have never seen anything like this before, but in the course of the fighting, before my eyes, squadrons relying on their firearms were repeatedly overturned and defeated by squadrons attacking at speed and not firing.”
Colonel George Taylor Denison, a Canadian author, admitted in his "History of the Cavalry": "Never in ancient or modern history, not even in the wars of Hannibal or Alexander the Great, were such brilliant operations performed by cavalry that could be compared with the deeds of cavalry Frederick the Great in his last wars. The secret of their success lay in the careful training of the individual soldier, in the constant maneuvers of large masses of cavalry, in the confidence in the saber and in the fiery energy, and also in the careful prudence of the great military leaders who commanded it.
He also mentions one of Frederick's notes in the margin of his memorandum on cavalry tactics. "N. C. If a soldier is found to be refusing to do his duty or wishes to run away, the first officer or non-commissioned officer who notices this should hit him with his saber ”- a healing measure that has been maintained in the name of maintaining discipline from the very beginning of history and appears to be maintained in the future. One coward can drag an entire company with him, and an unreliable company can cause defeat in battle. Dealing with a cowardly soldier right on the battlefield is a painful decision that any officer or non-commissioned officer may have to make at one moment. There are times, however, when even the fear of death cannot keep people in the ranks (which is largely responsible for why most people still stay in the ranks, although all instincts tell them to run). At such moments, the realization that ahead of them, perhaps, an honorable death awaits, and behind - an inevitable, dishonorable death, keeps them in place.
The Prussian cavalry was divided into three types: cuirassiers, dragoons and hussars.
The cavalry has always, since the beginning of history, been divided into three more or less distinct groups - light, medium and heavy. Light cavalry was intended for reconnaissance, reconnaissance and fast attacks. Medium, more heavily armed and better protected by armor, still retained the speed of maneuver. Heavy - large warriors on large horses, often fully armored - were much slower, but defeated the enemy with a shock blow due to their mass. In the time of Frederick the Great, this division was further exacerbated by the use of firearms. There were cuirassiers who still retained the back and breastplate cuirass, who were armed with two huge pistols and a heavy broadsword; dragoons, both heavy and light, were armed with a short musket with a bayonet and a saber and were able to fight on foot if circumstances so required; mounted grenadiers, whose functions almost coincided with those of heavy dragoons; hussars - light cavalry - armed with a saber and an even shorter musket called a carbine; in some parts of the lancers, heavy and light.
Headdresses of the hussars "Dead Head" and the 2nd hussars
However, from the very beginning of such a variety of types of cavalry, there was an ever-increasing tendency (especially in Prussian units) to use light dragoons and hussars in the same ranks with regiments of heavy cavalry. This trend became particularly evident during the next century, and by the time the cavalry disappeared from the battlefield, there was almost no difference in armament, equipment and use between cavalry regiments of various types.
Friedrich's cuirassiers and dragoons were organized into regiments of five squadrons, consisting of two companies of seventy men each. Each regiment consisted of seventy-five officers and twelve trumpeters. The hussar regiments, which were light cavalry, consisted of ten squadrons each. The formation of the squadron, adopted on the eve of the Seven Years' War, consisted of two lines, and for the attack the regiment formed two lines, the squadrons in the first line were built at short intervals, and in the second, or reserve, line - in a freer order.
Since cavalrymen were often used in small groups, or picket lines, which offered great opportunities for desertion, the cavalry was recruited with a certain selection, with special preference for the sons of wealthy farmers or owners of small plots of land. In the event of a son's desertion, his parents were responsible for the loss of both the soldier and the horse.
To support the masses of cavalry in battle, Frederick created the first horse artillery units, light horse-drawn guns, and gun limbers with mounted gunners. This measure opened the way for new possibilities for cavalry tactics. For the first time, the firepower of the artillery was combined with the striking power of the attacking horsemen. Until that time, the attacking cavalry, up to the moment of direct contact with the enemy, was open to the fire of enemy artillery and suffered severe losses, sitting on horseback hour after hour, under the crushing fire of the enemy, not being able to answer it.
Artillery already played a prominent role in the wars of the 18th century, and Frederick's armies had a significant number of 3-, 6-, 12- and 24-pounder guns. Frederick also made extensive use of 18-pounder howitzers, which could send a projectile in a cantilevered trajectory over an obstacle, such as a hill, and hit enemy troops hiding behind it.
The artillery shell, however, although it appeared in the 16th century, did not change for the better - and was not capable of changes to such an extent as to become a decisive factor on the battlefield. The explosive charge in it was too small, and the fuses were too unreliable - to such an extent that the core sometimes exploded in the gun barrel or, more often, did not explode at all. These projectiles became effective only with the advent of rifled barrel guns firing cylindrical projectiles with percussion fuses. The main means of destruction was shrapnel, which remained so until the end of the American Civil War.
The infantry regiments of the Prussian army consisted of two battalions - each of them had eight companies. Of the latter, one company was a grenadier. True, the grenades themselves were now used only in the case of siege operations, but special companies, formed from the tallest and strongest warriors, nevertheless remained, although their personnel were armed with muskets. Such a company was considered the elite company of the regiment and often wore distinctive uniforms or special headgear. For combat, the battalions formed a battle formation three people deep.
The Prussian soldier was armed with a metal ramrod, although at that time other armies used ramrods made of wood. The weight and reliability of the metal ramrod gave advantages when loading, but only as a result of endless training, the Prussian infantry could fire five volleys per minute, while the command of other armies was happy if their soldiers managed to shoot twice in the same time.
Such clarity in the handling of weapons was rare in any armies, if at all it could be compared with the Prussian. It was achieved only in professional armies, with long-serving soldiers who spent a fair share of their lives on such drill. At the time of the Battle of Waterloo, the musket fire of the British infantry was considered the most deadly in the whole world. Military training required British soldiers to be able to load a musket and fire fifteen times over the course of three and three-quarters of a minute—that is, four times a minute. But even at this rate of fire, their fire could not match the rate of fire of Frederick's Prussians; except that the British shooting was somewhat more accurate, since the British soldiers were trained to aim before pulling the trigger.
The fire was carried out in squads, not in ranks, and began from both flanks of the battalion. When the commander, standing on the flank of the company, gave the command "Fire!", The commander of the next company commanded his subordinates "Get ready!" - and so to the center. When the two companies stationed in the center fired a volley, the flank ones were already finishing reloading their muskets and getting ready to fire. During the offensive, each company moved forward several steps before opening fire. Thus, the battalion's offensive consisted of successive advances of individual companies, slowly marching forward and belching fire and smoke at three-second intervals. At a distance of thirty paces from the enemy ranks, or at a greater distance, if the advanced rank lost formation under a hail of lead, a command was given, and the soldiers went on the offensive with attached bayonets.
It has already been said that the small arms of that period, that is, before the adoption of the rifled musket, was fully consistent with the tactics of that time. Or rather, it would be more accurate to say that the tactics of that period, like any other period of history, were determined by the weapons that existed at that time. By modern standards, the weapon looked rather primitive. The main weapon of the infantry was a smoothbore musket. Since this type of firearm was used by all countries until the second quarter of the 19th century, it makes sense to describe it in detail.
The flintlock gun, which replaced the matchlock and wheeled gun of the 17th century, was, in comparison with its predecessors, a much more efficient mechanism. His lock was more reliable, it could be much easier to maintain and repair. The charge was ignited by a flint fixed in the holder of the trigger, which struck sparks when the flint hit a notched steel plate called a grater. If the gun was properly loaded, and the flint in good condition (a soldier had spare flints. The British got three flints every sixty shots) and correctly set, the powder in the baiting shelf was dry, and the priming hole was not clogged with soot, the gun would serve its owner faithfully.
Musket "Brown Bess" with percussion flintlock
One officer complained in 1796 that "the unreliability of the musket, and in particular the cover of the bait shelf of his castle, leads to what the soldiers call a misfire. They happen so often that if you take any number of people at random, after ten or twelve shots you will find that at least a fifth of the cartridges have not been used. Consequently, one person out of five practically did not participate in the shelling of the enemy. This is what we see every day during the fighting again and again; I myself have repeatedly seen how, after the “fire” command, the soldiers try to shoot, but in vain ... ”.
Based on the number of operations required to fire a shot, we can say that a flintlock gun could be reloaded and made to fire a new shot fairly quickly; the duration of this process depended entirely on the preparedness and self-control of each individual soldier. The Tower system musket, which became world famous under the nickname "Brown Bess", was a weapon that was widely used in all armies. Like other examples of modern weapons, it has remained virtually unchanged since the beginning of the 18th century. Its weight was eleven pounds and four ounces, not counting the weight of the bayonet, while the spherical bullet itself weighed one ounce. The bullet, together with the powder charge, was stored in a paper cartridge, the end of which the soldier bit off before firing and, pouring part of the powder onto the seed shelf, poured the rest into the barrel. Then a bullet was driven all the way into the barrel with a ramrod. Leaving the barrel, the bullet followed in the direction that the last blow gave it when leaving the muzzle. With such internal ballistics, there was no need to talk about any accuracy of hitting at a distance further than a few meters. A single person at such a distance had a fairly significant chance of staying alive. At longer distances, accuracy dropped so quickly that at the turn of 137 meters, any hit was simply a miracle. A famous marksman, a major in the British Army during the days of the American Revolutionary War, wrote: “A soldier’s musket, if only its barrel is properly drilled and not curved, which happens quite often, makes it possible to hit a person’s figure at a distance of up to 73 meters - and sometimes up to 91.5 meters. But the truly exceptional loser will be that soldier who is wounded by an ordinary musket at a distance of 137 meters; as for shooting at a man at a distance of 183 meters, you might as well shoot at the moon and hope to hit it.”
In many ways, it was a pretty bad weapon. It is true that it was reliable and easy to use, and therefore was a very suitable companion for a strong and narrow-minded peasant armed with it. It also provided a very successful support for the bayonet, by which many battles were still decided, but as a firearm it left much to be desired.
If a soldier was equipped with a weapon whose effective range did not exceed 36.5 or 45.7 meters, then it is not surprising that in many attacks he went with an unloaded musket, using only the steel of his bayonet. There was, however, another reason for bayonet charges. It consists in the fact that it is not so easy to inspire large masses of people to such an extent as to induce them to go on the attack under heavy enemy fire, especially if they have already been in battle and suffered damage from this fire. Drums may rattle and officers may yell and brandish sabers, but this may not always overcome a certain hesitation in those in the front rank who must take the first step. Therefore, if the formation has already begun to move, it is essential that this movement should not be interrupted until contact with the enemy has been made. If the first rank stops for a salvo, there is always the possibility that the attack will turn into a skirmish, and the blow it delivers will lose its power.
World at WarReturning to Friedrich, it must be said that in May 1740, the old Friedrich-Wilhelm died and the essayist and poet, possessing a superbly drilled army and a tightly stuffed treasury, ended up on the throne. There was also a temptation in the form of a weak neighbor - and not only a weak one, but not even a neighbor, but a neighbor, and a beautiful one at that.
When the nominal head of the rather loose Holy Roman Empire, Charles VI, died in October 1740, he had no male heirs - only a daughter, Maria Theresa. An agreement was drawn up, called the Pragmatic Sanction, which guaranteed her succession. This treaty was recognized by all states, with the exception of Bavaria alone. Frederick, who was also bound by this highly important agreement, set his sights on the wealthy province of Silesia. He decided to capture her, justifying such an action with very shaky and half-forgotten rights. But for propaganda purposes, these rights were extracted from ancient acts and inflated in every possible way (the king was a master at such actions). He secretly admitted that "ambitions, interests and desires to inspire people to talk about me hastened the day when I decided to go to war."
The king sent a message to the archduchess with a proposal, in exchange for the legalization of his claims to the torn territories, to organize the defense of her remaining possessions from the encroachments of any other power. Such an offer, very reminiscent of the mafia offer of a "roof", was indignantly rejected, and the Austrians began to prepare for war. But Frederick threw thousands of his soldiers across the borders of Silesia so suddenly that the young archduchess only learned about it when that province of hers had already been captured. Completely unprepared for this turn of events, her troops stationed in Silesia were quickly withdrawn from there. The capture of Silesia had far-reaching consequences. To quote the English historian McCauley: “The whole world has taken up arms. All the blood that had been spilled in the war that raged furiously for many years and in every corner of the world fell on the head of Frederick, the blood of the soldiers' columns at Fontenoy, the blood of the mountaineers who fell in the massacre at Culloden. The misfortunes created by his evil trick have also seized those countries in which they did not even hear the name of Prussia; and, in order that he might plunder the neighboring regions, which he promised to protect, black people fought on the Coromandel coast, and red-skinned warriors scalped each other near the Great Lakes in North America.
Rarely has the career of an outstanding general begun so unfavorably as in the case of Frederick. The first big battle took place at Molwitz (April 10, 1741). The Prussian cavalry was then still not in the best shape that it subsequently achieved, so the blow of the more numerous Austrian cavalry drove them out of the battlefield. The king was convinced that the battle was lost, and hastily left the battlefield. Then the Austrian cavalry attacked again, this time at the center of the Prussian forces, but the gallant Prussian infantry under the command of the seasoned veteran, Marshal Schwerin, were hard to impress with any cavalry in the world. The brave Austrians attacked her five times, but each time they were driven back by musket fire. The Austrian infantry had no more success than the cavalry, and finally the marshal gave his soldiers the order to attack. In orderly rows, to the music of their orchestras, the Prussians moved on the enemy, and the Austrians, unable to stand it, retreated, leaving nine guns. The king, as Voltaire quipped, "covered himself with glory - and powder."
The war went on. Secret agreements were signed, separate peaces were concluded, invasions, retreats and betrayals were made. The Prussians won several significant battles - at Hotusitz, Hohenfriedberg and Kesseldorf, which raised the prestige of their weapons even higher. In addition, Silesia became a possession of the Prussian crown for a long time.
For 11 years (1745-1756) peace reigned in Prussia, and Frederick was able to devote himself to the problems of the country. Buildings and bridges were designed and erected, swamps were drained, agriculture was developed, industry was encouraged, the decayed Academy of Sciences was revived, and public education was expanded. As one might expect, much attention was paid to the army. Its strength increased to 160,000, and by the start of the Seven Years' War, the army was the most trained and equipped armed force in the world.
1 - cuirassier officer; 2 - broadsword; 3 - a sash with a tashka; 4 - cuirass from simple steel of an ordinary cuirassier
This famous conflict, during which Prussia was more than once on the verge of destruction, was a direct consequence of the role played by Frederick in the previous war. Maria Theresa could not forget and forgive the rejection of Silesia; France, although a traditional enemy of Austria, was concerned about the rise of Prussia (in addition, many of Frederick's scathing remarks were directed at Madame de Pompadour, then the true ruler of France). With his sharp remarks, he did not spare the Russian Empress Elizabeth; one of her nicknames given to her was "the papal witch". Maria was to regain Silesia; in exchange for France's help, Austrian possessions in the Netherlands were promised; the queen was to get East Prussia; Saxony was promised Magdeburg and Sweden with Pomerania. Thus, Frederick turned against himself all the states of the continent, but he could only count on the support of the English fleet and English money, since England automatically became an ally of France's opponents. In fact, the battles between the two powers never stopped in their overseas possessions - in India, Canada and the West Indies.
The insidious Friedrich, without waiting for all his opponents to unite, struck first. Leaving part of the troops to look after the Russians and Swedes, he invaded Saxony (in August 1756), took Dresden and defeated the Austrian army at Lobozitz. The following spring, he again defeated the Austrians, began to lay siege to Prague, and recklessly attacked an Austrian army, almost twice his own strength, at Kolin. Here the king suffered a serious defeat - he lost about 40 percent of the personnel of his army. After that, an unprecedented concentration of the armed forces of various states began with the aim of crushing Prussia. The Russians invaded Prussia, occupying a small part of their forces in Berlin, and received 300,000 thalers as a ransom for leaving it intact. Meanwhile, Frederick, maneuvering quickly, tried to check the advance of his opponents, but in the end came face to face with the combined Franco-Austrian army at Rosbach.
The French numbered about 30,000 soldiers in their ranks, significantly inferior in their fighting qualities to those who at one time marched to victories under the leadership of Moritz of Saxony. One of their own officers rather unkindly described them as "murderers well deserving of being broken on the wheel," and predicted that at the first shot they would turn their backs on the enemy and run from the battlefield. It is quite possible that the 11,000 soldiers of the Austrian troops were no better than their colleagues. Frederick was able to gather only 21,000 warriors, but they were all experienced veterans, and the king himself led them to fight.
Hussar sabers
The Battle of Rosbach (November 5, 1757), one of Frederick's most famous battles, took place on an open plain with two small hills that can hardly be called hills. The Prussians were just encamped right in front of them when they saw their opponents moving in large numbers in such a way as to attack the king's army in the flank and rear. The Prussian camp was immediately alerted, and the cavalry, thirty-eight squadrons under the command of Seydlitz, began to advance under the cover of hills to meet the enemy. The infantry and artillery followed her. The allies, deciding that these rapid movements meant the withdrawal of the Prussians, continued the offensive with three parallel columns. Now the attackers, not yet realizing it, exposed their unprotected flank to the Prussians. As soon as the dense columns were in front of low hills, Seidditz, whose squadrons were waiting for the enemy, hiding behind the hills, suddenly gave them the order to attack, crossing the hilltops. The enemy cavalry, taken by surprise, at the head of the columns, barely had time to turn around in battle formation when "the Prussian cavalry, advancing in close formation, like a wall, and with incredible speed" cut into their ranks. After a fierce battle, the squadrons of the Allied cavalry were driven back and put to flight. Deprived of cavalry flanking cover, the densely packed infantry columns came under heavy fire from the Prussian artillery, and the seven battalions of Prussian infantry, advancing down the slope, engaged the advanced Allied regiments. The infantry columns, having fallen under artillery fire and volleys of the advancing Prussian infantry, began to retreat in confusion. Unable to turn into battle formation, they huddled into a dense crowd when Seydlitz and his cavalry hit them in the rear. The allied troops faltered and fled, while Seydlitz's soldiers followed them with musket volleys in the back. Allied losses were 7,700, while the victors lost only 550.
In this battle, the superiority of Prussian military training was convincingly demonstrated. The speed with which the camp was alerted and built into columns (within half an hour), as well as the speed with which the Prussians moved, became Frederick's great advantage. The superiority of the Prussian cavalry was obvious. Not only did she win the initial bout, but she retained her discipline to such an extent that she was ready to strike the decisive blow at any moment. The artillery staff of a battery of eighteen heavy guns did much to frustrate all attempts by the enemy columns to attack up the hillside, in which they were greatly helped by the speed and effectiveness of the musket fire of seven infantry battalions (the only infantry units that took part in the battle from the Prussian side) .
A month later, the battle of Leuthen (December 5, 1757) took place, which became another brilliant example of Frederick's tactics and the courage of the Prussian soldiers. The balance of power under Leuthen was even more not in favor of the king - 33,000 against 82,000. The Austrian and Saxon forces were too stretched out, but covered by natural obstacles, the allies had about two hundred guns, mostly light. Frederick's plan was to move along the front of the enemy army and strike on its left flank, with a preliminary diversionary maneuver with a small force, which was supposed to look like a strike on the right flank. In accordance with this plan, the Prussian army approached the right flank of the Austrians in a solid formation, and then, finding itself under the cover of a small hill on the field, turned to the right, reorganized into two columns and quickly moved along the front of the Austrian troops. The Austrians, however, who did not seem to bother to follow the Prussian maneuvers, still continued to reinforce their right flank, expecting a blow to it. The Prussian columns, maintaining perfect alignment and distance, appeared on their left flank and reorganized from marching columns into a battle line. Each battalion carried a 6-pounder gun, and a battery of 10 heavy siege mortars was brought up along with the attacking columns.
Now these mortars began to destroy with their fire the notches of fallen tree trunks, with which the Austrians strengthened their front, after which the Prussian battalions went on the attack. They attacked in an oblique formation, known since the time of Epaminondas, in this case the battalions marched at a distance of fifty yards from each other and in such a way that the right flank of each of them was closer to the enemy, while the left seemed to be lagging behind. This attack swept through the Austrian positions from left to right. The Austrian reserves, located in the village of Leuthen, fought desperately; reinforcements approached from the right flank of the Austrians, and they made an attempt to level the front line. The mass of people concentrated here was so great that in some places the defenders stood a hundred people deep. Battalion after battalion of Prussians stormed the Austrian formation, but not before the reserve battalions were thrown into battle, the village was finally cleared of the Austrians. The offensive, supported by the fire of heavy guns, continued. The commander of the Austrian left flank abandoned all the cavalry concentrated here in a desperate attempt to beat back the stubborn advance of the Prussian infantry. But forty squadrons of Prussian cavalry, emerging from camouflaged hiding places, intercepted them with a blow from the front, flank and rear. The Austrian cavalry scattered, and the triumphant Prussians on their horses attacked the rear of the Austrian infantry. When the day began to decline, the Austrians broke and fled, pursued by the cavalry. Others began to throw down their weapons and surrender, the army ceased to exist as a fighting force. Austrian losses numbered up to 10,000 people, about 21,000 were captured, 116 guns, 51 banners and thousands of carts with supplies were captured. As if to add to this triumph, two weeks later Breslau surrendered to Friedrich, along with 17,000 soldiers and 81 guns.
“The battle of Leuthen,” wrote Napoleon, “is a masterpiece of march, maneuver and analysis. This alone would be enough to immortalize the name of Frederick and put him in the ranks of the greatest generals.
Prussian hussars of the era of Frederick the Great. Private and officer
But the continuous campaigns wore down the Prussian army. Many of the best parts fell on the battlefield; losses in the battles of Prague and Kolin were extremely heavy. Such victories as at Zorndorf (August 25, 1758), where the Prussians first had to experience the stamina and fighting spirit of the Russians, came at a high price. Along with the victories, at Kunersdorf (August 11, 1759), Frederick suffered a crushing defeat, losing about 20,000 people killed and wounded (almost 50 percent of the army) and 178 guns. Morale and discipline in the Prussian army continued to be excellent, but the veterans were largely replaced by newly recruited warriors or soldiers from enemy states, many of whom, after surrendering, were recruited en masse into the Prussian army. Although organized into fighting units with strict Prussian discipline, they were still not the kind of warriors who could calmly march like a parade in a rain of shrapnel and musket bullets or fire their muskets at a speed of five shots per minute. Discipline, caste spirit, and faith in their generals partly made up for the lack of training; and although desertion, that plague of all the armies of that period, became a serious problem, the command still managed to compensate for the loss of the rank and file. Moreover, these troops, although there were many new recruits among the rank and file, were still capable of making such attacks as at Torgau (November 3, 1760), when they stormed a dug-in enemy with six hundred guns, spewing a shower of buckshot on advancing, until out of six thousand grenadiers in one of the columns only six hundred remained on their feet.
Nevertheless, the war so depopulated the country that by the end of 1761 the Prussian army was reduced to 60,000 men. A complete catastrophe was prevented only by the death of the Russian tsarina and the accession to the throne of her heir, the Germanophile Peter III. This "worthy" monarch not only offered to conclude an immediate peace, but also returned Friedrich Pomerania, and also ordered that a Russian army of 18,000 people be placed at his disposal. With the news of this, Sweden immediately withdrew from the alliance. Saxony suffered a complete defeat, Austria and France were exhausted to the limit. The latter, in addition to defeats on the fields of Europe, lost Canada and India. Peace was finally concluded in 1763.
Prussia lay in ruins. According to contemporaries, four-fifths of all the men who served in the army during this time were killed or wounded, and a little more than half of the people who lived in them before the war remained in the cities. Nevertheless, the kingdom was able to survive this storm and even emerge victorious from the war. The whole power of Russia, France, Austria-Hungary, Sweden and Saxony was not enough to wrest even one acre of his country from the Prussian king. With forces numerically incomparably smaller than his opponents, he waged an unequal struggle for seven long years. Knowing the bitterness of accidental defeats and sometimes forced to retreat, he won many glorious battles. His fame eclipsed that of any other general of the time, and the slavish copying of everything Prussian by military figures around the world was just another testament to the reputation of the Prussian army and the Prussian soldier.
This soldier could be imperturbable and unimaginative; he may have lacked personal initiative, and without a firm guiding hand he was lost. But he had a habit of obedience and an innate fortitude that urged him to do his duty at any cost. To a large extent, the cruel system of Prussian drill also influenced the creation of this habit. Yes, she was extremely cruel, and non-commissioned officers were ruthless and knew their job; but something more than fear of punishment spurred columns of soldiers to attack at the Battle of Leuthen, singing the old German anthem to drums and flutes, or throwing the Prussian grenadiers over and over again on the blood-drenched hillsides near Torgau.
Prussia. The Prussian army of the 18th century deserves separate consideration. The army of Frederick the Great represents the extreme point of development, the highest achievement of the direction that military art took under Maurice of Orange. In some respects, the development of military art along this path was carried to the point of absurdity, and the further evolution of military art became possible only after the most severe shock introduced by the French Revolution, and the setting of evolution on an entirely new path. The very one-sidedness of the army of Frederick the Great, with its contempt for the masses, with its lack of understanding of moral forces, is very instructive, since it gives a picture of an almost laboratory experience of combat work under the lash of artificial, soulless soldiers. Superficial historians explained the impoverishment of Germany in the 17th and 18th centuries by its ruin in the Thirty Years' War. In fact, the material losses were not at all so significant as to throw back a flourishing country, with an extremely capable population of organization and work, two centuries ago. But as a result of the Thirty Years' War, Germany was politically fragmented by the art of Richelieu and Mazarin into hundreds of small states; the Germans were deprived of the opportunity to take part in trade with the colonies, since the world's routes under the bourgeois system were open only to merchants supported by military squadrons. Holland, owning the mouth of the Rhine, levied a tax for shipping on it; Sweden did the same with regard to the Oder; hundreds of customs blocked all the ways; the markets involuntarily had an almost exclusively local character. On this area of central Europe, mutilated by French policy, a state of a robber type, Prussia, began to take shape and grow. The policy and the whole structure of the harsh predatory state met, first of all, military requirements.By the end of the 30 Years' War, in 1640 Friedrich-Wilhelm, the Great Elector, came to the throne of Brandenburg; this Hohenzollern received the title of great because he learned from Wallenstein his politics and methods of government. Austria inherited from Wallenstein his army, with its anti-national, anti-religious, free traditions of the 16th century, with its non-state, dynastic character. The Hohenzollerns inherited from Wallenstein the idea of a military enterprise; only now it is not private entrepreneurs who become entrepreneurs, but the Electors of Brandenburg, who, due to the power of their army, are elevated to the rank of Prussian kings by the beginning of the 18th century. The war became their specialty, like a profitable item. The internal administration was organized in the likeness of Wallenstein's occupation administration. At the head of the county was the landrat, whose main task was to ensure that the county properly performed its functions to ensure military needs; the representatives of the population who were with him, as well as in the requisition commissions of Wallenstein, monitored the uniform distribution of duties and, not to the detriment of the requirements of the army, observed local interests. The district collegiums, which stood in the next instance above the landrats, had the same character of the military commissariat, and the nature of the main commissariat department certainly had at first the central department - the general commissariat; commissariat - the mother of the Prussian administration; only over time, in the central administration, cells of purely civilian competence were separated from the military administrative administration.
Growth of a standing army. The income of the Prussian kingdom consisted of taxes squeezed out of its population, as in an enemy country, from income from very significant and exemplary royal estates and from rent for the use of the Prussian army, as the subsidies of wealthy states, mainly Holland and England, for which Prussia agreed to take part in wars outside her interests. So, for the period 1688 - 1697, Prussia is sold to the maritime powers, to fight against Louis XIV, for 6545 thousand thalers. The robber state vigilantly followed misunderstandings between neighbors, intervened in other people's affairs at every opportunity, and gradually rounded its limits. The Prussian cities represented half of the military settlements, since if the number of the garrison in them reached a quarter of the population, then the other quarter was formed either by the families of officers or it found its livelihood by serving military needs.
Acquisition. In 1660, when, during the demobilization of the army after the intervention of Prussia, in the war between Sweden and Poland, it was decided from an army of 14-18 thousand, in addition to the garrison units, to keep field troops in the number of 4 thousand, the issue of a standing army was resolved in principle, and she began to grow gradually; it was completed by voluntary recruitment. But recruitment remained voluntary only in name during the reign of Frederick William I, who began to vigorously increase the army. His predecessor, Frederick I, in 1701 made an attempt to organize, in addition to a permanent recruiting army, a landmilitia on the basis of compulsory conscription of the population. Friedrich Wilhelm I, who could not stand the very word "militia" and even established a large fine for using it in official correspondence, dissolved the landmilitia, but retained the principle of conscription of the population. From the very beginning of his reign (1713), he established that a soldier serves for life, until the king dismisses him. Determination in the Prussian army began to equal civilian death. The composition of the Prussian army became very mature - the average age of non-commissioned officers was 44 years old, more than half of the soldiers were over 30 years old, there were quite a few 50-year-olds, and there were old people over 60 years old. But, despite this lifelong detention of a soldier in the ranks of the army, it was not easy to complete it. The conscription of the population was first carried out in the most disorderly, ugly forms. The instruction of 1708 indicated - to grab without publicity people who are insignificant in social status, whose relatives are not able to make a big fuss, while observing that they meet the requirements of military service, take them to the fortress and hand them over to recruiters. Such orders caused a hunt for people. The peasants began to refuse to carry their products to the city markets, as they were threatened by ambushes of recruiters on the roads. The officers organized the proper human trafficking. One officer released the people he caught for a decent ransom and bought from another an excess of a successful catch. Especially zealous recruiters caused emigration and desolation of their areas. The landowners suffered at the same time; in other states, the protest of the landowners against military service, which deprived them of the laborers necessary for cultivating the fields, was sufficient to put an end to the arbitrariness of the agents of the state, but the Prussian government, acting in its own country as in a conquered region, could take less account of the violation of the interests of the ruling class. In 1733, nevertheless, it became necessary to streamline the attitude of the population towards military service, and the "canton-regulation" was issued.
Canton regulation. This law largely curtailed the arbitrariness of the captains. From now on, each captain had the right to seize people not within the entire regimental district, but only in the manning area assigned to the company. Numerous groups of people were seized in this area at the discretion of the captain. They could not be captured: any person with a fortune of at least 10 thousand thalers, employees in the household of a landowner, sons of clerics, the most important categories of artisans, workers of all industrial enterprises, in the planting of which the state was interested, finally, one of the sons of a peasant who has his own yard and self-employed. After the Seven Years' War, the captain began to perform recruiting functions not on his own, but as part of a commission. The city of Berlin did not form a recruiting station, but all the captains were allowed to recruit people of insignificant origin in it.
Who from among those who were not withdrawn from military service were taken into the troops? The 18th century did not know lottery for recruitment; the role of the lot was played by high growth. In the Prussian army, the requirement to have tall soldiers was especially emphasized. The recruiter passed by the small ones without any attention, but it was not easy for a man of large stature to get rid of the recruitment, even if he was subject to seizure by law. The law itself emphasized that if a peasant has several sons, then the yard and household pass to the son with the smallest stature, so that tall sons do not shy away from military service. If the growth of the boy promised to be outstanding, then from the age of 10 the captain registered him and issued him a certificate that protected him from the assassination attempts of recruiting neighbors. No attention was paid to the moral qualities of the recruited. Prussian. the army, with its cane discipline, was not afraid of any spiritual contagion. In 1780, an order was issued to the courts - to sentence to military service, after serving their sentence, all illegal (underground) writers and persons engaged in rebellion and anti-government agitation. Despite this strain of recruiting work in Prussia and the forced rather than voluntary nature of recruitment, the country was able to supply only 1/3 of the recruits required for the army. The rest were foreigners. Prussian recruiters worked in imperial cities, in small German principalities, in Poland and in Switzerland. In 1768, the Prussian army had 90,000 foreigners and 70,000 Prussians; in other periods the percentage of foreigners was even greater. Where did these foreigners come from, as if voluntarily dooming themselves to that lifelong penal servitude, which was service in the Prussian army? The answer to this question is given by the surviving list of soldiers of the Retberg regiment, dating back to 1744. Of the 111 foreigners who served in one company, against 65 there is a mark on the previous service of their "other potentate"; in another company, for 119 foreigners, the number of soldiers who had already served in other armies was 92. Three-quarters of the foreigners were deserters, either voluntary or lured by Prussian agents! During the war, the number of foreigners increased significantly from the deployment of prisoners of war. Frederick the Great believed that Prussian discipline could make serviceable soldiers out of any physically strong human material, and his contempt for what was going on in the heart of a soldier reached the point that when in 1756 , in the first year of the Seven Years' War, the Saxon army capitulated near Pirna, Frederick the Great did not even bother to distribute the Saxon prisoners of war among the Prussian regiments, but simply replaced the Saxon officers with the Prussian ones, without violating the organization of the Saxon battalions. For this, Frederick, however, was punished by riots, the killing of officers and the transfer of entire battalions to the side of the enemy on the battlefield. The Prussian soldier under these conditions was not spiritually soldered to the Prussian state; when Breslavl capitulated in 1757, the Prussian commandant negotiated with the Austrians the garrison the right to withdraw to Prussia. But 9/10 of the Prussian garrison did not want to take advantage of the benefits provided, but preferred to enlist in the Austrian army, where the service was much more free.
Desertion. The forcibly recruited and retained Prussian soldier sought to use every opportunity to desert. The fight against desertion was the most important concern of the Prussian command. All 14 principles with which Frederick the Great's treatise on the art of war begins, speak of measures to prevent and combat desertion. In 1745, the French ambassador Valory reported that the Prussian army was not allowed to remove patrols more than 200 paces from the main forces. All sorts of outfits - for firewood, water, etc. - were to be sent in teams, in close formation, under the command of officers. In 1735, on the advice of Field Marshal Leopold Dessau, the most distinguished Prussian general, it was even decided to change the direction of operations in order to bypass the rugged terrain on the river. Moselle, where the army was threatened by a large drain of deserters. In 1763, Frederick the Great issued an instruction requiring unit commanders to involve officers in the study of the environs of their garrisons; but the area was studied not from the point of view of the requirements of tactics, but in order to ascertain local data that would facilitate the capture of deserters. Striped Prussia, according to Voltaire, was a kingdom of borders; almost all the garrisons were located no further than two marches from the line, and the fight against desertion became possible only with extensive, systematic measures.
Stick discipline. The firmer the discipline in the troops, the less the goodwill and moral virtues of recruits are valued. The cane discipline of the Prussian army allowed it to process into soldiers the most unwilling to self-sacrifice material. In turn, the disgusting material of staffing the Prussian army - deserters and criminals from all over Europe - could only form a combat-ready army under the condition of unshakable discipline. There were two means of maintaining discipline in the army. Firstly, drill training and drilling were brought to subtlety; while in the French army only recruits were engaged in drill training, and the entire company was taken out for training once a week, in the Prussian army the soldier was busy from morning to night. During the two spring months, from April to June, there were persistent drills in full force. During the rest of the year, the troops were busy with an extensive guard duty, the accuracy of which was paid exceptional attention. Part of the soldiers, about one-third, was released from guard duty and removed from salaries and rations. If these "Freivachters" came from the population of the section that completed the company, then they were fired on a 10-month vacation; among them were foreigners who knew the craft; the latter continued to live in the barracks and supported themselves with their earnings.
In addition to incessant drill training, brought to virtuosity, the main means of maintaining discipline was a stick, which non-commissioned officers were officially armed with. All the demands of humanity, rights, and private interests were sacrificed to discipline. Frederick the Great often said that a soldier should fear his corporal's stick more than an enemy bullet. At first, in his instructions, Frederick pointed out that soldiers were not trained with blows, but with patience and method, and that a soldier should be beaten with sticks, but with moderation, only if he began to resonate or if he did not show diligence. But after the battle of Zorndorf, where, under the influence of a clash between his infantry and the Russians, he experienced disappointment, he directly recommended to the officers to lay on a stick. The soldier was protected from the arbitrariness of the captain, who could stab him to death with sticks, only by protecting the working cattle from maiming by his driver: the captain, who, by the unlimited use of the stick, would maim his soldiers or cause increased desertion among them, would be at a loss, since the company had to be kept in a set, and recruiting new soldiers cost money. Moritz of Saxony insisted that the recruitment of soldiers should by no means be carried out by the state, but should continue to be carried out by the captains, since if the private interest of the captains in preserving the soldiers who fell into their company is excluded, then all the soldiers will die. Indeed, in Prussia, the stick was especially rampant in the guard, which was staffed not by captains, but by the care of the king. Friedrich had to issue an order to the guards, by which he forbade company commanders to say during the punishment with sticks - "send him to hell, the king will send us another to replace him." For guards officers, a fine had to be introduced - for depriving a soldier of health by beatings, preventing further service; an officer for such a mutilation of a soldier paid the king a loss - the cost of recruiting a new soldier, and was sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months in the fortress of Magdeburg. In the army, where the captain himself suffered losses from excessive enthusiasm for the stick, there were no restrictions. The officers leaving the Prussian cadet corps were rude and poorly educated; until the middle of the 19th century, Prussian officers spoke the vernacular. non-literary language. Frederick the Great treated his officers with almost unbearable contempt, surrounded himself with representatives of an incomparably more refined culture, wrote out French professors for his "noble academy".
General base. The Seven Years' War raised the question of a general staff in all armies. Each commander, even in ancient times, had his own headquarters, his own "home". As the complexity of military affairs and the growing need to make decisions on data that lie outside the actual horizons of the commander, the importance of employees grew. In 1515, near Marignano, the Swiss chiefs were already using maps. Machiavelli already calls the geography and statistics of the theater of operations "imperial knowledge" necessary for the commander; to help him, the general staff should work “from reasonable, knowledgeable people and with great character; this headquarters is the reporter of the commander and is responsible for the intelligence service, for the collection and provision of cartographic material and for the provision of food to the troops; an intelligence service - military and intelligence - should be organized already in peacetime in relation to all possible opponents. But the advanced views of Machiavelli overtook the actual rate of development of European armies for hundreds of years. The officers of the general staff almost did not stand out from the general mass of adjutants; couriers were columnists, engineers reconnoitered positions and gorges and set up camps, topographers (geographical engineers) performed cartographic work; each army had, in general, ten to twenty specialists of these categories; in war they were its general staff, but their service and training in peacetime were not at all streamlined. Frederick the Great, in spite of the conveniences that linear tactics afforded to single-handed command, felt the need for properly trained assistants so keenly that, after the Seven Years' War, he undertook to personally train them; he himself selected 12 young, capable officers with some knowledge of fortification and surveying. Classes - for two hours - took place weekly in the palace (in Potsdam or Sanssouci); the king began with a short lecture. developing any position of the theory and illustrating it with military-historical examples, and demanded that the officers enter into a discussion, after which he gave everyone a task. The surviving Rüchel notebook contains several tasks on tactics for covering and leading a convoy column, for strengthening a position for a regiment to cover a village, a project for a fortified camp for the army, a description of the Silesian mountains, essays on various military topics, works that have the character of military scientific abstracts - and far from first-class writings. At the end of the 18th century, the Prussian general staff consisted of 15 officers and 15 topographers.
The infantry tactics of Frederick the Great oscillated between pure fire worship and total denial of the significance of fire. Despite maintaining the closeness of the formation and firing exclusively in volleys, at the command of the chiefs, eyewitnesses of the battles of the Seven Years' War (Berenhorst) claimed that the infantry unit that started firing quickly slipped out of the hands of the command; a soldier who started shooting could only be forced by extraordinary efforts to stop firing and move forward. In a real battle, only the first volleys were friendly; then they degenerated into chaotic free fire. On the other hand, decisive fire fighting distances were short; the Austrian charter required that, during defense, fire be opened when the enemy approaches 100 paces. There was a great temptation not to get involved with the enemy in a firefight at such a short distance. Moritz of Saxony therefore insisted on making an attack without firing a shot. By the beginning of the Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great was inclined to the same idea. The infantry was inspired that its own interest dictated not to linger under enemy fire, but to climb on the enemy; "The king takes upon himself the responsibility to every soldier that the enemy will not put his bayonets into action, but will run." Indeed, a bayonet charge met with bayonets represents an extremely rare occurrence in military history - one side wins before the blades cross; Prince de Ligne, a participant in many campaigns, testifies that only once in his entire life, in 1757, did he hear the clanging of a bayonet against a bayonet.
The beginning of the Seven Years' War found the Prussian infantry trained but far from educated in this tactic, of which Suvorov is the most famous representative in history. In the battles of 1757 near Prague and Kolin, the Prussian infantry tried to attack almost without a shot, covering the offensive only with the fire of light battalion guns. The results were disappointing: in one case, the Prussians won with difficulty, thanks to cavalry coverage, in the other, they were defeated; The Prussian infantry could not develop a strike, since Frederick, concerned about maintaining closeness and order, even forbade the infantry to pursue the enemy, who trembled and began to run away when the Prussians advanced close. The enemy suffered relatively small losses, was not shocked by the battle; even in those cases when an attack without a shot overturned the enemy, it did not pay for itself without pursuit - since the advancing units suffered heavy losses, especially in the chiefs, and were not suitable for the further development of the battle. At the end of the 1757 campaign of the year - in the battles of Rossbach and Leuthen - the Prussian infantry was already advancing with shooting, and at the beginning of the next year, Frederick the Great forbade the production of attacks without shooting. Requirements: Fighting to the bone against superior coalition forces forced both strategy and tactics to evolve towards more economical warfare.
The Prussian soldier gave up to 4 volleys at the shooting range; the combat rate of fire reached 2-3 volleys per minute. The battalion was divided into 8 plutongs and the plutongs fired in turn. Within 20 seconds, volleys of all 8 plutongs followed one after another, starting with the right-flank one, and at the time of the left-flank plutong salvo, the right-flank one was already ready for a new salvo. Such an organization of fire was a kind of requirement to keep pace when firing, forced to trim the fire, strain attention, and disciplined the troops. Although in battle this artificial fire could rarely be maintained, still other armies sought to imitate the Prussian in this curiosity.
The infantry formed two lines. In theory, in this era, the idea of \u200b\u200ba oblique battle formation reigned. Already Montecuccoli pointed out the advantages of directing forces against one enemy flank, with a possible envelopment of it, and leaving a passive barrier against the other. Folard, a fanatic of the idea of a column, brilliantly reconstructed Epaminondas' oblique battle formation at the battles of Mantinea and Leuctra, and Puy-Ségur elevated it to a doctrine. Frederick the Great, a great admirer of Folard and Puy-Segur, for ten years before the Seven Years' War, stubbornly developed in exercises the technique of attacking oblique battle formations. The latter can be characterized as the desire to envelop without sacrificing to the latter either the continuity of the front or the offensive in parallel directions. In the end, Friedrich's oblique order technique resulted in an offensive in concession form, with each subsequent battalion moving 50 paces behind its neighbor. This form of offensive made it easier to maintain order during maneuvering, in comparison with an offensive by a common front that stretched for two versts; but in itself, of course, it did not give advantages and even allowed the enemy to beat the suitable Prussians in parts. It acquired decisive importance from Frederick only because of the concentration of forces on the shock flank, where the king deployed his reserve in the form of a third line and sometimes arranged a fourth line of hussars, but mainly because of the suddenness with which Frederick deployed his oblique battle formation against the flank. enemy. Probably, the Prussian infantry near Leuthen, suddenly brought out to continue the enemy flank, would have won equal success with a simple frontal attack, but all contemporaries saw some mysterious force in the "oblique" maneuvering of the Prussian front; neighbors sought to copy it.
The Prussian infantry of the line was adapted only to battle on the open plain, where the soldier did not escape from the supervision of an officer and where it was possible to maintain close formation to the end. Coppices, villages were extremely unfavorable for the Prussian army; Friedrich, even if he had to defend himself in the countryside, forbade the houses to be occupied by soldiers. The main enemy of Prussia - Austria - had good and numerous light infantry - Croats (Serbs), Pandurs, etc. Austrian border guards, that is, a kind of settled army, Cossacks, who covered the Austro-Turkish border. The Austrian light infantry, manned by militant semi-barbarians, not crushed by the discipline that aroused the desire to desert, fought very skillfully in loose formation, skillfully used the terrain and could have been used even more widely if the general gravity of all the armies of the old regime had not pushed them onto the drill path beaten by the Prussian army. . The pandurs and croats, which the battalions of light infantry and chasseurs in other armies began to imitate, were the forerunners of the differently educated and enthusiastic French revolutionary infantry, which forced the recognition of the right of citizenship for battle in loose formation
In view of the need to combat partisan actions, which were widely developed by the Austrian light troops, Frederick had to increase the number of light infantry battalions from 4 to 6; they received the same staffing as the line Prussian infantry; so that this crappy squad would not scatter, he was not subjected to cane Discipline, was in the position of semi-free servants, and his misdeeds in the war were looked through the fingers. As a result, the Prussians got only bandits of robbers, who were despised by their own and others and who robbed the population (. Only jaeger companies, staffed by foresters, showed themselves at high altitude and rendered serious services. But also in other states where light infantry was more successfully organized, it was still not a reformed infantry, but an auxiliary weapon.
The cavalry played an essential role in the army of Frederick the Great. At the beginning of the 16th century, when soldiers in the infantry were already glued into tactical units, and the cavalry still retained a knightly character, the percentage of mounted fighters greatly decreased, armies and their combat operations acquired a pronounced infantry character. But the transition of the entire cavalry, following the reiters, to an organization into tactical units that democratized the type of cavalry soldier, made it possible to greatly increase the percentage of cavalry, and in the first half of the 17th century, armies often consisted of an equal number of infantrymen and cavalrymen. The increase in the size of armies by 3-4 times during the transition to permanent troops in the second half of the 17th century brought to the fore the demands of economy; mainly the cheapest type of troops increased - the infantry, and the cavalry, in percentage terms, in the composition of the armies became smaller. When the Prussian standing army arose, in the troops of the Great Elector, the cavalry made up only 1/7 of the army. The deterioration in the moral qualities of the infantry of the 18th century, its inability to fight for local items, the search for open spaces for battle, the mechanical foundations of a linear battle formation - all this opened up a vast field for cavalry activity in the 18th century, created a "golden age of cavalry". Frederick the Great increased the cavalry in his army to 25%; in peacetime, for every 100-200 people of the population of Prussia, there was one cavalryman - the maximum that the country could support.
Friedrich inherited from his father a well-disciplined; the infantry trained by Field Marshal Leopold Dessau, did not invest anything new in the development of the infantry, so the words of Berenhorst (son of Leopold Dessau) that Friedrich knows how to spend troops, but not educate them, are fully justified in relation to the infantry. But in relation to the cavalry, Frederick was a reformer. In the very first battle that Frederick gave near Molwitz in 1741, his cavalry was beaten by the Austrian and carried him away from the battlefield, but the remaining infantry, alone, on their own, emerged victorious from the battle. Frederick began to rework his cavalry: 400 officers were retired, outstanding commanders were placed at the head, the cavalry was required to attack with wide gaits, first from 700 paces, and then from 1800 paces. Under the threat of dishonor, the cavalry commanders were always obliged to retain the initiative of the attack and be the first to rush to the enemy. All pistol firing was canceled during the attack. On a wide gait, the squadrons had to keep as close as possible - stirrup to stirrup. The outcome of a cavalry clash was not decided by action. weapons, even cold ones, but with a blow to the enemy of a closed, merged into one mass of horsemen. The idea of shock was born - the onslaught of a horse avalanche, running up a full quarry and overturning everything in its path with its living force. If the Serbs have a saying that the battle is won not by weapons, but by the heart of the hero, then the most famous cavalry leader of Friedrich, Seidlitz, owns the idea: the cavalry attack is won not so much with sabers as with whips. During the exercises, the masses of cavalry were trained by Seydlitz extremely vigorously. According to the Prussian charter of 1743, all reorganizations aimed at the deployment of the front, as well as the attack, had to be carried out at a gallop. When Friedrich drew Seydlitz's attention to the large number of injuries that cavalrymen receive when they fall on exercises and to complicate the issue of recruitment, Seydlitz asked the king not to pay attention to such trifles. With the transfer of the center of gravity to the shock, the fighting-cavalry of Frederick cast, in general, into the form that was preserved for the actions of the cavalry masses throughout the 19th century. The battle order of the cavalry is three-line; linear - the beginning in cavalry tactics lasted long after the infantry switched to deep, perpendicular tactics, due to the preference for supporting the cavalry not from behind, but from a ledge, in view of the importance of the flanks in a cavalry battle; support from behind will either be late to the decisive moment, or, in case of failure, will even be crushed by the first line rushing back. Only the development of dismounted combat and the use of equipment in purely cavalry combat (machine guns, regimental artillery, armored cars) have now forced the cavalry to abandon Friedrich's linear tactics. Since the entire Frederick's army represented one corps on the battlefield, one jointly working collective body, the entire cavalry united into two masses on the flanks of the army, where the cavalry leaders had a lot of room for action and where the cavalry did not suffer from fire until the moment of the attack. This custom of strong cavalry wings persisted until the age of Napoleon.
Hussars. The cavalry of Frederick the Great was equipped with somewhat better elements than the infantry. However, cane discipline in the cuirassier and dragoon regiments was as merciless as in the infantry, and the reliability of the cavalry in relation to desertion was not at a sufficient height to allow small cavalry units, patrols, to be sent to a considerable distance. Therefore, intelligence in the army of Frederick the Great was very unimportant, and there were moments (for example, during the invasion of Bohemia in 1744) when the Austrian light troops completely cut off the Prussians from all sources of information, and it was necessary to act positively blindly. Frederick the Great was looking for a way out in the organization of light cavalry, which would be brought up in the spirit of adventurism, would receive a number of concessions and would not be subject to the general harsh discipline of the army. To this end, Frederick began to develop hussars; their number was increased from 9 to 80 squadrons; Friedrich paid much attention to their training and education. Irregular and semi-regular units succeed, as we have already seen in the example of the early Middle Ages, in cavalry much easier than in infantry, and Frederick's hussars proved to be much more useful for the army than his light infantry. At first, the hussars belonged to the infantry, and only after the Seven Years' War were they assigned to the cavalry. The cavalry was much smaller than in other cavalry units; hussar officers were forbidden to marry, so as not to quench the spirit of enterprising partisans in them. Thus, at the end of the 18th century, the imperfection of the recruitment and organization of forcibly recruited armies forced the division into linear and light troops in the infantry and cavalry. Line infantry and cavalry are the troops of the battlefield, helpless in the theater of war; light infantry and cavalry are theater troops not disciplined enough for regular operations. kind of partisans. Such a division provoked sharp criticism from prominent writers, but only the French Revolution managed to eliminate the contradictions that prevented in the same parts from combining the merits of light and linear parts.
Artillery. With regard to artillery, the tactics of Frederick the Great are characterized by the desire to form a large battery of heavy-caliber guns (Mollitz, Zorndorf and friend, battles) in front of the strike wing of the battle formation, which, with their fire, prepared a decisive attack. The Germans trace their tradition of using heavy guns in field battles to Frederick the Great. The positional character that the Seven Years' War assumed had a significant effect on the increase in artillery in the armies. The initiative for the increase, however, did not belong to the Prussians, but to the Austrians and partly the Russians, who sought to occupy fortified positions provided by powerful artillery. The extent to which the positional struggle affected the number of artillery can be seen from the following comparison: near Mollwitz (1741), the Prussians had 2.5 guns per 1000 bayonets, the Austrians had 1 gun; near Torgau (1760) - the Prussians had 6 guns, the Austrians had 7 guns. In the 20th century, the development of European armies also deviated in the same direction under the influence of the positional experience of the world war.
Strategy. Frederick the Great with his, compared to the scale of the 19th century, a small army, with a forced break in hostilities for the winter, when it was necessary, in view of the impossibility of bivouacking in the field and the equal impossibility of placing soldiers seeking to desert, in philistine homes, it is imperative to occupy winter apartments - he could not set himself up with extensive plans for a deep invasion of enemy territory, for inflicting a mortal blow on the enemy. The battles of the era of Frederick the Great were associated with heavy losses for the winner, as well as for the vanquished. The victory over the Austrians and Saxons at Soor (1745) was bought by the Prussian infantry at the cost of 25% of losses, the success over the Russians at Zorndorf cost the Prussian infantry half of the personnel killed and wounded. The pursuit was hampered by the composition of the army, in which, after a successful battle, it was necessary to establish complete and strict order; under these conditions, even victory did not always pay off losses; there were no modern means for quickly manning the army - each regiment, during the period of winter quarters, performed the role of a western battalion for itself. Frederick the Great said that with his troops he could have conquered the whole world if victory had not been as disastrous for them as defeat for opponents. Store allowances made the army extremely sensitive to rear communications. Only once, in 1744, did Frederick the Great invade deeply into Bohemia; Austrian Field Marshal Thrawn, occupying hard-to-reach positions, cutting through the rear of the Prussians with light troops, forced the half-decreased Prussian army to retreat without a fight. Frederick the Great called Thrawn his teacher after this campaign. At the beginning of the war, when Frederick had a fresh, trained army with energetic officers, with full ranks in battalions, he willingly took the risk of battle. But the general attitude of the King of Prussia, when he had matured militarily (1750), is expressed by the following thought from his "Art of War", written in French verse: "Never engage without good reason in a battle where death reaps such a terrible harvest." This idea is very characteristic of the strategy of the 16th-18th centuries and sharply contradicts the doctrine stemming from the Napoleonic Wars, which sees only one goal in a war - the destruction of the enemy’s manpower, and knows only one means to that - a decisive battle. Only when the French Revolution opened up an inexhaustible reserve among the masses of the people to replenish the army, did the commander's mind cease to be afraid of losses, and a shock Napoleonic strategy of crushing was created. Until then, the commander, who worked with limited human material, had to not forget about the "Pyrrhic victories", after which there may not be an army left to continue the victorious march. For Frederick the Great, as for other commanders before the Napoleonic period, the battle was only one of the means to achieve the goal: endurance to the end, which Hindenburg remembered during the world war first of all; it was necessary to strive so that every month of the war inflicted more severe wounds on the enemy in his economic resources (and political consciousness than on us - these are the foundations of the strategy of exhaustion, which by no means refuses, when the need arises, from accepting a decisive battle, but sees in battle only one of the means to achieve victory.Frederick the Great - the greatest master of the strategy of exhaustion, in the Seven Years' War, he achieved his goal - not to return Silesia captured from Austria - in the fight against the powerful coalition of Austria, Russia and France.
The strategy of exhaustion, which correctly takes into account all the political and economic conditions of war, which leads to the disintegration of the enemy’s power not only through military operations of armies, but also knows other means (economic blockade, political agitation, diplomatic intervention, etc.), is always threatened by the danger of degeneration in contrast to the Napoleonic strategy - into a strategy of impotence, into a strategy of artificial maneuver, an empty threat to the enemy, which is not followed by a blow. Such a barking, but not biting strategy was that of Frederick, when he, already 66 years old, undertook the war for the Bavarian succession (1778-79). The whole campaign passed in fruitless maneuvering; the Austrian commander Lassi turned out to be a worthy partner for the exhausted Prussian king, Frederick the Great in this era, "already tired of reigning over slaves", undoubtedly lost faith in the moral strength of his army, understanding better than all Europe admired its weakness, and was afraid to take risks. The war turned into an armed demonstration; the opponents dispersed without a single battle. Whereas the Russian General Suvorov, with an indomitable impulse to solve military problems by battle, bitterly criticized the "learned Lassian cordon", many writers were carried away by this new type of bloodless war, saw in it a sign of the progress of mankind and its humanity (for example, the future Prussian War Minister Boyen ); and the soldiers, with their immediate instincts, called this war - a laughingstock - "potato war", since only potato crops were affected.
Wars of the 17th and 18th centuries are often characterized as cabinet wars. The term "cabinet war" is used as a concept opposite to the people's war. The war represented only the business of the government, the "cabinet", and not of the nations, not of the broad masses. From this, however, it would be erroneous to conclude that at that time, along with the armed struggle, there was no agitational struggle front at all. Paper war has always accompanied military operations. Frederick the Great did not despise the fabrication of false documents that would allow him to use any national or religious trumps. However, in the 18th century the front of the struggle, facing the masses, was still purely auxiliary. The government went its own way, and some "diligent jurist" acted as its lawyer before the masses. The behavior of the army in relation to the population was of decisive importance on the propaganda front. With his cynical frankness, Frederick the Great instructed his generals in this way: play the role of defenders of the Lutheran religion, in a Catholic country we must constantly talk about religious tolerance." One should "make heaven and hell serve oneself."
Rosbach. Examples of the tactical art of Frederick the Great from the era of Silesia and the Seven Years' War are numerous and vivid. Near Rossbach, in the late autumn of 1757, in the second year of the war, a combined Franco-imperial army, consisting of about 50 thousand poorly disciplined soldiers, stood against 25 thousand selected Prussian troops. The allies were commanded by the Prince of Soubise (French) and the Duke of Hildburghausen (Imperial). In another, the most important theater for Prussia, the Austrians, having broken the barrier left against them, completed the conquest of Silesia, which was the goal of the war, and settled there for the winter, Frederick the Great needed to finish off the French as soon as possible in order to drive the Austrians out of Silesia before the onset of winter, without economic resources which he could not continue the war. But the allies stood in a fortified position, on which Frederick could not attack the double forces of the enemy. His position was already becoming hopeless when the enemy, contrary to the situation, pushed by his numerical superiority, went on the offensive. Prince Soubise decided to force the Prussians into retreat by outflanking them from the south and threatening to intercept the escape route of the Prussian army. On November 5th, leaving 1/6 of his forces under Saint-Germain to demonstrate at the front, Soubise moved in three columns. The march took place in an open area, during the day it was - a big halt was made. In front, the movement was covered by the advanced cavalry. Frederick the Great, from the Rosbach bell tower, observed the movement of the allies and in the morning received the idea that, under the cover of the abandoned rearguard, the French had begun a retreat; but in the afternoon the enemy's detour was clearly outlined to him. Then Frederick decided to meet the French maneuver with a counter-manoeuvre, falling on the head of the marching columns. Against S.-Germain, an insignificant rearguard was left. 5 squadrons of hussars on the crest of the hills masked the movement of the army behind them. Seydlitz's cavalry knocked over and drove the French cavalry from the battlefield with one blow. At the same time, an 18-gun battery was deployed on Janus Hill, which began shelling the French infantry, which was trying to turn in the direction of movement; the Prussian infantry crossed the ridge and, advancing, opened fire in volleys; only 7 head Prussian battalions managed to take part in the battle, which fired 15 rounds each. By this time, Seydlitz had managed, after the first attack on the cavalry, to collect his squadrons and threw them on the numerous headquarters of the Prince of Soubise and on the French infantry crowding in disarray. Almost instantly it was all over - the French army fled in complete disarray. The danger on this front was eliminated, Frederick was able to turn with his best regiments to the Silesian theater. The success of the evasive maneuver is generally associated with the passivity of the enemy, with the absence of a riposte. According to our modern concepts, in order to get around the enemy, you must first of all make him immobile, tie him up, nail him to the place with a fight. From this point of view, the Saint-Germain screen should have hit bigger; the task of this barrier should not have consisted in a simple demonstration, but in waging an energetic frontal battle, which would have hampered the maneuverability of the enemy, and then the enemy, who had already lost mobility, could be encircled or bypassed, in order to give a decisive turn to the battle. The flank. moving the clumsy army of Soubise in front of an unrestrained, flexible, especially capable of quick maneuvering enemy was an unjustified risk.
Leithen. By a forced march (300 km in 1.5 days), Frederick transferred the army from Rosbach to Silesia. The Austrian army, which captured the most important fortresses of Silesia - Schweidnitz and Breslau, and made a horse raid on Berlin, considered the 1757 campaign already over and was located in winter quarters in the recaptured region. The approach of the Prussian army made it necessary to concentrate 65,000 troops ahead of Breslau. The Austrians took up a position; in order to rest the flanks against local objects, it was necessary to stretch the front for 7 miles. On December 5, Frederick the Great attacked the Austrians with 40,000 troops.
The bushes hid the area in front of the front. Ahead were only the Austrian hussars. As soon as the Prussian cavalry pushed them back, Charles of Lorraine, the Austrian commander of the army, found himself in the dark about what the Prussians were doing. The latter appeared on the road leading to the center of the Austrian location, then disappeared. The Austrians, not assuming that the Prussians would decide to attack the strongest army, striving exclusively for a passive goal and waiting for the Prussians to retreat, did not take any measures and remained in place. Meanwhile, the Prussians having made a flank march 2 versts in front of the Austrian front, they suddenly appeared against the tip of the left flank of the Austrians, which occupied the village of Leiten, and with lightning speed built a front in a perpendicular direction to the Austrian position. The Austrians had to enter the battle simultaneously with the change of front; from a stretched front, the troops did not have time to turn around and piled up, in disorder in depth, forming over 10 lines. Frederick concentrated against the village of Leuten, where the main attack was directed, 4 lines of troops and, moreover, got the opportunity to cover the enemy with both wings. On the right flank, the Prussians only the fire coverage was successful, on the left flank the Prussian cavalry of Drizen, after waiting for an opportune moment, overturned the Austrian cavalry of Luchesi and fell on the right flank of the Austrian infantry.The Austrians, unfortunately, in the village of Leuthen did not have light infantry, so suitable for the defense of local objects , I am their infantry just as clumsily about dropped the village, as the Prussian attacked it. Despite the complete exhaustion of the Prussian infantry, events on the flank forced the Austrians to retreat, which degenerated into panic. Frederick organized the pursuit only by cavalry, it was not carried out very energetically, but the Austrians hurried to withdraw the remnants of the army to their limits. In the battle of Leuthen, Frederick I repeated Soubise's Rosbach maneuver, but performed it confidently, quickly, with lightning speed, so that the battle took on the character of a surprise attack on the enemy's flank. If Frederick's maneuver succeeded, this is due not so much to the art of execution as to the passivity of the Austrians, who achieved everything they wanted, who had no will to win and who only looked forward to when the restless enemy would get rid of them and it would be possible to comfortably to be accommodated in good conquered winter quarters. The lethargic always turns out to be beaten by the resolute. If the Austrians had vanguard positions and sentry units in front of the front, which would gain time and space for the subsequent maneuver of the main forces, or, even better, if the Austrians, noticing the deviation towards the heads of the Prussian columns, went on a decisive offensive, without guessing, they maneuver whether the Prussians or simply avoiding the battle - the Prussian army would probably suffer the same defeat as the French at Rosbach (179). The oblique order of battle of Friedrich, used in the attack of the villages. Leiten, in which contemporaries saw some kind of magical power, actually did not play a role in the Leiten victory.
Battle of Kunersdorf. Typical for characterizing the tactics of the Prussian and Russian armies is the battle near Kunersdorf on August 12, 1759. The Russian army, which was joined by the Austrian corps of Laudon, in total 53 thousand, plus 16 thousand irregular troops, in the first days of August gathered near Frankfurt, on the right bank of the Oder , and settled down here fortified camp. The right flank was on the hill with the Jewish cemetery, the center was on Spitzberg, the left flank was on Muhlberg. Muhlberg was separated from Spitzberg by the Kugrund ravine. , the Russians were in this position for 8 days and covered their front with a retransmission, reinforced with notches, which formed a bend on Mulberg. The Austrians stood in reserve behind the right wing, the rear was covered by swamps that went to the Oder.
Friedrich concentrated 37,000 infantry and 13,000 cavalry to Mulrose - forces almost equal to the Russian-Austrian regular army. Napoleon, who had only battle in mind and looked only to a decisive victory for a successful end to the war, would probably secure for himself a superiority in numbers by drawing in the screens left to defend Silesia and Saxony. But Frederick fought to the point of exhaustion, the loss of a province was more dangerous for him than a tactical failure, only once, near Prague in 1757, he was in more favorable numerical conditions than now; he decided to attack. A decisive blow would have been possible if it had been possible to cut off the communications of the Russian army and attack it from the east. Frederick the Great made a personal reconnaissance from the heights of the left bank of the Oder. Lebus, he did not have any satisfactory map, he got confused in determining the local objects to which his horizons opened, trusted the testimony of a local resident and came to the conclusion that the Russian army was facing northwest, to the Oder swamps (180 ).
Frederick the Great decided to send the army across the Oder at Geritz, in the passage below Frankfurt, bypass the Russians from the east, strike at them from the rear and overturn into the Oder. The fulfillment of this plan brought the Prussian army, which described an almost complete circle, to the front of the motionless Russians. Since the ponds and gullies threatened to break the Prussian offensive into two parts and create two centers of battle, which was contrary to Frederick's desire to maneuver the entire army together, he decided to concentrate all his forces on the attack of Muhlberg - north of the strip of ponds stretching from Kunersdorf. No link offensive was launched against the rest of the Russian front. Young regiments of the Russian observation corps, a decisive attack by the Prussians. Mühlberg was taken by the Prussians, and Frederick sought, as at Leuthen, to build on his success by rolling his troops along the Russian front. But with Saltykov, the center and the right wing, not connected by anyone, represented a huge reserve. The stubborn battle for Kugrund failed for the Prussians: the attack for Spitzberg was repulsed, Russian artillery brutally mowed down the Prussian army crowded on Mühlberg, a Russian counterattack began, and panic seized the Prussian ranks. In desperation, Frederick ordered Seydlitz to lead a mass of cavalry into the attack. Seydlitz saw the hopelessness of a cross-country attack on the Braga located behind the fortifications, but on repeated orders he threw his squadrons into the attack. They were repulsed by fire, the Russian and Austrian cavalry launched a counterattack; the Prussian army, leaving artillery and carts, fled in complete disarray and dispersed. In the evening, Frederick from the 50,000th army was able to collect only 10,000, including 7,000 left at Geritz on the bridges over the Oder; in a few days it was possible to collect up to 31 thousand. The loss of the Prussians, therefore, is about 19 thousand, the Russians and Austrians - up to 17 thousand. The Prussians suffered a decisive defeat. According to Clausewitz, Frederick the Great near Kunersdorf became entangled in the nets of his own oblique battle formation. A one-point attack on the Russian left flank, since it did not cause the collapse of the entire Russian battle formation, put the Prussians in a very difficult position, crumpling their front, concentrating all the infantry in the cramped space of Muhlberg and depriving them of maneuverability. In this battle, attention is drawn to Saltykov's super-philosophical indifference to the Prussian army circling around him, the passive sitting of the Russians in a convenient (immediately rearward to the enemy) chosen position, their strong tactical restraint, the mistake of such an experienced commander as Friedrich, when reconnoitering the enemy location, and finally , the extreme dependence of the linear battle formation on local conditions, which forced Frederick to narrow the attack area.
Berenhorst - the son of Leopold Dessau, the famous educator and leader of the Prussian infantry, adjutant of Frederick the Great - quit military service, as he could not endure the contemptuous attitude of the king towards his retinue. He owns a deep criticism of Friedrich's military art.
Berenhorst completely ignored the geometric part of military art and concentrated all his attention on moral forces, on the human heart. He owns the most severe criticism of the front side of the Prussian army, which blinded so many. The maneuvering art of the Prussians is illusory - there is nothing in it applicable for serious combat work, it causes pettiness (micrology), timidity, service slavery and military rudeness. Pettiness, a fever of detail, dominate the Prussian army. Here the insignificant details of training are valued, if only they are given with great difficulty. Obermaneurists play tactical riddles. Frederick the Great not only did not raise, but belittled the moral strength of the army, did not consider it important to attend to the state of mind, courage and inner dignity of the soldier; this commander knew how to spend better than to educate soldiers. How much thought, diligence, labor and strength is spent on the teaching of the Prussian army - and for the most part it is completely useless, and partly even to the detriment. Oh, the vanity of all artificialities... In the Prussian army, a man is trained faster than a four-legged warrior, Berenhorst ironically, since the Prussian soldier becomes more flexible and more learned from beatings, and the horse kicks with every blow. And just that, over which the masters rack their brains most of all, what costs the officer the rudest remarks, and the soldier gets the heaviest blows - all this is not applicable in a real battle. How does an experienced, brave officer, accustomed to meet with the enemy and coolly dispose of during an attack, feel when he loses distance at a review - he falls behind or climbs 10 steps ...
The Prussian infantry traditionally wore blue uniforms. The style of clothing in the army changed according to changes in the general European military fashion. Since the reign of Friedrich Wilhelm I (1714-1740), Prussian officers have worn black and silver scarves. All regiments had their instrument colors.
From the end of the 17th century Prussian dragoons and cuirassiers wore leather camisoles with red, blue and blue cuffs (the dragoons had only blue ones). Around 1735, cloth uniforms were introduced into the Prussian cavalry, at first a yellowish tint, as if repeating the color of the skin, and then white. Only the 2nd Cuirassier Regiment retained the yellow color of the uniform until 1806, for which it was nicknamed "yellow".
Under Frederick William I, blue and red became the instrument colors of the dragoon regiments. Cloth saddlecloths of red color were sheathed, as was customary in some European armies, with regimental galloon. Mounted grenadiers wore grenadier caps, and dragoons and cuirassiers wore hats (dragoons had yellow braid along the edge of the fields). After the First Silesian War, some cuirassier regiments changed instrument colors.
Hussars appeared in the Prussian army in 1721. Their uniform had the same features of the Hungarian national costume. Until 1740, the cloth colored kneecaps of the hussars, or "shalevari", were blue, both in the 1st hussar regiment and in the 2nd, which at the time of accession to the throne of Frederick II, this type of cavalry. By the beginning of the Seven Years' War, the hearts on the mentioned knee pads had disappeared. The colors of the regimental uniform of the Prussian hussars remained unchanged for many decades.
The artillery uniform was described by the regulations only under Friedrich Wilhelm I. Before that, the Brandenburg artillerymen wore mostly brown clothes. Around 1709 the gunners were given blue caftans with a blue set, which remained until 1798, when it was replaced by black. The casket became the general headdress of the Prussian artillery in 1731 and served until 1741, after which it was replaced by a hat.
1. Private Guards Grenadier Battalion (No. 6) in summer uniform. 1745
2. Officer of the hussar regiment Devitz (No. I) in dress uniform. 1748
3. Private hussar regiment Ryosha (No. 5). 1744
4. Private of the cuirassier regiment of Prince Wilhelm (No. 2). 1742
5. Private of the Schulenburg Cavalry Grenadier Regiment in summer marching uniform. 1729-1741
6. Bombardier of the Prussian foot artillery, 1740
Prussia. Seven Years' War (1)
After the Second Silesian War (Prussia's participation in the all-European War of the Austrian Succession of 1741-1748 is usually called the Second Silesian War of 1744-1746) - some changes took place in the uniform of the Prussian army. The infantry received black winter gaiters (whites continued to be worn in the summer).
The infantryman's marching equipment, in addition to a harness with an infantry saber and a cartridge bag, consisted of a fur satchel on a belt over the right shoulder and a bread bag. In addition, on the campaign, each soldier carried ten tent stakes, as well as an ax, a shovel, or a pickaxe. Each infantry regiment had two grenadier companies. For the duration of the war, these companies were reduced to separate four-company battalions, which acted independently as selected shock units. Prussian regiments began to be called by numbers only after 1806. Until that time, as in all European armies, they were called by their last name, in Prussia - by the name of a colonel. Regiments created after 1740 were called fusilier regiments. Their uniforms differed from the uniforms of the old regiments inherited by Frederick II from his father, with a headdress reminiscent of the old grenadier hats of the Poles and Saxons, and black ties (red in the old regiments). The guns of the Fusiliers were somewhat shorter than those of the infantry. Old fusilier regiments (No. 29 - 32) in the 1740s were converted to infantry.
Prussian infantry officers, unlike privates and non-commissioned officers, did not wear mustaches. In the old infantry regiments, they had white ties and a figured braid on the hat, which was worn by officers of both musketeers and grenadier companies. The officer uniforms of the infantry and dragoons had curly buttonholes on the pockets, cuffs, under the lapels and at the waist.
After 1740, the instrument colors of the cuirassier and dragoon regiments received official status and remained unchanged until 1806. The same can be said about the colors of the uniform of the hussars, which existed, with minor changes, until the end of the 19th century. Dragoon and cuirassier hats during the Seven Years' War lost the white braid that had previously been sheathed on their edges; from 1762 they were decorated with a white plume with a black base for officers and a black top for non-commissioned officers. After the Second Silesian War, white uniforms in all regiments of dragoons were replaced by blue ones, and ties became black. The aiguillette worn by the dragoons on the right shoulder was supposed to be the applied color (the color of the metal of the buttons). The dragoon's lyadunka was not located on a separate sling, like the cuirassiers, but directly on the carbine. The ranks in the hussar regiments differed in galloons. Privates had white galloons, non-commissioned officers - silver, officers - gold. Since 1756, the regiments that wore fur hats began to wear mirlitons in the summer. 1. Musketeer of the infantry regiment of Margrave Karl (No. 19). 1756 2. Grenadier of the Finca Infantry Regiment (No. 12). 1759
3. Fusilier of the Creutzen Infantry Regiment (No. 40). 1756
4. Officer of the infantry regiment of Georg von Kleist (No. 4). 1758
5. Private Life Cuirassier Regiment (No. 3). 1762
6. Private hussar regiment of Tsiten (No. 2). 1760
7. Private of the Platen dragoon regiment (No. 11). 1762
Prussia and Saxony. Seven Years' War (2)
At the very beginning of the Seven Years' War, the Saxon army, numbering 18 thousand people, was surrounded by Frederick II and almost completely taken prisoner. Frederick dismissed the Saxon officers to their homes, and replenished his army with soldiers, forming new (“fusilier”) regiments from them.
From 1734 the Saxon infantry wore white uniforms. The shelves differed in instrument colors and in the color of buttons. Since 1745, colored collars appeared on the uniforms of Saxon officers and non-commissioned officers. The dragoon regiments of the Saxon army had their own color combinations. Cuirassier regiments wore white uniforms, while cuirasses were worn under them, over yellow camisoles. The saddle pads in the Saxon cavalry were instrument-coloured. The distinction of non-commissioned officers was the galloon on the hat.
1. Musketeer of the infantry regiment of Prince Xaver. Saxony. 1756
2. Private Brühl's Shevolezher regiment. Saxony. 1756
3. Jaeger of the free battalion of Le Noble (No. I). Prussia. 1757
4. Pioneer of the infantry regiment Manteifepya (No. 17). Prussia. 1759
5. Private Corps Bosnyakov. Prussia. 1760
6. Hussar of the Free Corps of Kleist. Prussia. 1760
Russia. Seven Years' War (1)
By the beginning of the reign of the daughter of Peter the Great, Empress Elizabeth, the Russian army consisted of 4 guards (of which one was cavalry), 38 infantry, 4 cuirassier and 28 dragoon regiments, an artillery regiment, 3 siege corps and a mine company, not counting the provincial and garrison regiments, as well as land militia and irregular troops.
The appearance of the Russian army has not changed much since the Great Northern War. Powder and braids came into fashion, floors and tails on soldiers' caftans began to be worn constantly tucked up, and a white bow appeared on the hats of all military ranks, which was called the "field sign" in the Russian army. In the mid 1730s. infantry officers and non-commissioned officers changed their semi-pikes (non-commissioned officers' halberds, officers' espontons) to guns. Introduced under Anna Ioannovna in the grenadier companies, a single pattern of a grenadier cap with the accession to the throne of Elizabeth Petrovna often again began to be replaced by caps of arbitrary patterns. The pump-skin grenadier hat introduced in 1756 (in the manner of the guards) was supposed to put an end to this diversity, but in combat it turned out to be extremely uncomfortable, and during the Seven Years' War it was replaced by Prussian-style cloth caps sewn in the regiments or another type with a forehead statutory caps.
Hussar regiments appeared in the Russian army in the late 1720s. and wore a uniform almost identical to the Austrian one, from which it was sewn. The only difference was in the emblems and monograms that were present in the hussar equipment.
One of the experiments in creating new types of troops was the formation in 1756 of the Reserve, or Observational, Corps under the patronage of Count P.I. Shuvalov. It was called observational in the sense of "experimental" (experimental). It was supposed to consist of one grenadier and five infantry regiments (the fifth regiment was never formed), intended to cover the numerous corps artillery. For the regiments of the corps, new banners were developed with special symbols (the state emblem with the monogram of the empress superimposed on the radiance framed by military fittings), which, as usual, was repeated in the details of the uniform of the corps (officer badges, foreheads of grenadiers, etc.). Caftans of the lower ranks of the corps were sewn with a "frill" cut (without side folds in the tails), the collar and cuffs were sewn onto camisoles and turned away over the caftan. The ammunition pouches of the rank and file replaced the pouches, the armament of the musketeer officers consisted of halberds and pistols, the cartridges for which were carried in caskets. All ranks of the corps had to wear boots, and instead of swords, soldiers had cleavers with a curved blade and a hilt with a crosshair without a bow. 1. Artilleryman. 1757 2. Musketeer of the Observation Corps, 1759
3. Grenadier Musketeer Regiment in summer uniform. 1757
4. Officer of the army infantry. 1757
5. Hussar of the Serbian Hussar Regiment. 1756
6. Cuirassier, 1756
7. Mounted grenadier. 1757
Russia. Seven Years' War (2)
The events of the Seven Years' War quickly forced us to abandon the idea that a major "infantry-artillery" a unit such as the Observation Corps could play a decisive role on the battlefield. The real elite of the Russian infantry turned out to be four numbered grenadier regiments, the first of which later became part of the Russian guard. The main difference between the uniforms of these regiments was the replacement of city symbols (coats of arms) on the details of their uniforms with the state ones.
Following the example of the Fusiliers of the artillery of some European armies, intended to cover the artillerymen, during the war, the lower ranks "at the regimental artillery teams" began to stand out in the Russian infantry regiments.
Russian "hunters" - huntsmen were formed to counter the free corps of the Prussians during the fighting around the Kolberg fortress (1760). The ranks of the "light" battalions differed from ordinary musketeers in the absence of a sword and trim on the hat.
Dragoons from the middle of the XVIII century. continued to form the basis of the Russian regular cavalry. Since there were clearly not enough cuirassier regiments (the problem was mainly the lack of a sufficient number of tall and strong horses), at the very beginning of the Seven Years' War, the elite units of the Russian cavalry tried to increase by converting a number of dragoon regiments into cuirassier (three regiments) and horse-grenadier (six regiments ). In addition, the first four hussar regiments were included in the ranks of the Russian cavalry: Serbian, Hungarian, Georgian and Moldavian, named after the nationalities that made them up.
Despite the fact that leather jackets and trousers remained an indispensable attribute of the uniform of the Russian cavalry, in the Farmer's division, dragoons and horse grenadiers wore blue cloth trousers during hostilities. 1. Musketeer with regimental artillery teams in Fermor's division, 1760 2. Army infantry drummer. 1756
3. "Hunter" of the light battalions of Second Major Miller in summer uniform. 1761
4. Privates and officer of the army grenadier regiment. 1759
5. Infantry headquarters officer. 1756
6. Dragoons of Fermor's division, 1759
Austria. War of the Austrian Succession
After the introduction of the regulations of 1718, the color of the uniform of the Austrian infantry regiments was mostly white. Around 1735, the uniform of Austrian officers lost almost all decorations. At the same time, only a yellow-black scarf remained an attribute of an officer's rank, which changed to green with gold and silver in the period from October 1743 to October 1745. From 1740 the Austrian grenadiers were no longer armed with grenades. At the same time, all the external differences between the grenadiers and the Fusiliers were only fur hats with a small instrument-colored hat and traditionally preserved wick tubes on the bandage of the cartridge bag. In 1740, the Austrian army had 60 infantry regiments, the uniforms of which differed in instrument colors of cuffs and lapels.
In 1720, cuirassier leather camisoles were replaced by light gray (later white) cloth uniforms. In 1740, the wearing of blackened cuirasses on the back was abolished. The rich decoration of the front chest part now served as a distinction for an officer's rank.
Before the reform of 1749, the Hungarian regiments, which were part of the Austrian infantry, along with various Balkan border units, served as light infantry. However, unlike the latter, the Hungarian regiments had a uniform uniform of national cut. To defend against the frequent attacks of the Turks, the border territories of the Austrian Empire were divided into military districts - districts, with a general at the head of each of them. The first military districts were formed in 1699 (Karlstadt, Varashdin and Banal), in 1702 Slavonsky joined them, in 1747 - Banatsky, in 1764 - Sekler and in 1766 - Wallachian. All these districts, or generalities, had their own armed units or regiments, until the early 1750s. which did not have any uniformity both in clothing and in weapons.
Since the accession to the throne of Maria Theresa, forced to defend her hereditary right with the help of force, the number of Hungarian regiments in the Austrian army - both infantry and hussars - has increased dramatically. The Hungarian nobility actively supported the new empress, which resulted in the creation of a number of new regiments.
The uniform of the Hungarian hussars continued to preserve the traditions of national dress. One of the private changes in the hussar uniform of this period was the replacement in 1748 of the felt hussar caps, called mirlitons, on fur hats. 
2. Grenadier drummer of the Vasquez Infantry Regiment (No. 48). 1740 /.
3. Fusilier of the Schulenberg Infantry Regiment (No. 21). 1740
4. Standard-bearer of the militia of the Slavonian district. 1740
5. Private of the Hungarian infantry regiment No. 34. 1742
6. Hussar of the Gillany regiment. After 1740
7. Cuirassier officer. 1740
Austria. Seven Years' War (1)
Of the fifty-six infantry regiments of the Austrian army, thirty-six were German. The reform of 1749 established a new cut for the white Austrian uniforms, bringing it closer to the Prussian model. The regiments, which were named after the names of the owners, differed in the instrumental color of the cuffs, lapels, sometimes lapels, and the color of the buttons. The colors of pompoms and tassels on hats were special for each regiment. The armament of the infantryman consisted of a gun and a bayonet (the grenadiers also had infantry sabers). In 1754, fur knapsacks were introduced in the Austrian infantry regiments instead of the previous cloth bags, and black winter leggings were officially prescribed for wearing. The grenadier companies of the Austrian regiments (two per regiment) for the duration of the campaign were reduced to separate corps, reaching up to forty companies in number.
Non-commissioned officers of the Austrian army, like the Prussians, wore canes, fastened to one of the buttons of the lapel on their uniform. The non-commissioned officers of the musketeer companies were armed with a halberd, and the grenadier companies, like their officers, were armed with a gun with a bayonet. The officer ranks in the infantry differed in the splendor of the brushes on the protazans and the richness of the decoration of the officer's cane.
The regiments of the border provinces (borderiers) were formed among the population of the eastern territories of the Austrian Empire, mainly from Serbs and Croats. The soldiers of these regiments wore uniforms of the “Hungarian” type. By the end of the Seven Years' War, were headdresses bordering? changed their shape and began to resemble the shako expanding upwards, adopted in many European armies at the beginning of the 19th century.
All eighteen cuirassier regiments of the Austrian army wore almost identical white uniforms with red instrumentation (except the Modena regiment, which had a blue instrumentation). The differences between the regiments were reduced to the color of the buttons and their location on the sides of the uniforms and camisoles, which, however, was completely hidden by the chest plate of the cuirass. Carabinieri, whose companies since 1715 were in every cavalry regiment (by analogy with the grenadiers in the infantry), differed only in their weapons, which consisted of a blunderbuss (instead of a carbine) and a long saber (instead of a broadsword). Fourteen dragoon regiments, according to the regulations of 1749, were supposed to have white uniforms with blue trim, but the colonels decided this matter in their own way, and as a result, the variety of colors of Maria Theresa dragoons was almost the same as among the hussar regiments. The regiment of Landgrave Ludwig of Hesse-Darmstadt is the only dragoon regiment that did not have lapels on its uniforms. The uniforms and camisoles of other regiments fully corresponded to the cut of the infantry. The grenadiers of the dragoon regiments had the same distinctions as the infantry. Horse ammunition in the Austrian army was the same for all, both dragoon and cuirassier regiments. 
In 1749, the Hungarian infantry, which consisted of eleven infantry regiments, received white uniforms. "German" type. The Fusiliers of these regiments wore "German" hats, but officers apparently often used traditional Hungarian mirlitons. The uniforms of the Hungarian regiments were distinguished by colored boutonnieres located on the chest instead of lapels. Another indispensable attribute of the uniform of the Hungarian infantry was tight-fitting colored pants, decorated on the hips. "hungarian knots", and black ties (in the German regiments they were red). High cloth knee pads “shalivari” were also a characteristic detail of the uniform of the Hungarian soldiers. In the infantry regiment of Archduke Ferdinand (No. 2), the soldiers continued to wear hussar-type tashkas. All infantrymen of the Hungarian regiments, in addition to a gun with a bayonet, were armed with infantry sabers.
In the hussar regiments of the Austrian army (fourteen during the Seven Years' War), their traditional uniform has been preserved, the style of which has already become common to the hussars of all European armies. The trumpeters of these regiments wore "German" uniforms (regimental or instrument colors) and hats. Horse and foot pandurs, who did not have any specific uniform, made up the militia recruited in the Balkan provinces of the empire, and performed the functions of light corps: reconnaissance, raids, guarding convoys, escorting prisoners, etc.
The Austrian artillery, which became a regular arm only after 1756, consisted of three "German" and one "Walloon"(Belgian) brigades (eight companies each). Brown became the color of the uniform of the Austrian artillerymen. The Belgian artillery uniforms, unlike the German ones, had red lapels and lapels, while the German uniforms did not have lapels.
The first rangers were organized in the Austrian army in 1756. Before that, the functions of light infantry were performed by border regiments. In 1760, the number of rangers was ten companies. Initially they were used to cover the work of the pioneers (the pioneers wore very similar uniforms), but as the war progressed the chasseurs increasingly operated on their own. In 1763 they were transferred to the infantry guard regiment of the headquarters.
1. Officer of the Hungarian infantry regiment Josef Esterhazy (No. 37). 1756 2. Grenadier of the Hungarian infantry kidney Halleri (No. 31). 1756
3. "Hunter" courier corps. 1760
4. Private of the field artillery, 1760
5. Hussar Popka Nadashdi (No. 8). Around 1750
6. Trumpeter of the hussar regiment of Kalnoki (No. 2). 1762
7. Mounted pandur. 1760
Drawings: O. Parkhaev
From the book "300 years of a European soldier (1618-1918)" Encyclopedia of military costume. - M.: Izographus, EKSMO-Press, 2001.
English-speaking historians and popular writers, for the most part, do not understand the historical features of the Brandenburg-Prussian armed forces at all. They have given rise to many myths, of which the most ridiculous and baseless myths relate to the Prussian light infantry of the Napoleonic Wars. The task of this work is to finally clarify all these fables about the “hard” and “outdated” tactics of the Prussian army before 1807, as well as about the “new” tactics in 1812-1815.
The generally accepted view is that the experience of the battles of the French Revolution and the campaign of 1806 made the Prussian army rather cautious about light infantry. In fact, light infantry appeared in Prussia under Frederick the Great (1740-1786) and continued to develop throughout the following years. During the Seven Years' War, Friedrich was greatly impressed by the Austrian light infantry - the infantry of the border districts / Grenzregimenter. The Prussian king wanted to form similar units. The experience of the War of the Bavarian Succession (1778-1779) confirmed this need. Three so-called. "volunteer regiment", and the size of the corps "foot rangers", armed with rifled weapons, was brought to ten companies.
V 1787 year "volunteer regiments" reorganized into fusilier battalions, which will be discussed.
Initially, the attitude towards light infantry was wary. The reason for this is not difficult to understand. The "volunteer battalions" of the Seven Years' War were poorly disciplined gangs of robbers and had a high level of desertion. Aristocrats did not want to serve in these parts, so they had to put officers of ignoble origin there. However, already the fusilier battalions formed on their basis were considered elite units, they were well trained and disciplined. They were led by carefully selected young and educated officers.
Jaegers armed with rifled weapons have always been considered shock units. Their professionalism was generously rewarded with various privileges that were not known in the infantry regiments. Initially, they acted as columnists. The number of rangers grew from a small detachment to a full-blooded regiment (1806). They were recruited from among the hunters and foresters. They knew how to shoot accurately and were armed with more accurate weapons. They were born light infantry, designed for covert operations in the forests. Often the huntsmen purchased weapons at their own expense, their uniform was green, traditional for hunters. The contrast between the chasseurs and the "volunteer battalions" was very sharp, however, by the time of the Napoleonic Wars, they merged, giving rise to the Prussian light infantry.
Initially, the light infantry was a completely special branch of the army, having nothing in common with the line infantry. However, by the end of the 18th century, it was becoming more and more of a “universal” infantry, that is, infantry capable of operating both in scattered and close formation. An important step in this direction was the emergence March 3, 1787 years of ten shooters (Schuetzen), armed with rifled guns, as part of each company of infantry regiments. These were selected soldiers, candidates for non-commissioned officers. WITH 1788 year they received the right to wear non-commissioned officer insignia and stand in the ranks next to non-commissioned officers. WITH December 5, 1793 a year each infantry battalion received a bugler, whose duty it was to transmit orders to the shooters.
As already mentioned above in 1787 Fusilier battalions were formed in the year, formed from three light regiments, five grenadier battalions, the 3rd battalion Leipzig Regiment (No. 3) and elected companies of garrison regiments. Fusilier battalions received their own drill charter, published February 24, 1788 of the year.
The development of rifle squads in infantry regiments and fusilier battalions continued. Soon the fusilier battalions formed their own rifle squads. The number of these departments in 1789 year brought to 22 people. Some officers understood that there were not enough riflemen in the line regiments. Therefore, in 1805 in the Potsdam garrison, ten so-called "reserve rifle" branches.
The attitude towards light infantry in Europe continued to be ambivalent. Some believed that in the future it was skirmishers who would decide the outcome of the battle. Others favored the conservative tactics of the line infantry. As time has shown, both sides were somewhat right. Indeed, light infantry had rifled weapons - the weapons of the future. However, before the advent of breech-loading rifles, the process of loading rifled guns was extremely lengthy. Therefore, soldiers armed with rifled weapons could not operate without fire support from line infantry. And until the middle of the 19th century, skirmishers did not represent an independent fighting force. In addition, skirmishers' tactics required a high level of discipline from them. While 18th-century armies were manned by forced recruits and mercenaries, soldiers tended to desert at the first opportunity, and skirmisher tactics, with their patrols and scattered formations, provided such opportunities in abundance. However, during the period of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, mass armies arose, many of whose soldiers served not out of fear, but out of conscience, driven by a sense of patriotism. In addition, with the introduction of universal conscription and the emergence of numerous armies with a high level of desertion, it was quite possible to put up with. Thus, favorable conditions were created for the development of light infantry.
The army of Brandenburg and Prussia took an intermediate path, gradually increasing the number of light infantry. The personnel for the rifle units were carefully selected, trained and received various privileges. The Fusiliers were so well trained that they soon began to look like real elite units in the eyes of others. A well-trained and well-prospected soldier will not desert. Campaigns 1793 and 1794 years against the French in the Palatinate - a wooded and hilly part of Germany - the light infantry showed its best side. The Palatinate was ideal terrain for light infantry operations. The campaign of 1806, which took place in open country, developed according to a different scenario, and light infantry played a much smaller role in it.
During the Italian campaign of Bonaparte, another trump card of light infantry was fully revealed - the strong influence of a large number of allocated skirmishers on the morale of the enemy. The most effective tactic against enemy skirmisher lines was to use your own infantry in loose formation. Usually, a third of an infantry battalion (the last of three ranks) was allocated for these purposes. Formed into separate platoons, these soldiers could act as a reserve for the battalion, cover its flanks, and also form a chain of skirmishers or support it.
This practice was introduced in 1791 Duke of Brunswick. V 1797 Prince Hohenlohe wrote a series of rules for the Inspectorate of Lower Silesia, published on March 30, 1803 under the general title “On the use of the third rank as skirmishers” ( Vom Gebrauch des 3ten Gliedes zum Tiraillieren). (…) Thus, even before the advent of "chains of skirmishers" During the Revolutionary Wars, there was a similar practice. Therefore, it is not clear why many historians allow themselves to call this tactic of the Prussian army "Friedrich's", "inflexible" and "obsolete".
However, the Prussian light infantry did not have sufficient military experience by the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars. (…)
Organization
Arrows / Schuetzen
Order from March 3, 1787 years, the presence of ten shooters in each company was determined. Thus, there were 120 riflemen in the infantry regiment. WITH May 5, 1793 a year later, a bugler appeared in each regiment, whose task it was to transmit orders to the shooters. In December of that year, buglers appeared in every battalion. V 1798 The number of rifle squads of fusilier companies was increased from 10 to 22 people. On November 23, 1806, the number of riflemen in a line infantry company was increased to 20. Subsequently, rifle squads were abandoned, switching to the practice of the “third rank”.
In March 1809, a separate Silesian rifle battalion was formed, and on June 20, 1814, the Guards rifle battalion appeared, staffed by volunteers from the Neufchatel region, which had just been annexed to the possessions of the Prussian crown.
Fusiliers / Fusilier
Fusilier battalions appeared in 1787 year. Each battalion consisted of four companies and consisted of 19 officers. 48 sergeants, 13 musicians (each company had a drummer and bugler, plus a battalion bugler), 80 corporals, 440 privates and 40 reservists. The auxiliary service of the battalion consisted of a controller, a battalion quartermaster, four surgeons (including a battalion surgeon) and a gunsmith. The battalion had 40 riflemen. At some point, each Fusilier Battalion had a crewed 3-pounder. The number of wartime battalions was 680 privates and 56 non-combatants, including 46 convoy soldiers and four artillery crew assistants. The total strength of the fusilier battalion was 736 people.
V 1787 year, 20 battalions were formed, consolidated into brigades. As of April 8, 1791, the structure was as follows:
1st Magdeburg brigade: 1st, 2nd and 5th battalions
2nd Magdeburg brigade: 18th, 19th and 20th battalions
East Prussian Brigade: 3rd, 6th, 11th and 12th battalions
West Prussian Brigade: 4th, 16th and 17th battalions
Upper Silesian Brigade: 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th battalions
Lower Silesian Brigade: 13th, 14th and 15th battalions
V 1795 another battalion was formed. V 1797 the year the number of battalions reached 27. The battalions were consolidated into 9 brigades, each of which was headed by a colonel and roughly corresponded in status to a regiment.
WITH 1797 of the year, each fusilier battalion had eight sappers. However, in 1806 only 24 battalions remained, organized as follows:
Magdeburg brigade: No. 1 Kaiser-lingk, No. 2 Biela, No. 5 Graf Wedel
Westphalian Brigade: No. 18 Zobbe, No. 19 Ernest, No. 20 Yvernua
1st East Prussian Brigade: No. 3 Wakenitz, No. 6 Rembov, No. 11 Bergen
2nd East Prussian Brigade: No. 21 Stutterheim, No. 23 Schachtmeyer, No. 24 Bülow
1st Warsaw Brigade: No. 9 Borel du Vernet, No. 12 Knorr, No. 17 Hinrichs
2nd Warsaw Brigade: No. 4 Greif-fenberg, No. 8 Kloch, No. 16 Oswald
Upper Silesian Brigade: No. 7 Rosen, No. 10 Erichsen, No. 22 Boguslavsky
Lower Silesian Brigade: No. 13 Rabeno, No. 14 Pelet, No. 15 Ryule
Together with the numbers, the names of the battalion commanders are given. In practice, the battalions were called by the name of their commander, while the number was used only on formal occasions (...)
Jaegers
Drill and combat training
In some works, one can see that their authors have a rather vague idea of how the skirmishers acted. But they like to use terms like “skirmisher squadron”, “scattered formation” and “disband formation”. It was they who created the myth that “free” French soldiers used light infantry tactics, while “downtrodden” soldiers of “despotic” regimes acted only in close formation to prevent desertion. Of course, as in any other myth, there is some truth in this myth. However, this piece of truth is buried under a heap of flowery, amazing lies. In fact, any European army of that time had more or less numerous light infantry units operating in scattered formations. And the main factor holding back the development of light infantry was not sociology or politics, but underdeveloped technology.
Smooth-bore flintlock guns loaded from the barrel were too bulky, difficult to load and had low accuracy. Therefore, any significant results could be achieved only with a massive volley. In addition, there were many other reasons, which will be discussed below, due to which the skirmishers had to operate in close proximity to the main forces. To establish interaction between the dense formation of line infantry and the scattered formation of light infantry, a high level of experience of commanders and training of personnel was necessary.
Frederick the Great developed the first recommendations for the training of the Prussian light infantry, published on December 5, 1783. According to these recommendations, the task of light infantry included combat in settlements and forests, action in the vanguard, rear guard and on the flanks, attacking enemy positions located on a hill, storming artillery batteries and redoubts, as well as guarding convoys and winter quarters. This activity was called "outpost war". As mentioned above, the volunteer regiments were the forerunners of the fusilier battalions, transferring their methods and training methods to them.
The regulations for the fusilier battalions were published February 24, 1788 of the year. It remained in force until the campaign of 1806/07 and formed the basis for the infantry regulations of 1812. This light infantry charter ordered light infantry to operate in two ranks, instead of the three usual for line infantry. The fusilier battalions fired volleys from two ranks, so that the first rank did not need to kneel. Two-rank tactics became widespread in the line infantry after the introduction of the charter of 1812. Each fusilier company consisted of four divisions - eight platoons. The 1st and 8th platoons acted as skirmishers, which accounted for a quarter of the total strength of the battalion. If necessary, they could be supported by the 5th and 7th platoons. Hornists could transmit the following signals: advance, stop, rally ranks, open fire, cease fire, move to the left, move to the right, deploy orders, retreat, call for help. Of course, more than any charter meant experienced officers who knew how to conduct a “war of outposts”. And there were such officers in the Prussian army. The officer corps was made up of commanders of volunteer battalions, officers who had experience in the American Revolutionary War. Among them were very talented commanders: York, Bulow and Muffling. These were professionals with high morale who showed their capabilities during the wars of the French Revolution.
Rifle squads of line companies received their charter February 26, 1789 of the year. The shooters, armed with rifled weapons and having very special combat missions, required separate training. For two weeks a year, marksmen practiced marksmanship. Specially assigned officers supervised the firing. One of the 12 company non-commissioned officers was also a shooter and armed with a rifled musket. It was assumed that the shooters would act like foot rangers.
The main emphasis was on accurate shooting and the effective use of terrain features, primarily forests, undergrowth, ditches, rocks, crops, etc. In addition, the shooters could act as part of pickets and patrols, as well as protect the main forces of the regiment on the march. During the attack of enemy positions, the arrows moved forward 100 steps. Their task was to disrupt the enemy's formations before the attack of the main forces of the battalion. When retreating, the arrows acted in a similar way.
Light infantry performed well during the wars of the Revolutionary Wars. The experience gained during these wars has shown that the tactics are on the whole correct and only minor additions are needed. These additions were introduced by the charter of March 14, 1798 of the year. Instead of pushing flanking platoons forward, the fusilier battalions were ordered to move the rifle squads of each platoon, which made it possible to quickly form a line of skirmishers. Fusiliers armed with smoothbore weapons also began to look for a target. The number of shooters in the fusilier company was increased to 22. By order of June 18, 1801, the number of standard mountain signals reached 20, which brought order to the huge number of improvised signals used in practice. Although the light infantry was well trained and represented the elite of the Prussian army, during the campaign of 1806 it turned out that their numbers were clearly insufficient. Very often, the enemy won only because of their overwhelming numbers. Many German military experts foresaw this situation even before the start of the 1806 campaign and tried to take any measures. In practice, the advancement of the third rank of infantry battalions was used to reinforce the light infantry. The Duke of Brunswick developed this maneuver for his 10th Regiment as early as 1791. Prince Hohenlohe was also taken with this idea, describing it in instructions for the Lower Silesian Inspectorate in 1797. The garrisons of Potsdam and Berlin were also trained to advance the third rank. Hohenlohe's instructions were published on March 30, 1803. Later statutes contained extensive quotations from this text. The Elector of Hesse, Field Marshal of Prussia and Inspector General of the Westphalian regiments, issued a similar order for his units on April 11, 1806. A similar order was issued on October 5, 1805 by the King of Prussia.
The deployment of a unit in a rifle chain did not mean at all that all the soldiers of the battalion acted as skirmishers. In reality, only a certain part of the soldiers advanced forward, while the main forces of the battalion maintained a close formation. The main reason why it was not possible to deploy the entire battalion in a chain was the insufficiently developed rifle technology. The infantryman's weapons at that time were too ineffective to ensure the safety of an individual soldier. It took too long to load. Even if the skirmishers acted in pairs - one shoots, the other charges - all the same, the practical rate of fire left much to be desired. The amount of ammunition carried by one soldier was limited, so it often happened that the infantryman used up all the cartridges before he had time to inflict any damage on the enemy. All this had a negative effect on morale. Having quickly shot the ammunition, the soldier became completely defenseless on the battlefield, and the gun failed from overheating of the barrel. Finally, muzzle-loading guns are most conveniently charged while standing, so the infantryman had to stand up to his full height, representing a convenient target for the enemy.
The chain of skirmishers was especially vulnerable to enemy cavalry. If the cavalry managed to catch the shooters by surprise, then the entire chain could be destroyed. Platoons and squads of skirmishers changed each other. At the same time, not only fresh soldiers entered the battle, but the chain gained greater stability. Thus, the rifle chain was an integral part of the infantry formations. Only in rare and exceptional cases, the shooters could decide the outcome of the battle on their own. As a rule, the arrows only started the fight, preparing the way for the line infantry.
Platoons of the third rank usually acted in formation in two ranks. If the entire rank was involved in solving a combat mission at once, then it was headed by a captain specially trained for this purpose. Each platoon was led by a junior lieutenant and three non-commissioned officers. The lieutenant had a bugler at his disposal, who transmitted various commands to the soldiers. (…)
Armament
Among the models of muskets used by light infantry are the following:
- Fusilier musket model 1787;
- Fusilier musket model 1796;
- “Old” Prussian rifled guns of various types, including the 1796 model;
- “New” corps rifle model 1810;
- Rifle rifle model 1787;
- Various hunting rifles and carbines, rifled and smoothbore.
Third rank skirmishers were usually armed with the following types of standard infantry muskets:
- Model 1782;
- Model 1801 (Notard):
- Model 1809 (“new” Prussian musket).
Fusiliers
Initially, the fusilier battalions were armed with fusilier muskets, but from 1808, the battalions began to use any weapon that they could get - an acute shortage of small arms affected. The French Charleville muskets were popular, as were the "new" Prussian muskets.
huntsmen
Since the rangers were recruited from among the forest rangers and hunters, they took their own hunting rifles with them to the service, so it is very difficult to give any complete list of rangers' weapons. Several attempts were made to restore order: in 1744, 1796 and 1810. However, for a variety of reasons, all attempts failed. (…)
The most important difference between a rifle and a musket is that the bore of the rifle barrel has several grooves that give the projectile bullet rotation along the longitudinal axis. This increases the range and accuracy of fire. Unlike smoothbore muskets, rifled rifles had front and rear sights. (...) The disadvantage of rifled guns was their low rate of fire (it could even take several minutes to load the gun), as well as the speed of contamination of the bore. To increase accuracy, the lead pool was wrapped in felt wad, so that the bullet cut into the grooves more tightly. To drive a bullet into the barrel, they hit the ramrod with a mallet. After a few shots, smaller caliber bullets were used because the barrel became dirty. Very quickly, the gun began to require a thorough cleaning. Therefore, the shooters carefully chose the target, trying to shoot only for sure. A few well-placed shooters could act as snipers, but the depressing rate of fire of rifled guns did not give them a chance to be widely used.
Arrows
Rifle squads in line and light infantry companies were armed with rifled guns of the 1787 model. The guns had a front sight and a rear sight, and the rear sight was calibrated at a distance of 150 and 300 steps. About 10,000 of these guns were made. A bayonet could be attached to the barrel of a gun. Silesian rifle battalions did not have a single weapon, many Silesian riflemen had only infantry smooth-bore muskets.
non-commissioned officers
Theoretically, non-commissioned officers were armed with rifled carbines. Non-commissioned officers did not fire in a volley along with privates. However, in practice they usually had the same guns as the privates. Sometimes non-commissioned officers used cavalry firearms. (…)
A uniform
Fusiliers
1789-1796
The Fusiliers wore dark green coats of the same cut as the foot soldiers, white waistcoats, knee breeches, black gaiters, eagle caps, black neckerchiefs and white belts. The color of the collar, lapels, cuffs and buttons determined the battalion affiliation.
» Table / » Table
| Battalion No. | applied color | Buttons |
| 1 | light green / hellgrün | yellow / gelb |
| 2 | pink | yellow / gelb |
| 3 | white / white | yellow / gelb |
| 4 | blue / hellblau | yellow / gelb |
| 5 | dark green / dunkelgrün | yellow / gelb |
| 6 | orange / orange | yellow / gelb |
| 7 | pink | white / white |
| 8 | light green / hellgrün | white / white |
| 9 | straw / stroh | white / white |
| 10 | straw / stroh | yellow / gelb |
| 11 | white / white | white / white |
| 12 | orange / orange | white / white |
| 13 | suede / sämisch | white / white |
| 14 | black / black | yellow / gelb |
| 15 | suede / sämisch | yellow / gelb |
| 16 | black / black | white / white |
| 17 | blue / hellblau | white / white |
| 18 | carmine / karmin | yellow / gelb |
| 19 | carmine / karmin | white / white |
| 20 | dark green / dunkelgrün | white / white |
Officers have dark green, black and carmine finishes
Was from velvet. Officers' cocked hats were decorated with a white and black plume, a cockade and a buckle with a small eagle.
Footwear - boots. The soldiers were armed with fusilier muskets and a short broadsword. Since 1793, the lanyard of the broadsword determined belonging to the company: white, dark green, orange and purple. The officers were armed with a sword.
1797-1807
Instead of helmets, wearing cocked hats with white edging was introduced. The battalions were distinguished by the color of the pompom:
White: 2, 6, 8, 10, 14, 17, 19.21
Red: 1,4,7,9, P. 15, 18,23
Yellow: 3.5, 12, 13, 16,20,22,24
WITH August 24, 1801 year, the wearing of a cylindrical black felt shako was introduced. The shako was decorated with an eagle of the same color as the buttons, a plume of the same color as the pompom on the cocked hat and white edging along the top edge,
V 1797
A shortened camisole with a red lining appeared. Colored collar, lapels and cuffs. brigade "Kurmark"(since 1803 "Magdeburg") and Magdeburg(since 1803
of the year "Westphalia") had a crimson finish. brigade “Upper Silesia” and “Lower Silesia”- black trim, 1st and 2nd East Prussian brigades - light green. 1st Warsaw Brigade and Orshad "South Prussia"(battalions No. 7 and 8) - blue. 2nd Warsaw Brigade (battalions No. 4 and 16) - dark green. In 1800, the South Prussia brigade was disbanded, and its colors were transferred to the 2nd Warsaw brigade (battalions No. 6, 8 and 16).
V 1806 year, the differences between the battalions were carried out according to the following scheme:
| brigade | battalion number | applied color | Buttons |
| "Magdeburg" | 1,2,5 | carmine | yellow |
| "Westphalia" | 18,19,20 | carmine | white |
| 1st "East Prussia" | 3,6, 11 | light green | yellow |
| 2nd "East Prussia" | 21,23,24 | light green | white |
| 1st "Warsaw" | 4, 8, 16 | blue | yellow |
| 2nd "Warsaw" | 9, 12, 17 | blue | white |
| “Lower Silesia” | 13, 14, 15 | black | yellow |
| “Upper Silesia” | 7, 10,22 | black | white |
In 1800, the soldiers of the Silesian battalions received red neckerchiefs, while the officers continued to wear black. The white "schemiset" waistcoat was replaced with a green vest, which, in turn, gave way to a white sleeveless jacket in 1801. Long white trousers were worn with black leggings. There were work pants made of twill. The belts are black, the saber was hung from the waist belt, and not worn in a sling over the shoulder. The officer's tunic, but in cut, corresponded to the tunic of an officer of the line infantry, but had tails with red lapels. A white waistcoat, trousers and black boots complemented the officer's uniform. The officer's cocked hat was decorated with a white plume. A silver-black sash was worn over the tunic. On a black baldric is a saber with a lanyard. Raincoat and overcoat of green color.
huntsmen
1789
In the regiment of foot chasseurs, they wore a simple cap with a green plume for privates and black with a white tip for non-commissioned officers. Camisole with green lapels and cuffs, green vest, leather trousers and boots. V officers' plume is white with a black base, cockade and buckle. Otherwise, the uniform has not changed since the time of Frederick the Great.
1797-1807
A cocked hat appeared with white and green cords, a black cockade and a gold buckle. The plume remained the same. In 1800, the wearing of white cloth breeches to the knees and boots with high tops was introduced. In 1802 the waistcoat was changed from green to white. During the mobilization of 1805, the huntsmen received long green button-down work trousers. In 1806, a gray version of these trousers appeared. The green jacket retained the red collar with cuffs and the yellow wool epaulettes. The openings are green. Black velvet neckerchief with white tie. In 1806, it was planned to introduce a shako, but this plan could not be implemented before the start of the war.
Publication: MILITARY HISTORICAL ALMANAC New SOLDIER No. 213
Editor: Kiselev V.I.
The text is abbreviated (...)!
Prussian war psychosis
By the autumn of 1806, the international situation in Europe had deteriorated sharply. It is possible that the state of "semi-war" would have continued longer if it were not for the war psychosis in the Prussian kingdom.
During the War of the Third Coalition in 1805, Prussia remained neutral, although Berlin leaned towards Vienna and St. Petersburg, and had already decided to speak out, but Austerlitz forced the Prussians to change their minds. However, in 1806, Berlin decided that France had gone too far in spreading its influence in Germany. The "war party" led by Queen Louise, who had a special relationship with the Russian Tsar Alexander, came to the fore in Prussia.
In Berlin, in high society, long-forgotten concepts were spoken of: “honor”, “duty”, “sword”, “glory of Frederick the Great”. They began to recall the chivalrous prowess of the Prussian nobility. Queen Louise on horseback rode around the regiments lined up in the parade; the officers drew their swords and uttered war cries. In the court of the Hohenzollerns and in the salons of the Prussian gentlemen, they began to assert that the Prussian army was the strongest in Europe and the world, that the Prussian officers were the bravest, that the Prussian monarchs were the most powerful and valiant dynasty.
Thus, a real military psychosis reigned in Prussia. Berlin, confident that the Prussian army was the true keeper of the testaments of the victorious Frederick the Great, hurried to start the war first so as not to share the laurels of Bonaparte's victors with anyone.
Declaration of war
On October 1, 1806, Berlin presented an ultimatum to Napoleon demanding that French troops be withdrawn from German lands beyond the Rhine within ten days. The deadline for a response was October 8th. There was no doubt in Berlin that they would win. The higher nobility, generals and officers boasted with all their might that they would teach the Corsican upstart a lesson. In anticipation of a response to the ultimatum, the Prussians paraded with triumphant shouts and mockery of the French emperor. Prussian officers came to the hotel where the French envoy was located and "bravely" sharpened their sabers on the steps of the main staircase. Some of the generals declared that the war would end in a matter of days, with one blow (here they were not mistaken) and regretted that the Prussian army took guns and sabers with them to the war. They say that only clubs would be enough to drive the French away. They were afraid of only one thing, that Frederick William III would not make peace before the military defeat of France. To inspire soldiers to heroic deeds, they were taken to the theater to see Wallenstein and Schiller's Maid of Orleans.
The Prussian headquarters considered two options for action. The first was to stick to a defensive strategy at the beginning of the war and, when the French army approached, slowly retreat behind the Elbe, and then behind the Oder, link up with Russian troops and Prussian reserves, and, ultimately, with the combined forces, go on the counteroffensive and give a pitched battle to the enemy . That is, in general, this plan resembled the preliminary plan of the 1805 campaign, when the Austrians were to wait for the Russian army and attack Napoleon together. But the Austrians did not wait for the Russians and went on the offensive on their own, which ultimately led to the military-political catastrophe of Austria and the defeat of the third anti-French coalition.
The Prussian generals turned out to be no smarter than the Austrian ones. The Prussian military considered the retreat shameful for themselves, and therefore this plan was decisively rejected. As a result, we settled on the second option. The Prussians planned to invade Bavaria, allied to France, fall upon the French at their bases, defeat the enemy corps one by one and thereby force Napoleon to retreat behind the Rhine. By this time, Russian troops were to join the victorious Prussian army and the Allies could continue the offensive.
For the upcoming war, the Prussian kingdom could put up about 180 thousand people. Just a few days before the start of the war, a divisional and corps organization was introduced in the Prussian army. The Prussian army was reduced to 4 corps (14 divisions).
The so-called main corps, which included up to 60 thousand soldiers, according to the disposition worked out on October 7, was located between Merseburg and Dornburg. It was led by the commander-in-chief of the Prussian army, Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Duke of Brunswick. This elderly commander (born in 1735) gained combat experience during the Seven Years' War and was a great supporter of the Friedrich school. In 1792, the duke led the combined Austro-Prussian army against revolutionary France, but was defeated at Valmy.
Prussian commander-in-chief Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand of Brunswick
The 2nd Corps consisted of 43 thousand Prussian and 20 thousand Saxon soldiers. It was located in the Chemnitz region, and was headed by Prince Friedrich Ludovik Hohenlohe, who lost his principality during the creation of the Confederation of the Rhine. The main and 2nd corps were tasked with attacking the French during their march into Saxony.
The 3rd Corps, under the command of General Rüchel, consisting of 27 thousand people, was located in the area of Eisenach, Gotha and Erfurt. He was supposed to cover the direction to the Electorate of Hesse, while remaining in place. The 4th Corps under the command of Prince Eugene of Württemberg - about 25 thousand people - was scattered in East Prussia, Poland and Silesia.
Meanwhile, the French emperor Napoleon, concentrating his troops on the Main River, planned to cross the Franconian and Thuringian forests, bypass the left flank of the Prussian-Saxon location and force the Germans to accept the battle with an inverted front. For the upcoming maneuver, the emperor divided his troops into three columns, which were supposed to move in the form of a giant square battalion. The right column was made up of the corps of Soult, Ney and the Bavarian division of Wrede; the center - the corps of Bernadotte, Davout, the imperial guard, Murat's cavalry; the left column - Lannes and Augereau's corps. Almost the entire core of the French army was concentrated here. The emperor fielded about 200 thousand people against Prussia. Thus, Napoleon traditionally led the matter to one or two decisive battles, which were to decide the outcome of the war. He was not going to wait for an enemy attack and the connection of the Prussian and Russian troops. Thus began this amazing war.
Napoleon did not wait for the boastful Prussian army to go on the offensive, he did not even wait for the ultimatum to expire. On October 6, 1806, in a message to the Senate and an order for the army, he announced that France was entering the war with Prussia. Wasting no time, the emperor moved towards the enemy. On October 8, an order was given to invade Saxony, allied with Prussia, and the "Great Army", concentrated in Bavaria, began to cross the border in three columns.
Napoleon at the Battle of Jena. Painting by Horace Vernet
Prussian army
To understand the causes of the catastrophe that will befall the Prussian army and kingdom, it is necessary to familiarize yourself with the state of the Prussian army of the early 19th century. If Napoleon's army was the brainchild of a new socio-economic order generated by the bourgeois revolution, then the armies of his opponents reflected the feudal-absolutist system with underdeveloped industry and serfdom in the countryside. A typical Prussian soldier is a serf, given entirely to the power of noble officers. It is clear that such a soldier went to war by force of coercion and did not want to fight. War hysteria and propaganda captured only the top of Prussian society and did not affect the interests of the broad masses of the people. While the French soldier went into battle, believing that he was defending the gains of the revolution, that is, he had moral and volitional superiority over the enemy (except for Russians), the recruited soldier of the Prussian monarchy went into battle by force of compulsion.
Only towards the end of the Napoleonic wars did the situation change: France was bled dry and disappointed by the endless wars of Napoleon's empire, the revolutionary spirit faded. The exhausted soldier masses of the French army lost their collective will to fight, while the opponents of France, humiliated by the French invasion, matured into a national liberation upsurge.
The armies of Napoleon's opponents were organized on the Prussian model, built on the experience of the Seven Years' War with its linear tactics and brutal cane discipline. The soldier and officer of the Prussian army is an army reflection of the caste-class division of society. The relationship between them was based on the subordination of the serf to his master. The Prussian soldier was in the service until he died or became disabled. Only after that he was subject to mobilization, and instead of a pension he was given a special certificate for the right to beg. There was nothing like the unity of a soldier and an officer that appeared in the French army, where any capable young man could become a senior officer and general, was not here. The Prussian generals, representatives of the landowning aristocracy, were unable to understand that the socio-economic and political shifts that had taken place in France forever threw the Friedrichian system into the depths. She is outdated.
However, the Prussian government, led by King Frederick William III, did not understand this. Reaping the laurels of the “glorious past” of the era of Frederick the Great and preserving the old order, Berlin did not allow any reforms. For example, the command staff in the Prussian army sat up in their positions almost to natural death. In 1806, of the 66 colonels of the Prussian infantry, almost half were over sixty years of age, and of the 281 majors, none were younger than fifty. It is clear that in this environment it was difficult to find commanders capable of resisting Napoleon and his galaxy of brilliant generals.
The military theory of Prussia was strongly influenced by the theorist Lloyd, who attached exceptional importance to the area, cultivating the "science of the choice of positions." The basis of Lloyd's theory is a careful study of geography in search of positions on the ground that would be inaccessible to the enemy and at the same time would provide communications for their army. Convenient and advantageous positions were given special importance, calling them "keys of positions" and even "keys of the country."
Based on the experience of the War of the Bavarian Succession of 1778-1779, which ended without a battle after a long trampling of opponents in potato fields, Lloyd's theory allowed for the possibility of waging war by one maneuver, without decisive battles. It was believed that the dependence of the enemy on the 5-way supply system made it possible to constantly threaten his messages to force him to retreat.
At the beginning of the 19th century, Bulow's theory became even more widespread in the armies of Europe, who "improved" Lloyd's idea. If Napoleon considered the manpower of the enemy as the object of the operation, then Bülow considered only enemy shops and carts. Victory with the help, according to Bülow, did not promise serious results, but reaching the enemy’s communications and depriving a large army of supplies should have led to the complete defeat of the enemy. Developing the theory of maneuver strategy, Bülow proposed to act in two groups, one of which attracts the enemy, tying him up, and the other at this time acts on his messages, intercepting them. This theory found its supporters in Russia as well.
Thus, the Bulow-Lloyd theory was quite in the spirit of absolutist monarchies. They say that a decisive battle with a strong enemy is dangerous in its consequences with the predominance of a mercenary and recruited army, which in its mass does not want to shed blood, and which is difficult to replenish if it is defeated and the soldiers desert en masse.
As a result, until the defeat of 1806, the Prussian army retained the basics of Friedrich's tactics - maneuvering in the open field with the flawless execution of complex restructuring in linear combat formations. The column did not have a place in the battle order of the Prussian army, and the loose formation was considered risky (being out of the supervision of commanders, a forcibly recruited soldier could desert). The battalion, armed with smoothbore guns of the 1782 model, lined up in three deployed ranks for firing in volleys. Frederick's oblique battle formation - advancing by maneuvering on the battlefield a series of ledges against one of the enemy's flanks - was applied just once and for all the established pattern.
The usual order of battle adopted by almost all armies after Frederick I was two lines of deployed battalions with artillery on the flanks or in front of the front. Cavalry lined up behind both flanks, deploying squadrons in 2-3 ranks at a distance of 4-5 steps. Large cavalry formations lined up in three lines of squadrons. The cavalry, constituting an element of the general battle order, was chained to the infantry. The supply system is only stores.
Friedrich's oblique order of battle
Only the hard lesson of Jena and Auerstedt made Prussia rebuild its army. These fundamental changes are associated with the name of Scharnhorst. At that time, he was almost the only officer in the Prussian army who understood the obsolescence of the Friedrich system. Even before the war of 1806, Scharnhorst submitted a memorandum to the king outlining the reorganization of the army, but the king and his "wise" advisers rejected almost all proposals.
Although some innovations were nevertheless introduced: the Prussians adopted a corps and divisional organization. The corps was given reserve cavalry and artillery. The infantry regiment consisted of three battalions of four companies. The cavalry regiment consisted of 4 squadrons, artillery - from foot batteries, which were armed mainly with 12-pound guns and 10-pound howitzers, and horse batteries, which had 6-pound guns and 7-pound howitzers. Infantry regiments had their own artillery - 6-pounder guns. However, the reforms were late. The army has just begun restructuring.
Only after the military defeat and disgrace, when Prussia was preserved as an independent power only thanks to the good will of Alexander Pavlovich, who persuaded Napoleon to spare the Prussian kingdom, was Scharnhorst listened to. Berlin took a course on reforming the army. The national upsurge, which embraced wide circles of the population, contributed to the creation of a mass army, the significance of which was finally realized.
Serfdom was partially abolished, and the system of corporal punishment in the army was abandoned. Under the Treaty of Tilsit, the armed forces of Prussia were reduced to 42 thousand people. However, Scharnhorst, who became Minister of War, on the eve of the inevitable war with Napoleon's empire, managed to bypass French control and create a military-trained reserve from part of the population. He acted by training young people, attracted at the request of the French emperor to build fortifications on the North Sea coast against England, as well as by early dismissal of part of the active duty soldiers and replacing them with new recruits.
Further reforms were carried out. After Napoleon's "Great Army" perished in Russia, Berlin introduced universal conscription and created the Landwehr (militia, put up by districts in Prussia) and Landsturm (militia, called in case of emergency), which were trained on Sundays and holidays. The Landwehr could operate alongside the regular army. All men capable of bearing arms, but not included in either the Landwehr or the regular army, were involved in the Landsturm. Landsturm was intended mainly for rear service, but was also used for guerrilla warfare in areas occupied by the enemy. Representatives of the bourgeoisie began to be allowed into the ranks of the officers. In addition, after 1806, the Prussian command, on the basis of the charter of 1811, drawn up with the participation of Clausewitz, taking into account the experience of the Napoleonic wars, began to partially use the French order of battle - a combination of rifle lines with a column. The battle order of the brigade occupied a distance of 400 steps along the front and in depth.
Thus, the lesson of 1806 benefited the Prussian army. The army was seriously improved and by the time of the decisive battles with Napoleon in 1813, it had 240 thousand people in its ranks, in addition, there were 120 thousand Landwehr and Landsturm.
To be continued…
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